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Abstract
My broadest aim in this thesis is to explore some of the central ethical concerns of 
social anthropologists vis-à-vis the phenomena of development. In particular, what I 
want to bring out and examine is the dynamics of the ‘moral experience’ and ‘moral 
force’ of anthropologists in this area. I go about this by considering the historical 
unfolding of the anthropological conceptual and evaluative apprehension of planned 
social and economic change. On this basis, I also consider tlie nature of die critiques 
and contributions that social anthropology has generated. I also make an attempt to 
review the major conceptual moral controversies and agendas that are intrinsic to 
development fiom an anthropological perspective. Whilst the concepts and values that 
emanate fiom social anthropology are multi-faceted and many stranded, I believe that 
the anthr opological standpoint is both distinctive and potentially cormter hegemonic. I 
look specifically at the moral resources that can be unearthed fiom the emerging field 
of ‘development ediics’ which is largely articrdated in terms of the maxims that are 
fundamental to Western moral and political traditions. I attempt to set out the terrain 
of the ethical deliberation of anthropologists involved in development in terms of 
some of the moral difficulties of Western society. I argue that Western moral 
reasoning, as a result of deep disagreements about the sources of value in human life 
and society, tends to rely upon procedural, iristr*umental and coercive ethical 
frameworks. On this basis, one of my assertions is that communitarian arguments, 
whilst also being needed as a healthy antidote to the excesses of liberal individualism, 
also constitute a reflection of the aspirations of people(s), many of whom are 
beleaguered by the alienation, atomism and instrumentalism of modern society. The 
communitarian perspective also rmderpins a political commitment to supporting those 
besieged indigenous cormnunities that struggle to defend their integrity in the face of 
the aggressive intrusions of the market mentality. This may involve supporting the 
maintenance of ‘traditional’ versions of moral reasoning, well being, and sociality 
(such as indigenous life-worlds), collective rights in the face of the fiagmentar y and 
individuating neo-liberal development policies, and to support the ‘construction of 
new associative networks such as ‘new social movements’ that represent the 
aspirations, and embody the values, of marginalised and disempowered social groups.
Chapter 1 
Introduction
‘ . and it also follows that we have not yet fully understood the claims o f any moral 
philosophy until we have spelled out what its social embodiment would be ’ (Alasdair 
MacIntyre 1997: 23).
Development^ Ways o f Self-Understanding and the Apprehension o f the ^OtheN
One of the central tasks of contemporary social anthropology is to try to elucidate the 
ways in which oui* modem concepts and values are efficacious in paiticulai' social 
worlds and how they shape our discourses of, and towards, the ‘other’. The 
‘background picture’, that is, the moral and ethical repertory that underlies our own 
historically and culturally specific, as well as our personal settings, conditions om- 
ways of seeing, apprehending, categorising, and ultimately, treating, those we 
encounter and have interaction with. Similarly, the increasingly intenogated 
assumptions which underlie the practice of social anthropology constitute more than 
just prepositional knowledge; they presuppose moral philosophies and are inevitably 
dialogically linked to material practices, becoming efficacious forces in the social 
world. As Charles Taylor (1985b: 125) writes, in our endeavour* to understand the 
languages of self understanding of the other, implicitly or explicitly, we are also 
challenging our* own.
If the complex array of moral resources that characterise the ‘modern moral outlook’ 
constitute the basis of our* initial apprehension and conceptualisation of the ‘other’, 
and are brought to bear on our interactions with, the ‘other’ the ethical implication 
would seem to be that it is imperative to consider the substantive somces from 
whence concepts and values reside and emanate. As Gow (1991: 17) argues, ‘we must 
find out how local people use their idioms, and such an enquiry should not be 
prejudiced, at this point by trying to fit into an alien discourse’. This task then, 
demands both self reflexivity and the detailed ethnographic endeavour of 
miderstanding the other on their terms, as Hastrup (1995: 17) affirms; the invention of 
culture in anthropological writing must reflect tlie ways in which cultures invent
themselves if anthi’opology wants to be faithful to its aims. Additionally, if, as R.D. 
Laing (1968: 15) writes, ‘my behavioiu* is an experience of the other’, what is of 
further interest is apprehending the contexts where accommodation and resistance 
between different cultural realities are played out. Hornborg (1994: 238) agrees that 
whilst it is salutary ‘for anthropology to side with ‘locals” , this should go hand in 
hand with a critical appreciation of ‘the modern project of which anthropology itself 
has been a part’ {loc. cit.). Apprehending the nature of this ‘anthropological 
condition’ - where one constitutes a locus of reflection between different life-worlds -  
is a necessary starting point for the consideration of what an ethical approach to the 
anthropological endeavour in development means.
In the contemporary setting, the principal way, at least in terms of political and 
economic arTangements, in which the ‘West’ interacts with indigenous peoples, ‘poor 
countries’, the ‘South’, HIPC^s, ‘LDCs^’ or the ‘Third World’ is through 
‘Development’. Esteva (1992: 8) argues that ‘development occupies the centre of an 
incredibly powerfirl semantic constellation’. The ubiquitous presence of this 
phenomena at a local level is expressed by Croll and Parkin who observe that 
‘development is as much a fact of everyday life for most peoples of the world as the 
other kinds of overarching frameworks of assumption and action’ (1992: 8). 
Development constitutes an arena where, around the frameworks of modernisation, 
relative values, knowledges and moralities are contested and modified.
The ways in which tlie moral and political presuppositions that characterise the ‘West’ 
become embodied in the array of discourses, practices and impacts that fall under the 
rubric of ‘Development’ is simultaneously an area of anthropological interest and 
constitutive of deep moral dilemmas that pertain to the discipline itself. It is worth 
keeping in mind anthropology’s philosophical and theoretical inheritance here which 
implicates our forebear’s in an obtuse and tautological depiction of the other, as 
Overing writes;
‘It has been anthropology, the science of alterity par excellence^ that has
provided the objectified, simplified imagery and the ‘technical’ language
 ^Highly Indebted Poor Counti ies, a term used by the IMF and World Bank 
 ^Least Developed Countries, a tenu used by the World Banlc.
through which all those peoples who were conquered and colonised by the 
Western state could be digestibly incoiporated into, and depreciated by, a 
supremacist European mental framework’ (2000: 11).
Antliropologists, nevertheless, have become increasingly cognisant of the moral and 
intellectual imbroglio of being occupants of tlie role of ‘cultuial brokers between 
societies witli disparate political, economic, and cultural resources at their disposal’ 
(Pardon 1987: 3). An area where these dynamics are patently acute is the arena of 
applied anthropology; development constitutes a domain where, arguably, 
anthropology’s most abstruse and mgent moral and ethical dilemmas are played out. 
Escobar captures this quandary:
‘Few historical processes have fuelled the paradox of anthropology -  at once 
inextricably wedded to Western historical and epistemological dominance and 
a radical principle of critique of the same experience -  as much as the process 
of development’ (1991: 662).
The key moral and philosophical presuppositions that underlie development practice 
and give it legitimacy and authority flow from whence development is driven, that is 
the ‘West’, although the discourses of development are multi-layered, complex and 
not always uni-directional. ‘The West’ in this thesis, is not meant to be understood 
geographically. The conceptual imiverse of modernity as opposed to ‘pre’, or ‘non’ 
modern cultural realties should not necessarily be regarded dichotomously as being 
intrinsic to distinct societies but more often as different principles that operate to 
different extents within different social realities. Marcus and Fischer (1986: 75) insist 
that social anthropologists have to be cognisant that, in many contexts: ‘Outside 
forces in fact are an integr al part of the construction of the inside, the cultural unit 
itself, and so must be registered even at the most intimate levels of cultural processes’. 
This is not to deny, however, that particular non-modern forms of sociality are, in 
many ways, mcommensur able with the dynamics of modernity.
It would be a mistake to be overschematic in assembling a portrait of development. 
Featherstone suggests that there are ‘emerging sets of ‘third cultures’, which 
themselves are conduits for all sorts of diverse cirltural flows which cannot be merely
understood as the product of bilateral exchanges between nation states’ (1990: 1). The 
development context is an example of tliis kind of arena where protean values, 
laiowledges and idioms meet to be contested, negotiated and imposed. The social 
anthropologist, then, camiot avoid being mindful that a self-reflexive mien is 
imperative in grasping this complex reality.
As, on the whole, development involves planned social and economic change, 
anthropologists have increasingly exposed the duplicity of development planners’ 
narratives that depict ‘underdeveloped’ areas in pathological tenns that can only be 
remedied by the West' .^ The protagonists of orthodox economic development, whilst 
perhaps not wearing their imperial hearts on their sleeves, have unmistakable 
inheritances. Historically, development is usefully understood in terms of 
‘Modernisation’. Arce and Long give a very good definition of development in this 
sense:
‘A comprehensive package of technical and institutional measures aimed at 
widespread societal transformation and underpinned by neo-evolutionary 
theoretical narratives’ (2000: 2).
However, unlike colonialism, which transparently served imperial interests, the idea 
of development is often understood and/or sold in terms of an emancipatory ideal. 
Sachs (1992: 11) notes for instance tliat ‘the countries of the South proclaimed 
development as their primary asphation after they had been freed from colonial 
subordination’. Nevertheless, considering the asymmetrical and hierarchical positions 
of those driving and aspiring towards the development ideal is important. A lasting 
legacy of the colonial period is the adoption of the ideal of progress (with a concept of 
entelechy that ascribes authority and prestige to Western economic, technological and 
political mantras) tlrroughout the Third World. Development, then, constitutes a 
shared but bitterly contested global language that is spoken in ahnost every corner of 
the world.
 ^However, whilst the modern concept of development is closely linked to grand-scale central planning, 
development can also be understood in terms of unplanned changes, and changes whose linlcs to 
plaiming are tenuous. Social change often comes about as an î/wintended consequence of action, that is, 
as Ortner puts it, ‘a by-product. . . however rational the action may have been’ (1994: 401). Clearly,
The evangelical zeal with which a common ‘development language’ has been 
broadcast has also been interpreted as a stealthy harbinger of the establishment of 
coercive social and economic relationships. This point is made by Godelier (1993: 
112); ‘in some way dominators and the dominated, exploiters and the exploited must 
share the same representations’. Hornborg adds that the language of modernity can be 
both peremptory and coercive;
‘In submitting to their own conceptual encompassment by notions of 
‘development’ generated by Western science (in particular economics), the 
‘Rest’ cannot resist domination and exploitation by ‘the West’ (Hornborg 
1994: 239).
The implication that Hornborg points to is that ‘a first and necessary step toward 
emancipation must be an awareness of the nature of tliis relationship’ (Joe. cit.). The 
question of the teleology of development, that is, who defines the means through 
which the ‘ underdeveloped’ are to achieve the conditions of life that can be called 
‘developed’, has been the focus of anthropological and sociological critiques (Hobait 
1993, Croll and Parkin 1992; Sachs 1992, Grillo and Stirrat 1997, Gardner and Lewis 
1996; Ferguson 1990, for instance). Teleological approaches, taking for granted a 
specified end state, have been criticised on a number of fronts, paiticulaily the 
assumption that the social and economic realities of industrialised nations constitute a 
desirable and sustainable goal on a global level. The state of being ‘underdeveloped’ 
is presented ideologically as a prior and inferior state to that of the developed world. 
Sbert (1992: 194) aigues that ‘what had been called by Europeans uncivilised, 
uneducated and backward all over the world, had a new name: underdeveloped’.
Development tliinking commonly resorts to the use of metaphor to explicate its 
implicit key ideas and motivations. Certain cultmal forms and traditions are reified as 
‘obstacles’ to change, knowledge is constituted as a ‘mirror’ of reality, as a neutral
the intransitive sense of ‘to develop’, that is, the unfolding of latent potential in response to new 
opportunities is also relevant to the analysis of development.
‘space’ for positive exploration^. The idiom of ‘development’ itself evokes an organic 
idea of inevitable unfolding and flourishing inunanent in every society (whether its 
members have worked this out, or otherwise).
Hobart et al (1993) argue that the systematic knowledge systems which infonn 
professional discussions of, and approaches to, development generate ascriptions of 
‘ignorance’ associated with conditions of ‘under-development’, a state that has to be 
changed by superior knowledge:
‘Ignorance is not however, a simple antithesis of knowledge. It is a state which 
people attribute to others and is laden with moral judgement. So being 
underdeveloped often implies, if not actual iniquity, at least, stupidity, failure 
and sloth’ (Hobait 1993: 1).
Here it is appropriate to note the latent ambivalence in Weber’s (1930) as well as 
Winch’s (1964), foimdational demonstration of the qualitative differences between 
different cultural realities. It is one of my central contentions that this equivocation is 
one of the key tensions in the consideration of the ethics of applied anthropology. On 
the one hand there are the dichotomous evaluative apprehensions of the qualitative 
differences between modern and non-modem societies that are cential to both 
modernisation and dependency theory. These dichotomies draw a gieat deal of valid 
criticism. Nelson and Wright, for instance, note that, within anthi'opology, ‘by the late 
1970s the discipline’s division of humanity into schemes of contr asting ‘cultures’ was 
seen to be part of the conceptual underpinning of colonialism and continuing Western 
domination’ (2001: 46). Strathern argues that ‘we are heir’ to the modernist imagery 
of parts and wholes’ (1992: 75). Said’s uncovering of the Orientalist tendencies of 
Western ideology which continuously projects an inferior ‘other’ onto different 
cultural realities so as to produce a superior definition of itself has been extrapolated 
onto the analysis of development. The West’s approach to ‘the Rest’ is understood as;
‘Dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short Orientalism [can
 ^See Rorty (1980) for his discussion on western epistemology understanding itself in terms of a min or 
that, if not contorted or obscured will give an accurate representation of reality.
be analysed] as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and dealing with 
the Orient’ (Said 1978: 3; see also Hornborg 1994).
On the other hand, anthropologists have sought wider recognition of tlie intrinsic 
value of cultural realities Ürat differ in important ways fiom modern, Western 
societies and the ways in which Western intrusions are harmful to these ways of 
constrncting well being. It is crucial to pay attention to ways in wliich the elements of 
life are conjoined in culturally specific ways. De Coppet (1992: 78), for example 
argues: ‘Comparison is only possible if we analyse the various ways in which 
societies order their ultimate values. In doing so, we attempt to understand each 
society as a whole, and not as an object dismantled by our own categories’. Despite 
assertions that we live in a ‘post-cultural’ age, applied anthropologists are often in the 
predicament of being interpolated between the monolithic instrumental capitalist 
machinery of economic development and particular indigenous cultures that are 
clearly fragile in the face of such encroachment, and objectively disappearing.
However, whilst the argument that the sum effect of development is an exploitative, 
neo-imperialist system is highly plausible, it is important to recognise the tensions 
that exist between different positions and philosophies that exert an influence on 
development. In the contemporary setting, engaged analysts are seldom entirely 
condemnatory of development. Indeed Grillo (1997) criticises the tendency of ‘anti- 
developmentalists’ such as Hobart (1993) in their distance fiom the actual 
deliberations of those involved in the work of development. As Thin (an 
anthropologist and senior development consultant) with mild consternation, observes
‘ . . .  the irony of the more strident anti-development anthropologists 
forgetting tlieir anthropological principles, pontificating about 'the 
development discourse' with minimal attempt to understand development 
concepts fiom the point of view of users and consequently with woefully 
inadequate recognition of the diversity of development discourses. This is 
rather like letting theologians, but not clergy, worshippers, and 
anthr opologists, tell us what religion is about, or letting music critics but not 
musicians, dancers, composers and ethnomusicologists tell us what music is 
about.’ (pers. comm.)
Grillo (1997: 21) is coixect to observe that ‘although development is sometimes 
guided by authoritative monocular visions . .  . development is not usually a single set 
of ideas and assumptions’. Various actors witli different, and often competing 
interests and political commitments, contribute to tlie extensive range of activities and 
representations that come under the rubric of development. Ferguson (1990: 17) 
rightly considers that grasping the multiple meanings that are generated by 
development involves deciphering a ‘riddle, a problem to be solved, an 
antliropological puzzle’. Indeed, a formative observation for tlie foimulation of this 
thesis is that the intentions and aspirations of development actors are often very 
different ftom tlie effects of tlieir work. The intentions of anthropologists, for 
example, have to be filtered tlnough and combined with, complex procedural 
considerations, cultural assumptions and hierarchies of values within the development 
context.
So, the manifold and shifting natur e of development discourse disconcerts any facile 
characterisation of the ethics of involvement. It is important to observe, with Gar dner 
and Lewis (1996: 128) that ‘contrary to the impression given in much contemporary 
analysis, discourses of development are not all the same; nor indeed are they fixed’. 
Grillo and Stirrat concur-; ‘to think of the discourse of development is far too limiting 
(1997: 21), wliilst Hobart refers to ‘several co-existent discourses of development’ 
(1993: 12). This very feature of the mutability of development practice and policy 
presents enticing possibilities to anthropologists who are motivated to influence 
change within it, perhaps seeking to subvert dominant neo-liberal agendas, or to 
emphasise the importance of social and cultural factors in any intervention. However, 
beneath the rhetoric and/or earnest idealism that one encounters in development 
language, there lies unavoidable disagr eement, fiustratingly blind proceduralism and 
even straightforward chaos.
The Professional and Personal Judgement o f  the Applied Anthropologist
Given the above, applied anthropology cleaily involves a convergence of thorny 
etliical issues. As I will explore, the direct and immediate impacts of involvement in 
the ironies and pathos of development constitutes a serious challenge to the 
antluopologisf s moral outlook. In anthropological literature, there has been relative 
inattention to exploring the phenomenology of dealing with the moral dilemmas that 
arise in the comse of anthropological endeavours in the context of development. 
Geertz, however, argues that the topic of ‘tlie moral experience of social scientists’ 
should be a searcliing investigation of a central aspect of modem consciousness 
(2001: 17).
Anthropologists working in development are required to be a locus of reflection and 
interaction between different and disparate life worlds, somehow channelling both 
needs and solutions, required to represent and make explicit the nature and value of 
different cultural settings. Croll and Parkin argue tliat decision making in the field of 
applied anthropology involves ‘not just methods about how to get things done, but 
entails moral prescriptions, various collective enthusiasms, different and competing 
liierarchies of adherents and an over-riding assumption that human betterment is 
society’s primary essence and by which it justifies itself (1997:8). Having an 
understanding of the terms of reference for the eschatology, or telos, as well as the 
methods, of development is therefore essential.
In this thesis, I am concerned with a ‘normative view of development’ that is, viewing 
development models in terms of different rmderstandings of the ‘good life’, of well 
being and of sociality. Indeed, the tensions that exist within and between 
anthropology and development emerge from differing visions of the good which often 
stem from anthropologists’ identification with, and advocacy of, the aspirations of 
those they work with. This is Quinlan’s point; ‘both the vitality of the discipline and 
the persistent criticism of it are due to the awkward position that anthropologists 
occupy between their patrons, subjects and other disciplines’ (2000: 134). 
Anthropologists, as mdividuals with heterogeneous views of social justice, morality 
and the value of community vis-à-vis the individual, for instance, will obviously bring 
variable opinions and moral reactions to bear onto the practices and philosophies of 
development.
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Also, generally coming from diverse social backgrounds, applied anthropologists in 
the field, encounter other cultural realities as strangers who carry particular kinds of 
cultural baggage (Okely and Callaway 1992). Intrinsic to applied anthropology then, 
is a questioning of the anthropologist’s own visions of the good. Obviously, when 
involved in decision making, one’s personal allegiances are bound to become evident, 
as Gledhill observes; ‘there are limits to Hie degree of duplicity anthropology can 
successfully practice, since people are inclined to demand answers to questions about 
one’s personal views on social and political matters’ (1994: 219). Recognising this 
inevitability, Mies proposes that anthropologists should be more honest and open 
about their* moral and political commitments rather than making a pretence of 
neutrality:
‘The postulate of value free research, of neutrality and indifference towards 
the research objects, has to be replaced by conscious partiality, which is 
achieved through partial identification with the research objects’ (Mies 1983: 
22; cf. Rabinow 1986).
A prevailing contemporary view is that academia, whether its practitioners like it or* 
not, has an inevitable impact upon governance, by design, or by neglect. Rapport 
speaks of the ‘inevitably political character of antlnopology’s own pronouncements’ 
(forthcoming). It is arguably a small step from the idea of understanding the values, 
social structure, culture, and behaviour* of defined populations to contriving to control 
that population. As Hobart notes;
‘The social and Iristorical vision of the world order, and the rationality, which 
subtends it, has been in no small part constituted and justified by academic 
writings. In so far* as such accounts are adopted by the governments or people 
of the developing countries as constitutive of their aspirations, they are 
hegemonic in Gramsci’s sense’ (Hobart 1993: 3).
Schrijvers expresses this view more explicitly, contending that ‘value free’ research is 
now imderstood ‘as an obfuscation of the power* relationsliips involved’ (1993: 33-41; 
1979) and, she argues elsewhere, that research agendas are often ‘ethno- and 
andocentric’ (1995: 20). Sponsel complains that anthropologists are far* better* at
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writing about indigenous peoples than communicating with them and showing 
genuine solidarity (1992). Hobart also concludes in relation to development research; 
‘questioning and answering are activities which are the exclusive prerogative of the 
researcher. Things wait to be discovered. They are passive: the activity belongs to the 
explorers who discover, map and master them’ (1995: 53). The citations given above 
demonstrate the anthropological suspicion of contributing towards governance or 
overt political advocacy.
Applied anthropologists, however, may envisage the necessity of engaging with 
governing institutions and see tlie promotion of anthropological understanding as 
contributing to the alleviation of poverty and enliancement of the well being of the 
peoples of the Third World. The view here is that by preciously opting out of 
engagement with the institutions of development, in effect, one is granting gr eater 
agency to the very dynamics that one criticises. This is Gardner and Lewis’s position:
‘(Applied anthropologists) as we ourselves might prefer to put it, are trying to 
raise living standards -  not only in material terms, but with regard to legal 
rights, freedom of expression, quality of life -  for the poorest sections of the 
world’s population’ (1996: 29)
In very broad terms, there appear to be three main ways of envisaging anthropology’s 
relationship with development. The first is a hyper-critical perspective that sees 
anthropologists working in development as colluding with a neo-imperial agenda. 
The second view is one based upon a belief that anthropology already has made, and 
will continue to malce, a positive or at least tempering impact on development 
philosophy, policy and practice. The third view is that, whilst anthropologists may 
flatter themselves in terms of their importance in the formulation of development 
policy, their efforts always have been and will remain marginal to the dominant 
agenda.
The Communitarian Imperative in Applied Anthropology
An argument that I malce throughout the thesis is that the duplicity and profoimd rifts 
that miderlie the apparently universal agreement of the putative aims of development
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(freedom, benevolence, ‘all human rights for all’ etc.) can only be understood in temis 
of an appreciation of the thoroughly fr agmented natur e of the modern moral outlook. 
Further, I want to ar gue that social anthropologists, notwithstanding the points made 
above, often, at least in aspiration, occupy standpoints of moral resistance vis-à-vis 
what Taylor calls the ‘disengaged and instrumental modes of thought and action 
which have steadily increased their hold on modern life’ (Taylor 2000: 495), 
identifyhig more with the strands of Western moral thinking concerned with the 
search for, or continuation of, somces which can ‘restore depth, richness and meaning 
to life’ {loc. cit.). This is not to characterise and cordon off social anthropologists as if 
we are all ‘Romantics’^  but to signal the complexity of moral aspiration that is 
intrinsic to the phenomena of development. Rather than understanding this 
fr agmentation in terms of coherent interest groups rationally discussing differences of 
opinion, I would argue that fragmentation is apparent in our own individual moral 
thinldng, as Charles Taylor argues:
‘These are goods, moreover, by which we moderns live, even though those 
who believe they deny them: as disengaged rationalists still puzzle through 
their personal dilemmas with the aid of notions like fulfilment; and anti 
moderns will themselves invoke rights, equality, and self-responsible freedom 
as well as fulfilment in their political and moral life’ (2000: 511)
Anthropologists are not immune to the moral equivocation that comes as part and 
parcel of the ‘modem liberal identity’, and, as such, are presented with a range of 
different strands that pertain to different moral traditions and origins in their moral 
formation and deliberation. Taylor proposes tliat some dominant strands are as 
follows: firstly, Judeo-Christian ‘other regarding’, secondly, the Enlightenment; 
disengaged rationality, autonomy, freedom, human equality, universality, and thirdly, 
the Romantic emphasis on connection with natiue, belonging, human fulfilment, 
wholeness and expressive integrity.
® In the sense of ‘ the pictuie of a restored harmony within the person and between people . . .  the 
breaking down of bairiers between art and life, work and love, class and class, and the image of 
harmony as a fuller freedom’ (loacit.). Indeed, Michael Jackson aigues that the idea of culture that was 
adopted by nineteenth century anthropology had its origins in German romanticism (2002: 109).
13
Pels is one anthropologist who, having concluded that a great deal of poverty and 
inequality is actually caused and perpetuated by the globalised liberal political 
agenda, believes that the Western insistence on individual freedom has to be balanced 
with a sense of responsibility, as he writes;
‘The anthropologist’s duplex position, situated, like a ‘trickster’, in between 
different moralities and epistemes, discovers some of the impossibilities of 
maintaining the liberal desire for individual autonomy of choice and opinion at 
a distance from political struggle over existing inequalities in the world’ (Pels 
2000: 136).
On this basis, one of the central contentions that 1 malce in the thesis is that in this 
moral disarray, more precisely in the lack of agreement about the political, economic 
and ethical models that underlie development, instrumental and individuating agendas 
continue more or less unabated. Contemporary moral debate generally involves trying 
and failing to rationally settle the claims of rival moral concepts which stem from 
incommensurable evaluative premises and traditions -  ‘an unharmonious melange of 
ill assorted fragments’ (MacIntyre 1997: 10). As there is no way of settling these 
rationally, contemporary moral debate risks becoming interminable. In practice, the 
manner in which these debates are finally settled, becomes a matter of emotive 
assertion, power, and persuasion; no more than a masquerade of rationality. As the 
most powerfiil global ‘moral’ agenda in currency is liberal individualism and its 
accompanying individuating economic and social models, other forms of morality, 
well being and sociality are often obliviated in moral debate and in the decisions of 
plamiers and policy malcers.
Contextualising this view in terms of an ethical approach to applied anthropology in 
development, should not, I argue, mean adopting a pessimistic stance. On the 
contrary, I want to argue that an important moral counterpoint to the liberal 
individuating agenda is the anthropological critique of, and response to, the failure of 
dominant liberal institutions to allow the continuance and flourishing of 
‘communities’ within which social groups achieve well being. I contend that it is from 
the communitarian perspective, often embodied in highly particulai’ and nuanced
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foiins in indigenous life-worlds, that we can best understand the mistakes which lie at 
the heart of modernity.
Whilst, as I have argued, it would be facile to characterise Western society solely in 
teims of liberal individualism, procedural etliics and instrumentalism, I submit that 
these models exert an overbearing influence upon Western thinldng and practice. As 
Taylor (2000: 196) argues, in the West, ‘without a special effort of reflection on this 
issue, we tend to fall back into an atomist/instrumentalist way of seeing’. One of my 
assertions is that communitarian arguments, whilst also being needed as a healthy 
antidote to the excesses of liberal individualism, also constitute a reflection of the 
aspirations of people(s), many of whom are beleaguered by the alienation, atomism 
and instrumentalism of modem society, to realise their visions of the good life.
There appears to be an affinity, for example, between Aristotelian concerus with 
human flourishing, belonging in a moral community and the interests of many 
anthropologists seeking to describe the sociality of the peoples of Amazonia (see for 
instance Overing and Passes 2000; Ales 2000). Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1997) reading 
of Aristotehan ideas of human functioning, particular'ly the view that affiliation and 
reciprocity with others is an intrinsic part of being fully human are particularly 
apposite for the anthropological interest in the moral value of community. 
MacIntyre’s understanding of virtues which are grounded in a shared ‘social 
teleology’ is helpful in conceptualising the particular' nature of the achievement of 
culturally specific visions of the good. The Aristotelian perspective stresses the 
intrinsic goodness of the relationships of love, nurturing, care and acknowledged 
dependence that bind people together whilst not denying personal autonomy. Tire 
individual who exists utterly outside such a life, according to Aristotle, simply can not 
achieve a completely fulfilled human life. As Nussbaum (1990: 373-4) explains, ‘a 
solitary good life that does not need other human beings because it does not have the 
forms of dependency and neediness that lead human beings to reach out to one 
another would not be a human life’ .^
 ^ Interestingly, Aristotle argued that there was no need for moral virtues among the Greek gods. This 
was, as Nussbaum (1990: 378) argues, because the social life of the gods was uninspiied by need and 
as a result they were at liberty to be frivolous and irresponsible; ‘just plain callous, lacking totally the 
pamstaking effort of mind and desire tliat is involved in human justice . . . they simply don’t fully see 
what is going on in our lives, they lack compassion’ and exhibit a ‘carelessness inseparable from their
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On this basis, then, I submit that anthropologists should talce seriously the moral 
claims of those ‘powerless, dispersed, disparaged peoples’ seeking to recapture 
‘something of the integrity and autlienticity they feel they personally lost’ (Jackson 
2002; 107) as a result of the instrumental machinations of modernisation. The same 
can be said for those besieged indigenous communities that struggle to defend their 
integrity in the face of the aggressive inti‘usions of the market mentality. This may 
involve supporting the maintenance of ‘tr aditional’ versions of moral reasoning, well 
being, quality of life and sociality (such as indigenous life-worlds), collective rights in 
the face of the fragmentary and individuating neo-liberal development policies, and to 
support die ‘construction of new forms of community within which the moral life can 
be sustained’ (MacIntyre 1997: 263). One of the ironies of the anthropological 
involvement in development is that whilst the anthropologist may be aware of the 
incommensurability of indigenous ideas of well being vis-à-vis those that are in 
currency in the West (prmcipally universalist, rights based, procedural ethics), a key 
aspect of the applied anthropological task in the defence of communities of well being 
involves utilising these same Western moral resources, as I will explain.
I will now outline how I will approach the many questions that I have signalled above.
Structure o f  the Thesis
My claim is that applied anthropologists, without a good grasp of the wider political 
and ethical issues that are implicated in their work, risk floating adrift in the stormy
transcendence of our wholly needy way of life’. It is interesting to juxtapose this argument with the 
anthi'opologist Rapport’s feting of the ‘transcendent individual’. Rapport ‘wants to keep the idea of 
God alive, but ‘under a new name: Individual’. ‘The transcendent individual, the individual who writes 
herself, and, in the process, rewrites the socio-cultural envhonment around her, is most Mly a 
Nietzschean one. It is the essential, objective, inherent nature of the individual self, Nietzsche believed, 
to be self-caused and free’ (1997: 4,). This is powerfully stated and without a few necessaiy 
qualifications, one could say overstated. Taylor argues that atomist views ‘don’t stand up very well in 
argument’ and ‘even a modicum of explanation is enough to show their inadequacy’ (2000: 196). I 
would agree with MacIntyre that ‘the necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence (are) the 
virtues of acknowledged dependence’ (1999: 120).
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seas that their very profession requires them to navigate. I wish to emphasise the 
intractability of ethics from the practice of applied anthropology. Anthony Cohen 
(1994: 192) admits to a certain ‘missionary zeal’ in his advocacy of social 
anthropology as '’the fundamental discipline in the humane study of society’. One of 
tlie most important contentions in this thesis is captuied by Cohen in the following 
quote:
‘ . . .  not just the idle claim that we do it better than other scholar s. Rather it is 
the plea that we must do it better in order not to allow a licence by default to 
those dull political dogmatists to invent selves for us in the image of their own 
self-interestedness’ (Joe. cit.).
The thesis has been organised in three sections, reflecting three imbricated lines of 
enquiry. These are:
° ‘The Moral and Ethical Dilemmas of Applied Anthropologists in Development’,
° ‘Slow Steps Towards a Relevant Anthropology: Theoretical Resources for 
Applied Anthropology’ and finally,
° ‘ Anthropological Engagement with the Ethics of Development Theory and
Practice’.
I will now briefly go through my intentions in each of these sections, give an 
indication of the substance of each chapter and trace the (hopefully) accumulative 
dhection of my argument.
A: The Moral and Ethical Dilemmas of Applied Anthropologists in Development 
Tliis comprises the following chapters
Chapter 2: An Apprenticeship in Applied Anthropological Angst
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In this chapter, thi'ough the prism of the work I undertook in Bolivia as a development 
consultant and researcher on behalf of the UK government’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), I introduce the main issues that I will be 
addressing throughout the diesis, that is, the moral ethical dilemmas that I contend are 
intrinsic to the applied antiiropological task in development. Here I collaborated with 
members of CIDOB (Confedemcion de Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia), an 
organisation that represents the indigenous peoples of the lowlands of Bolivia in 
writing a proposal to the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 
requesting funding for a laige scale consultation of the vaiious indigenous groups 
thi'oughout lowland Bolivia that would result in the presentation of their perspectives 
and needs to the forthcoming ‘National Dialogue’ which focused upon the allocation 
of funds that were to be released by proposed debt cancellation under the IMF’s 
(International Monetary Fund) HIPC II scheme (Highly Indebted Poor Countiies II). 
The consultation also involved assessing whether or not CIDOB constituted a 
sufficiently representative and effective organisation vis-à-vis the indigenous groups 
spread throughout the Eastern lowlands. Further, DFID asked myself and another 
anthropologist/consultant to do an assessment of the principal ‘threats and challenges’ 
that the indigenous people of lowland Bolivia experience, to undertake an analysis of 
development work already being carried out by other donors and NGOs and to give a 
series of recommendations for DFID’s future support of the lowland indigenous 
peoples. This involved speaking to the constituent organisations within CIDOB, 
travelling to various indigenous communities, undertaking ‘participatory poverty 
assessments’, interviewing the staff of NGOs and relevant Bolivian governmental 
departments as well as studying relevant literature. The chapter largely involves a 
description of die natur e of the consultancy task I undertook and serves as basis for 
the more detailed analysis that follows in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Caught in Webs o f Moral Bewilderment; The Ethics o f Anthropological 
Involvement in Development Interventions
Here, I begin by setting out the main moral issues that emerged directly from my 
work in Bolivia, and then move on from these immediate reflections to discuss the
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wider ethical and political issues that lie at the heart of applied anthropology. These 
are discussed under the following headings:
a ‘Negotiating Incommensurable and Multi-layered discourses’;
° ‘Aspects of the Asymmetric Positionality of the Anthropologist as Consultant’ ;
° ‘Controlling one’s Contribution -  Co-option or Critical Engagement?’;
° ‘Development and the Question of Relativism’ and 
° ‘Emotion and Detachment in Development’.
Chapter 4: Social Anthropology as Moral Conduct
This chapter opens up and situates the question of the moral and ethical dilemmas of 
applied anthropology by exploring the assertion that ‘social anthropology is moral 
conduct’. On this basis, I attempt to delineate and introduce some of the principal 
characteristics of contemporary moral conditions (mainly with regard to the public 
sphere) that are ineluctable in any attempt to achieve clarity on the ethical stances that 
social anthropologists might talce in relation to development policy and practice.
Firstly, as was observed in my opening remarks, I make a case for the necessity of the 
thorough self examination of the conflicts of modernity. As part of this endeavour*, I 
note that because the transmission and imposition of Wester*n values is not always 
transparent, an important anthropological task involves ‘unmasking’ and 
defamiliar ising these values from the doxic practices of Western institutions.
In the following section, I put forward the view that there is a strong feeling of 
disconcertion and resistance with regard to the self-examination of Western ethical 
models. I believe that this discomfiture can be apprehended in two ways. Firstly, I 
argue that procedural and rights based ethics comprise an insufficient moral language 
to articulate the range of moral intuitions that we feel. Secondly, I suggest that 
intrinsic to Western public morality is a defensive resistance to scrutiny. 
Development, as a universalistic discourse, inevitably involves a ‘lack of fit’ in 
relation to culturally specific perspectives and sources of value. We can see here the 
root of the moral dissonance that accompanies every development intervention.
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A subsequent argument that I make is that the Western compartmentalisation of 
academic disciplines, which is thankfully gradually dissolving, but which social 
antluopology, for a great part of its history inherited, has resulted in narTow and 
truncated conceptualisations of morality. Whereas in reality morality, or ethics, 
involves die conjoining of the inner life wiüi social action, there has been a 
preponderance of paradigms in social anthropology attuned to describing the outer 
manifestations of human behaviour whilst eitlier consigning the ‘iimer life’, the 
emotions, for example to other disciplines or envisaging them in deterministic 
structural terms. Secondly, I argue that nanow academic compartmentalisation is also 
restrictive in the sense of constraining the extent to which antlrropologists ar e able to 
exert a moral influence upon wider society.
In Üiis chapter, I also present a critical analysis of social antiiropological professional 
codes of ethics and present the ar gument that only a dim light will be shed on the 
substance of the moral deliberations of social anthropologists by examining these 
codes which I consider to be little more than celebratory platitudes. Codes of ethics 
tend to serwe institutional purposes, and offer an obscure reflection of tlie manifold 
ways in which anthropologists influence, and are involved in, decision making of 
moral import in development. Further, by examining these codes, it is difficult to 
discern anything that amoimts to a shared moral commitment by anthropologists 
beyond standard liberal formulas. My argument is that the whole idea of professional 
ethics has to be based upon a definition of what the profession is and what its 
professionals do and experience.
Drawing upon the preceding sections, in anticipation of the next section, I introduce 
the idea of the ‘relevance’ of social anthropology.
B: Slow Steps Towards a Relevant Anthropologv: Theoretical Resources for Applied 
Anthropologv
Over Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I review the substantive body of theoretical and ethical 
resources within social antliropology for the applied task in development. My main
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concern is to unearth the aspects of antiiropological theory that have been diawn upon 
in applied anthropology in the endeavours to relevantly and ethically reflect and 
respond to those who are affected by, and involved in, planned social and economic 
change.
This review of anthiopological theoiy necessitates choosing a wide angle lens, which 
in turn, means that the exposition of particular- areas will be restricted. It is obviously 
difficult to faithfully typologise different theoretical directions and the periods 
associated with them. Even Ardener (1985: 48), for example, concedes that: ‘over 
many years of trying to examine what social anthropology is about, I have been 
forced to the conclusion that there is no account of the mtellectual history of social 
anthropology that would command universal support’. However, Ardener also writes 
encouragingly, that anthropological works and the lives of their authors are closely 
meshed and ‘are not impossibly numerous, bibliographically or demographically’ 
(1985: 54). It should, therefore, be a feasible project to locate and define, in broad 
terms, the major trends and innovations of the discipline in relation to development 
policy and practice.
The history of applied anthropology is often presented in ter-ms of an enlightened 
progression from positivistic begimiings at the serwice of nation states to more 
partisan approaches to the amelioration of social, economic, and technological 
problems. Generally in agreement with this view, I trace the gradual assembling of the 
theoretical perspectives that allowed the discipline’s relevance to the disempowered 
and oppressed to be sharpened over time. I look especially at the emergence of 
persuasive and forceful critiques of tlie dominant discourses in development on the 
basis of a relativistic approach to human flourisliing in different contexts. In the 
contemporary setting, anthropologists are increasingly involved in arguing for the 
incorporation of indigenous and local perspectives in development practice and 
planning, in promoting participatory approaches, self-determination, and development 
that is rooted in particular- traditions. The background to this contribution constitutes 
an interesting history.
Chapter 5: A Brief History o f  Development Thinking
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Here I begin by setting out the main characteristics of Development’s pre-history in 
which the central forces and ideas that preceded the phenomenon of development in 
the West are identified. This is followed by a description of the ideational aspects of 
the particular historical period when the idea of development became an explicit 
global project. After this, in turn, I look at variations on the theme of the two 
dominant currents in development tliinking, that is ‘Modernisation Tlieory’ and 
‘Dependency Theory’. I also review the major critiques of these explanatory models. 
One of my key arguments here is that the uni-directional evolutionary narrative or 
interpretative grid of both modernisation and dependency theory legitimises tlie role 
of ‘homogenising’ Western scientific, bureaucratic and management solutions to the 
perceived problems of under-development. This dichotomisation of ‘nature’ and 
‘culture’, ‘people’ and ‘tilings’ underlies what Arce and Long call ‘the purification 
principle of conventional science’ (2000: 6). I also argue that whilst both 
modernisation theory and dependency theory have been thoroughly turned over and 
impugned by theorists, they remain powerful explanatory models for both 
development practice and in the critique of development, perhaps partly because of 
their symbiotic nature. The anthropological response to both of these theories has 
been to insist upon a more accurate and more nuanced grounding of economic 
relations in local contexts without pre-empting the specificity of social and cultural 
dynamics. However, the underlying argument of dependency theory remains 
compelling and highly plausible as a way of grasping the wider dynamics of global 
capitalism.
Chapter 6: Practical Values; Slow Steps Towards a Relevant Anthropology
Here, I look at the major theoretical developments in anthropology fiom the colonial 
period imtil tire 1980s and present a sketch of the unfolding of applied anthropology. 
My aim is to explore the creative tensions between the sociological frameworks that 
anthropologists grappled with to apprehend different social realities and their growing 
imderstanding of the often drastic changes that Western expansion was causing. One 
aspect of this is the analysis of the meetings and mutual antipathies between 
anthropologists and colonial authorities. I look at the various theoretical paradigms 
that anthropology moved through in terms of the way they inhibited or facilitated tire 
arrthropological response to planned social and economic change. I rrote an important
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paradox of the colonial era - that functionalism, whilst being a relativistic paradigm 
that emphasised the importance of societal coherence, was a peculiarly appropriate 
and compliant theory vis-à-vis colonialism. Following this, I trace the major 
theoretical movements that accompanied the demise of colonialism. As it became 
untenable to write credibly without reference to the social and political forces that 
were imposing themselves upon ‘traditional’ societies with unprecedented impact, 
anthropologists, with a certain recalcitrance in many cases, began to explore the 
urgent issues of social change, agency, power, relative values, ethnicity and identity. I 
trace these accumulative and iterative developments to introduce the ‘practice 
perspective’, wliich I consider to be of particular importance as a theoretical resource 
for applied anthropology. Tliis perspective sought to merge materialist and idealist 
frameworks into a compatible and coherent theoretical project.
Chapter 7: Theoretical Resources fo r  Applied Anthropology
This chapter is a continuation of the endeavours of the previous chapter both 
historically and in terms of theoretical developments. Agam, in lar gely abstract terms 
what I try to do is to locate the principal theoretical resources that anthropologists 
draw upon in their applied work in development. Here I look at aspects of the 
sweeping politicisation of anthropology from the late 1970s onwards. I argue that 
whereas the ‘social’ and the ‘individual’ had been relatively ^fepoliticised in 
theoretical paradigms such as stmctural functionalism and structui'alism, subsequent 
theoretical developments actively sought new understandings of power, social change, 
agency, authority and representation and the relationship between the local and the 
global. The chapter is organised as follows;
° Understanding Social Change 
° Political Economy Approaches
° Agency-oriented theories of social action moving towards ‘Practice’
° Peiwasive Power and Knowledge 
° Local Complexity and ‘Lack of Fit’
° Feminist Anthropology and Development 
° Post-modern applied antliropology
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C: Anthropological Engagement with tlie Ethics of Development Theory and Practice
In the preamble of this introductory chapter, I have already given an indication of my 
espousal of a communitaiian approach to the ethics of applied anthropology. This is 
one of the agendas that I pursue over the next four chapters.
Chapter 8: Western Thinking on Global Poverty
In this chapter, I set out the core issues of development ethics and also, the key 
features and characteristics of the development context. Whilst development 
anthropologists tend to work in specific localities, I introduce some general features 
of their shar ed global work place and discuss some of its main trends in moral terms. 
Looldng at global dynamics is indubitably part of the anthropological task as these 
clearly have an impact on every locality. Globalisation is understood in this thesis in 
terms of complex and overlapping trends of social and cultural splintering, the 
emergence of new kinds of transnational networks and elites and vertical polar isation 
within and between nations. I look at the adaptations of the development agenda 
within this context, particularly the curTent emphasis on human rights and the ways in 
which civil society organisations (CSOs) have embraced the idea of ‘development as 
leverage’. This section is rounded off with an effort to list the main threats and 
challenges that relatively financially poor, disempowered and marginalised people(s) 
experience in the ‘developing world’.
I then look at what the bases of moral deliberation for development thinking might be 
in terms of Western moral discourse. This is followed by a series of discrete but 
accumulative arguments that amount to an assertion that Western society (of which 
social anthropology is a product) has a moral responsibility to respond to global 
poverty that is greater than what has been achieved thus far-. I also argue here that it is 
as important to achieve clarity with regar d to the moral dimensions of development as 
with the scientific, political, sociological, management, ecological and technical 
aspects. In the final part, I look at the rationalisations that often amount to moral 
abdications on the part of the affluent and powerful when thinking about 
development.
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Chapter 9: The Moral Possibilities of Western Development Ethics
Here, I set out the major bundles of theory that make up the substance of development 
ethics. I also evince the aspects of this body of work tliat are relevant to the 
consideration of the ethical and moral dilemmas of anthropologists involved in 
development. This chapter on the whole, stays within the boundaries of contemporary 
Western moral and political reasoning. Wliilst maintaining a critical perspective, I 
seek to elicit ideas that offer moral possibilities in the Western tradition for 
anthropologists involved in development.
Before going on to discuss specific development models, I look at the compromises 
and possibilities of modern liberalism, which I believe to be necessary in terms of 
setting out the conceptual backgroimd to development ethics and practice. Following 
this, I work through a number of critiques of the dominant paradigms for 
development. Specifically, I look at the rationale that underlies ‘Commodity Based’, 
‘Utilitarian’ and Kantian ‘basic needs’ approaches.
Following this analysis, I present the main characteristics of 'The Capabilities 
Consensus*, This approach is a liighly persuasive paradigm for development ethics 
which has assumed a dominant status among development ethicists and, to some 
extent, in practice. Fundamentally, this approach is founded in political liberalism^ 
and seeks to establish a cross-cultural consensus on human values and the basic 
human ‘functionings’ that are necessary for dignified living. This approach differs 
from basic needs and welfare approaches in its focus on looking at what people are 
'able to do and to be ’ in actuality rather than looking only at the means for human 
functioning. As the norms proposed by this approach are intended to be applicable 
universally, they have a very general nature. This approach constitutes a hybrid of 
different philosophical positions; keeping tlie Kantian emphasis on personal 
autonomy, including utilitarian and Mar-xist critical argumentation concerning welfare 
and bringing in Neo-Aristotelian concerns on human flourishing and the ways this is
* Political liberalism is a model for social co-operation associated with Rawls. It is different from 
comprehensive liberalism in that it does not propose one vision of the good over any other but sets out 
to establish a model of pluralism delimited by, and achieved through, political virtues and principles 
such as tolerance, protection from discrimination and the provision of basic needs to all, regardless of 
merit (Rawls 1993).
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often connected to belonging in a moral community. I argue that, among the models 
in currency for development ethics, this approach has the greatest conespondence 
with the applied anthropological endeavom* to combine an appreciation of the 
particularity of different forms of well being with poverty alleviation and social 
justice.
In the final section, a discussion entitled ‘Meaningful Universals* follows. Here, 
developing the ideas presented above, I look at an anthropological conundnrm, that is 
how to articulate the idea of ‘culture’, which remains a central concept in the 
anthropological construction of social and moral belonging, in relation to proposed 
universal values. 1 present a number of arguments that support tlie view that universal 
norms should provide a basis for development ethics, at least at the level of agreeing 
on constitutional guarantees. 1 also introduce the counter, or tempering, arguments put 
forward by theorists who stress the importance of contextualising ethical 
considerations. Both communitarian (neo-Aristotelian) and post-modernist 
perspectives, albeit in significantly different ways, make the charge that universal 
norms may obfuscate the imposition of paternalistic Western liberal individualism, 
commercialism and ethnocentrism upon peoples with different moral interests. My 
overall ar gument in this thesis draws upon communitarian sources but 1 also contend 
that defending universal frameworks of human value at the level of public action, 
does not contradict this contention. My argument is that whilst antliropologists can 
support universalising frameworks and agendas, (such as rights) as these constitute 
useful resources and means for the achievement of well being, the capabilities 
approach also has scope for the anthropological agenda of imderstanding well being at 
the level of shared life worlds (communities, indigenous nations, particular 
individuals and social groups).
Chapter 10: The Western Moral Tradition in Pieces
In this chapter, 1 pick up on several themes that 1 intr oduced over the last few chapters 
but was unable to discuss in depth. Primarily, what 1 want to explore is the difficulty 
and awkwardness that arises in Western ethical thinking in attempts to grasp, let alone
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translate, non-modern ‘visions of the good’. I contend that the difficulties that I 
describe in the Western moral tr adition ar e also apparent in development practice and 
therefore need to be understood in abstract terms as a basis for an adequate 
anthropological critique of development. I contend that this normative blindness 
comes about as a result of the skewed nature of Western liberal individualist and 
perspectivist ethical narratives that stress the ‘individual’ in contradistinction to inter­
subjectivity and the achievement of sociality, which conceives of the ‘social’ 
primarily in terms of political and legal structures, which artificially excises the 
emotional, aesthetic and domestic fi*om consideration of the ‘moral’ and which 
stresses obligation, coercion and enforcement as opposed to virtue and trust in ‘moral’ 
societal relations. 1 propose that the tradition of virtue ethics which allows a finer and 
more nuanced appreciation of particular* social teleologies offers an important 
resource for applied anthropologists in their pur suit of an etliical approach to their 
work.
Chapter 11 : Using Rights to subvert the Neo-Liberal Discourse
In this chapter 1 draw fiom 3 different research sources. Firstly, 1 refer to a series of 
interviews 1 undertook with the policy makers of a number of major UK based 
development NGOs’ on their interpretation of a ‘rights based agenda in development’. 
1 also draw data fiom a desk based study that 1 undertook of DFID funded project 
reports. Finally, 1 present a case study fiom research 1 undertook in Lima and Callao 
on Women’s Economic Rights in Per*u’.
My aim here is to articulate the conceptualisation of the rights agenda from the point 
of view of professionals seeking to elevate the status of economic, social and cultural 
rights vis-à-vis, and alongside, civil and political rights. Here, on this basis, 
notwithstanding the critique 1 have given of the rights agenda, 1 highlight the aspects 
of the rights agenda that, due to their sidelining in the Western emphasis on individual 
civil and political rights, it would be salutary for anthropologists to engage with. The 
rights agenda can be interpreted in terms of the anti-liberal-individualist emphasis on 
human solidarity and the protection of communities ratlier than restricting the 
discussion to a narrow individuating rights agenda. Notwithstanding the inlierent 
danger that rights language is so easily co-opted by liberal individualistic
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presuppositions, this discourse provides a useful resource to create the conditions that 
are necessary for well being (land rights, for instance) and these goals can only be 
achieved by harnessing the legitimacy of rights language and processes.
The Moral (im)Possibilities of Being an Applied Anthropologist in Development
To sum up, whilst traditional ethnographies would not have undertaken to bring 
together such a wide range of topics, each of which demands a great deal of work in 
its own right, the experience of anthropologists in development practice is such that 
all of these areas are, by necessity, reflected upon and acted upon. Thus, the 
descriptive endeavour* of this thesis is to evoke some of the underlying conceptual, 
ethical and moral questions which anthropologists are faced with through then* 
engagement with development practice.
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C h a p te r  2
An Apprenticeship in Applied Anthropological Angst
Tt is desirable that development managers and policy investigators are able to 
identify and articulate their own personal and ethical boundaries . . . 
Development is replete with examples o f those who have come to help but who 
have made things worse ’ (Blackmore and Ison 1998: 63).
This chapter introduces the main issues that I will be addressing througliout the thesis, 
that is, the moral ethical dilemmas that I contend are intrinsic to the applied 
anthropological task in development. I hasten to add that Üiis chapter, by definition, 
then, asks many more questions than it answers. The first part of this chapter involves 
a description of the work I undertook in Bolivia as a development consultant and 
researcher on behalf of the UK govermnent’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) along with a brief description of tlie social, economic, and 
policy context.
This section would seem to confirm Seymour Smith’s argument that ‘in general, the 
training of anthropologists includes relatively little instruction, guidance or debate 
over ethical issues arising in the fieldwork situation (1988: 95). I do however, 
problematise Seymoiu* Smith’s statement that ‘the most common, or at least the 
traditional, position among the majority of anthropologists is to separate the area of 
academic research fiom the area of personal commitment and to consider that 
questions of ethics are to be decided by the anthropologist according to personal 
criteria apart fiom academic considerations’ Qoc. cit.). A key argument in this chapter 
is that an attempt at resolving the moral dilemmas of working in development is 
utterly unavoidable, as in fact, these ethical considerations are intrinsic to being an 
anthropologist.
In the next chapter I extr apolate fiom this basis to define a number of related areas 
that I posit as moral questions central to the theory and practice of applied 
anthropology in development many of which also relate to the ordinar y fieldwork 
situation. In an attempt to find a balance between maintaining narrative flow and
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providing sufficient detail, I use footnotes extensively in this chapter, particularly in 
the first part.
Deliberating with DFID and CIDOB
The research and consultation that I undertook witli DFID involved four separate but 
inter-related tasks (I was joined for tlie latter part of the work, by another 
anthropologist, Stephen Kidd). The first task was to collaborate with members of 
Confederacion de Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), a civil society organisation 
(CSO)^ that represents the indigenous peoples of the Eastern lowlands of Bolivia^, in 
wilting a proposal to the PNUD^ (United Nations Development Programme) to 
request funding for a laige scale consultation of the various indigenous groups 
throughout lowland Bolivia. As will be described in more detail below, this 
consultation was to result in a document that would be presented to the Bolivian 
government at the time of a ‘National Dialogue’. This event constituted a debate 
between tlie government and civil society groups on the ways in which money 
released by debt relief could be used for poverty reduction.
The second requirement of the consultancy was an assessment of the main ‘threats 
and challenges’ experienced by the indigenous people of lowland Bolivia. This 
research involved a combination of visiting indigenous communities'^ tluoughout the
‘ DFID define ‘Civil Society’ as ‘the broad range of organisations in society which fall outside 
government and which are not primarily motivated by profit. They include voluntary associations, 
women’s groups, tiade unions, community groups, chambers of commerce, farming and housing co­
operatives, religious and tribal-based groups, cultural groups, sports associations, academic and 
research institutions, consumer groups and so on’. From ‘All Human Rights For AH’, a speech by the 
erstwhile Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short’s speech to the Law Society, (3 
December 1998). This speech stressed the indivisibility of tlie Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and argued that, in many Western countries, civil and political rights have been given more weight than 
economic, social and cultural rights. She argued that a ‘rights based approach’ to international 
development must rediess the balance to work for the attainment of all rights for all people. 
Empowering civil society is an important part of this strategy.
 ^CIDOB is the umbrella federation for the many indigenous organisations representing the indigenous 
peoples of lowland eastern Bolivia.
 ^Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarollo (United Nations Development Programme - UNDP)
* Over an extremely intense two month period, interviews were undertaken with different 
representatives of all the regional indigenous organisations -  ORCAWETA (Organizaciôn de la 
Capitania Weehnayek), CPESC (Coordinadora de los Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz), CPITCO 
(Central de Pueblos Indigenas del Tropico de Cochabamba), CIRABO (Central Indlgena de la Regiôn 
Amazônica de Bolivia), CPILAP (Cential de Pueblos Indigenas de La Paz), CPIB (Central de Pueblos 
Indigenas del Beni), APG (Asamblea de Pueblos Indigenas) as well as with numerous local community 
organisations for example, CANOB (Cential Ayoreo Nativa del Oriente de Bolivia) COPNAG (Central
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lowlands and interviewing indigenous leaders and staff of NGOs and government 
agencies working with indigenous peoples.
Further, the consultation involved making a judgement on whether CIDOB properly 
represented the perspectives of the indigenous groups spread throughout the Eastern 
lowlands and whether it was a sufficiently ‘effective’ organisation.
Finally, part of the consultancy was to undertake an analysis of development work 
already being undertaken by other donors and NGOs and to give a series of 
recommendations for DFID’s futme support of the lowland indigenous peoples. I will 
go through each of these in turn and then, on this basis, isolate what I consider to be 
the main moral and ethical dilemmas that emerged. This will be followed by a more 
general discussion of the moral deliberations that I submit to be intrinsic to the 
applied anthropological task in development.
Supporting CIDOB *s involvement in the National Dialogue
At the time when I was beginning my research, DFID were in the process of 
ascertaining how they should best continue their support of the indigenous peoples of 
the Eastern lowlands of Bolivia. This coincided with an IMF programme of debt
de Organizaciones de Pueblos Natives Guaiayos), CMIB (Central de Mujeres Indigenas del Beni), 
CABI (Capitania del Alto y Bajo Izozog) CONIYURA (Consejo Yui'ucare) and CIDDEBENI (Centro 
de Investigaciôn y Documentaciôn para el Desarollo Beni). We looked in some depth at the work of 
each of the work commissions within CIDOB, that is, ‘Investigations’. ‘Communication, ‘Land and 
Teiritoiy, ‘Gender’, ‘Economy and Development’, ‘Education and Cultuie’, ‘Natural Resources’, 
‘Health’, and ‘Organisation’. We also gathered views and information from indigenous people and 
non-indigenous professionals involved m specific projects linked to CIDOB such as CENDIC (Centro 
de Documentation, Investigaciôn y Informaciôn), Projecto Hidrocaiburo, DFID Natural Resouices 
Investigation Programme, CPTI (Centro de Planificaciôn Territorial Indlgena) PDI (Proyecto de 
Desarrollo Indlgena) and PDPI (Proyecto de Desanollo de los Pueblos Indigenas). A number of 
indigenous communities were visited for three or four days at a time to undertake ‘paiticipatoiy 
poverty analyses’; Guaiayos - Ascenciôn de Guarayos and Uiubicha, Ayoreo - Puesto Paz and Poza 
Verde, Moxenos and Shionos - Bella Brisa, San Ignacio de Moxos and Yurucaré - Puerto 
Cochabamba, Mision and Ibauicito, We also undertook extensive consultation with the following 
NGOs and CSOs -  CEJIS (Centro de Estudios Jurldicos e Investigaciôn Social), CARITAS, CIDAC 
(Centro de Investigaciôn, Diseno Artesanal y Comercializaciôn Cooperativa), APCOB (Apoyo para el 
Campeslno del Oriente de Bolivia), CIDAC, ALAS (Asesoria Legal y Asisténcia Social) Pastoral 
Social, Oficlna de Asistencia Social de la Iglesia and Jubileo 2000 and the Instituto Cultural Bilingue. 
We also met with staff from other international development agencies; SNV (Servicio Holandés de 
Cooperaciôn al Desarollo), HI VOS (Dutch), IBIS (Belgium), DANIDA (Danish International 
Development Agency), and the government agencies VAIPO (Viceministerio de Asuntos Indigenas y 
Pueblos Originarios) and BOLFOR (Proyecto de Manejo Forestal Sostenible en Bolivia).
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relief^ which Bolivia was eligible for on the condition that the government presided 
over a participatory process of consultation with a cross section of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) that represented the different sectors of Bolivian society to 
formulate a comprehensive plan to reduce poverty (Coventry 1999). This was entitled 
the ‘Participatory Poverty Reduction Process’ (PRSP). This wide ranging consultation 
was to culminate in a ‘National Dialogue’; that is, a forum where the various sectors 
of Bolivian civil society were to make representations to the Bolivian government 
about their needs, challenges, perspectives and proposals for the allocation of funds 
that would be released thiough the proposed debt relief.
DFID had already declared that one of its aims was to enhance the ability of 
indigenous people to engage in policy dialogue with the Bolivian government. When 
the PRSP was announced, DFID staff sought to seize the opportunity to support 
CIDOB, one of the many civil society organisations of Bolivia, to ensure that 
indigenous voices and perspectives were gathered, collated and represented at the 
National Dialogue. I was to assist CIDOB in obtaining a grant from the United 
Nations Development Programme (PNUD) to undertake a laige scale consultation 
with the indigenous peoples of the lowlands of Bolivia about the major challenges to 
their well being which was to be presented by a representative indigenous delegation 
to the Bolivian government. My task as a consultant was to assist and facilitate the 
process of intioducing tliis idea to CIDOB^ and then collaboratively to pull together 
the people and resources required to get the necessaiy consultation done and the 
document produced. The end result of the consultancy was to be a document that 
would detail the major challenges to the livelihood of these communities, the state of 
their political participation and representation and a number of positive proposals for 
development projects and changes in legislation that would benefit the indigenous 
population. The importance of monitoring the government’s implementation of its
 ^This was entitled the ‘Highly Indebted Poor Countiies IP (HIPC II) scheme - whereby countries such 
as Bolivia would stand to have a proportion of their national debt annulled if they agreed a 
comprehensive programme of poveity reduction in consultation with civil society organisations (CSOs) 
such as CIDOB. Following this, under the two accumulative tranches of HIPC I and II, the 
international community cancelled approximately £1.4 billion from Bolivia’s external debt, freeing 
£220 million in repayments over 2002 and 2003 (DFID CSP 2002: 13).
 ^I worked collaboratively, for the first three days of the consultancy with another anthropologist, Dr, 
Rebecca Ellis.
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poverty reduction strategy to assess whether its impact on the indigenous population 
is positive was also stressed.
After collaboratively designing a process of consultation that involved meetings of 
indigenous communities thr oughout the lowlands that would be attended by a number 
of consultants who would work with a committee to write the final document that 
would be presented at the PRSP, we secured funding from the PNUD. The 
consultation unfolded over a 3 month period and the document was successfully 
presented.
The * Threats and Challenges^ Facing the Indigenous Peoples of the Eastern 
Lowlands, A Picture of the Political Landscape.
The indigenous population of lowland Bolivia is commonly recognised to be between 
250,000 and 300,000. Taking into consideration the indigenous people living in urban 
areas, the total indigenous population in lowland Bolivia rises to approximately 
500,000. 21 ethnic groups inhabit the Amazonian region, 4 in the Chaco area and 4 in 
the Eastern region according to Diez (1995: 14) However, the indigenous people of 
the lowlands themselves (or at least the members of CIDOB) state that they number 
34 separate groups, going by their own definitions of cultural and linguistic 
differences. The indigenous groups that have political representation through CIDOB 
are as follows; in the department of Santa Cruz; the Ayoreo, Chiquitano, Guarani and 
Guaiayo, in the departments of Pando and Riberalta; Araona, Cabineno, Chacobo, 
EsseEssa, Machined, Pacahuara, Tacana, Yaminagua, in Tarija, the Weehnayek, in 
the department of Beni, the Bauies, Itonoma, Canichana, Cayubaba, Mosetenes, 
Itonoma, More, Movima, Moxeno-Tiinitario, Moxeno-Javierano, Siriono and 
Tsimane, in the departments noifh of La Paz; Leco, Moseten and Tacana and in the 
Tropic of Cochabamba, the Yuqui and Yurucaré (Szabo 1998; VAIPO 1999; Perez 
1998; Hirsch 1991; Ellis and Arauz. 1998; Velazquez 1999). In addition, a nmnber of 
groups remain out of contact with mainstream society, for example, the Toromonas 
and Nahua whose populations are not laiown. The smallest of the groups in regular 
contact with CIDOB ar e the Pacahuara with only 17 individuals, whilst the largest are 
the Guarani people who have a population of over 77 000 (at the time of our research 
- 2001). The lowlands cover 70% of the surface area of Bolivia (Marinissen 1998).
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In OUI* report to DFID, we deliberately avoided descriptively emphasising solely the 
manifestations of ‘poverty’  ^among indigenous people, such as high infant mortality, 
poor nutrition, lack of formal education, for instance (World Bank, 1999A and 
1999B). Instead we concentrated on what we considered to be the key causes of their 
relative deprivation, disempoweiment and marginalisation.
We sought to identify the issues that we thought CIDOB should be assisted to address 
if it was to succeed in having a widespread and sustained impact on indigenous 
livelihoods. It is important to note here that whilst CIDOB and the indigenous 
movement more generally had achieved some very important political advances, 
many more subsequent and urgent challenges had emerged. In 1990, a protest march 
(entitled Marcha Indlgenapor el Territorio y  la Dignidad) between Trinidad and 
La Paz by the indigenous people of Beni (the march was the initiative of the then 
recently-formed CPIB [Central de Pueblos Indigenas del Beni] but was supported by 
CIDOB), signalled the beginning of a decade of intense engagement with the State 
that aimed to achieve a recognition of the rights of indigenous people, essentially 
through a transformation in the national legislative framework. The result of the 
march was the award, by means of a Decreto Supremo, of just rmder one million 
hectares to the indigenous people of Beni. This success was followed by a proposal 
for a Ley Indlgena which focused on a range of key issues such as temtorial rights, 
intercultural education, political participation and the environment (CEJIS 1999a). 
Parliament refused to pass this law in its entirety but many of its key elements 
subsequently reappeared in legislative proposals that did receive Parliamentary assent
’ In our proposal to the UNDP, Hie following statement setting out the indigenous understanding of 
poverty vis-à-vis mainstream Bolivian society was included. Essentially, the point is that the relative 
‘poverty’ of indigenous people has come about as a result of them being historically systematically 
disadvantaged and denied justice, rather than being due to the lack of capacity often ascribed to them 
by NGOs, government agencies and wider Bolivian society. Indeed, the indigenous people we spoke to 
often referred to the affluence that then forebeam enjoyed before Western intrusion. Wliilst their basic 
rights are gradually being recognised in legislation, this legislation has not, so far been reflected in 
practice and indigenous people continue to be disadvantaged; ‘El sentido, con que generalmente se ha 
venido utilizando el término de "pobre" asociado a los pueblos indigenas, ha sido como algo inherente 
a nuestia natuialeza de ser indlgena, esta percepcion acerca de nuestra situaciôn hiere nuestra dignidad, 
por el contrario, consideramos que estamos sumidos en una situaciôn tal debido a que sistematicamente 
se nos han negado oportunidades y derechos que si bien progresivamente estàn siendo reconocidos en 
la legislaciôn nacional, mâs allé de la realidad legal, falta mucho paia que se plasmen en prâcticas 
sociales. En principio, nuestia perspectiva de anâlisis acerca de la pobreza y los factores que la 
provocan no puede estar divorciada de la dignidad. Mâs allé de estos principios bâsicos, es necesario 
enriquecer esta nociôn de pobreza con el concmso de nuestras bases’.
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(the most significant of these laws were: the Ley del Medio Ambiente (1992), the Ley 
de Participacion Popular (1994), tlie Ley de Reforma Educativa (1994), and the Ley 
Forestal (1996). In addition, CIDOB played a key role in promoting Bolivia’s 
ratification, in 1991, of the International Labour Organization’s ‘Convention 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries’ (Convention 
169) and was instrumental in ensuiing that indigenous concerns were included in the 
reform of the national Constitution that took place m 1994. Probably the most 
significant success of CIDOB followed a second large scale march, in 1996, of 1,500 
indigenous people from Santa Cruz to La Paz. Its aim was to protest about the land 
question and after travelling 120 kilometres the government negotiated with CIDOB 
and agreed to promulgate the Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Ley 
INRA). This law set out a framework for the resolution of all indigenous land claims 
(Marinissen 1998; Kidd and MacLullich 2000; Castillo and Chirif 1994; Ip- 
Lathia/CEDETI 1995; Ton*es, 1999). Notwithstanding these impressive and 
significant achievements, as noted above, many new challenges had emerged, mainly 
due to the difficulties that indigenous people were experiencing in ensuring that these 
legislative changes were made concrete and carried out by the government at all 
levels.
There is a great deal of variation in the livelihoods of the many indigenous 
communities spread throughout the lowlands (Suarez 1998). It was obvious that an 
easy characterisation of indigenous people in terms of ‘poverty’ would be facile. 
Some groups have little or no land and eke out a Hvmg by selling their labour* at the 
lowest end of the market whilst others possess relatively large areas of land where 
they continue to practice a more traditional economy relatively unmolested. Thus 
nutritional status varies enormously throughout the lowlands. Malnutrition is obvious 
in many indigenous communities, especially some groups such as the Weehnayek and 
the Ayoreo (Suaznabar 1995; Velazquez 1999) in the departments of Tarija and Santa 
Cruz respectively as well many Guaranr communities in the department of 
Chuquisaca, who live on restricted areas of land or on land belonging to non- 
indigenous landowners (see also Beneria-Surkin, 2000). Nevertheless, many 
communities in Amazonia have an abundance of food due to the relatively lar ge areas 
of land available and the fertility of the soil.
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We agr eed that focusing solely on what indigenous people lack might divert attention 
away from the important assets that could be built upon. On this basis, we sought to 
give a picture of the political landscape witliin which the indigenous population could 
assert a greater influence. The most obvious assets that we stressed were their 
entitlement to their traditional territories and their social capital (organisations and 
shared goals tlrroughout the lowlands) which could be used to advance their political 
aspirations.
“Besieged^ - Accessing and Controlling Indigenous ^Tierras Comunitarias de 
Origen’ and ^Propiedades Comunales^
The most urgent concern of lowland indigenous people was to secure sufficient land 
for their present needs and future development. The land crisis was at a crucial stage 
at the time of our* resear ch. As mentioned, the mar ch of 1996 lead to the promulgation 
of the Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Ley INRA) which established a 
framework for* the resolution of indigenous land claims. Since this date, a large 
number of claims had been presented to the Bolivian government and were being 
processed at the time of our* consultancy. The major* ter*ritor*y claims are called Tierras 
Comunitarias de Origen (TCO). In 1998, 43 TCOs were being processed, totalling 
17,113,554 hectares for* 120,729 people (de Vries 1998). Propiedades Comunales 
(PC) are smaller land claims and refer to the land occupied by an individual 
cormnmiity. There are between 2,500,000 and 4,000,000 hectares of PCs (de Vries 
1998:14). There was great tension surrounding the land titling process as the success 
and integrity of each claim was under serious threat. It was clear that the Bolivian 
government was actively striving to find ways to reduce the size of the claims. The 
chief concern of tlie indigenous people was that unless the government’s attempts to 
reduce the land claims were resisted, they would be forced to accept areas of land 
insufficient for their nutritional requirements, particularly in their aspiration to 
continue traditional livelihoods which involved himting, gatliering and fishing and 
distinct forms of sociality within which these livelihoods were embedded.
A serious source of fr ustr ation for indigenous activists was that the legal basis for land 
claims which had been established through the Ley INRA ceded a great deal of 
discretionary power* to the gover*nment (VAIPO 1999B). Essentially the Ley INRA
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involved the idea of the government granting land to indigenous communities. This is 
quite different from the ILO Convention 169’s insistence on the recognition of 
indigenous people’s riglits to land they traditionally occupied over and above the 
rights of ownership of more recent landowners. In 1991, Bolivia ratified ILO 
Convention 169 which stipulates: ‘The rights of ownership and possession of the 
peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised’ 
(Article 14). However, as land claims were being processed through tlie Ley INRA, 
rather than through appeal to Convention 169, significant proportions of their 
traditional territories were excised from the agreed TCOs (CEJIS 1999A). It appeared 
that indigenous activists agieed to the process of being granted land from the 
government as tliey understood that tliis would be faster and more likely to succeed 
even if the teriitories agreed would be less extensive.
There were two main ways in which the government reduced the size of the TCOs. 
Firstly, before titles aie agreed, a process of ‘saneamiento ’ must be undertalcen. This 
involves ascertaining the legal rights of non-indigenous land-owners and businesses to 
remain within the territory and have their lands excluded from the TCO {Tierras 
Comunitarias de Origen). This can mean dramatic reductions in the size of TCOs, for 
example, the TCO pertaining to the Weehnayek people was shrunk from 196,849 
hectares to 13,000 hectares. Secondly, VAIPO (the Bolivian government’s vice 
ministry for indigenous affairs)^ is given the task of making an assessment (called a 
spatial needs study) of the area of land that each indigenous community ‘requires’ for 
its future subsistence. The results of these studies caused great concern among the 
indigenous communities as the areas of land recommended by VAIPO were 
significantly smaller than the land traditionally occupied (which had already been 
diminished by the saneamientoŸ. Paiadoxically, VAIPO, whilst being part of 
Bolivian cential government, for its work on land titling was being funded by the 
Danish governmental aid agency DANIDA which had the intention of supporting 
indigenous peoples. DANIDA’s aim was to assist indigenous people to regain their 
tenitories whereas VAIPO was shrewdly using this funding to reduce the areas titled 
and to legitimise the claims of non-indigenous landowners (see also CEJIS 1999A).
Viceministerio de Asuntos Indigenas y  Pueblos Originarios
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Once an indigenous community gain title to their territories, they assume the status of 
landowners. This lead to the challenge of managing valuable assets that could be used 
for the sustainable benefit of the communities or, conversely and commonly, a source 
of conflict between, as well as within, different communities about the use of land 
which often lead to a competitive scramble to sell assets and a rapid depletion of 
resources
It was widely felt, among the indigenous people, that the government bureaucracy 
was being used shrewdly to make the processing of indigenous land claims as 
complicated and difficult as possible. It was, in fact, a legal requirement for 
indigenous people to draw up sustainable land management plans for their territories 
before they could proceed. We noted the urgent need to assist the indigenous 
communities who had gained title to land to acquire the sldlls and resour ces required 
to undertake ‘participatory land management planning’. It was also clear that the land 
management plans required for the sustainable well being of indigenous communities 
demanded far* more involved and comprehensive preparation than what would be 
entailed by purely commercial approaches such as the normal practices of non- 
indigenous companies involved in the non-sustainable extraction of timber. Recent 
experiences had shown that genuinely participatory management plans involving the 
shared decision making and ownership of all those within a TCO that would provide 
for an equitable and sustainable distribution of economic and social benefits were 
extremely complex and required a considerable amount of time, thought and resour ces 
to put together.
 ^Various activists we interviewed argued that VAIPO pre-determines the area of land to be that would 
be recommended in terms of spatial needs prior to undertaking the study. Examples were given of 
recommended areas dovetailing with forestry interests within a territory.
We heard numerous examples of non-indigenous timber firms exploiting forest resources and 
building roads, for example, in the province of Ballivian (department of Beni), in the traditional 
territory of the Cabineno people, in the Parque Nacional Pantanal San Mattlas (Santa Cruz), in tlie 
province of Iturralde (department of La Paz), the traditional territory of the Araona people, and witliin 
the Tacana TCO in the province of Vaca Diez. Whilst most of these cases appeared to be can ied out 
without any indigenous assent or involvement, we noted widespread cases of accusations and counter- 
accusations between indigenous cormnunities about the sale of assets, for example, the vice president 
of CIDOB was ‘investigated’ for sale of assets in the Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure whilst the 
president was accused of the sale of land in the commimity of Barrio Nuevo. Both of these individuals 
were later declared to be iimocent. In the Guarani commimity of Villa Paralso, land had been sold to 
non indigenous farmers with false documents by a member of the commimity. The other members of 
the commimity had resolved not to allow this land to be used and had made representations to the 
government to resolve the issue (Oyendu No.6 1999).
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The government was widely approving forestry concessions to private companies and 
which were to be excised from TCOs. 75% of the total area of the TCOs is recognised 
as having forestry potential (de Vries 1998:32). Further, illegal logging was a 
widespread thieat and was causing conflict within communities as some indigenous 
leaders were unilaterally sellmg areas to loggers (see footnote 10).
At the time of the consultancy, there was insufficient expertise available to the 
indigenous communities to undertake these plans as TCOs were being titled. In the 
meantime, indigenous communities were being inundated with offers from 
commercial interests to set up plans for the exploitation of their natural resources. 
This was leading to a multiplication of conflicts, the rapid depletion of resources and 
the consequential diminishment of the potential benefits to indigenous coimnunities.
After these considerable difficulties, further challenges confronted indigenous 
communities in their efforts to reclaim, and defend the integrity of, their traditional 
territories. The main threats were firstly, natural resources^ \  (timber, gas oil and 
minerals) being exploited without their consent or control and secondly, the invasion 
of their lands by ‘colonisers’ (usually subsistence faimers fr om the Andean regions) 
(Orellana 1999A).
As indigenous people do not have ‘sub-suiface’ rights to land, the Bolivian 
govermnent had a free hand in granting concessions to private companies to explore 
for peti-oleum, gas and minerals within TCOs (CEJIS 1999A; Marinissen 1998 
Caifagena, Gonzales, Oehlerich, 1999). CIDOB was working to demand that the 
Bolivian government respected Article 15 of ILO Convention 169 which states that 
indigenous people should be consulted before natural resource exploration takes 
place, participate in the benefits of these activities and be compensated for any 
damage (CEJIS 1997, 1999A, 1999B; Beneria-Suildn, J. 2000).
Problems with Political Participation
Concessions for oil exploration affect 32 TCOs totalling 22% of the area of the sum of all TCOs. 
Mining concessions amount to 575,153 hectares within TCOs (de Vries 1998).
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A further difficulty for indigenous peoples was their lack of political representation at 
every level of government. Despite the passing of the Ley de Participacion Popular, 
indigenous people were still largely maiginalised from positions where they could 
have meaningful political influence (Lianos and Perez 1998; Diez 1998)^ .^ With the 
promulgation of this law in 1994 it was expected tliat indigenous communities would 
gain greater access to government resources through the municipalities and the 
prefecturas. This law widened the role of, and increased the resources channelled 
through, municipal government. Indigenous communities and organizations were 
given the opportunity to be recognized as Organizaciones Territoriales de Base 
(OTB). An 0TB is the lowest level of administration witliin a Municipality but its 
functions include proposing work to be undertaken by a Municipality and the 
monitoring of a Municipality’s resource use in the fields of health, education, the 
environment and sustainable development. To enable OTBs to exercise control over a 
Municipality, a Comité de Vigilancia should be established which consists of a 
representative from each canton or district. These representatives should be elected by 
the constituent OTBs. Although some of the people we consulted believed that the 
Ley de Participacion Popular has benefitted indigenous people, most suggest that it 
has failed in its aim of giving indigenous communities enhanced control over local 
government resources. In many areas indigenous people cannot gain access to the 
Comités de Vigilancia and, even when they do, the Comités rarely exercise influence 
over the Municipalities. As a result, indigenous people often remain last in the list of 
priorities of the Municipalities and Prefecturas.
In short, the interests of indigenous people generally figured far down the list of 
government priorities at every level. The Municipal elections of 1999 revealed some 
of the dynamics of indigenous political representation. Only 35 indigenous people 
were elected as councillors and only two were elected as mayors throughout the 
whole lowland area Some of these owed their success to being co-opted as token 
indigenous candidates on party lists. Following their election, a common experience 
was that these councillors have been unable to respond to the demands of the
As only listed political parties can take part in elections, to enter the political arena, indigenous 
people aie forced to form alliances with them. Their actual ability to influence decision making within 
parties is often minimal. Also, indigenous candidates practically never have the resources or power to 
compete with local elites in their campaigning, bargaining power, bribery or threats in election 
campaigns.
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indigenous population and have either followed paity Imes or been marginalised 
within theii' parties.
The difficulties that indigenous people faced in competing in the manipulative and 
unscrupulous political arena, then, constituted a serious challenge. We considered it 
important to recommend that a programme of ‘civic education’ be initiated so that 
indigenous people were better equipped to be able to participate effectively in, and 
exert gieater influence upon, the political process. Many of the specific difficulties 
that indigenous people voiced involved a chi onic lack of basic services such as health, 
education and means of communication. We argued that this could be only be 
improved if a gieater, and fairer, share of local government resources were made 
available to indigenous communities. This, in tuin, would only be achieved if 
indigenous people had gieater political power. Similarly, the perspectives of lowland 
indigenous people continue to be a low priority at the level of central government 
spending. The Bolivian government received the vast majority of its resources for 
indigenous peoples from international donors, for instance, only 3% of VAIPO’s 
(Vice Ministry for Indigenous Affairs) budget is provided by the Bolivian State. More 
generally, 50% of Bolivia’s public investment is made up by external donors (VAIPO 
1999A)
We observed that that gender relations among lowland indigenous people were 
becoming progressively less egalitarian, possibly as a result of changing work 
patterns. Whilst gender relations in lowland South America are highly egalitarian, a 
number of observers we spoke to had noted that this had been progressively 
weakening. Some manifestations of this ar e as follows. The labour' bmden of women 
had been increased hi many areas with the introduction of rice cultivation. Girls’ 
access to secondary education was relatively restricted as this often meant leaving 
their commimities. Generally, in relation to boys, girls are often expected to remain 
in the communities to carry the responsibility of domestic work (Suaznabar 1995). 
Indigenous women’s eai'iring power and job secmity was also far lower than that of 
men (Tijai'aipa 1993). Similarly, women’s access to positions of decision making 
power and influence is very limited. We also foimd that these problems were also 
reflected within indigenous organisations. Very few community leaders were women. 
Only CIDOB and one regional organisations had ‘gender secretaries’ and in these
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cases, their role was understood primarily in terms of reproductive health. There were, 
however a few indigenous women’s organisations. Bolivia, in fact, has a 
comprehensive rights framework written into its constitution. Part of this is the 
ratification of legislation pertinent to the rights of women, such as Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The 
indigenous movement, as fai* as we could make out, had barely used this legal 
resource for the benefit of women.
In general, we noted that there were many areas in wliich the rights of indigenous 
people were being denied and access to justice was severely restricted. For instance, a 
key area in which indigenous people suffered continual abuse of their rights was 
employment. An increasingly large proportion of the indigenous population were 
resorting to working on large farms on extremely low wages with no security. We 
found tliat these workers were often rmaware of their laborrr" rights. In the zone of 
Ingre, for instance, where there are several landless Guarani communities of 780 
households (3800 individuals) in the Department of Chuquisaca, the majority of the 
population (men, women and children) were forced to work as ‘peones’ (labourers 
with no labour rights, often held in bondage by spurious and often unpayable debts to 
their employers) on non-indigenous farms/ranches. They normally worked 14 hours 
six days a week, suffered malnutrition, had no educational provision and were paid 
only 5 Bolivianos per day^  ^ (from interviews with CIDOB investigators, Rene Pablo 
Perez, Jose Martinez. See also Oyendu 1999 No.6 ).
Equally, the extent to which indigenous people had access to their civil and political 
rights was severely compromised by their lack of knowledge about their rights. This 
was arguably compounded by entrenched racist attitudes and practices in Bolivian 
society and its police and legal institutions (CEJIS 1999B).
Assessing the Representatlvity and Efficacy of CIDOB
Ayoreo women in the community of Puesto Paz told me that they can collect an average of 30 Bs per 
day by begging in central Santa Cniz which often compares favourably with opportunities in their 
commimities.
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CIDOB is the umbrella federation for the many indigenous organisations representing 
the indigenous peoples of lowland eastern Bolivia. The Confederation is organised in 
the form of a pyramid, with individual communities at the base and CIDOB’s 
National Office at the apex. Directly below the National Office are seven regional 
organisations and each regional organisation consists of a number of affiliated, 
smaller organisations. The essential role of each organisation within the 
Confederation is to represent its affiliated members in their dealings with non- 
indigenous society. When dealing with government, local organisations work at the 
level of the Municipalities, regional organisations with departmental governments, 
and the National Office with central government.
A central aspect of the consultancy was to assess CIDOB’s role firstly as a 
representative organisation and secondly gauging its capacity to achieve the technical, 
organisational and political goals of the indigenous people they represented. This 
involved describing the historical development of CIDOB before moving on to an 
examination of its role and internal organisation, personnel and capacity. The 
following figure and table give an overview the confederation’s structuie and it’s 
constituent gi'oups.
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Our enquiry into CIDOB as a representative organisation came to the following 
conclusions. There were no other indigenous organisations competing with CIDOB 
for the right to represent indigenous people "^ .^ Instead, all organisations were 
integrated into the Confederation, respected its structure and accepted the national 
office’s position at the apex of its pyramidal structure. However, we concluded that 
CIDOB was not achieving its potential of being an organisation that comprehensively 
and effectively represented the peoples of the lowlands. We observed firstly, that the 
flow of information from the National Office to community level and vice-versa was 
often problematic. For instance, lower level organisations often did not hear about 
initiatives at the national level while, conversely, the National Office was frequently 
not informed of problems experienced by local communities. A common complaint 
was that members of the National Directorate did not visit local communities often 
enough. Indeed, people in local communities had often never heard of CIDOB and the 
only organisations of which they were aware were their local and regional 
organisations.
Secondly, conflicts occasionally arose between organisations at different levels of the 
pyramid. Lower level organisations frequently decided to follow policies that 
conflicted witli tire recommendations of the Confederation thereby provoking 
uncomfortable relations with the organisations above them. Thirdly, the larger and 
more capable organisations within the Confederation often implemented strategies 
and representation to government at a national level without fully consulting the 
National Office. Some of the regional and lower level organisations, paificularly 
clearly had greater technical capacity and expertise than the National Office of 
CIDOB. CPESC (Coordinadora de los Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz), and CABI 
(Capitania del Alto y Bajo Izozog), for instance were involved in the management of 
budgets many times greater than that of CIDOB and, arguably, had greater political 
impact^^ (Beneria-Surkin 2000).
The Bolivian government had made an unsuccessful attempt to replace CIDOB with their own 
agency some years before.
The $2,000,000 Plan de Desarrollo Indigena (PDI) was being managed by CPESC. CABI 
independently set up a foundation (Ivi lyambae) to administer finance for its various projects as well 
as co-administiating a USAID-funded project to manage the Kaa-Iya National Park which at 3.4 
million hectar es is the largest in South America.
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Nevertheless, we concluded that CIDOB possessed significant assets upon which 
futuie work could be based. Ai'guably the most important were its powerful image and 
the respect in which it was held by the Bolivian government, primarily as a legacy of 
its past political successes. The government along with external donors, international 
solidarity organisations, NGOs and other indigenous organisations regarded CIDOB 
as the legitimate national and international representative of the lowland indigenous 
peoples of Bolivia.
The past successes of CIDOB in changing areas of Bolivian legislation that were 
crucial to the interests of the indigenous peoples of the lowlands had, in fact, 
multiplied their challenges in engaging with the interpretation and implementation of 
these laws. We str essed that it was important to str engthen the capacity of CIDOB to 
respond adequately to the many challenges (outlined above) that were facing 
indigenous people.
One aspect of this task involved looldng at the professional capacities of the elected 
indigenous members of CIDOB in relation to the professionals who worked alongside 
them, the majority of whom were not indigenous. CIDOB’s national office comprises 
eleven indigenous members of a ‘National Directorate’ who are elected as 
representatives of the regional organisations and are expected both to design and 
implement policy. We noted that ‘while tliere have been, and are, some gifted 
dirigentes^^ who have done excellent work, this is often not the case’. Dirigentes were 
not always chosen because of their capacity to fulfil a specific role, but achieved their 
position for other reasons, such as their influence or status within their communities. 
It was obvious that, in some cases, candidates who displayed few of the necessary 
sldlls and, in some cases, lacked the proper motivation had been elected. We 
concluded that CIDOB, rather than relying solely on an electoral system that did not 
seem to produce the best candidates for the very demanding jobs that were set before 
them, could overcome its cuirent incapacity by the employment of capable 
professional staff (indigenous or otherwise), known as "técnicos’ (technicians). 
CIDOB's past successes had, in fact, involved very significant input fiom technicians
The choice of the term dirigente inappropriately suggests a formal hierarchy in the organisation. The 
essence of this role may have been better encapsulated by the choice of a term such as représentante 
(representative). The use of the term dirigente is apparently derived from the sindicatos (ti ade unions).
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who maintained good working relations with the indigenous dirigentes. In interviews 
with CIDOB dirigentes, it was frequently expressed that the posts of ''técnicos ' should 
be filled by indigenous professionals. Nevertheless, in our report to DFID we 
suggested that ‘while this aim is laudable, the problems faced by indigenous people 
are so serious that every effort should be made to employ the highest quality staff 
possible. At the same time, in the course of their work technicians should place a high 
priority on the tiansfer of skills to indigenous people’.
In fact within CIDOB, whilst there was a strong sense that indigenous people should 
have ownership of all the major decisions taken, there was also recognition that the 
indigenous movement is not, in fact, restricted to indigenous organisations as it also 
encompasses a number of non-indigenous NGOs and individuals who are politically 
committed to the indigenous cause and work closely with indigenous organisations at 
all levels. Arguably, CIDOB was originally set up on the initiative of anthropologists 
working in a local NGO^^, whilst CIDOB instigated the creation of many of the lower 
level organisations. The indigenous organisations of lowland Bolivia did not appear to 
have emerged spontaneously fiom indigenous society (Riester 1985, Marinissen 1998; 
Castillo and Chirif 1994; Ip-Latina/CEDETI 1995; Torres, 1999)
In fact it seemed clear that this pattern of initiative and finances originating with the 
non-indigenous agencies and individuals working with indigenous people was still 
prevalent. My fellow consultant, Stephen Kidd, opined that this model of financial 
support being provided fiom above had coirespondence with the traditional practice 
of the indigenous leader being generous and providing for his community. In addition, 
this pattern fits witli Bolivia’s political system which is thoroughly patrimonial and 
clientelist (World Banlc 2000)^ .^ A potential implication of these dynamics was that 
the indigenous leadership were becoming more accountable to donors and open to 
corruption. After these observations, we explored CIDOB’s relations with its current 
donors and made an analysis of why indigenous people themselves did not offer 
financial support to then own organisations. CIDOB, in common with almost all 
indigenous organisations in lowland Bolivia received no funding fi*om those it
APCOB (Apoyo para el Campesino del Oriente de Bolivia)
In Transparency International’s ‘Global Corruption Report’, Bolivia was perceived by the 
international business community as being the 85^ ' worse out of 91 countries in the sui'vey (2001).
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represented and was maintained by external (mainly European) donors. We noted that 
the absence of financial support fiom the communities threatened the sustainability of 
indigenous organisations and made them less accountable to their constituents.
Recommendations to DFID for the Future Support of the Indigenous Peoples of 
Eastern Lowlands
Before suggesting potential areas of future DFID support, we undertook a study of the 
existing development programmes among lowland indigenous peoples. This meant 
undertaking a ‘stakeholder analysis’ On this basis, we made the observation that 
while there were a wide spectrum of development initiatives underway, very few of 
these had a clear* political focus to then* work. We concluded that the majority of these 
sought to directly improve indigenous livelihoods without creatively challenging the 
political status quo. The brief analysis and consultation described above had, we 
ar gued, demonstrated that the approach that would most benefit the indigenous 
population was an avowedly political one.
We concluded tliat, despite the difficulties of representativity, efficacy and capacity 
tliat we identified, there was clear potential for future DFID collaboration with 
CIDOB in areas that would have a significant impact on the livelihoods of indigenous 
people. After examining the range of projects under*way in lowland Bolivia, it was 
also apparent that space existed for DFID to support work that is not currently being 
covered by other institutions^^.
A ‘stakeholder analysis is a research tool used by DFID before any development intervention. It 
involves finding out what development work is already underway, where and by whom. The analysis 
also involves figui'ing out what the likely prognosis of different project ideas would be vis-à-vis views 
and political positions of the various stakeholders (community gioups, landowners, political groups, 
church groups, NGOs and otlier CSOs) and identifying likely risks that might preclude undertaking a 
project, for example corruption or the possibility of exacerbating existmg social tensions.
Whilst indigenous people are targeted by development agencies extensively, and there were a wide 
range of development projects underway among the various indigenous groups, only a tiny number had 
a political focus. We identified a few projects that dealt with indigenous land rights, such as legal 
assistance provided by CEJIS, ALAS and the Catholic agency, Equipo Pastoral Indigena. CEJIS was 
impressive in the sense that, with modest resources (from Oxfam UK) it unfolded a multi-faceted legal 
aid project nationally for indigenous people, as well as working on land rights, staff also focused on 
such issues as water, laboui*, and civil and political rights, aiming to modify national legislation. 
However, the majority of NGOs sought to improve indigenous livelihoods in various ways but did not 
address underlying political difficulties. A number of NGOs implement small-scale projects focused on 
improving agricultmal production, sustainable use of forest products (such as honey) for sale in local 
and global markets, artisan workshops, micro-credit systems, commercial outlets sanitary facilities and 
the provision of basic infr astructure. Some programmes were partially supported by central government
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The specific areas of future work that we recommended were as follows. Ffistly, we 
recommended supporting CIDOB to acquire the technical capacity to respond 
politically to the main threats and challenges facing indigenous people. Given that the 
land struggle was at a critical stage, we considered it imperative that CIDOB was 
strengthened in its capacity to effectively monitor and challenge the government 
which was quite explicitly delimiting the potential benefits to indigenous peoples of 
recent changes to the legislation^ \
Secondly, on the basis of our analysis of regional organisations, we recommended 
that DFID could support efforts to strengthen the capacity of indigenous organisations 
and leaders throughout the confederation to make effective political representations.
Thirdly, in conjunction with the above, we recommended undertaking a programme 
of raising indigenous people’s awareness about their rights and trying to increase their 
access to mechanisms through which they could claim these rights^ .^
On the basis of oui* obseiwations concerning the relations within the confederation, we 
suggested that DFID should involve Regional Organisations in any discussions about 
fiiture projects.
Having noted the lack of co-ordination and occasional conflicts of outcome that 
existed between the different international donors supporting the indigenous 
movement, we advised that any discussions on future support should include all of 
these parties. We suggested that any future DFID project should be channelled
(usually with external donors)., such as the Proyecto de Desarrollo de Pueblos Indlgenas en el Beni 
(PRODESIP), the Ministry of Education’s intercultural education programme and VAIPO’s 
reproductive health programme. According to some commentators, these projects seemed to be more 
active before elections. New projects, managed by combinations of NGOs and indigenous communities 
had arisen as a result of compensation payments for the impact of large-scale development projects 
(such as roads and gas pipelines) on indigenous temtories.
Specifically, we recoimiiended the resurrection of the Centro de Planificacion Territorial Indigena 
(CPTI). This had been a project designed to provide the technical support for indigenous communities 
to defend their land claims. The Centre (which was based in CIDOB’s national office) had the most 
advanced computer mapping systems in Bolivia. Staff here had worked to collate and monitor 
information on land claims and was a significant resource for the indigenous movement in its defence 
of land claims. Due to conflicts over the management of the Centre, funding was withdrawn and the 
CPTI ceased to function in 1999. This had been a huge blow to the indigenous movement as the 
national office was presently unable to co-ordinate land claims process at a national level and 
effectively challenge the Bolivian government.
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through a ‘platfonn of donors’ and that all donors should agree a common set of aims 
prior to entering into discussions with CIDOB on future funding.
Finally, we argued that futuie support for CIDOB should aim to establish the financial 
independence of the national office and the regional organisations with regard to their 
core funding whilst aclcnowledging that funding for technical teams would be beyond 
the capacity of the indigenous population^^.
Emergent Ethical Issues
From this experience as a consultant, I became awaie of a number of areas of moral 
confusion or moral ambiguity that I submit to be intiinsic to the applied 
anthi'opological task.
As consultants in Bolivia we were required to rapidly assimilate the complexity of the 
tasks presented to us and to distil recommendations about how to achieve agreed 
goals from our engagement and immersion in this intricate and often indecipherable 
context. There was a obviously a huge contrast between the relatively manageable and 
coherent world presented in our report for DFID and the complex disarray and 
imbroglio of the political, economic, inter-cultural and moral world that we had been 
plunged into. It could be argued that the report had no more than a verisimilitude of 
consistency, predictability and order. As DFID has an explicit commitment to a 
‘rights based approach to development’, we sought to present our analysis and 
recommendations in terms that would fit with, and appeal to, proponents of this 
agenda. In reality, the sometimes messy experience of researching and writing this 
report brought forth many wider perplexing issues than those that finished on the 
desks of DFID.
^ For instance, Bolivia has ratified CEDAW, Convention 169 and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.
^ We argued as follows; ‘existing donor support for the core funding of indigenous organisations - 
especially the National Office - should continue for two years. Then, over a period of three years, it 
should be progressively reduced to zero. Dui ing this period of five years, donor support should focus 
on developing the financial independence of indigenous organisations, which should include 
contributions from member communities’.
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Not having worked as a consultant before, I was interested in more than the terms of 
reference defined with DFID. Probably as a result of this openness, I found myself 
bewildered by the complexity of the situation I found myself in. I found it daunting to 
reflect that I had to quickly capture the crucial aspects of the fast moving issues that 
sunounded me in a succinct report written in ‘development reportage’. As I pondered 
the many different issues tliat converged on tlie consultancy, it occuiTed to me that the 
moral validity, or otheiwise, of what I was doing would be difficult to figuie out. The 
question of what role I was supposed to fill, how best to do it along with the woiTy of 
being caught up in something that I would not wholly agree with came to occupy my 
mind as much as the research and report wilting I was being paid for. I found myself 
contemplating a wide range of moral dilemmas that I suimised to be intiinsic to the 
whole development process. Principally, I was concerned with the positionality of the 
anthi’opologist/consultant in relation to those we were supposed to represent 
(simultaneously DFID and the indigenous peoples of the Eastern lowlands of Bolivia). 
I realised that these considerations opened up a wide range of questions about the 
philosophical presuppositions and models as well as the political goals that underlie 
development practice.
The most difficult task seemed simply understanding the nature of the different levels 
of development discourse and practice in the context of radical global asymmetry. 
Wliilst I considered it essential to gain a grasp of the agendas and multiplex 
relationships that exist between levels that join the politics of bilateral lending 
discussed in DFID’s Victoria Street London offices to the asphations of individuals in 
specific indigenous villages, I found it challenging to know where to stall.
In short I was stmck, although not paralysed, by the thoroughly moral texture of the 
work I was undertaking. My initial reflections were as follows. I had to confiont the 
fact that I was thoroughly unclear about where I stood in the complex positionalities 
of people fiom different backgrounds, representatives of different agencies, powerful 
funders and an indigenous organisation that was regarded as being less than efficient 
and efficacious and was even suspected of being conupt. I felt uncomfortable about 
aspects of the consultancy such as the scmtiny that we were putting the indigenous 
organisations under, the sense of being an intrusive auditor at times. It was disturbing 
to consider the very real possibility that our findings would be interpreted in such a
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way as to end DFID’s funding of CIDOB. I was pertuibed by the mis-match between 
the potential implications of our report and the extent of my knowledge and expertise. 
It rankled my anthropological sensibilities or aspirations to play a fleeting and 
fugacious role in the lives of the research subjects in indigenous communities, 
extr acting information with no promise of what the outcome would be. On a more 
theoretical level, I began to consider the inevitable difficulties of negotiating between 
the politically pluralist approach necessary for indigenous well being and the 
ineluctably paternalist perspectives of DFID and the Bolivian government. In writing 
the report, I began to confr ont the limits of development language and became acutely 
aware of the entangled asymmetries of knowledge, power and finance. Specific 
dilemmas also ar ose such as advocating for the land rights of indigenous peoples over 
and above the need that landless settlers had for land^ "^ . In the next chapter, I will look 
at some further developments of these initial reactions and some reflections of these 
in anthropological literature.
As human rights legislation opens up possibilities for indigenous peoples to gain legal title to land 
that they are the historical occupants of, questions arise with regard to the well being of the displaced 
landless peasants who are moved on and forced to eke out a living on the margins of urban society. The 
antln-opologist, adopting the expected role as advocate of indigenous people, risks becoming an 
accomplice in the removal of recent colonisers of unused land. Nugent aigues that peasants in 
Amazonia are often rendered invisible in many anthropological representations. He asserts that where 
they do figure on the margins of ethnographies, they may even be demonised (1993). Whilst the fact 
that, in Bolivia, at least, indigenous people tend to also be tlie most marginalised and financially 
impoverished, may make claiming special rights for them seem less problematic, it remains that there 
was a tension between different discourses of entitlement here. Landless peasants may suffer multiple 
deprivations, vulnerabilities and insecurities as severely as indigenous groups whilst having no 
recoui'se to special rights. The logic of granting whole indigenous communities legal personality is not, 
primarily, to do with income-poverty, but involves respecting the value of indigenous life-worlds as 
distinct and precious ways of being. It also putatively involves indigenous people managing the 
resouices on their land according to their own decision making processes, even if this means not 
exploiting the land’s commercial potential, although land management plamiing usually involves the 
external professionals. The idea of collective rights, however, clashes with individual rights. Some 
development professionals we spoke to were concerned about the position of women in indigenous 
communities, arguing that previously egalitarian gender relations were being eroded and currently left 
a lot to be deshed. They argued that these women were becoming doubly disadvantaged within their 
own communities.
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C h a p ter  3
Caught in Webs of Moral Bewilderment; The Ethics of Anthropological 
Involvement in Development Interventions
Negotiating Incommensurable and Multi-layered discourses
Many applied anthropologists, perturbed by the realities of poverty, or of the failings 
of exclusionary styles of development, feel compelled to take on the role of advocate 
and/or commit themselves to some form of solidarity with those whose lives they 
seek to represent. Gabriel makes a distinction between ‘development anthropology’ 
and the ‘anthropology o f  development’ in terms of the former dealing with ‘what 
ought to exist in the future’ as opposed to research that deals with ‘what exists at 
present’ (1991: 37). The very fact of anthropological involvement indicates that a 
moral choice has been made.
Recent increases in the involvement of anthropologists in development combined with 
clearer understandings of the inextricability of power and the production of 
knowledge, (for example through the regularities in development language which 
arguably reproduce dominant perspectives [Escobar 1995]) complicate the picture 
further, as Manderson and Wilson argue:
‘In the past, romantic accounts situated anthropologists as unproblematically 
‘champions of the weak’. Now, more often, we are caught in a delicate 
balance of different moralities, ethics and responsibilities: of those who fund 
and support our work, whose objectives -  at least for many applied 
anthropologists -  are concordant rather than at odds with our own: those who 
provide institutional approval for our presence or under whose auspices we 
work; and those whose lives are the subjects of our inquiry and investigation. 
Ethical, moral and political circumstances intrude at every point in the 
research process’ (1998: 215).
Critiques of development often contain the erroneous assumption that anthropologists 
have radically different views from those of developers (for instance Sachs 1993;
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Esteva 1993; IlUch 1993). Marcus, in fact asserts that despite previous stand-offs, 
there is an emerging affinity ‘between bureaucrats, officials, professionals, and left- 
liberal scholars that may be disturbing to the latter, but which progressive scholars 
would have to take self-consciously into account in puisuing futuie projects’ (1999: 
9). Often development interventions, either in terms of a specific input, or regarded 
more generally, are valued and supported by anthropologists. I could not discern 
anything sinister in the self aware efforts that DFID professionals in London were 
making to support the indigenous peoples of the lowlands of Bolivia. The approach 
was one of empoweiment, the promotion of greater autonomy and involved a 
paiticipatory approach. Notwithstanding this, I found it perplexing to consider tliat 
DFID forms part of a government that quite blatantly defends and promotes its 
dominant geo-political and economic position in a world system that arguably creates 
the very conditions that development inteiwentions are designed to mitigate. The 
efforts, work and resouices of DFID in comparison to the effects of the machinations 
of global capitalism was obviously minute.
However, it is not implausible that anthropologists may see globalisation as an 
inevitable reality that has to be worked within even though it is orchestrated by 
Western or Northern hegemony. Gledhill, for instance, raises the provocative and 
rhetorical question of whether there is any ‘compelling reason why an anthiopologist 
should not, for example, be convinced of the long term desirability of Northern 
models of global modeimsation. It is as least logically possible to believe that such 
models can be implemented without riding rough-shod over human rights and 
denying people opportunities to continue to express cultural diversity’ (1994: 209). 
Rapport (1997) is one anthropologist who, with a few qualifications, appears to 
propound this view.
There seems to be an assumption in academia that the anthropologist will always be 
on-side with the views of the people s/he has come to represent, cleverly taking a wry 
anti-development stance in solidarity with the people. This is frequently untrue. 
Esteva, for example, describes his confusion when discovering that the people he was 
conducting research among were enthusiastically embracing the benefits a 
development project offered. This was quite contrary from what he had learned in his 
academic preparations about development: ‘I kept asking myself: ‘Why haven’t the
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settlers and (Nakanai) villagers realised that development stinlcs?’ ’(1987: 35). The 
multiplication of conflicts within and between indigenous communities that we 
became aware of in lowland Bolivia was paitially caused by incidents of indigenous 
people abandoning their commitment to their own communities and unilaterally 
selling resources that were owned collectively.
I think it is important to make the point that dichotomising between a homogenous, 
scientific, rationalist, neo-colonial, top-down depiction of development discourse on 
the one hand and ‘recalcitrant indigenous people only versed in local knowledge’ on 
the other, is simplistic; ‘there is as much diversity mthin the community of 
‘professional developers’ as between them and other stakeholders or players’ (Grillo 
and Stinat 1997: 21). These idealised differences are both naïve and patronising. 
Richards observes that it is a fiequent mistake to assume that ‘small scale cultivars 
necessarily abound in agi'o-ecological wisdom’ (1993: 61); they may, and often do, 
benefit fiom Western technological inputs \  In our consultancy, one of the primary 
benefits that we envisaged coming from Western professional sources was the 
expertise to construct participatory land management plans that would allow the 
continuation of sustainable livelihoods in limited areas. Indigenous people, to the 
extent that this was possible, were hastily studying these skills with the assistance of 
various European donors.
The pressure and urgency to resolve these dilemmas of involvement and making a 
judgement about the long term impacts of development, the benefits of Western 
technology and the threat of capitalist social fiagmentation, is heightened by the fact 
that the worlds that development addresses itself to are often fiaught with human 
suffering and injustice. From the beginnings of the discipline, anthropologists have 
asked themselves whether or not they can make a difference by getting involved in the 
forces of colonialism or development. Whereas Benedict (1934) insisted that no one
 ^ One of the most urgent points that was reiterated in my paiticipatory poverty assessment in the 
Ayoreo community of Poza Verde was their necessity for a tractor. The last tractor owned by tlie 
community that had been part of an aid package from the World Bank had never been maintained and 
still stood lusting and str ipped of parts at the edge of the village (there was also an empty one room 
school house which had not been served by a teacher for tliree years). Whilst the members of tlie 
community benefited in the short term from the use of their first tractor in terms of being able to 
cultivate more land and to transport their produce to local markets more easily, they did not have the 
expertise or resources to maintain the tr actor.
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culture should assume superiority by prescribing solutions to the apparent problems of 
another, Malinowski argued in 1945 that:
‘The native needs help. The anthropologist who is unable to perceive this, 
unable to register the tragic errors committed at times with the best of 
intentions, at times under the stress of dire necessity, remains an antiquarian 
covered with academic dust in a fools paradise . . .  But research in order to be 
of use must be inspired by coinage and purpose . . . Shall we therefore mix 
politics with science? Decidedly “yes” ’ (in Hackenberg and Hackenberg 
1999: 1).
Whilst anthropologists may have ethical concerns about the forces driving colonialism 
and/or development, they may opt to engage with these forces so as to temper them, 
to work critically within the development framework. Gulliver relates his thinking in 
1952; ‘ . .  . colonialism was the going regime and it seemed reasonable and attractive 
to try and work within it, to contribute towards amelioration and improvement and 
even, just a little, to hasten its end’ (1985: 45).
The decision to get mvolved in development obviously carries the risk that one might 
be compromised ethically but for many, this is preferable to adopting a diffident or 
disdainful posture as Gledhill reasons:
‘A holier than thou attitude of scholarly detachment and smug complacency 
regarding the transcendental wisdom embodied in a discourse restricted to the 
academic arena hardly seems a much more politically satisfactory position for 
an antlrropologist than selling one’s conscience for a quick buck’ (1994: 216).
Whilst these are hyperbolic characterisations of both the academic anthropologist as 
an irrelevant, vainglorious and trivial buzz-word and tail chasing figure and the 
applied anthropologist as an unscrnpulous mercenary, Gledhill draws attention to an 
area that has been the locus of a great deal of anthropological deliberation and even 
angst. The academic studies that I had imderiaken of the peoples of lowland South 
America, which focused almost exclusively on indigenous life-worlds, sociality and 
cosmology had furnished me with a commitment to be part of an agenda that assisted
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indigenous peoples to maintain and protect their traditional ways of life (see for 
example Overing and Passes et al 2000). The field of social anthropology, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, from its most abstract and inaccessible theory building 
to its most obvious applications, is obviously sufftised with ethical and moral 
deliberations.
In defence of academia and what it has to offer to practice, Geeriz warns against 
hastiness in the production of knowledge about other societies, saying that ‘to judge 
without understanding constitutes an offence against morality’ (2001: 40). Whilst this 
view is now central to the work ethic of social anthropologists, on the other hand, it 
could also be argued that to understand without judging and acting in the face of 
suffering or injustice constitutes a worse offence. In fact, Geertz notes that ‘there is a 
diagnostic and a remedial side to our scientific concern with (other) societies, and the 
diagnostic seems, in the very nature of the case to proceed infinitely faster than the 
remedial’ (2001: 24). Applied antluopologists set out to be professionally involved in 
the remedial counterpart of the diagnostics of anthropology, rightly or wrongly, 
feeling an mgency to ‘do something’.
However, anthropologists, whilst arming to contribute to the well being of those they 
work among by getting involved in development, at the same time, may have deep 
concerns about being part of a global project that extends the social, cultural, 
economic and moral reach of the West whilst being acutely aware of the 
accompanying stark inequalities, environmental damage and alienation (see also 
Jackson 2002: 107-8). Anthropologists often have profound difficulties with the 
whole idea of Western driven progress, and the society that development aims 
towards. The philosopher Charles Taylor asks why it is that ‘rational control over 
natme, which has grown with the European philosophical and technological 
achievement, has nevertheless produced such anti-human results’ (1968: 226).
Anthropologists, ambivalent about the moral basis of Western society, are inevitably 
confronted with the question of whether they should be supporting and defending 
non-modem models of human morality, sociality and interaction with the natural 
environment as evidently. Western interventions are often felt to be intrusive, 
offensive, aggressive and poisonous by indigenous groups (see Overing and Passes
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2000). Gow gives an apt description of the impression of ‘white people’ that the Piro 
people of the Bajo Urubamba, (Peru) have developed over the course of their contact 
with them:
‘When they say that white people are mshinikatu, ‘disrespectful’ they refer to 
the shockingly disrespectful manner in which white people treat each other 
and everyone else. As they say, ‘Go to the white man’s house and see if he 
will feed you! That’s where you will learn to suffer!’ White people either do 
not notice other people’s hunger, or they do notice it and do not care’ 
(2000:52)
Theorists with radically different stances can not help agreeing with the evidence that 
economic development has generally been canied out m an exclusionary and 
inequitable manner. Vargas Llosa, (whilst coming from a very different political 
position [right wing, neo-liberal and pro-development] from anthropologists of 
GledliilTs ilk), writing from the Peruvian context, admits that ‘the very notion of 
progress must be difficult to conceive by the communities whose members never 
remember having experienced any improvement in their lives, but rather, prolonged 
stasis with periods of regression’ (1983: 36).
I am personally persuaded by views that are militantly against mainstieam 
development considering it, as Sachs writes, to have ‘provided the fundamental frame 
of reference for that mixture of generosity, bribery and oppression which has 
char acterised the policies towar ds the South . . .  a blunder of planetar y proportions’ 
(1993: 1, 3). I also think that a crucial insight in the apprehension of the orthodoxy of 
economic development processes is its relational aspect, that is, the active and 
coercive categorisation of people and resouices in asymmetrical relations. Escobar 
also makes a strong case for this view, asserting persuasively that development 
plaiming has ‘contributed greatly to the production of the socio-economic and cultural 
configuration that we describe today as underdevelopment’ (1992: 132).
There is an almost seamless identification between capitalism and development, both 
in its economic motivation and the reparations and redistribution carried out through 
various kinds of projects that are its consequential necessities. A concern of many
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critics of the development process as a whole is that, essentially, the naiTow 
organising principles of capitalism render valueless all aspects of nature and society 
tliat are not priced in the market. The anthropologist Hornborg, for instance, makes 
the case that capitalism retains its monolithic consistency as a system of power 
‘precisely because it is not a species of culture but the very denial o f culture, in the 
sense of specific and implicit local meanings’ (1994: 240, my emphasis). The 
relentless exploitation of natural resour ces that underpins Western industrial society 
often ignores ecological processes that are essential for the regeneration of these 
resources^. Similarly, tlie perspectives of those people whose needs are not satisfied 
through, and whose visions of well being are out of synch with involvement with, 
market mechanisms are also ignored, rendered worthless if they are not engaged in 
market oriented productivity (see also Berthoud 1992, Sbert 1992 and Bauman 1990).
Economic grovrih has historically often caused poverty and social dislocation for 
those removed from previously viable and sustainable traditional livelihoods. The 
anti-development position, involves tire defence of indigenous life-worlds against the 
inexorable individuating pressure of capitalism which can reduce persons who once 
belonged relatively securely within a traditional moral community to the level of 
landless, migrant or slum-dwelling proletarians competing with others in a 
deregulated infomial economy. Apffell-Mai'glin, for instance, from her collaborations 
with anti-development anthropologists in Andean Peru, laments the capitalist 
obliviation and denigration of the rich world of ‘peasant livelihoods’:
‘Native agriculture and culture (are) not only appropriate to that environment 
but alive and vibrant -  despite the efforts of development, education and a 
long term histoiy of attempts to extirpate the native culture -  and embody a 
totally different mode of being in the world, of being a person, of relating to 
others both human and non-human, and of notions of time and space and of 
nature . . .  it is only from the perspective of development, which makes one
 ^Across the world we continue to see the pollution of air and water, over-fishing, the destruction of 
tropical and temperate rain forests, the extinction of entiie species, desertification, erosion of precious 
topsoil, and the disappearance of wilderness for development.
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wear modem Western lenses, that peasant agriculture and culture looks 
backward, stagnant and altogether lacking (1998: 3) .^
This irresolution and vacillation then, between the desire to contribute to the well 
being of others who are perceived to be in need, (which is practicable and can malce 
real gains), and the cynicism (or realism) about the neo-colonial basis of development, 
is a central pait of tlie antluopological moral experience of others’ ‘poverty’. For the 
most part, however, anthiopologists in development are unlikely to jettison their 
discipline and the development process in its entirety and will work with a pragmatic 
agenda of balancing the autonomy of indigenous communities against the anonymity 
of the omnipresent market economy.
When considering the ethical dimensions of development, it is also necessary to look 
at the social and political models that accompany development. As development 
agencies increasingly adopt a ‘rights based approach’, which embodies a particular 
kind of morality, the challenge for anthropologists is to understand the impact of this 
morality (which has pretensions to universality) in specific contexts. As will be 
discussed below, the moral sensibilities of indigenous peoples are formed in 
qualitatively different traditions. Whilst, in my work as a consultant, I did not have 
sufficient time to personally explore the many indigenous forms of sociality and 
morality throughout lowland Bolivia in any depth, it was apparent that their 
necessarily combative engagement witli the Bolivian government through rights 
legislation involved a leap away fiom their accustomed ways of relating socially.
Marcus and Fischer argue that ‘Liberalism, including a strong relativist component, 
triumphed as the explicit ideology of public policy, government and social morality ..  
. It became the defining framework for discussions of rights and justice’ (1986: 32). 
There is, however, opposition to this agenda in Western theory. Annette Baeir, for 
instance, aigues tliat the wholesale adoption of rights based or contractarian, 
procedural systems of morality would mean that ‘life will be nasty, emotionally poor 
and worse than brutish’ (1995: 14 -  this debate is discussed in Chapter 10). Gledhill
 ^ She further describes how members of Andean collectivities, that explicitly set out to engender the 
regeneration of indigenous culture and agricultural practices, who were also trained as anthropologists
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also contends that the presupposition that Western models of liberal democracy are 
the most hopeful for global society in terms of social justice and liberty ‘remains an 
open question’. He asks ‘whether real history is really going the way of Rawls and 
Rorty on the basis of tlie evidence . . .  presented thus far on the realities and politics of 
poverty, even in the countries which come closest to realising liberal ideals’ (1997: 
90). Anthropologists need to consider these debates which originate from an 
ambivalence and equivocation about Western values, so as to know where they stand 
in relation to the force of ‘human rights’ and the values it enslirines and negates.
Aspects of the Asymmetric Positionality of the Anthropologist as Consultant
\  the privileged interpreter, the producer o f knowledge that might or might
not be put at the service o f others ’ (Gledhill 1994: 222)
One of the first moral difficulties that I became aware of was the asymmetry of the 
relationships that made up the various encounters I was involved in and observed, in 
teiTns of decision making power. I look here at how the dynamics of asymmetiy relate 
to privileged kinds of ‘knowledge’ and language, ascriptions and assumptions of 
‘ignorance’, uni-directional ‘scmtiny’ and the radically unequal economic status 
between developers and the ‘under-developed’. I attempt here to make a virtue out of 
my naïveté'  ^ and method out of my ignorance, writing this section in terms of my 
perceptions at the time of tlie consultancy and the further considerations that these 
initial intuitions and reactions lead to.
I had written to DFID speculatively about research possibilities and had unexpectedly 
been given the opportunity to take up this consultancy. The role that I filled had two 
aspects. On the one hand I was there to assist CIDOB write a funding application to 
the PNUD, on the other I was there, along with the other consultant, to make 
potentially influential recommendations regarding the ways in which DFID might
in Western universities underwent a ‘moral passage’ that made clear to them ‘the impossibility of 
participating in the Andean collective actions from within the profession’ {op.cif. 5).
As Rapport notes; ‘Naiveté . . .  was an anthr opological duty, inasmuch as it behoved the investigator 
to retain an open mind, open to all maimer of influences and informations while conducting his [or her] 
research, open to the fullness and diversity of experience, while at the same time the investigator had 
ultimately to achieve closure, at least to the extent of writing a final paragraph to the account of his 
research. It was in naiveté that such opeimess and closure met.’ (2000:1)
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support the indigenous peoples of the lowlands (the funding for an existing DFID 
project was coming to an end). Whilst some of the difficulties I describe originated 
fiom the fact of my naïveté and lack of experience, I submit that these issues also 
arise for more seasoned and cognisant consultants, although perhaps not so acutely.
The dynamics of the consultancy were such that I quickly became acutely awaie of 
the tensions inherent in my role. I was simultaneously perturbed and challenged by 
the (co)responsibility of finding myself in a position in which I had to quickly grasp, 
imderstand, and unpack the colossal amount of information, opinion and strategy that 
surrounded the consultancy and then re-package all of this in a language that would be 
acceptable to DFID. I knew that our report could have far reaching consequences and 
for this reason I also felt the import of ensuiing that all of the information that I 
gathered was cross referenced or triangulated fiom different sources.
Whilst the whole purpose of DFID’s support for CIDOB was explicitly spoken about 
in terais of empowerment^, there still remained the dynamics of asymmetrical power 
between the reseai'cher/consultant and the subjects of research. There are various 
aspects to this asymmetry.
Firstly, as consultants, we were positioned so that we could scrutinise and malce 
decisions about the other without being subject to the same from those who were the 
‘targets’ of the development intervention. A central task in this research was to give 
DFID a judgement on the extent to which CIDOB truly represented the interests of the 
indigenous peoples of lowland Eastern Bolivia. This involved travelling to speak to 
the people of as many mdigenous communities as possible, seeking their views on 
CIDOB and checking whether or not their concerns were reflected in the projects that 
were being realised. The question of representation also meant asking questions about 
the political autonomy of CIDOB, whether accusations of corruption^ and feuding
 ^‘The goal of DFID’s futm e str ategy is that state and society work together to achieve sustainable 
poverty reduction in Bolivia’ (DFID CSP Bolivia 2002).
® Our report came up with a niunber of recommendations with regard to this. At one level, this seemed 
morally appropriate, finding what the most efficacious way that aid could be invested and ensur ing that 
those who would receive the funds would be accountable to both the people who were meant to benefit 
from it and from the donors. However, there was no parity in scrutiny, for example if CIDOB wanted 
to challenge the way in which DFID spends money. Here, though, I fbrmd the idea of corruption far 
fiom straightforward. Corruption, or clientelism, at one level, was simply the way in which politics
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between different groups had any basis and whether the democratic stiuctuie of the 
organisation was adhered to m decision making. The scrutiny and judgement here was 
decidedly one-way.
A related aspect of asymmetiy is the positionalities of the production of knowledge 
and decision making power. Various theorists have commented on this dynamic of 
Icnowing. Sponsel, for instance, criticises the tendency of applied anthropologists to 
speak about indigenous peoples, and rarely with them (1992). Geertz notes that the 
uneasy reflections on applied anthropology stem from ‘the field’s complicity in the 
division of humanity into those who know and decide and those who are known and 
are decided for’ (2001: 95). The reports written by applied anthropologists are often 
unavailable to, or untr anslated for, the people to whom they refer. Being aware of this, 
we made sure that our report was tr anslated professionally and sent to CIDOB when it 
was finished.
A number of the people I spoke to in various indigenous communities complained 
that so many researchers had filed tlirough their village over the years, often given 
them rapid fire questioning, extracted information (albeit sometimes using 
participatory methods) and then disappeared without ever sharing the results or (more 
often than not) non-existent implications of their findings. Their lives then, are re­
packaged in development language in terms of current imderstandings of poverty and 
fed into tlie rnminations of development agencies without any palpable change. The 
information is given over and left to development professionals to make their 
judgements^. It was difficult not to be lame when answering the utterly pertinent 
question in the indigenous communities about whether there was likely to be any 
positive outcome from all our intei-viewing, tours of the communities and close 
questioning. Whilst it was clear that I would benefit from the research in terms of 
financial remuneration and data for my thesis, the benefits were not so obvious for the 
people I interviewed. Abbot recounts a similar experience and was forced to admit 
that ‘even where research is more directly policy related, it is not likely that those
were done in Bolivia and also in conditions of extreme inequality of power and wealth, corruption was 
seen by some as a means of redress, as long as it did not involve stealing from one’s own.
’ Another aspect of this asymmetry of knowing is the possibility of the consultant being swayed by 
paiticular interests; ‘on tlie other hand, he or she is likely to be ignorant of much that other actors know 
about the local society and thereby highly susceptible to manipulation’ (Gledhill 1994: 217).
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being researched will benefit immediately — policy change is more likely to have an 
indirect affect on others like them’ (1998: 219).
The main problem seemed to be that the anthropologist-consultant, as well as being in 
the difficult position of heing a messenger (who may, or may not prove to be 
influentially persuasive) becomes caught up in a position where it is necessary to 
engage in an asymmetrical discourse where the modes of representation of the other’s 
experience is already set. Development language, as will be explored in subsequent 
chapters, involves the production of self-referential meanings that, even if translated 
into the languages of the subjects of research, may remain opaque and limited as a 
reflection of their lives. Bloch contends, with regard to even academic anthropology, 
that ‘the way anthiopologists conceptualise the societies they have studied in their 
ethnographic accounts almost always seem alien, bizarre, or impossibly complicated 
to the people of those societies’ (1992: 127). Hobart makes a similar point that, in 
some anthropological accounts, ‘human agents are reconstituted as ciphers of a 
narrow and exclusive anthropological imagination, such that not only are they 
alienated from their ovm actions, but the agents become largely unrecognisable, even 
to themselves on the few occasions they obtain access to ethnographic descriptions of 
themselves’ (1995: 66). Certainly, in our work, there was little scope for writing about 
indigenous sociality, in fact, our* tactic was actually to side-step this to focus on land 
rights so that indigenous groups might be able to secure Hie conditions where they 
could maintain their traditional lives relatively unmolested.
If this is true about the painstaking efforts of social anthr opologists spending years in 
one setting to represent the lives of the ‘other’, then how much more so in 
development where research is often rushed, limited in its scope and in which 
meanings are pressed into the narxow terminologies associated with market driven 
progress and human rights? The applied antlrropologist, working as a consultant, is 
confronted with the difficulties of properly communicating matters of great moral 
import (such as the achievement of conviviality and the sociality witlrin which 
different forms of well being are achieved) across different language, idiom, cultural 
and professional bariiers. This asymmetry of Imowmg and experiencing, as well as 
the sometimes private and opaque language of development, leads inevitably to 
insensitive and inappropriate development interventions.
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These difficulties in being conversant with a language sufficient to communicate 
different visions of well being cross-cultuially in the development arena seem to be at 
the heart of the ethics of applied anthropology. Whilst social anthropologists have 
been at the forefront of attempts to improve the ways in wliich other’s experience of 
marginalisation, disempowerment, poverty and aspiration are communicated and 
translated into policy and practice, this process remains problematic (see Nelson and 
Wright 2001 and Mosse 2001 for critiques of participatory approaches). Tlie very fact 
of being a detached professional anthropologist, involved in the development process 
to a greater or lesser extent, but essentially remote in an experiential sense from those 
living in poverty and adhering to a separ ate agenda and personal outcome, is for some 
writers, a gulf that caimot be crossed until there is an attempt at genuine ‘solidarity’. 
Apfell-Marglin despairs about this difficulty and seems to recommend a cessation of 
the anthropological contribution to development practice:
‘No matter how much one tries to develop more sensitive, more appropriate 
methodologies, or modes of representation, tlie anthropologist’s agenda and 
that of the aritlir opologised are not usually the same or even similar*. However, 
self-reflective, however sensitive anthropologists’ representations become, 
however much anthropologists try to give voice and agency to their subjects, 
the fact that anthropologists (and other* social scientists) are located in the 
university means that their agenda and the agenda of the people they study 
cannot he the same’ (1998:10).
Apfell-Marglin argues, further, that to a greater or* lesser extent, ‘professional 
researchers live their work lives within the parameters and paradigms framing their 
profession’ (1998: 14). I would disagree with this view. In our* work, whilst 
admittedly, it was unrealistic to achieve ‘solidarity’ with the members of indigenous 
communities, especially because of the extremely short research windows we had to 
make the most of, I thinlc that there were many aims expressed in our* report that 
reflected indigenous aspirations (particrrlarly political empowerment and land rights). 
Also, many antliropologists undertaking long term fieldwork seem to achieve 
meaningful dialogue with indigenous people that can be translated into political 
commitments and meaningful teaching in the academy.
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The social organisation of academic and applied anthropology does, however, impose 
certain conditions that mark it as a distinct language game that requires editing and re- 
foimulating one’s experience according to particular rules in order to be published. 
Certainly in applied anthropology, ‘facts must be presented with affective detachment 
under penalty of being labelled ‘romantic’, or ‘biased’, labels damaging to one’s 
professional reputation’(/oc. cit.). This could engender a kind of ethical recalcitrance 
or compliance for applied anthropologists who want to be given furlher assignments 
from their employers. Gledhill asserts that ‘some anthropologists are reluctant even 
to bear* witness publicly to events for fear of damaging their professional interests’ 
(1994; 209) although he does not give examples. I think that the crucial point is that, 
working within development practice and discourse may mean that anthropologists 
are constrained in how they define the most pertinent research agenda for the 
alleviation of poverty, disempowerment and mar ginalisation, their critical voices may 
be de-radicalised so as to be institutionally non-offensive. Ferguson (a development 
anthropologist) observes tiiat ‘reports which are too critical are condemned as being 
irrelevant or useless and are not acted upon because they do not fit into the discourse’ 
(1990; 69. Gardner and Lewis, on this basis, note that ‘it would seem that 
anthropology is welcomed by developers but only on their terms’ (1996; 164). On a 
different consultancy, I had written two repor*ts for DFID on NGO’s understandings 
of a rights based approach to development and had been advised to reformulate them 
before submission by an experienced consultant as, whilst he thought tliey gave a 
good analysis, they were too critical or ‘negative’ and would therefore ‘not be read’.
Another aspect of asymmetry is that of what the anthr opologist/consultant comes to 
represent by association with Western development. In the field, the predicament of 
the anthropologist/consultant is that s/he is posited, however privately critical, as a 
representative of Western progress, and is forced to speak in the restricting language 
of development discourse. Geertz describes this as an instance of ‘anthropological 
irony’;
‘Inespective of what one does, thinks, feels or wishes, by virtue of the fact 
that the anthropologist is a member, however, marginal, of the world’s more 
privileged classes . . . unless he (she) is either incredibly naïve or wildly self
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deceiving, he can hardly bring himself to believe that the informant, or the 
informant’s children, aie on the verge of joining him as members of this trans- 
cultural elite’ (2001: 31).
This is an extremely contentions and perplexing remark on a number of levels. There 
appears to be the assumption that the aspirations of the ‘targets’ of development are 
co-valent with the normative models and ways of life that characterise ‘privileged’ 
Western industrial society (that Geertz seems to consider himself to be a successful 
exemplar of). The truth is Üiat indigenous people have more considered views of 
Western people and what they represent. To see the contrast between Geertz’s self 
ascription and an indigenous description of non-Indians, consider Echeverri’s citing 
of one of his Uitoto (Colombian Peruvian Amazon) informants:
‘I remember one very potent image which (Enokalcuido) constructed to 
express his understanding of the relationship between non-Indians and Indians 
. . .  He likened the situation to that of a woman showing her vagina to a man: 
non-Indian’s showed the Indians ‘that woman’s vagina’ that is, ‘money, 
alcohol, merchandise, technology’ . . .  For Enokakuido, the whole matter is 
thus a question of sexual education: of how to regulate desire, how to know 
the limits’ (Echeveni 2000: 35)
The philosopher Charles Taylor echoes the views of many anthropologists who have 
worked with indigenous peoples; ‘an instnrmental society, one in which, say a 
utilitarian value outlook is entrenched in the institutions of a commercial, capitalist 
and finally a bureaucratic mode of existence, tends to empty life of its richness, depth 
or meaning . . . the individual has been talcen out of a rich community life and now 
enters instead into a series of mobile, changing, revocable associations, often designed 
for highly specific ends. We end up relating to each other thr ough a series of partial 
roles’ (Taylor 2000: 500-502). In the volume edited by Overing and Passes 2000 there 
are numerous examples of the ways in which Amazonian peoples understand the 
‘good life’. Jamieson, for instance, writes that ‘living good’ for the Miskitu people 
(Nicaragua) ‘also means the absence of politics, give and take, negotiation, hustle and 
compromise (all of which provide potential threats to harmony), and the presence of
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an atmosphere in which villagers exercise concern for each other’s well being’ (2000: 
83).
However, at another level - that of strategic financial disparity between the West and 
the ‘Rest’ - Geertz does point to the radical asymmetry between what development 
putatively offers and what it actually delivers. This chronic lopsidedness resonates in 
the etliics of development. Being cognisant of this, anthropologists ar e often involved 
in the detail of worthwhile projects and in the very valuable promotion of 
participation and empowerment. It is vexing that, at the same time, their work, for 
DFID, at least, is arguably subsumed within a liberalising, individuating, 
democratising and essentially capitalist agenda. DFID, for example, as part of its 
commitment to poverty reduction in Bolivia was seeking to promote ‘increasing 
competitiveness and productivity’, ‘to open markets’, ‘know-how and technology 
transfer mechanisms’ and to attract ‘foreign direct investment’ (DFID CSP 2002: 3). I 
felt a strong ambivalence about this agenda on various levels^. Part of DFID’s 
democratising agenda involves the promotion of human rights standards. My 
suspicion was that DFID would tend to support the strengthening of civil and political 
rights whilst giving less emphasis to economic, social and cultural rights. This latter 
group of rights would involve greater spending but might reduce poverty levels whilst 
some, such as labour rights may present a disincentive for foreign investment which 
was regarded as being essential for Bolivia’s economic growth. In short, the reduction 
of poverty was subsumed within a larger neo-liberal agenda, involving a particular 
kind of ‘progress’ entailing open markets, high productivity, foreign investment and 
the inculcation of competitive values intrinsic to the market mentality.
In our report, we relied upon the mternational language of human rights as the 
principal framework to represent the difficulties of the indigenous commimities, as 
well as a way of formulating solutions. This was an idiom that indigenous activists 
were already familiar with, to some extent. In their struggles with the Bolivian 
goverimrent, utilising human rights instruments was clearly the most efficacious
® Geertz ai'gues that there is a ‘radical short run incompatibility between the two economic goals which 
together comprise what agrarian reform in the long run consists of: technological progress and 
improved social welfare. Less abstractly, a radical increase in agricultural production and a significant 
reduction of nual unemployment seem to be directly contradictory ambitions’ (2002: 25). It is difficult
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approach to challenge the besieging of indigenous temtories and to combat other 
forms of dispossession and exploitation within the current political and economic 
climate. Here, indigenous people have had to come to teims with the fact that Western 
political engagement is a kind of sublimated warfare, or as MacIntyre aptly puts it 
‘modem politics is civil war carried on by other means’ (1997: 253). Beyond this 
rights based world of negotiation, we were aware that various richer pictures and 
versions of well being resided in the indigenous communities.
According to anthropologists who have sought to understand the moralities of the 
indigenous peoples of Amazonia (see Overing and Passes 2000), the ‘rights based 
approach’ has proved to be very limited as a way of apprehending indigenous ideas of 
sociality or well being. The implementation of rights here was very much an example 
of indigenous peoples ‘learning to do our politics’ so that they could achieve 
territorial autonomy thus allowing them to sustain their own distinct forms of sociality 
and morality. The only kind of answers offered by a rights based approach were in 
Western political institutional terms. Adopting a rights perspective, then, is a 
pragmatic decision, not one that reflects one’s moral commitments. The rights 
perspective, as MacIntyre argues, ‘contains within itself a certain note of realism 
about modem society; modem society is indeed often, at least in surface appearance, 
nothing but a collection of strangers (and interest groups), each pursuing his or her 
interests under minimal constraints’ (1997:250-251).
It is one of my most important contentions that indigenous moralities are more 
comprehensible from a ‘virtue ethics’ perspective rather than a rights based approach. 
This will be explored in subsequent chapters (particularly Chapter 10) where I 
indicate how the differences between these approaches run very deep. What I am 
going to suggest is that fr om the indigenous perspective, the rights based approach is 
strangely skewed and can, in certain instances, be felt as being immoral.
Over tire course of the consultancy, it was clear* that the relationship between local 
laiowledge/expertise and decision making power was often inversely proportional, 
especially in relation to some of the activists who had been working in the indigenous
to see how this is only a ‘short run incompatibility’ as agiarian reform generally involves permanent 
displacement of subsistence farmers.
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movement for many years. Arriving, for the first time at CIDOB’s national office was 
pertur bing in the sense that my identity had already been cast in terms of my putative 
‘proficiency’ and status as a representative of DFID. On the first day, I was 
introduced to the members of the ‘national directorate’ of CIDOB and the 
representatives of the largest constituent groups of the confederation. We were seated 
around a large hall with the various delegates waiting expectantly. I introduced myself 
and the terms of reference that had been agreed between our selves as consultants with 
staff at DFID’s London offices. My knowledge of the political, social and cultural 
context in lowland Bolivia was minuscule compared to those sitting aroimd me, yet 
somehow, a priori, I had been constnicted as an expert who would be indispensable to 
them in tlieir efforts to obtain funding from PNUD. This was an uncomfortable and 
unmistakably false position to be in. I had expected to go there to conduct research, 
not to play a semi-authoritative role with regar d to indigenous leaders in their efforts 
to make representations to the Bolivian government. I realised quickly that the issues 
that were of the gr eatest importance in the consultancy were thoroughly political and 
required knowledge of the Bolivian constitution, the working of the various vice­
ministries, the personalities therein, as well as the formal and informal alliances, 
rivalries and agreements that existed. It was clear that for many of the indigenous 
activists, ‘far* from being isolated from the same world system that forms the 
anthropologist’s cosmopolitan consciousness, (they were) often equally, if not more, 
awar e of its operation than tire anthropologist Irimself (Marcus and Fischer 1986: 86).
A similar scenario occurxed later in the consultancy when some long serving 
employees of a local NGO paid us a visit at our* hotel to discuss aspects of om* 
consultancy. Personally, I felt that there was something excruciating about sitting by 
the swimming pool of a luxur*y hotel (paid for by DFID) with these individuals who 
had dedicated their careers to the indigenous movement and were consummate 
experts on every aspect of the scenario that we were researching, knowing that they 
were being paid less in a month than DFID consultants receive in a day^. They knew a 
lot more than we did yet we were in a position of far greater decision maldng power 
solely by dint of our association with DFID. I perceived that there was a clear* tension 
in the ah* as we discussed the issues.
At the time of the consultancy, the rate of pay for DFID consultants was £360.00 per day + expenses.
70
Any idea of solidarity or genuine shared concern was tenuous and difficult to 
maintain. I intuited from them a kind of contempt, not for us personally, but for the 
whole role of consultants who live in relative luxmy^®, who play a fugacious role in 
their lives, who do not have to answer to the results of their decisions, who will never 
actually experience poverty, who, because they have not lived with the ‘targets’ of 
development often don’t really grasp their most important concerns and values, who 
are blind to the nuances of the sociality of indigenous communities, who lack 
autonomy of decision making and who are concerned chiefly about fulfilling the 
requirements of the terms of reference that have often been conceived elsewhere. I 
had a glimpse of what it was to be a presumptuous consultant who had never had, and 
would never have, an existential experience approaching that of dispossessed and 
politically oppressed indigenous peoples, purporting to make authoritative statements 
about their needs and perspectives. This discomfiture, however, was a species of 
‘guilt by association’; probably wrongly perceiving tliat tire local experts ascribed to 
myself and Stephen Kidd (who had spent a decade living among the Enxet of 
Par aguay), a caricature of the worst excesses of development consultants.
A frirther aspect of asymmetry is the one-way judgement of ‘efficacy’. We had been 
asked to assess the ability of the indigenous communities to meet certain standards 
that had been conceived by DFID. I felt that the very fact of our being there as 
consultants involved an implicit imputation of the incapacity or lack of initiative of 
the indigenous movement. This clashed with my initial experience described above of 
the expertise of many of those involved in CIDOB and other organisations. With 
regar d to the support that DFID wished to give to CIDOB to ensur e that indigenous 
perspectives were represented at the national dialogue, there seemed to be an 
assumption that the indigenous organisations themselves would not be able to put 
together a proposal to the PNUD so as to acquire the funds required for the wide- 
ranging consultancy with the indigenous communities of the lowlands. Perhaps the 
fear was tliat the indigenous movement was divided and partisan and that this 
consultancy might not be carried out in an equitable and fully representative manner.
The work is certainly lucrative. Flying in business class flights is standaid (on this consultancy, 
DFID booked flights for then consultants that cost seven times more tlian economy class). Consultants 
can take their pick of hotels.
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perhaps favoming some indigenous groups over others. As can be discerned from the 
summary of oui* report given above, we did, in fact, on the basis of looldng at the 
historical development of the indigenous movement and by observing the actual work 
and acliievements of indigenous dirigentes, come to the conclusion that the capacity 
of the indigenous movement to engage effectively with the Bolivian government and 
society in general was far* from optimal. However, this ‘wealcness’ was presented in 
our report as a relative disempowerment, marginalisation and comparative 
disadvantage in the political arena of mainstream Bolivian society as a result of 
financial and educational disparities. Blackmore and Ison (1998) note that in the 
dynamics of investigative processes that are linlced to policy development there are 
inevitable disparities in ‘expertise’, education’ and social position, for instance. 
Complex ethical issues emerge when development professionals, on principle, seek to 
elevate the status of those who might normally be excluded from decision making 
because of their real, or perceived lack of experience or education and promote these 
individuals to positions of responsibility with regard to a development project. 
‘Decisions to blur these boundaries may result in expectations about action or 
outcomes that are impossible to meet, while ‘reversals’ can be very difficult to 
achieve’ (Blackmore and Ison 1998: 65). The moral tension here is between on the 
one hand ensuring the success of an intervention by simply employing those most 
capable and on the other avoiding a paternalistic approach. Our recommendation to 
combine capacity building towards empowerment with a gradual diminishment of 
frmds to indigenous organisations to promote self-funding was intended as a step 
towards turning around the paternalistic pattern that seemed to rob the initiative from 
indigenous communities. We also recommended that indigenous técnicos where 
possible, and when suitably qualified, replace non-indigenous professionals.
When travelling to various indigenous commimities to undertake ‘participatory 
poverty assessments’ (PPAs) and to assess the ‘representativity’ of CIDOB, the 
stmightforwai'd financial asymmetiy between the consultant and those involved in 
these assessments was apparent. I discuss some of the more visceral reactions to this 
in a section below. Here I will briefly look at the moral implications of this 
asymmetry of financial means and explore Geertz’s perspective on this issue further. 
He makes the argument that the anthropologist working in development can not help 
but feel the acute paradox of, on the one hand, being perceived, or rather, presented as
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a successful and affluent exemplar* of moder*n western society (which is being 
proffered by the institutions of development), and on the other, being aware that 
certain benefits tliat he or she enjoys are, realistically, unlikely to be available to those 
upon whose behalf s/he is putatively working. Geertz paints a picture of the 
anthropologist in development in a way that I only partially recognise, remarking that 
s/he is:
‘A display case for* goods which are, despite their surface resemblances to 
local products, not actually available on domestic markets’ (2001: 32).
These dynamics are perhaps only acute for anthropologists explicitly working for 
Wester*n development agencies in that they are expected to provide a ‘road map’ to a 
‘better life’ for those understood to be living in ‘poverty’. There are tensions inlierent 
in the doubly problematic position of being a foreign-based researcher, and a 
‘privileged sur*veyor of poverty’. Whilst I recognised that indigenous peoples do not 
necessarily aspire wholesale to the ‘goods’ of the Western world, and hold dear quite 
different understandings of well being, it was clear that being provided with basic 
ser*vices (health, education etc.) in every community that I visited was a universally 
voiced aspiration. The political and economic reality of Bolivia however, meant that 
this aspiration would be unlikely to be fulfilled in the near* future.
One aspect of ‘applied anthropological angst’ then is that the straightforward disparity 
in terms of social and health services as well as financial wealth between Bolivia and 
the UK points to a global asymmetry that is outwith the scope of the consultant’s 
work. Gardner and Lewis seem to be rather resigned in accepting that:
‘Although (anthropology) may be able to contribute to problematising and 
changing aspects of development discourse, there are far* wider* issues involved 
over* which individual anthropologists and their methods have little influence. 
Ultimately, for the quality of people’s lives in poorer* countries to improve, 
global conditions must change’ (1996: 167).
The deflating and illusion puncturing irony of the anthropologist/consultant is that, 
from tlie perspective of global asymmetry and inequity, despite the financial
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remuneration and kudos, as well as instances of mitigating exclusionary styles of 
development in this work, in the grand scheme of things, s/he often plays a fairly 
partial, minor, thwarted and impotent role. Geertz, getting to the crirx of the matter, 
expresses the vexing natur e of this predicament:
‘The sort of moral atmosphere in which someone occupationally committed to 
thinking about (developing countries) finds himself often seems to me not 
entirely incomparable to that of the cancer sur geon who spends most of his 
effort delicately exposing severe pathologies he is not equipped to do anything 
about’ (2001: 29).
From conversations with indigenous activists, I felt a recognition of this in our* work, 
that DFID, whilst purpor*ting to represent the social and political concer*n of the UK, 
in compar ison to the str uctures of inequality that are presently wr itten into the global 
economy, could not be regarded as being radical or transformative. Whilst DFID was 
actively supporting a ‘rights based approach to development’, and in so doing 
commutating Western values, the more fundamental causes of global inequality which 
made resources so very scarce in countries like Bolivia and which locked in the 
advantages of the already powerfirl, carxied on regardless.
Controlling one^s Contribution — Co-option or Critical Engagement?
An immediate difficulty of anthropological involvement in development is being in 
control of the contribution one makes to decision making, as a supposed conduit, 
representative, or intermediary, of the people whom the development initiative is 
being aimed at. The danger* is that antlrropologists’ obser*vations and critical concepts, 
pressed into the narrow spaces of development reports, no mater how coherent, 
compelling or* persuasive, can be domesticated, institutionalised and eventually used 
in ways that the anthropologist would not intend. Gar dner* and Lewis argue that in the 
necessary abridging and/or* bowdlerisation of anthropological work for* the purposes 
of planners, there is a danger that ‘development may absorb anthropology -  
potentially its most radical critic -  into the dominant development discourse’ (1996: 
162-3).
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Such fundamental components of life as ‘work’, ‘family” , well being’, ‘land’, 
‘health’, ‘property’, authority’ are defined through the organising principles of 
development planning and become embodied in the execution of duties and mandates. 
Transitive, or intiansitive, participation in the processes of development entails 
involvement in a world carved up in particular ways; ‘a world of conventional lexical 
referentiality -  the names of things and things so demarcated’ (Wagner 1991: 45). 
Development projects involve the orchestmted mobilisation of material and human 
resources and ideally require the establishment and negotiation of shared meanings 
with regard to the economic, social and moral life of the people whose lives are 
affected by development. The multi disciplinary and cross-cultural realities of 
development projects, and the range of representations and gemes of which they 
consist can be described as polyphonic, perspectivally relativistic, and fragmented. 
The question of whose voice is heard, whose perspective is valued, and which 
fragments are included in the synthesising totality of policy reports is a crucial one.
Our final set of observations and recommendations in the report for DFID were 
deliberately designed to be easily consumed by pressured development professionals 
and we had to make judgements about how to vastly simplify the many perspectives 
and confiictmg voices Üiat we had listened to and engaged wiÜi from indigenous 
communities, NGOs, indigenous leaders and government officials. In addition, the 
time afforded us to undertake this study would have been far too short to properly 
even begin a trnly social anthropological study of even one of the thirty four 
indigenous groups of lowland Bolivia. Our way of dealing with this was to practically 
leave out any detail about the social and cultur al lives of the indigenous peoples that 
we had gleaned or had studied in advance, to focus upon finding a balance between 
the rights agenda of DFID and the ways in which rights could be used to further the 
aspirations of indigenous peoples to control their territories.
This reflected om* recognition that social anthropology’s predilection for detail and 
thoroughness may sometimes be at odds with the reductionist and concise analyses 
and action oriented directives development plarmers require. Kuper cites the 
pragmatic colonial administrator Mitchell’s complaint of anthropologists in the 
colonial period as
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‘asserting that only they were gifted with understanding, busying themselves 
with enthusiasm about all the minutiae of obscure tribal and personal practices 
[ft om which studies] resulted a large number of painstaking . .  . records . . .  of 
such length that no one had time to read them and often, in any case irrelevant, 
by the time they become available to the day to day business of government’ 
(1987: 107).
As the causes and impacts of poverty are often obvious and the causal connection 
between those who wield power and those who do clearly do not are quite clear, to 
avoid making straightforward statements about this (choosing instead to pursue 
endless detail) would surely constitute an abnegation of moral and intellectual 
responsibility. I believe that general recommendations about the causes and dynamics 
of social injustice can be given without the meticulous recording of every point of 
view. Applied anthropologists are caught in a liminal zone between different 
discourses (academia and multi-disciplinary practice), although I tliink that there are 
clear* correspondences in intent between these. Green, on the contrary, is pessimistic 
about the possibility of meaningful communication between development and 
anthropology and declares that a common language in which to conduct debate has 
never* been achieved; ‘the professional style of academic anthropology is exclusive 
and does not encourage the participation of non-academics in debates within the 
discipline’ (2000: 6). It is outwith the scope of this discussion to examine the on­
going debates witliin anthropology between emphasising ‘str*uctm'e’ or ‘experience’ in 
our theoretical approaches. The focus here is the problem of reducing anthropological 
insights into development language whilst retaining the integrity of these hard won 
etlmographic insights and values. I contend tliat high quality ethnography, rich in 
detail and sensitive to the multi-vocality of different social settings needs to underpin 
and inform the applied anthr opological necessity of reducing their laiowledge to the 
language acceptable to development planners. In simple terms, ‘bad’ antlnopology 
and ‘bad’ development deserve each other.
Anthropologists, in their* endeavours to acquire professional legitimacy in academy 
must contribute to the laiowledge of their profession where, ar guably abstraction and 
fine detail endows prestige. Working in development means being caught in a double 
bind of retaining the status of being sensitive and subtle observers of the nuances and
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complexities of cultui'e whilst also communicating solutions to problems in 
‘development speak’. In applied anthropology, the attitude of etlmographic ‘opermess’ 
is fundamental, although it must be combined with the sldlls and forthrightness that 
allow observations to be synthesised into conclusive statements, that is, to somehow 
arrive at closure in a language that can be acted upon. Development reports demand 
coherence and straightforward surety about facts and can not be written in an open 
ended style, requiring certain kinds of reduction (although, as will be seen in Chapter 
7 there are affinities between the heteroglossia of ‘post-modern ethnography’ and 
participatory approaches to development). Stirrat, rather than criticising academia, 
asserts that the difficulty is that development consultants are forced to communicate 
their views in a format that delimits the scope of what can be said:
‘the practice of development consultancy works against certain kinds of 
analysis, imposing rigid econometric cause and effect model onto social 
reality, in the process ensur ing the perpetuation of the yawning chasm between 
the views of the world held by local populations and tliose of developers’ 
(2000).
On the other hand, some Üieoretical approaches would disavow the validity of the 
necessary reductionisrn that development reports require. Geertz, for instance, notes 
that ‘post-modernists have questioned whether ordered accoimts of other ways of 
being in the world - accounts that offer monological, comprehensive, and all-too- 
coherent explanations ar e credible at all, and whether we ar e not so imprisoned in our* 
own modes of thought and perception as to be incapable of grasping, much less 
crediting, tliose of others’ (2001:102). Post-modernist theory questions the validity of 
the analyses of particular* positioned individuals (such as consultants) to act as 
commutators of ‘truth’. Gledhill notes that ‘new ethnographies’ aiming to represent 
the polyphony of all cultural settings encounter the difficulties of giving the subjects 
‘their* own voices’, and finds that ‘there is little prospect that the full range of power 
relations involved in the genesis of the dialogue will be laid out in its textual 
representation’ (1994: 223). There is a comparable difficulty in the composing of 
development reports. In short, an anthropology that will be relevant to the 
deliberations of development needs to come to firm conclusions (see also Gledhill 
2000: 5).
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The recommendations that we made, in a sense, bypassed some of the difficulties of 
representing the indigenous cultural perspective, or depicting their values, or visions 
of the good and how these were quite different from Western values. Our report 
focused primarily on indigenous political aspirations wliich amounted, above all, to 
regain the integr ity of their* traditional territories so that within these territories they 
could maintain then* social and cultural integrity. However, at various moments, the 
question of relativism did emerge in various ways. This is clearly a central issue for* 
the ethics of applied anthropology.
Development and the Question of Relativism
The anthropological analysis of development shows that, as Croll and Par*kin (1997: 
8) phr ase it, ‘it does not just refer* to methods and plans about how to get things done, 
but entails moral prescriptions, various collective enthusiasms, different and 
competing hierarchies of adherents and an overriding assumption that human 
betterment is society's primary essence, that for which it exists and by which it 
justifies itself. The description of relative values, beliefs, ontologies and the spiritual, 
aesthetic and emotional quality of life and how these ar e contested is crucial not only 
to the anthropological endeavour* but also to the anthropological critique of 
development practice. Thus the issues of cultural, cognitive, epistemological and 
ethical relativism permeate the field of applied anthropology on a multiplicity of 
levels. The ethics of intervention depend very much on how these issues are 
conceptualised.
Inherent to the idea of development is an impulse to bring about chmge, and therefore 
tlie necessity to make judgements about current states of affairs in different settings. 
Viveiros de Castro" presents the sociological hnplications of the ethnography of 
Amazonian ontologies and argues that, in order to understand these societies, a 
redistribution of the predicates which are normally conelated (in Western 
epistemology) with such dichotomies as nature/culture, body/soul and 
particular/universal is necessar*y. Notwithstanding this anthropological insight.
‘Relativism, Epistemological and Otherwise’, address given at the University of Edinburgh’s ‘Mimro 
Lectme’ Feb 1998.
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economic theory and the administrative practices of nation states in their dealings 
with indigenous peoples are not held back by such scruples as the possibility of 
incommensurate cultural universes. Anthropological critiques of development 
however, increasingly bring to light the ways in which social and economic change 
initiated by Western agency often has the concomitant effect of obliviating the webs 
of significance through which people in local and indigenous cultures constmct their 
existence. This dynamic of laiowledge in practice can be understood as the growth of 
ignorance - ignorance of other epistemologies, the ethnocentric and judgmental 
ascription of ignorance to others and the result - a profusion of ignorant plans put into 
action, (see Hobait et al 1993).
Within development discourse, the question of relativism elicits strong and very 
varied reactions. For some development theorists, the uigency of alleviating poverty 
and the uniformity of the fact of deprivation throughout the world, renders the 
question of relativism very relative itself. Chambers for instance, exclaims that ‘the 
extremes of rmal poverty in the Third World are an outiage’ (1983: 2). MacNamam 
similarly, describes the conditions of life for those in 'absolute poverty' as being 
‘beneath any reasonable definition of human decency’ (1978). Sen, on the contrary, 
asking for a more considered approach calls such statements as ‘unleashings of 
personal morals on the statistics of deprivation’ (1981: 56). Hobsbawn makes the 
important observation that the ways in which planners define and apprehend poverty 
necessarily contain a moral element ‘that may or may not coincide witli the 
conventions of the society in wliich it occurs’ (1968).
Definitions of poverty inevitably are often based on Western ideas of 'relative 
deprivation' and a comparative, cross-cultural perspective. Sen makes an important 
distinction between the ‘conditions of deprivation’, as defined by development 
planners and feelings of deprivation defined by the ‘targets of development, noting 
that ‘material objects cannot be evaluated without reference to how people view them’ 
(1981: 45). Pearse underlines tliis point, describing the disparity of perception 
between those defined as 'the poor' and the planners; ‘what for the economist were 
indubitable signs of poverty and backwardness . . . were often integral components of 
viable social and cultural systems rooted in different non-modern social relations and 
systems of laiowledge’ (1971: 25). The tension here is primaiily between, on the one
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hand, paternalism and the power of Western discourse and values to define and 
control the livelihoods of others on the pretext of development and in contrast to those 
who insist on the recognition of a plurality of voices on the subject of well being.
As noted above, cosmological premises very different from our own may inform the 
inteipretative constructions and evaluations indigenous people make of themselves 
vis-à-vis their enviromnent. Croll and Parkhi (1997), for instance, present the 
argument that anthropological insights into rural development, particularly among 
indigenous peoples, challenge the uncritical application of the conventional 
oppositions between human and non-human agency and between the human 
individual and the physical environment. Cosmological ascriptions of agency to the 
natural world may well involve the individual and society in a morality that extends 
beyond the categories of western ontologies. In the same way that anthropologists 
have used the concept of metaphor as a 'safety net' so as to malce figurative the 
apparently irrational statements which were intended literally (Overing 1985: 52) so 
too have the practitioners of development been incredulous to indigenous 
conceptualisations of person and environment. The planned social and economic 
change of rural areas through the vision of Western development inevitably involves 
the ignoring or negation of these ontologies towards the end of material and/or 
technological progress. Hobart, with reference to imposition of Western scientific 
laiowledge on indigenous life-woiids, for example, speaks of the ‘darker side of 
knowledge’ (1995: 49) which is manifested, for example in the fear of becoming it's 
object or of having one's own knowledge obliviated by the domination of another way 
of thinking and doing, of individuals or groups being rendered 'ignorant' by an 
inaccessible expertise which defines ‘legitimate’ practice (1993:21).
The 'work ethic' or disciplinary common sense of applied anthropology involves a 
degree of cultural relativism in that there is recognition of differences in behaviour 
and in cultural categories in different populations of people and that applied 
anthropologists advocate that cultural practices should be understood in their own 
terms and thus respected in any kind of intervention so as to encourage more 
appropriate strategies'^. A central tension for anthropologists cognisant of the above
Lummis argues that ‘to treat people justly may require treating them differently; on the other hand to 
treat them as if they were the same is not necessarily to treat them justly’ (1993: 38).
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issues is tliat development practice, however, whilst recognising variation, arguably 
still follows the 'Enlightenment project' of emancipation and human liberation through 
‘rational’ means, with the optimistic credo that putatively universal evils (‘poverty’, 
‘injustice’, ‘marginalisation’ etc.) can be heated by the universal cure of 
communication, understanding and ultimately. Western rationality which assumes 
superiority and dominance over all other forms of knowing and being.
For applied anthropologists, the discussions that surround relativism are played out in 
the ethics of intervention. A position of shong ethical and epistemological relativism 
would seem to lead to either a 'principled objectionism' or ‘monitorism’ with regard to 
development projects. Gellner argues, from a liberal stance, that the position of ethical 
relativists can result in a kind of paralysis; ‘the pm-suit of a unique culture- 
transcending huth is damned. The very idea is a cover for domination’ (1996: 2). 
Such a position of ethical relativism, as depicted by Gellner (in deliberate caricatures) 
and the championing of cultur al autonomy and its corollary criticism of intervention 
loses credibility for activist anthropologists who become aware of conditions which 
they understand as unjust or cruel and which they ascribe to the workings of 
ubiquitous processes. Anti-interventionist approaches which are based upon the idea 
that development is an expression of Western hegemony, are basically naïve, and are 
essentially apolitical and ineffectual, doing nothing to counter the excesses of 
capitalism or cultmal imperialism. However, the extreme epistemological relativist 
position that people live in cultural imiverses wliich are equally true and valid but 
incommensurable and opaque to each other is described more by its critics than those 
accused of being its adherents (also see Rosaldo 1989: 218). Marcus and Fischer 
argue against Gellner’s reactionary position;
‘Relativism has all too often been portrayed as a doctrine rather than as a 
method and a reflection on the process of interpretation itself. This has made it 
especially vulnerable to critics who charge that relativism asserts the equal 
validity of all value systems, thus making moral judgements impossible and in 
its insistence on fundamental respect to cultural differences among human 
societies, it has paralysed all schemes of generalisation, by which the progress 
of any science must proceed’ (1986: 32).
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Liberalist caricatures of measured relativist positions are, in my view, anathema to an 
ethical approach to applied anthropology. Anthropological responses to the 
'rationality debate' have argued persuasively that western definitions of rationality and 
knowledge fail in many respects to explain, apprehend and describe the flow of social 
life and the ways in which the practices of others can be understood. (Stoller 1989: 
133ff, Hobai't 1995: 49-72, Overing 1985). Writers such as Overing (1975, 1985, 
1992), Viveiros de Castio (1992) and Gow (1991) have demonstrated in great detail 
how a coherent, literal and moral reality within the specificity of a particulai* setting is 
projected thr ough ontologies and forms of reasoning and interacting which differ fiom 
our own. These writers, however, do not propose the kind of relativism which 
conceptualises discrete cultural universes utterly opaque to each other but rather 
emphasise the infinite diversity, riclmess of detail and depth of imagination in the 
worlds that we create alongside the possibility of dialogue. The anthropological 
discussions which have followed Winch's ar gument that rules of thinking are socially 
constructed and thus differ validly from culture to culture (1964) have brought into 
question the viability of trymg to miderstand, let alone explain, other rationalities with 
the particular* 'scientific' logic which is associated with western culture without 
distortion.
Emotion and Detachment in Development
'The "tropics ” really are sa d . . . they beckon with those dubious feelings o f
intense conviviality (which brings fragile comprehension) and with that 
formidable distance (which leads to objective authority)' (DaMatta 1993:
123).
The anthropological task in development carmot be adequately described and 
discussed in technical and purely rational terms; there are clearly emotional issues 
involved. When encountering extreme poverty whilst conducting research among 
rubbish collectors in rural India, Abbott describes her affective reaction: ‘there are no 
sociological guidelines to deal with this, or the guilty feelings that I developed, 
because whereas I could walk away at anytime, the people who had become my 
friends could not. I have never felt comfortable in the position of surveyor of poverty 
and I could not remain objective as I was angry at what I saw’ (1998: 220). Abbot
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resists the professional expectation of being able to view the suffering of those she has 
come to know and to feel a sense of shared humanity with, as merely another feature 
of their lives to describe dispassionately, as if somehow her feelings had to be 
hermetically sealed off from the research task. There is a primary experience of 
empathy and sympathy, as Blake writes; ‘Can I see another’s woe. And not be in 
sorrow too? Can I see another’s grief. And not seek for kind relief?’ The question is 
not whether or not anthropologists have feelings (most of the ones I know seem to), 
but rather whether each applied researcher can defend development as the way in 
which poverty and injustice can be alleviated and thereby vindicate one’s transient 
and sometimes fleeting role in the lives of others caught up in development.
Whilst my investigations into the experience of ‘poverty’ and marginalisation 
involved short studies of a few days m each indigenous community, I had similar 
reflections to the above. One of the most troubling aspects was the high infant 
mortality rates among indigenous communities from easily preventable diseases and 
from conditions that required simple operations. Doing no more than gathering this 
infonnation from families who had recently suffered infant deaths was deeply 
disconcerting. Nussbaum observes that the circumstances of deprivation, ‘affect the 
irmer lives of people, not just their external options: what they hope for, what they 
love, what they fear, as well as what they are able to do’ (2000: 31). The objectively 
radical difference in life chances between myself and the families I interviewed 
simultaneously provoked within me a sense of guilt and responsibility.
Another aspect was witnessing the appar ent disarxay of indigenous communities, such 
as the Ayoreo, who could no longer follow tr aditional hunting and gathering practices 
but were forced to work for extremely low wages on ranches and farms, as migrant 
workers or resorting to begging or prostitution in Santa Cruz (see also Suaznabar, 
1995 and Suarez, 1998). DaMatta describes tliis in terms of ‘anthropological blues’, 
that is ‘the melancholy that comes from working with societies that my country 
(Brazil) does not recognise as nations . . .  a tme tropical sadness comes from the 
realisation that some of the societies we study with such affection, sacrifice and 
sympathy are about to perish’ (1993: 123).
From the poem, ‘On Another’s Sorrow’.
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The question of scientific detachment becomes problematic when experiencing strong 
emotional reactions to the realities of poverty and injustice. Geertz, despite paying 
close attention to the acute and often excruciating moral dilemmas that 
anthropologists in development experience, seems to opt for a defence of 
scientifically driven progress and a justification of academic detachment: 
‘Detachment comes not from a failure to care, but from a kind of caring resilient 
enough to withstand an enormous tension between moral reaction and scientific 
observation, a tension which only grows as moral perception deepens and scientific 
understanding advances’ (2001: 40). My feeling is that development practice should, 
in fact, be fuelled by these primary intuitions of empathy and concern, although, as 
touched upon briefly in the section above, care and detachment are required in the 
consideration of the form that development takes.
Aspects of Applied Anthropological Angst
I have attempted in this chapter to introduce, or at least signal the main issues that I 
will be exploring further thr oughout the remainder of tlie thesis.
Development practice flows from the values that are written into modem. Western 
society. Development constitutes a phenomenon in wliich partially incommensmable 
moral traditions encounter one another. The difficulty is that we have no rationally 
grounded principles that will allow a ‘transvaluation’ whereby complete agreement 
could be reached. One of my central contentions is that one ‘moral tradition’ (liberal 
individualist, rights based and minimalist) has more force than many traditional moral 
economies and inevitably compromises the capacity of these systems of well being to 
remain intact. I contend that this is because, as MacIntyre ar gues, the Western moral 
tradition is based on a series of moral fictions based on the ideas of rights and utility 
through which ar bitr ary forces of economic power achieve their ends (1997).
Whilst controversies that are intrinsic to social anthropology, such as cultural 
relativism, the problems of representation, translation and asymmetry are unlikely to 
ever be definitively resolved, I argue that it is both worthwliile and necessary to 
identify what the major issues, questions, and principles are. Applied anthropology is
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unavoidably an ethical and political pursuit in the sense that any kind of intervention 
in others’ lives cannot be undertaken from a ‘neutral’ perspective; certain values are 
bound to be affirmed whilst others will be denied.
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C h a p te r  4
S o c ia l A n th r o p o lo g y  as M o r a l C o n d u ct
Part 1: The Moral Nature o f Anthropological Conduct
‘An assessment o f the moral implications o f the scientific study o f human life 
which is going to consist o f more than elegant sneers or mindless celebrations 
must begin with an inspection o f social scientific research as a variety o f  
moral experience ‘ (Geertz 2001: 23)
Discussing anthropological ethics, Geertz puts forward Dewey’s ‘succinct and 
chilling doctrine that thought is conduct and is to be morally judged as such’ (2001: 
21). This pithy statement condenses a wide range of important questions for the field 
of social anthropology. The postulation of an essential continuity between ‘thought’, 
‘social action’ and ‘morality’ draws out manifold implications for social 
antlnopology, both in terms of the ways in which we approach and depict the subjects 
of our* research, and with regard to our* own professional and personal self- 
understanding. This is more than merely observing that ‘ideas have consequences’ 
(Lai 1985: 10); anthropology as an interpretative endeavour cannot help but admit that 
the ways in which we (as individuals, as professionals) engage with the consequences 
of ideas is a matter of moral import. Dewey was concerned with philosophy when he 
urged; ‘philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the 
problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for 
dealing with the problems of men’ (in Gouinlock 2000: 207). By replacing 
‘philosophy’ and ‘philosophers’ with ‘anthropology’ and ‘anthropologists’, an 
interesting challenge emerges. This challenge is especially per*tinent in this time of 
intense anthropological reflexivity and the opening of anthropological concerns to 
more socially relevant questions beyond the scope of the discipline’s previously 
relatively Ihnited universe of self-referential meanings. My view is that an imperative 
for an ethical social anthropology is that of relevance. This is a difficult topic to 
legislate for as often the relevance of a given issue may be discovered dnough an 
iterative process. Also issues that may seem to be of urgent, or direct, relevance, such 
as the interactions between an indigenous group and the state can only be approached
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in an ethical manner on the basis of an in depth knowledge of indigenous values, 
something that might be seen as being indirectly relevant.
Dewey held ‘knowledge to be an instrument for action, rather than an object for 
disinterested contemplation . . .  or a passive reflection of the fixed, objective structuie 
of things’ (Quinton 1999: 679). On this view, the distinction, in moral terms, between 
academic Üieorising/tlie intellectual life and social action is essentially aitiflcial. 
Theoretical enquiry is an iterative and self-corrective process that has to be 
understood as occuiTmg in specific historical and cultuml circumstances. As the work 
of social scientists involves ‘direct, intimate and more or less disturbing encounters 
with the immediate details of everyday life, encounters which can har dly help but 
affect the sensibilities of the persons who practice it’ (Geertz 2001.* 22-23), tlie moral 
force of social science and the ethical lives of its practitioners ar e inextricably related. 
Iris Murdoch argues that one’s whole ‘texture of being’ has an ethical dimension 
(2001). The experience of participatory fieldwork certainly involves the whole person 
where the anthropologist learns
‘not only through the verbal, through the transcript, but through all the senses, 
through movement, through their bodies and whole being in a total practice’ 
resulting in a laiowledge that is more than cerebral but also embodied. This 
knowledge can only be made sense of thr ough ‘profound resonances’ between 
the personal, theoretical, emotional and political’ (Okely 1992: 16).
Maintaining this means that the acquisition of a better understanding of the ‘moral 
quality of the experience of working social scientists’ becomes a crucial concern 
(Geertz 2001: 22). The ‘moral passage’ of the anthropologist working in 
development, then, involves the distillation of their experiences, reactions and 
intuitions and the tr anslation of these into actions that make an impact in one way or 
another on the perceived rights and wrongs of the development encounter. The 
practice of social anthropology is, then, both a ‘variety of moral experience’ and a 
‘moral force’ (Geertz 2001: 23). The thesis sets out to examine the dynamics of these 
overlapping aspects of the profession of social anthropology, that is, their moral 
experience in development tasks and the moral force that they exert upon
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development thinking and practice as anthropologists in development or in the 
academy.
A definition of ‘morality’ that is probably too broad to be meaningful is that which 
‘deals with all human acts, and dispositions to act, insofar as these affect persons and 
other sentient beings’ (Fox and DeMarco 1990: 21). Instead, following Taylor, the 
range of ideas that I will discuss under the rubric of ‘the moral’ are as follows:
‘In addition to our notions and reactions on such issues as justice and the 
respect of other people’s life, well being and dignity, I want also to look at 
what underlies our dignity, or questions about what malces our life meaningful 
or fulfilling. . .  what makes our life worth living’ (2000: 4).
As will be discussed below, this covers a lot more than the concerns that tend to 
figuie in anthi'opological professional codes of ethics. In fact, the subject matter of 
social anthi'opology inevitably evokes issues of a moral nature, as Overing argues:
‘Anthropologists are asking about moral universes, their basic duty being to 
understand the intentions and objectives of actors within particular* social 
worlds, as well as what these actors say, understand, believe truth and those 
worlds to be, a task in metaphysical descr*iption . . . the facts of the 
ethnographer, the trutlis we describe, are almost always tied explicitly to a 
world of values ’ (1985: 4)
Bourdieu, among others, illustrates how speech acts are creative socially; literally 
bringing into existence that which they evoke (1991). The centrality of meaning to 
practice is underlined by Sahlins; ‘no object, no thing, has being or movement in 
human society except by the significance man can give it’ (1976: 170). Rappaport 
signals the impor*tance of recognising that our* language and understandings are 
formative in the construction of the world (in Borofsky 1993: 155) whilst Murphy 
argues that the relationship between Concept and Act is ‘the very substance of our 
discipline’ (in Borofsky 1993: 59). This can be usefirlly extrapolated by Hor*nborg to 
ar gue that:
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Tf OUI' images of the world take an active part in shaping it, we need to be 
more reflexive about the potential impact of the images we produce. Perhaps 
we should understand the present impasse as hesitation at some kind of 
threshold in the development of a morally more self-conscious social science’ 
(1994: 12).
Hornborg is arguing that social anthropology has reached an impasse in the sense that 
the discipline has split along the same Cartesian lines that divides the academic 
community as a whole into ‘objectivists’ and ‘relativists’ or ‘scientists’ and 
‘humanists’ (Hornborg 1994: 10). Another way of explaining this same impasse is as 
an ‘epistemic dualism’ within the discipline which involves a ‘continuing and 
complex dialectic between the universalism of ‘Antliropos’ and the diversitarianism 
of ‘Ethnos’ (Stocking 1982: 361; cf. Rapport ‘Culture is no Excuse’ forthcoming 
Social Anthropology). The natur e of this threshold will be explored throughout the 
course of the thesis.
An awar eness of the outcomes and impacts of the work of anthropologists beyond the 
boundaries of their discipline and institutions is fundamental, as arguably, ‘the 
institutions in which professionals malce and transmit knowledge are instruments of 
governance . . . the double participation of resear chers is a participation in the local 
activity as hidden agents of governance’ (Addelson 1994: 161). Rapport also stresses 
that anthropology has a moral case to answer; ‘inasmuch as anthropological writings 
now operate in a global arena as tools of political engagement , we are obliged to 
make imequivocal pronouncements - that can feed into moral and legal judgements 
(forthcoming; ‘Culture is no Excuse’ in Social Anthropology). The work of 
anthropologists, through speaking, writing and engaging, inevitably has manifold 
impacts upon Üie worlds it moves within and between.
It seems obvious that discussing moral issues would require agreement on what 
constitutes ‘reality’. However, many theorists, m post-modern anthropology would 
not now attempt to juxtapose cultural representations against a fixed idea of ‘material 
reality’ (transparent only to researchers). Indeed, asserting, as a generalisation, that 
the development encounter is characterised by relations of social inequality and
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unequal exchange implies the idea of a grand narrative, which is anathema to 
constructivist post-modern anthropology. However, I will ar gue, with Hornborg that:
‘The imperative of addressing such interfusion of participants’ representations 
and some less accessible level of ‘reality’ is obvious once representations are 
recognised as ‘real’, not only in the sense of emerging from objective 
conditions but also -  and more importantly - in the sense of being active 
ingredients in those conditions’ (1994: 10).
That is, assessing the morality of development practice and the anthropologist’s role 
in it, requires apprehending the ways in which the models of reality that are in 
ciuTency become embodied and impact upon the experience of tliose involved. The 
equal important corollary is tlie perspectives of those who are the targets of 
development.
Describing the moral deliberations of the anthropologist requires firstly setting out 
terms of reference. It is important to have clarity about the models we use to 
apprehend the mediating realities of culture and the individual person. Rapport is 
emphatic in his exhortation to fellow anthropologists that;
‘We must rigorously define what we take to be the ultimate constituent units 
of human life. Do we posit the ontological existence of experiencing 
individuals over and beyond the particular contexts of their social interactions 
and identities, as has philosophical liberalism throughout the centuries? And 
what bears tlie most fundamental rights: individuals, or normative relations 
and institutional groupings?’ (forthcoming; ‘Culture is no Excuse’ in Social 
Anthropology).
These are perennial questions that are often routinely and implicitly answered in the 
presuppositions of analysis and action. The analytical categories ‘thought’, ‘conduct’ 
(or social action) and to a lesser degree, ‘morality’ figure frequently in 
anthropological analysis. There has been great variation in the way each has been 
apprehended and also, in how the relationships between them have been understood. 
The difficulties of imagining and interpreting these ideas are compounded by the
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challenge of translating them across culturally different settings. In order to make 
sense of how well being is achieved in different cultural settings, we have to think 
about the kinds of values and beliefs that are embedded in particular' communities. 
Wlien considering the dynamics between social action and morality, ideas of ‘culture’ 
and the ‘individual’ intrude at every junctur e.
The ‘background picture’ that underlies our' claims to rightness, or justice, or what 
‘well being’ consists of, is normally implicit and remains unmolested. However, as 
Charles Taylor argues, we ar e forced to spell out these underlying postulates when we 
have to defend our responses in the face of failure or alter'natives (2000). The 
involvement of anthropologists in development, which inevitably involves 
tr ansgressing par*ticular moral imperatives in favour of others, is a scenario in which it 
is crucial to be able to understand our own moral presuppositions and stances.
Part 2: Characteristics o f Contemporaiy Conditions for the Conceptualisation of 
Ethical Practice for Applied Social Anthropologists
Ways of Self Understanding and the Development Encounter
Crucial to the morality of the representation of the ‘other’ and by extension, the 
development encounter, is the role of language and the ways in which knowledge of 
the ‘other’ is apprehended and then used. Anthropology is inevitably an intervention 
in the lives of others. Overing argues that
‘Because all loiowledge has power implications, it is the right, the need, or the 
duty of the anthropologist . . .  to comment openly and self-reflectively upon 
those implications relevant to the particular' body of laiowledge that one 
claims as one’s own. If judgement is to be assumed to be part of the 
anthropological endeavour, the anthropologist must also justify the standards 
used for such judgement.’ (1985: 24)
A premise of my argument, then, is the simple observation that the dynamics of our* 
own society are inescapably present in our views of and conduct towards the ‘other’. 
For this reason, the focus of my enquiry is directed as much towards the natur e of
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moral conditions and debate in Western society as in the localities where development 
practice is directed. Anthr opologists, as individuals coming from particular- contexts, 
let us assume Western, must confront the particular views of the world, of themselves 
and others and the constituent relationships in order to gain an appreciation of the 
ways in which people of other cultmal traditions may experience Western values. 
Marcus and Fischer argue that achieving a relevant anthropology ‘demands not only 
an adequate critical understanding of oneself through all phases of research, but 
ultimately such an understanding of one’s own society as well’ (1986: 110).
Development practitioners nowadays fr equently evoke the idiom of dialogue between 
peoples of different cultural realities. I would argue that any attempt at authentic 
dialogue must be preceded by a vision of anthropology, that does not, in Merleau 
Ponty’s words, ‘seek to vanquish the primitive or give him reason to oppose us, but 
instead (seeks) to situate ourselves on a terrain on which we can be mutually 
intelligible to each other, with neither reduction not brash transposition. . .  The task ..  
. consists of enlar ging our reason in order to be able to comprehend that which, in us 
and in others, precedes and extends reason’ (1962: 183, in DaMatta 1993: 125).
Merleau Ponty is implying that, underlying the various cultural lenses through which 
the world is made intelligible, there exists a common humanity that is both 
recognisable and loiowable cross culturally. A key aspect of the ethics of applied 
anthropology is deconstructing and understanding the ways in which our morality 
reduces, is brashly transposed upon or, alternatively, offers prospects for conviviality 
with, those of different arenas of interpretation, value and social action.
An immediate difficulty here is that the ways in which Western categories, values and 
forms of social action ar e communicated and imposed ar e not always tr ansparent.
Unpicking Opaque Practices
The modes of transmission of Western values are not always obvious and may be 
encoded in the opaque practices of institutions. For Homborg, the work of making 
these practices ‘more transparent’ or ‘unmasking’ them, is a responsibility that 
anthropologists should take up: ‘we cannot imderstand or hope to solve global
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problems of solidarity and sui-vival unless we aie prepared to experience a radical 
‘defamiliarisation’ vis-à-vis conventional categories of economics or technology’ 
(1992: 1). Ferguson argues that ‘the puipose of institutional ethnography is to unpack 
the work of institutions and bureaucracies, to train ourselves to see what we are used 
culturally to overlook, namely the participation of institutional practices in the making 
of the world’ (1994: 113), Gledhill seems to be evoking a universal understanding of 
power when he argues that:
‘In stiiving to transcend a view of the world based solely on the premises of 
European cultuie and history, antliropologists aie also encouiaged to look 
beneaüi the world of appeaiances and taken-for-granted assumptions in social 
life in general. This should help us to pursue critical analyses of ideologies and 
power relations in all societies’ (1994: 8).
Following MacIntyre, I will argue that unmasking is a peculiarly modem activity (cf. 
Crewe 1998) tliat is reflected for example in ‘critical’ approaches to ethnography. 
Thomas aigues that ‘critical ethnography’ seeks to uncover implicit forms of 
dominance; ‘Our culture entraps us in common sense and multiply segmented worlds 
in which “reality” includes a variety of mechanisms for assuring social harmony and 
conformity to interactional norms, organisational rules, institutional patterns, and 
ideological concepts’ (1993: 3; cf. Berger and Luclanann 1967: 19-28).
MacIntyre (1997) contends that unmasking, in addition to slirill protest, is a response 
to the deep-seated contradictions, or ‘schizophrenia’ (Stocker 1976) of Western moral 
reasoning. Protesters and theorists seek to reveal tlie oppressive forces of will and 
power behind Western discourses of rights and utility, i.e. what is really happening 
behind the rhetoric of public decision making.
This critical perspective, however, demands imagination as well as deconstruction and 
means transcending the Western tendency to delimit its vision of the other by the 
belief that its master tropes of society^ are in fact universally applicable.
‘ William’s discussion on ‘Society’ (1983; 293) shows how this idea (in its abstract form) emerged 
relatively recently in Western society (18*** century). Society, in the Western sense, immediately 
conjures up ideas of jural rules, coercive institutions, social control and hierarchy. This veiy particular
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Disingenuous ACulturalism
Arguably, we are liable to be distracted from seeing the particularity of Western 
cultural representations by the belief that our perspectives aie in fact sufficient to 
apprehend the realities of the other, as they aie, we assume, universally valid. 
Dumont, to the contiary, points to the experience of ‘existential relativism’ that 
fieldwork can bestow upon an antliropologist, allowing one to look from an estranged 
position ‘back to our modem culture and society as on a particular form of humanity 
that is exceptional in that it denies itself as such by its profession of universalism’ 
(1978: 207). Touraine makes a similar observation; ‘the Western countries resist 
every analysis of their own specific mode of modernisation, so convinced are they of 
their own incarnation of universal modernity itself (1989: 121). It seems cleai' that, in 
order to understand the drives, motivations and values of development, it is essential 
to adopt a relativistic perspective towards the societies from which development 
emanates.
Anthr opologists, through immersion in a cultural life that differs in important respects 
fr om that of the West, may call into question that which they previously took for 
granted. This ‘duplex position’ whilst not being unique to anthropologists, offers a 
valuable vantage point fr om which to evaluate the various exchanges and impositions 
between different cultural traditions. Ingold argues that the experiences gained 
through long-temi fieldwork may allow anthropologists to be able to see their own 
society in relief, with new intuitions and orientations;
‘The education provided by life . . .  is brought to bear in a systematic 
interrogation of the foundational terms of Western academic discourse -  terms 
lilce individual and society, culture and nature, language, art and technology, 
individuality and personhood, history and memory, equality and inequality, 
even hrrmanity itself (Ingold 1996: 4).
As ‘much of modernist social tlieory, including tlrat of anthr opology, is derived fr om 
the same rationalist, formalist and jmidical model of a ‘rights-centred’ view of
idea of interaction and collectivity is quite at odds with many indigenous visions and practices of 
togetherness (see also Overing and Passes 2000).
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society’ (Overing and Passes 2000: 4), an important anthropological task is to 
examine how these models are apprehended in the ‘oüier’s’ terms and, on tins basis, 
to collaboratively evaluate (and possibly oppose) in strong moral terms the impact 
that these models might have on the well being of non-Western individuals and 
groups.
Moral Disarray “where we are coming from ”
It has been argued that contemporary moral reasoning is in a state of disarray^. On the 
one hand, this confused state of affairs can be explained in terms of the heterogeneity 
of global culture and the countless sources that aie jumbled together for moral 
reasoning. A more contentious argument is that die particular Western liberal moral 
outlook is inherently confused and contradictory. Taylor writes.
‘We are torn two ways . . .  we don’t have any formula . . .  we can only malce 
difficult judgements in which demands are balanced against each other, at 
some sacrifice to one or both’ (quoted in Kerr 1997:152).
MacIntyre concurs;
‘We have all too many disparate and rival moral concepts, rival and disparate 
concepts of justice, and . . . the moral resources of the culture allow us no way 
of settling the issue between them rationally’ (1997: 252).
Clearly, apprehending the foundations for our* moral intuitions and ethical 
pronouncements is far from straightforward. Starting from an essentialist view of 
culture and of personhood will be unhelpful in the contemporary setting, as ‘in the 
grand assemblage of juxtaposed difference’ (Geerfz, in Borofsky, 1993: 465), it is 
difficult, as Hor*nborg (1994: 234) notes, to ‘Imow where to centr e our ethnocentrism’; 
as this is, ‘ultimately a question of personal identity. Diversity, or rather the 
awareness of diversity, has invaded us at all levels’. Marcus concurs with this view 
and argues that a generalised confusion is also reflected in the academy:
See Maclntyi-e (1997), Stocking (1976) and Taylor (2000).
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Tn anthropology and all other human sciences at the moment, “high” 
theoretical discour se -  the body of theories that authoritatively unify a field - 
is in disarray’ (1986: 166) .^
Much of what I am saymg here may be stating the obvious but it is nonetheless 
important to keep the above in focus so as to set out the moral implication that in the 
ensuing chaos and the lack of a shared vision of the good, arbitr'ary powers 
(economic, social and cultural) determine the arrangements under which people live, 
thus impacting upon the quality and possibilities of their lives. My contention is that 
this is a key dynamic of the development relationship.
Language Constraining Moral Intuitions
Tliis discomfort in plumbing the depths of Western moral intuitions and performance 
can be imderstood in two main ways. Firstly, having to rely upon procedural and 
rights based ethics, there is, in the West, a real difficulty with actually being able to 
explain where we are coming from morally and ethically. Secondly, perhaps as a 
result of the coercive and competitive natur e of the public domain in the West, there is 
an instinctively defensive resistance to scrutiny.
With regard to the first point, the moral responses that we bring to bear on our lives 
and work emerge from a backgroimd moral ontology that remains lar-gely implicit. 
Cohen writes that the logic of the reflexive turn in anthropology is that we ‘need to 
think about (our) selves in order to think about how other people thinlc about 
themselves’ (1994: 135) .^ This statement assumes an ironic air if combined with 
Taylor’s view that a symptomatic feature of modern identity is that there is sometimes 
a mis-match between our feelings and the concepts we use to explain them, that is, we
 ^ In subsequent chapters, the following aspects of this disarray will be explored: The so-called ‘Crisis 
of representation’ , uncertainty about adequately describing social reality, loss of confidence in existing 
scientific paradigms, disbelief towards meta-narratives, profound critiques of the West’s colonialist 
legacy, feminist critiques, ‘paralysis’ or overdone reflexivity, focus on selfhood and literary analysis 
and a generalised insecurity and doubt about the legitimacy of the anthropological enterprise 
 ^MacIntyre argues, conversely, that, in our* everyday lives, ‘our* self-lmowledge depends in key part 
upon what we learn about ourselves from others, and more than this, upon a confirmation of our* own 
judgements about omselves by others who know us well, a confirmation that only such others can 
provide’ (1999: 94).
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lack a vocabulary or set of ideas sufficient to apprehend and communicate our own 
underlying moral reactions (2000).
When considering our moral outlook, we do not seem to be conversant with a 
sufficient language. The ethical language for explicating oui* moral outlook to each 
other as individuals living in a Western, liberal democratic context can be counter 
intuitive. Pait of Taylor’s project is to retrieve from oui* own cultural and moral 
history modes of thought and description, such as Aristotelian, or virtue ethics, that 
have misguidedly been made to seem problematic and have been theorised away, so 
that we aie either embarrassed to appeal to them or we have even forgotten that they 
exist (2000; Kerr 1997). Taylor argues tliat, with regard to modern moral reasoning 
and intuition,
‘Over wide areas, the backgiound tends to remain unexplored. But beyond 
this, exploration may even be resisted. That is because there may be -  and I 
want to argue, frequently is -  a lack of fit between what people . . . officially 
and consciously believe, and what they need to make sense of their moral 
reactions on the other’ (2000: 9).
This obsei*vation, if accurate, begs the question of whether it is paradoxical that the 
raison d ’être of anthropological studies is putatively to reveal the underlying 
motivations and conceptual schemata of other peoples’ moral intuitions and 
understandings of well being. That is, anthropologists have puipoited to explain the 
essence of other cultures and other peoples’ behaviour without sufficiently 
undertaking to do the same in their own settings.
With regal'd to the second point, a disconcerting obsei'vation made by Said with 
reference to academics in positions of relative power is ‘an authoritative, explorative, 
elegant, learned voice spealcs and analyses, amasses evidence, theorises, speculates 
about everything -  other than itself (1978: 142). The discomfiture of self- 
examination obviously has political implications, DaMatta argues that:
‘Many of the great academic centres of the West have tended to avoid and 
resist studies of their own culture. It is as if the study of the “distant other”
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sometimes were an excuse for impeding the “defamiliaiisation” of ourselves ..  
. it avoids a certain kind of radical political questioning tliat often permeates 
the antliropologies of the so-called “Third World” countries’ (1993: 125).
Development, as an instiumental and universalistic discourse, is cut off from the 
somces of value that exist in different cultuial realities and operates under a pretence 
(or faith) that it constitutes a neutral arbiter between communities and force for 
universal progress. On this basis, I will argue that moral dissonance is a universal 
experience for all those involved in development.
Uneasy Moral Bundles
Given the confusion described above, it would be simplistic to represent the 
individuality and self-hood of anthiopologists by aiguing that, at least in terms of their 
professional lives, they foim paif of a paificulai* and definable cultuial reality. 
However, valions authors, both moral philosophers and social anthropologists, have 
sought to define the characteristics of a definable kind of modem, or Western, or 
liberal identity, of which the anthropologist is a paiticulai' example (Taylor 2000, 
MacIntyre 1997, Pels 1999). Taylor’s depiction of modern identity as inliering in a 
bundle of str ands that stem fr om our particular history is summarised by Parkin:
‘We are made up of at least three mutually conflicting strands in which are 
intertwined all the imporlant Western formative threads from classical 
antiquity to the present day. The three are: an other-regarding Kantian moral 
one that derives ultimately from the Judeo-Christian tradition; one that 
privileges disengaged rationality, autonomy, freedom, human equality, 
imiversality, which comes from the Enlightenment; and the Romantic one 
which emphasises tire demands of nature, human fulfilment, and expressive 
integrity^’ (1985: 20)
The communitarian critique of modern liberal theory offers the argument that 
rationalist, disengaged and individualist approaches to understanding well being, or
 ^Talcott Parsons referred to the Hippie Movement of the 1960s and the generalised resurgence in the 
non-rational in Western culture as constituting an ‘expressive revolution* (Joas 2001; 127)
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the goods by which we live, are both cramped and partial and must give way to a 
more inclusive vision. In our society, the expressive counterpart to the disengaged, 
rational self has been evoked in a nostalgic mode chiefly through the Arts and lacks 
presence in discourses of practical ethics and public life. Overing and Passes obserwe 
that
‘The dominant trend in contemporary moral philosophy . . .  has been to purify 
ethics of all aesthetics and desire and to narrow the definition of the moral 
domain so as to centre moral reasoning upon abstract issues of justice, and the 
rights and obligations adliering to it vrithin the impersonal context of the 
impersonal relations of the public domain (2000: 4).
From these competing models and intuitions, somehow individuals formulate 
particular value commitments. The kinds of questions that I explore with 
antluopologists working in development relate, for example, to ‘which types of 
actions and which types of experience produce the deeply emotional and subjectively 
emotional feeling that something is good or bad, praiseworthy or outrageous?’ (Joas 
2001: 130).
Throughout the thesis, I make an attempt to map out the moral territory that the 
antliropologist emerges from and must traverse when involved in development.
The Limits of Disciplines
Given that the inner life and social forms are conjoined and mutually efficacious, if 
social anthropologists wish to conceptualise and examine morality, it is clearly no 
longer tolerable for anthropologists to privilege the ‘outer’ manifestations of human 
life, whilst leaving the ‘iimer’ person to other disciplines. As Cohen and Rapport 
argue, the disciplinary boundaries of Western academia consign the study of the 
‘irmer person’ as being ‘either a matter of imagination (fiction, philosophy) or for 
specialised scientific investigation with a discovery objective different from 
anthropology’s’ (1995: 3). MacIntyre would agree:
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‘There seems something deeply mistaken in tlie notion enforced by the 
conventional cmriculum that there are two distinct subjects or disciplmes -  
moral philosophy, a set of conceptual enquiries, on the one hand and the 
sociology of morals, a set of empirical hypotheses and findings, on the other’ 
(1997: 73).
The anthropological tendency to characterise people of different traditions as ‘other’ 
by focusing upon the external cultural, institutional differences led to a relative 
paucity in anthropological apprehensions of the irmer life of the otlier -  indeed, as 
Cohen argues, ‘it is perhaps an indication of its former intellectual insularity that 
anthropology took so long to realise what it had been doing’ (1994: 136) .^ On the 
other hand, it has to be said that anthropology’s precise intellectual mission has 
always been far' more diverse and difficult to pin down^. The originally eclectic and 
diverse nature of the field of social anthropology is something that it would be 
salutar y to recover. In 1910, Boas declared that:
‘The field of the work of the anthropologist is more or less accidental, and 
originated because other sciences occupied part of the ground before the 
development of modern anthr opology’ (1910: 372).*
This ‘accidental’ nature should not be seen as a limitation but rather as a condition in 
which we can foster an evaluation of the diversity of approaches and interests that 
social anthropology can imdertalce and address. The debates of moral philosophy are 
abstract and faint echoes of the actual conversations, puzzles, conflicts, private 
decisions, dissents and agreements that go on between people as they interact, work 
together and find meaning in their practices. An anthropology that seeks to apprehend 
the moral quality of people’s lives is tlius boimd to transcend the fences that de-lirnit 
the scope of enquhy of different disciplines. Grasping the irmer and outer
 ^There were some important foremrmers such as Firth (Culture and Personality school).
’ ‘One of the advantages of anthropology as a scholarly enterprise is that no one, including its 
practitioners knows exactly what it is. People who watch baboons copulate, people who rewrite myths 
in algebraic formulas, people who dig up Pleistocene skeletons, people who work out decimal point 
correlations between toilet tiaining practices and theories of disease, people who decode Maya 
hieroglyphics, and people who classify kinship systems into typologies in which our own comes out as 
“Eskimo” all call themselves anthropologists’ (Geeitz 2001: 89)
® Levi Strauss made a similar point about the historical development of the discipline; ‘It made itself 
out of all kinds of refuse and left-overs from other fields’ (in Borofslcy 1993: 2)
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manifestations of moral deliberation and the inteiplay between these requkes an 
eclectic anthi'opology. Geeitz, reflecting upon tlie increase in the cross-fertilisation 
between anthropology and philosophy, writes; T was hardly alone among people 
working in the human sciences trying to find their way out of theh stoppered fly 
bottles’ (2001: x ÿ .
The dialogical contmuity between the individual’s inner moral reasoning/intellectual 
talk and the social and political embodiment of these is being increasingly explored in 
relatively novel modes of enquiry where moral pliilosophy, literature and psychology 
aie infoimed by social anthi'opology and vice versa (Canithers 1991; Overing and 
Passes 2000; Maclntyie 1999; Taylor 2000; Cohen and Rapport 1995; Rapport 1997, 
Lutz and White 1986, Lutz 1988, Lutz and Abu-lughod 1990).
A second way in which disciplmary boundaries may constiain the extrapolation of an 
ethical anthropology is as follows. Nanow academic compaitmentalisation is 
restrictive not only with regard to the range of approaches available to social 
anthropology but also, in turn, conshaining the extent to which anthropologists are 
able to exert a moral influence upon wider society. DaMatta contends that academic 
life (in ‘North America’ and ‘England’) is characterised by extreme 
compartmentalisation with the effect that academia (‘theoretical’, ‘technical’, ‘market 
oriented’) and intellectual life become dislocated. He ai'gues that in Brazil, for 
example, ‘the goal is to be an “intellectual”, read and known outside the academy’ 
which is seen as ‘limited, formal and reactionary’ and ‘not seen as socially 
significant’. He states that ‘In Brazil, in order to become an intellectual, an academic 
has to reach beyond the university walls and tiy to affect the entire society’ (1993: 
128)^ .^ Gledhill laments however, that ‘tliere has been little practical progress in 
tianscending conventional academic modes of producing laiowledge about the world.
 ^Appealing to the expertise and corroboration of other disciplines is, however, nothing new, the Annee 
Sociologique for example, declared that
‘A comprehensive knowledge of the facts is only possible through the collaboration of numerous 
specialists . . .  Only mutual supeivision and pitiless criticism can yield firm results’ (in Carrithers 1991 : 
vii).
Da Matta’s arguments here have close correspondence to the ideas of ‘liberation philosophy’ which, 
staiting in Argentina, spread throughout Latin America in the 1970s. The intentions of this movement 
were to assist poor and marginalised people in reclaiming philosophy and to use philosophical 
reasoning horn theii* perspective, so that philosophy was not solely in the hands of the affluent and 
educated. This movement was deeply influenced by ‘liberation theology’ which had emerged a decade 
earlier in the same continent. (Schutte 1993)
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which may be Western in origin but are now institutionalised on a more or less global 
scale’ (1994; 225).
Part 3: Anthropological Professional Codes of Ethics
It would appear tliat those who seek to bring etliical concerns out into the open arena 
of public debate are often met with indifference or suppression: ‘among many social 
scientists there also appears to be a high degree of wary indifference to those who 
show a strong interest in ethics’ (Graves III and Shields: 1991:132)^\ The idea of the 
dysfimctionality of morality has evocative power in Western society, that lives aie 
often constrained, rather than enhanced by moral codes (through blame and guilt) 
without sufficient compensatiug gains. Pels, however, contends that the 
circumnavigation of the attempt to agree on shared moral commitments is 
iiresponsible. He says that liberal anthiopological morals ‘may cover up new 
stmctures of exploitation’ and represent the ‘desire to create a subject position 
divorced from political struggle . . . and this political aloofness partly explains why 
attempts to create ethical discussion among anthropologists often has received little 
feedback or met with scepticism, even disapproval (“Why waste time on that”)’ 
(2000: 136). Geertz concurs that those who challenge academic orthodoxy aie 
sometimes met with considerable resistance;
‘Revolutionary moralists . . . aie never much liked, particularly by those, in 
this case, practitioners of the intellectual ti ades, whom they so severely call to 
account’ (2001: 21).
“ The recent ‘El Dorado’ scandal is a dramatic illustration of calling a colleague to account too hastily. 
An investigative jomnalist, Patiick Tierney and two anthi'opologists Terry Turner (representing the 
AAA) and Lee Sponsel publicly accused Napoleon Chagnon and colleagues of deliberately 
administering a ‘virulent’ vaccine’ which caused an epidemic of measles thus killing thousands of 
Yanomarao people as part of a ‘fascistic eugenics’ experiment. They further asserted that medical 
treatment was refused to those infected so that the effects of the epidemic could be observed. Chagnon 
countered that the epidemic had started before they aiTived and that they had brought a proven vaccine 
which actually helped contiol the epidemic. This was confirmed by other somces. It was argued in 
Tierney’s book ‘El Dorado’ that Chagnon sought to ‘cook’ his data on conflict among the Yanomarao 
(to support his allegedly Hobbesian theories that the most successful head-hunters reproduce more and 
have more wives) by fomenting conflict between neighbouring communities. Chagnon obviously 
denies this (see also Chagnon: 1968)
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If this is tnie, an interesting area to explore might be whether it is difficult for social 
anthropologists to spealc openly to each other about their personal views on morality. 
The formulation of codes of ethics is ostensibly one way for anthropologists to spealc 
about their ethical concerns.
The American Association of Anthropologists defines an antlnopologist as;
‘Someone whose first and paramount responsibility is to ‘protect the physical, 
social, and psychological welfare and to honor the dignity and privacy of those 
studied.’ (Principles of Professional Responsibility, AAA).
In 1949, the Society for Applied Anthropology was the first organisation within 
antlrropology to create an etlrics statement, which called upon the anthropologist to, 
‘take responsibility for the effects of his recommendations, never maintaining that he 
is merely a technician unconcerned with the ends toward which his applied scientific 
skills are directed’ (in van Willigen 1993: 32).
My reading of this is that our discipline should not just be about producing laiowledge 
o f the ‘other’, but about producing a particular kind of knowledge that is directed 
towards the achievement o f well being in different contexts, especially where cultures 
that have finely tuned tlieir idea of human flourishing are facing problematic social 
and economic upheavals.
The Point of Professional Ethics
I would contend tliat professional codes of ethics for the discipline of Social 
Anthropology serve inter-institutional purposes and functions within the discipline 
and tend to be celebratory and conservative rather than truly revisionary. The 
philosophical basis of these codes is detached and liberal, offering no shar ed vision of 
the good. Hie codes are characteristically defensive, being concerned with not 
harming research subjects rather than promoting well being. Gledhill concurs with 
this view; ‘Anthropologists have found it easier to agree on what is definitively not 
ethical than establish any common goals for themselves’ (1994: 217).
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Whilst all the various social science specialities have developed codes of ethics which 
relate to their particular exigencies, they have all stemmed from the basic model of 
experimental, bio-medical research (see Grave and Shields 1991: 135)^ ,^ which 
specifically attends to the de-limitation of harm done to the guinea pigs of 
manipulative experimentation. An equivalent ethical discourse in social science 
concerns itself with topics such as ‘deception, anonymity, confidentiality, and 
informed consent’ Qoc, cit). However, this emphasis on the protection of subjects of 
research reflects only part of the moral demands within social science.
Professional Codes of Ethics however, are based on minimalist liberal ideals of 
political neutrality, allowing individuals to pur sue Üieir own conceptions of the good. 
Liberalism is clearly the dominant ideology at the institutional level of social 
anthropology and is characteristically defended in negative terms that highlight the 
dangers of alternative doctrines. The discipline as a whole then, remains detached and 
fragmented as a moral force. Gledhill argues tlrat we should have
‘the courage to stop liiding behind a paternalist liberal relativism and a stance 
of academic detachment. Anthropologists should be readier to argue publicly 
for more inclusionary human futures’ (1994: 227)
Pels observes that, despite the aforementioned resistance, there has been a recent 
resurgence of interest in ethics, and particularly in revising codes of ethics (1999, 
2000). There have always been regular* attempts to redefine the Principles of 
Professional Responsibility, but it could be argued that these usually remain in the
Most discussions on ethics and social anthropology focus on the question of the accountability of the 
researcher vis-à-vis research subjects (Fluehr-Lobban 1991, Givens 1993, Levy 1993, Pels 1999). 
Graves and Shields, for instance, comment that, ‘The message of oui* various professional codes of 
ethics is veiy clear -  the rights and interests of science must never override the rights of the subjects of 
research, and it is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure tliat they do not’ (Graves 111 and Shields 
1991:137). This emphasis on ‘protection’ is problematic in the sense tliat it is not always clear who, or 
what we ar e protecting, and what/who jfrom, and tlien, if we work this out, the question remains of how 
‘to protect’ that which we have decided ‘to protect’. Also, as anthropologists collaborating with fellow 
human beings, it is clear that our hierarchy of values must place subjects first and science second. This 
focus on the individual researcher’s responsibility not to cause harm to their subjects presupposes that 
the goals of science may be at odds with the well being of individuals or groups. Indeed, since the mid 
eighties in particular, critiques of the traditional research relationship and the authoritative perspective 
in social anthropology have aboimded, contending that this approach can directly undermine the rights 
and interests of the subjects of research. The ASA proclaims that: ‘Anthropologists have a duty to 
anticipate problems and insofar as is possible to aim to resolve them without damagmg the research 
participants or the research community’ (ASA 1998: 523).
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realm of platitudes. Chambers argues that ‘discussions of ethics are more about trying 
to create and enforce the parameters of an imagined community of anthropologists’ 
(1985: 159). Recalling Cohen’s argument that a community’s shared symbols may 
often be a ‘very superficial gloss upon an enormous variety of opinion . . . people of 
radically opposed views can find tlieh* own meanings in what nevertheless remain 
common symbols’ (1989:18). Chambers argues;
‘We talk the same way, using similar words, in order to maintain the belief 
that we have something to discuss and yet, within oui* competing spheres of 
activity, we often mean different things by the words we use’ (1991: 159)^ .^
It is true that in any given society, the appearance of behaviouial equivalence often 
formally disguises the diversity of interests and motivations of their members. 
Wallace, on this basis is resigned to ‘the practical impossibility of complete 
interpersonal understanding and communication, and the unavoidable residuum of 
loneliness that dwells in every man’ (1961: 137, in Rapport 1997: 185). My view is 
that this stress on diversity of perspectives can belie the very real shared commitments 
that anthropologists have.
In short, foimal codes of etlrics cannot be read as anything more than a vague gauge 
of the actual moral positions of social anthi'opologists. Chambers argues that there is a 
gap between the ‘laboriously negotiated and circumspect wording of our ethical 
statements’ (1985: 157) and the real content and dynamics of professional discourse 
and application. Looking at different features of ‘ethics talk’ within the discipline, he 
concludes that ‘we tend to agree that anthropologists should do good work which 
benefits humankind and does no hai*m. But there is clearly a difference between what 
is actually said (or meant to be said) when we start discussing ethics and the shared 
discourse by which we say it’ (1985:157).
The drawing up and revision of Professional Codes of Ethics fulfils an important dual 
function within the imagined community of anthropologists; to simultaneously foster
Geertz might argue that this lack of precision, or studied vagueness on ethical issues is both 
necessaiy and positive, as his use of Wittgenstein indicates: ‘is an indistinct photograph a picture of a
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competition whilst reinforcing principles that everyone can agree with. In these 
revisions, core principles are seldom attacked and specific situations, rather than 
being addressed directly, aie dealt with by referring to wider principles. Arguably, the 
continual revisions often do not fulfil then* putative purpose of making changes but 
fulfil a conservative function. These revisions are, ‘rarely about changing values and 
situational ethics -  (they aie) nearly always in reference to what speakers hold to be 
absolute values’ and similarly; ‘often little more than a repetition and re-emphasis of 
our already codified general principles’ (Chambers 1985: 158). So, whilst the task is 
expressed in terms of revision, what usually happens is that ethics talk is celebratory 
rather than radical.
Ethics tallc, expressed through the ritualistic formulation of codes of ethics, occurs 
within a closed profession among professionals who consider themselves to be the 
best judges of what their ethical conduct should be. This dynamic is problematic 
according to the philosopher Addelson:
‘The unquestioned right to know in terms of one’s disciplinary concepts and 
methods is at the foundation of the cognitive authority of scientists and other 
professionals. It places them in the local sites of laboratory and field, not as 
participants but as ‘judging obseivers’ who are tliemselves to be unjudged’ 
(1994: 161).
The possibility of the anthropologist really engaging with those among he or she is 
working depends, to a highly significant extent, on social and, can I say ‘moral’ 
skills, such as empatliy, rapport and conviviality. Anthropologists often have to react 
and adapt to a multitude of unexpected events and ways of being ti eated. Obviously, 
if the anthropologist is encumbered by an aura of the ‘Western expert’ , then his or 
her human antennae and receptiveness will be significantly dampened.
The distinction between insiders and outsiders in social anthropology is also 
problematic. The problematic conceptual delimitation of what antluopologists do and 
experience as professionals, as opposed to their lives per se has been discussed by 
Okely (1992). On tliis basis, I would argue, with Chambers, that the abstraction of a
person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the 
indistinct one exactly what we need?’ (PI, 71, in Geeitz 2001 : xiii).
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category of particularly-professional-problems in ethical conduct means that ‘we 
invariably alter the problem and Ihnit the kinds of solutions that might be acliieved’ 
(1985). Going back to Geertz, the ethical lives of the individuals as people (not just 
professionals) brings a lot to bear on the making of the moral vision of the discipline. 
Most ethics talk focuses on the dilemmas and difficulties that arise through the 
ethnographic enterprise (fieldwork, writing and use of material) as i f  these are 
peculiar* to the anthropologist. However, it has been argued that many of these 
difficulties are inseparable from the ‘dilemmas of the neo-liberal self, and as such 
‘cannot be divorced from politics’ (Str*ather*n 2000: 10). Pels argues that, in cuirent 
conditions, the anthropological split, or ‘ethical double-self is made accomitable and 
marketable to a public domain through the definition of professional duties. The 
accompanying contemporary ethical standards, according to Pels lack the ‘concept of 
an ideal towards which every person would strive’ (1999: II.).
The two main points tlrat I would like to make about professional codes of ethics, 
then, are as follows. Firstly, the boundary between those within the profession and 
those outside it is essentially ar*tificial. Professional Ethics serve particular* 
institutional purposes and may not have very much to do with the transcendent and 
dialogic aspects of fieldwork. Secondly, codes of ethics are often minimalist, 
conser*vative and dry and do not offer a moral vision for the discipline. There does not 
appear* to be any will to find consensus within the discipline of social anthropology on 
how we should rmderstand and promote human flourishing or well being.
Part 4: The Importance of Relevance
The final part of my introduction to ‘Social Anthropology as Moral Conduct’ is a 
shor*t discussion on the idea of the ‘relevance’ of Social Anthropology. Again, this is a 
theme which emerges and re-emerges throughout the thesis and the following 
observations are intended as being preliminary and introductory.
Following on from argument made above, in order to put tlie well being of our* 
research subjects first in oiu* anthropological hierarchy of values, engaging relevantly 
with the issues that they regar d as being most important is essential. Ahmed and Shore 
argue that a central problem in anthropological ethics is that of relevance. They
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examine the ways in which social anthropology has to develop ‘new domains and 
methods of enquiry that aie commensurate with the new subjects and social forces 
that are emerging in the contemporary world.’ (1997: 14). This requires reinventing 
cherished methodologies, theories and practices as well as finding ways to 
communicate and engage with a wider audience.
In order to be of relevance to the contemporary world, complementing the expertise 
anthi'opology has in describing ‘exotic, small scale, disappearing worlds’ (Ahmed and 
Shore 1997: 37), what is required is greater concern with emerging worlds, the culture 
of the ‘colonisers’ as well as those of the colonised, and on subject aieas that cannot 
be defined by traditional fieldwork methods alone’ {loc. cit.). This idea of a ‘post- 
cultuial’ social anthropology is expressed by Bhabha:
‘What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to thinlc 
beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those 
moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural 
differences. These in-between spaces provide die terrain for elaborating 
strategies of self-hood -  singular or commimal -  that initiate new signs of 
identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of 
defining the idea of society itself (Bhabha 1994: 1-2).
My view is that whilst it is essential for social anthropology to engage with the 
creative interfusion of different cultural realities, this should be complemented by a 
continuing interest in (and defence of) the substantive sources of indigenous life 
worlds. Indeed as Rapport obser*ves, ‘many anthropologists would see their project as 
essentially a ‘moral’ one, which extends the perspective of different cultures so that 
areas of overlap become clear’ (1997: 185). A crucial aspect of the anthropological 
contribution to the moral nature of the ‘overlap’ or interstice of different cultmal 
realities, then, is to be cognisant of the ‘darker side of knowledge’, that is, the ways in 
which particular’ powerful, or aggressive world views can obliviate the value of 
others,
Ahmed and Shore suggest a number of ways in which we can ask whether social 
anthropology is relevant to the contemporary world. The first relates to a teclmocratic.
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or utilitarian interpretation of relevance, ‘much favoured by the government’ (1997: 
31), A number of writers have explored how the government actively fosters and 
cultivates this kind of relevance thr ough making academic funding decision subject to 
market forces (Pels 2000, Strathern et al. 2000). A cmrent contention in the discipline 
today is that the ‘success of a university principal -  traditionally one of the most 
privileged and isolated of national institutions -  is now determined predominantly by 
how much money he or she can raise for the college’ (Ahmed and Shore 1997: 32). 
This context of market oriented forces shaping knowledge impacts not just on the 
areas we research, but also what it is about them that we are funded to research, and 
how we go about it. Similar- dynamics abound in debates suiTounding applied 
anthropology, which I will look at in subsequent chapters. In order to go beyond the 
technocratic forces that diminish the independence and critical quality of theory 
making, it is essential to turn our attention to the moralities that govern the production 
of anthr opological laiowledge.
Secondly, die ^explanatory power’ of social anthropology is an important factor in its 
relevance. Recent articles in journals such as ‘Critique of Anthropology’ have adopted 
stances which are ‘explicitly anti-postmodernist’, interpreting postmodernist 
perspectives hi social anthropology as being focused on deconstruction and the 
abandonment of ‘truth’ for a celebration of ‘the poetics and aesthetics of our own 
literary creations as an end in their own right’ (Ahmed and Shore 1997: 32). On this 
view, the ‘preoccupation with text, writing and selfhood’ constitutes ‘a retreat finm 
society and the idea of reality’ {ibid. : 32) and therefore, for social anthropology to 
retain its relevance, its explanatory power as a social science must continue to hold a 
recognised place.
I would agiee with Nyamwaya, however, who considers that the problem is not so 
much die relinquishmg of quantitative methods but the lack of understanding other 
disciplines have of the contribution qualitative methods can yield:
‘Anthropology is still regarded as the ‘don’t disturb the people discipline’. In 
the minds of most planners, health and other development personnel, the 
discipline belongs in the same class as classical music and fine art, implying 
that it possesses litde practical value , . . Many development experts believe
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that quantitative infomiation is of more value than qualitative. Although the 
discipline has incorporated quantitative techniques, it is still lumped with 
literature in terms of its intellectual contribution to development’ (Nyamwaya 
1997: 199).
A tlrird aspect of anthropological relevance to the contemporary world, centres on the 
moral significance of the discipline. This concerns the way knowledge is used (or 
misused) and its ethical and political value. Referring back to earlier points made 
about postmodernism, Ahmed and Shore argue that ‘at the hearf of deconstruction 
there is an ethical vacuum’ (1997: 33). Their contentious argument is that 
anthropology’s potential for ‘creating some harmony in a world riven with conflict’ or 
‘doing some good’ is not being harnessed and with the advent of postmodernism, is 
on the threshold of ‘philosophical nihilism’ {ibid.: 40). The indication is that the 
direction taken by ‘liberation anthropology’ whereby laiowledge is explicitly put at 
the service of those with relatively less power may be an option for a morally relevant 
anthropology. The theme of post-modern ethics in relation to applied anthropology is 




A  B r ie f  H is to iy  o f  D e v e lo p m e n t T h in k in g
In this chapter, by looldng at the history of development thinking, my aim is to draw 
out the main themes that persist in current theory and practice. I will concentrate on 
the question of explanation, that is, how theorists and development practitioners have 
defined the ‘problem’ of imder-development and how they have understood, or 
glossed over, the dynamics of different Idnds of knowledge, agency, moralities and 
power in their foimulation of appropriate responses.
Many of the issues that are central to the field of ‘development studies’ have a short 
history. As will be discussed below, imtil the official withdrawal of the colonial 
powers fi'om their ‘tenitories’ an enduring assumption was that colonialism, and the 
concomitant asymmetries in power and ‘wealth’ reflected real differences in the 
capacities and/or environmental constr aints on the peoples of the North and the rest of 
the world. Development, whilst having its roots in imperialism and colonialism, is a 
modem concept that was fuelled by the polarities generated by the Cold War as well 
as North/South, rich/poor and industrialised/non-industrialised dynamics\ Thin 
ar gues that alongside these economic dynamics, the twin ideas of the possibility of 
achieving universal standar ds of well-being and human rights for all of humanity were 
radically new in the late 1940s and provided the main impetus for the modem idea of 
development (pers. comm,). The directions of development and human rights, 
however, have been divergent until recent attempts to bring rights legislation to bear 
on development practice, as we will see later.
Developments Pre-History
Here, as pari of my discussion on Development’s ‘pre-history’, I will look briefly at a 
number of studies that examine the colonial gaze towards indigenous peoples and 
extend the argument that this ‘monologue’ of assumed European superiority is
 ^ Arguably, the East/West and capitalist/non-capitalist polarities associated with the Cold War have 
now been exposed as not very polar at all, since both sides of the iron curtain were complex mixes of 
capitalism and socialist ideologies.
Ill
efficacious in the development context. The following, then sei-ves as a prelude to an 
analysis of Sach’s contention that ‘from the staif, development’s hidden agenda was 
nothing else than the Westernisation of the world’ (1992: 4). I wish to explore the 
fimdamentally tautological nature of universalistic Western depictions of its ‘other’ 
and advance the aigument that this dynamic can be discerned at different levels. For 
instance, at the level of economics (with reference to the formalist substantivist debate 
in economic anthropology), I will argue, with Hornborg that:
‘There is not much point in reducing the great variety of local meanings to a 
single formula. In trying to say everything . . .  the formalists say nothing that 
is not tautological’ (1992: 2).
An important aspect of anthropological resistance is in relation to this monological 
recycling of Western categories in development discourse.
No Prospects for Conviviality; Correspondences between Development and the 
Colonial Gaze
In Overing and Passes’ volirme “The Anthropology of Love and Anger” (2000), 
anthropologists explore various permutations of the word ‘conviviality’ as a way of 
grasping the social ethics or aesthetics by which the peoples of Amazonia achieve 
their ideals of a good, harmonious life, or well being as individuals and together, 
collectively. Mason extends this discussion by grounding his analysis in both the 
historical texts of the Conquest of the Americas and in recent ethnographies of 
Amazonia, to consider the resonances of the word ‘conviviality’ in the meetings of 
indigenous and Western societies^. Mason’s object of analysis is ‘tlie long moment of 
cross-cultural contact between Emopean travellers to and observers of the New 
World, on the one hand, and the Native Peoples of the American continent on the 
other’ (2000: 190). By observing how they saw each other, he examines whether or 
not their respective views offer any prospect of living together in any form of 
conviviality.
 ^ As Mason puts it, ‘the kind of societal relations that Ivan Illich had in mind in his ‘tools for 
Conviviality’ (1973) -  in other words, the good life, a life which, arguably, can never be carried to 
excess’ (2000: 189).
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A central argument advanced is tlrat, whilst indigenous American and European 
images of the ‘other’ malce use of comparable constitutive elements, they are, in 
imporlant respects, incommensurable. Further, I will argue that the ‘lack of fit’, in 
terms of the representation of the life-worlds of the subjects of development, involves 
a certain manipulative mystification in the sense that ‘the representational properties 
ar e simply incommensurate with that to which they refer’ (Friedman 1998: 19).
Mason, after noting a number of salient characteristics of Western discourse and 
practice, goes on to show how the view of the South American indigenous ‘other’ can 
be seen as a reflection of the hegemonic interests and assumptions present in 
‘European Culture’. Overing unearths and names these assumptions and argues 
further, that these constitute formative postulates in the disciplines of anthropology 
and sociology which can lead to a conceptual blindness to indigenous life-ways:
‘ . . . that it is the West which discovered the Individual, and also the mature 
rationality upon which individuality must be based, all towards the end of 
democracy, for equality, whatever . . .  It is nevertheless the case in Amazonia 
that we meet a strident individualism, an insistent individualism. We also find 
a value upon community relationships, or upon sociality. For the Piaioa, their 
higlily valued community is only achieved through the practices of 
individuals: personal autonomy is necessary for the creation of their 
community. Thus it is the case that our' analytical and disciplinary categories, 
and the relationships that might hold between them never quite fit the 
Amazonian life-way s’ (1995).
Emerging ft om this ethnography is the argument that, in both theory and practice, the 
Wester-n apprehension of, and interaction with, the indigenous peoples of South 
America stemmed fi'om a histor-ically peculiar aiTay of ideas that had erroneous 
pretensions to imiversality.
Mason’s thesis is that the range of Western images of the Native American, rather 
than being arbitrary, or innocent, are essentially at the service of the colonial 
str ategies of superiority, subjugation and ultimately, the physical and moral conquest
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of these peoples. Depictions of indigenous peoples often focused on relative Tack’ (in 
terms of European standards), or equated them with all that was despicable, weak and 
in need of reform, patronisation or eradication in the home society; with the mentally 
ill, the criminal, the savage, the child, the impoverished, the morally dissolute, the 
ignorant, the sexually profligate, or pei”verse. The colonial discourse also sought to 
feminise (in Western terms) the landscape and those within it so as to justify the 
enforcement of manly, military, mature control. Made to fit into Western ideas of 
order, disorder and hegemonic ideas of gender, the American continent was pr esented 
as being in need of reform and control; established as inferior in the colonial gaze. As 
Mason argues,
‘Columbus’s use of the single epithet ‘naked’ already frames the inhabitants of 
the New World as a people who live in a prhnitive state resembling either the 
mythical golden age of the past or a brutish condition awaiting social and 
technological advance’ (2000: 193).
The difference of the ‘other’ is construed as vacancy or blank sheet awaiting 
inscription upon its blankness by those who wield the power to confer meaning; 
‘Columbus’s epistemology anticipates the non-conviviality of the Conquista and the 
resulting genocide’ {op.cit: 210). The tautology intrinsic to the colonial gaze was that 
there was no real attempt to know or understand the indigenous world view on terms 
that were not related to European perspectives or values so that the idea of primitivity 
was imputed and projected. The Western view of alterity is dominated by what 
Levinas calls the ‘order of the same’; that is, thinldng shut inside a solipsism of reason 
and the drive to objectify and universalise which inevitably makes the ‘other’ a 
version of the ‘Same’  ^(1984: 12). In short:, tliis opaque characterisation of indigenous 
peoples clearly served the colonial purpose of subjugation.
Indigenous ideas of the Western Interloper
The corollary is the complex of ideas tlrat lie behind indigenous ideas of the Western 
interloper. Whereas Western views of indigenous people were formed in the context
 ^ A true meeting with the Other requires the transcendence of an idealist ontology, a mpture and an 
epiphany (see Lechte 1996:115-119).
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of a colonial agenda and came, in the first place fiom a hierarchical and stratified 
society which was comprised of defined groups differentiated in terms of power 
privilege and freedom, and so sought to define Amerindian peoples in terms 
commensur able with Old World hegemonic interests, indigenous images of alterity 
were formed by a dynamic with quite different categories, morality, intent and ethos 
(see Overing 1995).
Overing (1995) shows that central to Piaroa images of alterity is the understanding 
that ‘otherness’ is both dangerous and necessary for both proper social living and 
fertility when properly domesticated. Otherness denotes a potency that is different 
from self, but is not necessarily, inferior to self. As Overing states:
‘Since the right to domination is alien to the Piaroa understanding of proper 
social relations, they would not judge external otliers, even if monstrous, as 
inferior beings who were therefore rightly subject to Piaroa domination. 
Judgements canying comiotations of inferiority tend to have as little relevance 
to their logic of exteriority as to that of interiority’ (1995: 5, my emphasis).
Whilst the ‘other’ may be regarded as improper, indecent and ignorant socially, tlris 
does not lead to an imputation of inferiority or of a need for reform.
Self Fashioning
Todorov (1984a) argues that there are three levels of knowing or rmderstanding in the 
meeting of different cultural realities: firstly, relating to value judgements, secondly 
the extent of perceived, or real differences in each others’ identity and thirdly, the 
extent or depth of knowledge about each other. Cleariy, making judgements, defirrrng 
distinctions, gahiing knowledge of each other and establishing a way of interacting 
with, and accommodating, each other are all intertwined, hi the development and 
colonial relationship, it is apparent that a coercive language emerges from the 
asymmetrical nature of the encounter - politically, militarily and economically, as 
well as with regard to the instrumental intent to profit fr om the other. Thomas (1997: 
189) agrees with this analysis;
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‘Within the oppositional process in which a variety of dominant and 
dominated groups reify the attributes of others and themselves in a self- 
fashioning process, the resulting relationship will be an asymmetrical one’.
Tlie arguments presented above illustrate the antlii'opological endeavour to understand 
the ‘other’ before judging or acting and to articulate the ways in which power 
asymmetries are evident in the languages of relating (see also Said 1978: 40). My 
view is that it is morally insufficient for anthropology to be so enlightened about the 
way that power works, as political and economic forces continue regaidless, unabated 
by these esoteric obseiwations.
The ways in which the asymmetries described above continue to exert a ftmdamental 
influence on the dynamics within the development context will be examined in greater 
detail in following chapters. Analytically, the uses of language and of knowledge 
remain central to an understanding of the moral natuie of the development encounter.
In a manner commensurate with the vilification and patronisation of Native 
Americans throughout the Conquest, Hobart (1993:2) argues that, with reference to 
the subjects of development;
‘In order for them to be able to progress, these people first have to be 
constituted as ‘ underdeveloped’ and ignorant. Conversely, widiout such 
underdevelopment and ignorance, the West could not represent itself as 
developed and possessing knowledge’.
The whole idea of development specialist professionals implies that there are 
perceived inadequacies in the knowledge and expertise of development’s ‘subjects’. 
Escobar’s critiques of development discourses focus on tliis dynamic. His core 
contention is that the whole idea of the ‘Third World’ is a construct invented by the 
powers that be in the West. Through labelling, institutionalisation and 
professionalisation, a particular* fiarnework for miderstanding ‘imderdeveloped areas’ 
is created anterior to interaction. This ‘development gaze’ paves the way for the 
exercise of domination over the subjects of development.
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Despite the post-modernist observation that, in the West, faith in ‘progress’ has been 
profoundly shaken, ideas of evolutionism, instrumentalism and rational, scientifically 
driven progress remain strong currents in the Western consciousness and are 
discernible in various more or less obvious guises in development theory and practice.
I will now trace the major theoretical questions that arise when thinldng about 
development.
Visions of a Global Community
Clearly, the phenomenon of development has to be understood in its historical 
context, where, through the emergence of capitalism, fundamental changes in the 
natur e of productive relations allowed spectacular* advances in material progress and 
profits to be extended over* areas where economic change, on the whole, had been 
more gradual; ‘The global economy now produces as much in seventeen days as was 
produced in a year at the tur*n of the century’ (Postel and Flavin 1991: 186).
Tenbruck argues that development has to be understood in terms of the ‘ideologies of 
political progress, liberalism and socialism, which provided paths towards the same 
goal, the global community’ (1990: 198). The vision of ‘One World’ of nations was, 
at the onset of development, one that was presented as being a novel idea to 
deliberately strive for*. Historical materialists imderstand die spread of capitalism 
throughout the world as an inevitable and anonymous process. Nevertheless, the 
particular form of the development ‘dream of a secular* ecumeme’ as a moral force 
and vision of the future has a specific genealogy. This ‘dream’ continues to 
reverberate in the Western consciousness, as Tenbruck observes, ‘generations of 
children have grown up with the vision of a just world order as an ideal’ (1990: 197)
The underlying assumptions of development, in particular, die idea of uniformly and 
universally applicable laws and its missionary character could only have come about, 
Tenbr*uck contends, ‘in the context of secular remnants of Cliristian theology of 
history’ intrinsic to which was the ‘idea of an equal and common development of 
humanity as the frdfilment of Instory’ (1990*. 200). He argues further* that these 
conceptions acquired their historical dynamic horn the French revolution and its 
ideals of liberty, equality and hatemity.
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The teleology of development then, involves a massive imaginary leap to an 
ahistorical future state. Development, then, if we understand it as an expression of 
modernism, can be seen to be, in Ardener’s words, ‘parasitical on philosophies of 
historical progress, in which styles of the past in thought or taste received labels; the 
future received its labels in advance. The Modem is thus a kind of appropriated 
future’ (1985: 57).
Uncertain Landscapes
One of the central tensions in development theory and practice is precisely that of the 
ideological rhetoric of universality and ahistoricity which is opposed by the historic, 
particular and situated struggles of individuals and groups to retain their specificity. 
Appadurai ar gues that;
‘both sides of the coin of global culture today are products of the infinitely 
varied mutual contest of sameness and difference on a stage characterised by 
radical disjimctures between different sorts of global flows and the uncertain 
landscapes created in and through these disjimctures’ (1986: 308).
In this section, with these remarks in view, 1 will examine the major ideas that 
prefigured the universally known but fragmented phenomena of development. The 
first and most obvious contention that 1 have been alluding to is that development is a 
continuing form of neo-imperialism and/or colonialism {cf. Escobar 1988, 1991, 1995, 
Ferguson 1990, Gledhill 1994, Hobart 1993, Sachs 1993, Worsley 1984, Wallerstein 
1974, 1993, Appadurai 1986). Marcus and Fischer claim that ‘the view of the world 
order in terms of capitalism is common intellectual cunency in the West as well as in 
the third world where anthropologists still largely work’ (1986: 87). This perspective 
provides a ready historical framework for the analysis of the ways in which local 
contexts are encompassed by a ‘world system’.
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The Inception of Development
Larrain writes that ‘it was in the stmggle of the British bourgeoisie against the 
remnants of feudalism that the idea of development was born’ (1989: 2). He hiither 
contends that theories of development have emerged as products of particular periods 
in the growth of capitalism, thus effectively arguing that colonialism, imperialism and 
development ar e all epiphenomena of capitalism. He distinguishes 3 stages; firstly the 
age of competitive capitalism (1700-1860), secondly, the age of imperialism (1860- 
1945), and tliirdly, late capitalism (1945 to the present day).
‘Competitive capitalism’, was characterised by the precepts of classical political 
economy, in particular those of Smith, Robertson and Ricardo. In their thinking, the 
material, or substantive value of traded goods were overridden by the idea of 
‘exchange values’. There was no room for a critical appraisal of the resulting reality 
of unequal exchange in this schema. The fact that asymmetric trading relations of 
energy, labour, leisur e, use of land, crops, forests and unrenewable mineral resources 
has become the norm in global trade remains outside this discomse.
This was followed by the age of Imperialism and neo-classical political economy. 
From the mid 1800s onwards, the evolutionary theory of Darvrin and its extrapolation 
to ‘social Darwinism’ added scientific authority to these beliefs. Anthropologists such 
as Tyler (1871), Morgan"  ^ (1857) and Frazer (1890) stamped an evolutionary and 
ethnocentric orthodoxy upon their discipline. Tyler famously argued that the science 
of culture is essentially a reformer’s science that should guide us in our* duty of 
leaving the world better* than we found it (1871: 410, 439-40). Arguably, a general 
concern with the nature of change and historical process was what fuelled 
anthropology at its inception. Early theorists postulated a temporal pattern of 
progression from the simple, ignorant and primitive to complex and sophisticated 
modern society.
Morgan assumed an evolutionary approach in his later work.
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The Impact of the Enlightenment
Conterminous with the fractuiing of feudalism by the rising bourgeoisie and the 
burgeoning of free trade was the unfolding of the Enlightenment, which caused a 
revolution in Western society, new understandings of personliood and ways of 
relating to the ‘other’. Kant obviously figures here and Kantian ethics will be 
discussed properly in Chapters 8 and 9. Here it suffices to reiterate Kant’s radical 
assertion of the possibility of human autonomy through rationality (fr om theodicy and 
from values handed down on the basis of tradition). Tomaine argues that the idea of 
revolution is at the heart of the Enlightenment vision of modernisation. The chief 
dynamic of this revolution is ‘the removal of obstacles to the exercise of reason’ 
(1989: 121), meaning replacing custom and tr adition with a rationalist mode.
On the account given by Sahlins (1994: 439), the growtli of capitalism involved ‘some 
peculiar Western ideas of the person as an imperfect creature of need and desire, 
whose whole earthly existence can be reduced to the pirrsuit of bodily pleasures and 
the avoidance of pain’. Whereas previous to the Enlightenment, bodily lusts and 
avarice were viewed theologically as something to be brought under a higher moral 
control, Locke and Srnitli viewed certain desires as spurs to material prosperity. As 
Smith argued; ‘it is not fr om the benevolence of the butcher that we expect om* dinner 
but fr om his regard for his own self interest’ ([1776] in Campbell and Skinner (eds.) 
1974:24). Weber observed that the main motivation of capitalist man was ‘to sinlc into 
the grave weighed down with a great material load of money and goods’ whilst 
arguing that to malce acquisition, for its own sake, the goal in pre-capitalist society, 
would be imwoifhy and contemptible; ‘the product of a perverse instinct’ (1930: 71).
Continuing this theme, Siimnel argued that the transition to modern society where 
social communication was dominated by a market mentality necessarily involved the 
dissolution of traditionally held bonds as these would be felt as constraints;
‘The increasing emphasis upon individuality which cuts itself off most sharply 
from the immediate enviromnent. . . signifies a growing distance in genuine 
inner relationsliips and a declining distance in more external ones’ (in Frisby 
1994: 476).
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Berthoud contends that, from the same perspective tliat presented the market as 
boundless and the possibilities of technology limitless;
‘Being human is to be motivated by a constant search for material well being .
. . to strive to escape from constt'aints, both natural and social, to become an 
independent individual . . .  to be able to exercise one’s individual rights to 
accumulate goods within a culturally recognised competitive context’ (1992: 
82-3 my emphasis).
The movement to modernity then, involved a concept of freedom and a liberating 
disentangling fr om the perceived bondage of tr adition alongside a strong compulsion 
to subjugate the natural enviromnent. The idea of enlarging people’s choices 
continues to be an important concept in development. The UNDP for example, 
discusses development in terms of an expansion of choice (also Sen’s ‘Development 
as Freedom’ 1992). Herzfeld notes that ‘Choice itself is hardly a culture free or 
ideologically neutral notion; it is a key component of neo-liberal economies . . .  and it 
is often claimed as the hallmark of western individualism’ (2001: 154). This is a 
contentious area that will be discussed in later sections. For now, the main 
observation that I would like to malce here is that freedom, whilst celebrated as ‘the 
logical antithesis of repression’ {loc. cit.), like consumption, is not an unlimited good, 
as Thin reflects;
‘There are lots of ways in which downtrodden people need more choice, but 
this does not mean that in general the expansion of choice will result in greater 
happiness or responsibility. Excessive choice is often psychologically 
imwelcome (and therefore a source of unliappiness in itself) and a cause of 
socially irresponsible decisions’ (pers. comm.)
Alongside endorsements of material ambition and individualism, the Enlightenment 
also promoted reason, toleration and the liberation of people from ‘ignorance’ and 
‘superstition’. There was also a firm belief in the superiority of these values and an 
optimistic vision that the standar d and quality of life in Western Eur ope was upwar dly
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mobile and compar ed favourably with that of other parts of the world, as Adam Smith 
proclaims:
‘The accommodation of a European prince does not always so much exceed 
that of an industrious and frugal peasant, as the accommodation of the latter 
exceeds that of many an African king, the absolute master of the lives and 
liberties of ten thousand naked savages’ (in Campbell and Skinner (eds.) 
1974:24).
This dynamic of imputed superiority remains central to development discourse, as 
Tenbruck observes; ‘the USA regards their democracy^ as the universal prescription 
for progress . . . their own history as the universal paradigm for the reliable interplay 
of independence, democracy and progress . . . something all people naturally desire 
with their hearts and minds’ (1990: 199).
A related belief was that human progression involved individuals and societies 
‘fighting their way up a ladder of moral improvement using the weapons of hierarchy, 
order and education (Kuper 1999: 67). Darwin exemplifies this perspective when 
opining of the Feugians in 1826:
‘The perfect equality among the individuals composing the Feugian tribes 
must for a long time retard their civilisation . . .  it is difficult to understand 
how a chief can arise till there is property of some sort by which he might 
manifest his superiority and increase his power’ (Journal of Researches, 
Chapter X, in Kuper 1999: 67) .^
Dichotomous evaluative ascriptions, such as the above, were a central feature of 
Enlightenment discourse and, as we will see, have their latter day analogues in 
ascriptions o f ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped’. This dynamic is discussed below.
 ^For instance, the contemporary development ethicist Crocker asserts that ‘A nation with the right sort 
of basic political, economic, and social institutions -  for instance stable families, infrastructure, certain 
kinds of markets, a democratic government, a free press, and non-govemmental organisations -  can 
prevent and remedy both [famine and chronic hunger], while a society without the right set of 
interlocking institutions is likely to experience one or other if not both’ (1996:215)
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In development thinking, following 1945, Larrain argues that the age of late 
capitalism, characterised by modernisation theory, was followed by a period in which 
neo-Marxist critiques entered the discourse. I will now outline the main themes 
running thr ough these developments.
The Inauguration of Development
Given that I am arguing that many of the underlying themes from imperialism 
pervade development, it might seem arbitrary to say that there was a moment when 
development became the paradigm that replaced colonialism. However, over the 
period when the colonial powers officially withdrew their administrations, 
development rose to ascendancy as a way of explaining the relationship between die 
West (or North) and the rest of the world, and as Arce and Long observe, 
‘development studies arose as a distinctive field only after 1945’ (2000: 5). Sachs 
proposes that we call the age of development:
‘that particular historical period which began on 20 January 1949, when HaiTy 
S. Truman for the first time declared in his inauguration speech, the Southern 
Hemisphere as “underdeveloped areas”. The label stuck and subsequently 
provided the cognitive base for both arrogant interventionism from the North 
and pathetic self-pity in the South’ (1992: 2).
Tenbruck adds to this, that whilst the groundwork had been done in Western 
consciousness for the phenomena of development, ‘it represented a revolutionary step 
to tiUTi development aid into a global task and therefore into a regular duty together 
with a justified claim’ (1990: 195). Development began optimistically and with a 
surety that the future for developing countries was already exhibited in the modem 
West.
® In fact, thi'oughout the history of capitalism, financial inequality has always been the norm. For 
example, in nineteenth centuiy New York, the wealthiest 4% of citizens owned more than 80% of all
wealth (Schwarz 1995).
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The presence of the colonial powers, of cour se, continued in economic terms, and 
with the Cold War, direct and indirect military interventions were a continuous 
featur e of life in the ‘new states’ .^ In the 1950s, development was understood in terms 
of industrialisation. On a global scale, developing nations were encouraged to follow 
the dictates of Western economists who, in hindsight, had seriously flawed theories. 
Weak and often ethnically divided post-colonial states were unrealistically expected 
to quickly establish centrally planned economies. The emphasis in the 1970s was on 
the use of natur al resour ces (mining and agriculture) and massive loans were given to 
develop these potential sources of raw materials. In the 1970s and 1980s, as tar gets 
were not met and global prices punished developing countries^, Tliird World 
indebtedness became widespread and entrenched. The direct government approach 
was abandoned for neo-liberal ‘shock therapy’ where the State was to diminish whilst 
the private sector was to expand as markets were opened. In Chapter 11, I give an 
analysis of neo-liberal policies in Peru over the last decade. Repayments of debt 
became tied to structural adjustments demanded by IFIs (international financial 
institutions) who were the main creditors. Structural adjustment often meant the 
imposition of austerity measures, which impacted on the poorest sectors of the 
population. Today, the governments of previously occupied countries effectively have 
to share their sovereignty with IFIs. Generally, as Chambers, notes, ‘more than ever 
before, power is concentrated in the cores of the North, including power to determine 
national policies in the South (1997: 4).
Over the period in which ‘development’ grew out of the disintegration of colonialism, 
theorists made no apology for defining progressive strategies from a First World 
perspective. Imperialism' became a more apt term than 'colonialism' for the ways in 
which rich countries in the modem era exert undue influence over poorer countries. 
Some aspects of post-colonial development, such as nation building and 
démocratisation, are str ongly antitlietical to the spirit of colonialism.
’ Part of the political motivation for the capitalist West to support modernisation in developing 
countries, as well as opening up new markets, was clearly a strategy to counter the perceived threat of 
communism. In fact, the term ‘Third World’ was coined in the early 1950s as a way of designating the 
embattled territories which were being contested over ideologically by the 2 supeipowers.
® Oil prices rose throughout the 1970s, there was a decline in Africa’s commodity prices whilst the cost 
of imports continued to rise
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Nevertheless, as Gardner and Lewis obseiwe if one believes that Tife is generally 
better in the Noithem countries than in their poorer neighbours in the South . . . 
modernisation is an inherently optimistic concept, for it assumes that all countries will 
eventually experience economic growth’ (1996: 13). Ayres exemplifies this view;
‘The technological revolution is irresistible, the aihitiary authority and 
irrational values of pre-scientific cultures are doomed . . .  the only remaining 
alternative is that of intelligent, voluntary acceptance of the industrial way of 
life and the values that go with i t . . .  Not only do our* people eat better, sleep 
better, live in more comfortable dwellings, get around more . .  .and live longer 
than men have done ever before. In addition to listening to radio and watching 
television, they read more books, see more pictures and hear* more music 
(1962, in Sbert 1993: 194)
Whilst these claims seem quaint and parochial as a depiction of the constitutive 
elements of the good life, the underlying credo of progress and modernisation, 
although now less blatant, continues to be emblematic of much of the West’s dealings 
with the Third World. From this perspective, under-development is seen as something 
unfortunate that can be remedied by the various masteries of the West. Enduring and 
dominant themes in the evolution of development thinking and practice stem from this 
presupposition.
Modernisation Theory
‘Modernisation Theory’ refers to a group of approaches that were latent in 
colonialism and Imperialism, became explicit at an early phase in the histor*y of 
development and continue to echo thematically in contemporary theorising^. Indeed, 
Gardner and Lewis argue that these perspectives, ‘whilst at their most influential in 
the 1950s and 1960s, continue to dominate development practice today’ (1996: 12). 
Crewe, in accord, claims that ‘ideology within development agencies is still at least 
partially infor*med by the evolutionist heritage of moder*nisation theory, with its 
racialist theories prevalent dur ing colonial times’ (1997: 73). It is important to keep in
® The first journal devoted to development studies promoted a modernisation perspective and was 
significantly entitled Economic Development and Cultural Changé’.
125
mind the duplicity that is intrinsic to modernisation. Herzfeld sees this in terms of 
‘institutions taking refuge in their own theodicy -  ‘the system’ as an ethical alibi for 
self-fulfilling foimulations, such as for example, bromides about the ‘culture of 
poverty’ (2001: 231). The main features of modernisation theory, then, are as follows.
The premise of this group of theories is that political and economic stability can be 
achieved by replacing traditional practices, economies and forms of social 
organisation and governance with the Western package of the modem state, 
technology, industiy, principles of law, family size and time management. Corbridge 
notes that ‘clocks and condoms were among the most tangible forms of development 
assistance in the 1950s’ (1995: 2). Rogers (1980) showed how Western planners made 
basic androcentric assumptions such as the belief that farmers are men and that 
women play an ancillary role in productive activities (cf. Bosemp 1970)* .^ 
Modernisation theories are now commonly regarded as being fundamentally 
evolutionary, prescriptive and teleological. However, this group of approaches was 
given extensive theoretical justification. Various explanatory incarnations of 
modernisation theory emerged; some giving pre-eminence to sociological factors, 
others to psychological or economic factors, or all of these in different combinations.
Towards Economic T^ake-^ Off*
From an economic perspective, highly influential theorists such as Rostow^  ^ (1960) 
and Foster (1962) depicted underdeveloped countries in temis analogous to medieval 
and pre-industrial Europe and prescribed a linear path to a developed, industrialised 
society char acterised by high mass consumption. From the liistorical development of 
Europe from feudalism to the USA’s libertarian capitalism, different stages were
As will be explored later, these assumptions sometimes amounted to self-fiilfilling prophecies 
whereby men were given oppoitunities to utilise technological innovations leading to a féminisation of 
subsistence activities.
“ Rostow, who died early in 2003, as well as being an academic, was one of the chief architects of 
policy to the US government during the Vietnam War and was one of the first officials to argue for the 
extensive bombing of Noi*th Vietnam. Following this, when he began lecturing at the University of 
Texas, he was regarded as a pariah by many fellow academics and students staged protests at his 
appointment. Rostow’s economic theoiy provided much of the ideological underpinnings of the 
Vietnam War. Following the war, he maintained that US intervention, in net effect, had been correct 
and worthwhile (Noel Dolan, Obituary of Rostow in The Glasgow Herald 20 Feb 2003).
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extrapolated for developing countries to work their way thorough before they could 
achieve economic ‘talce off For example;
Tt is useful, as well as roughly accurate, to regard the process of development 
now going forward in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America as 
analogous to the stages of preconditions and take-off of other societies, in the 
late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centiuies’ (Rostow 1960: 21).
The 5 stages proposed by Rostow, as both factual and prescriptive were ‘traditional 
society’, ‘preconditions for take-off, ‘talce-off, ‘road to maturity’ and finally the age 
o f ‘high mass consumption’. ‘Tradition’ was understood here as referTing to relatively 
inert anachronistic instances of the smviving past. Williams argues that, from this 
perspective, “‘traditional habitats” are isolated, by some cunent hegemonic 
development as elements of the past which now have to be discarded’ (1993: 601)^ .^
Alongside this recognition that development is a social process, strong currents in 
development thinking were purely pragmatic, explaining under-development in terms 
of removing obstacles such as a lack of technical knowledge or finding ways to cope 
with difficult climatic conditions and landscapes. The initial conceptualisations of the 
necessary ‘inputs’ required to transform poor countries were straightforward and 
focused upon infr astructur al programmes to allow markets to be opened up, technical 
and bureaucratic training towards the goal of increased productivity and ‘good 
governance’. The concept of improving the capacities of poorer countries remains 
central to development practice today although levels of local consultation have 
improved.
^Tradition ’  as an Obstacle
Modernisation was envisaged as a process that had to be engendered through the 
establishment of particular* institutional aiTangements, division of labour*, values and
See Lairain 1989 for a thorough Marxist critique of modernisation theory.
As we will see, contemporary social development theory and practice, on the contrary, is ‘pervaded 
with the notion of lost hadition and the ‘recovery’, ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘revival’ of latent community 
practices’ (Mosse 1994: 265). This is understood by some theorists as an applied version of ‘salvage
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the entrepreneurial spirit '^*. Berthoud discusses how the ‘principle of boundless 
expansion in the technological and economic is generally alien’ in ‘traditional’ 
societies and that this principle ‘presupposes overcoming symbolic and moral 
‘obstacles’, that is, ridding these societies of various inhibiting ideas’ (1992: 72). 
Berthoud exemplifies this perspective with a citation fiom an article (disturbingly) 
entitled '"The Social Anthropology o f Economic Developmenf:
‘Economic Development of an imderdeveloped people by themselves is not 
compatible with the maintenance of their traditional customs and mores . . . 
What is needed is a revolution in the totality of social, cultural and religious 
institutions and habits, and thus in their psychological attitude, their 
philosophy and way of life’ (Sadie 1960: 302)
Development was understood as a phenomenon that had to be fuelled by economic 
progress and steered by teclxnological and politico-economic experts. Hobart writes 
that, ‘in modernisation theory, society or culture is treated, suitably reified, as an 
obstacle to change, more rarely as facilitating it’ (1993: 6). However, it is more 
accurate that tliese theorists sought to engender a particular kind o f society, one 
conducive to high mass consumption. Indeed, until the 1970s, the terms economic 
growth and development were used interchangeably (Corbridge 1995: 4). Long and 
Long observe that modernisation envisages ‘development in terms of a progressive 
movement towards technologically more complex and integr ated forms of “modern” 
society’ (1992: 19)
Normative Polarities
Dichotomous typologising of the ‘cultures’ of developing countries as compared with 
Western society provided the justification for this ideological movement. Various 
sociological models that dichotomised ‘traditional’ and modem societies lent 
themselves to modernisation theory, in particular' Tonnies’ theories of Gemeinschaft
anthropology’. The language of recovery in development discomse will be examined in greater detail 
below.
From the 1950s onwards, in the emerging discipline the ‘sociology of development’, a clear 
dichotomy became apparent between theorists concerned with exploring the social and institutional
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and Gesellschaft (1887/1955), Dui’kheim’s mechanical solidarity and organic 
solidarity, Spencer’s distinction between homogenousand heterogeneous societies, 
and Redfreld’s theories of ‘folk communities’. However, Larrain argues that it was 
Weber’s theoretical perspectives, which exerted the greatest influence upon 
Modernisation theorists (1989: 88). An interesting but seldom observed implication of 
Weber’s qualitative distinctions between the rationalities, roles and social institutions 
that characterised particular societies in particular times and places was that latent 
within tliese typologies was tire modernisation theorists’ normative rendering of a 
polarity between the traditional and modern.
For example, Parsons’(1949) and theories of social roles and relations in traditional 
and modem settings were rooted in Weberian theoretical postulates. Parsons set out 
‘pattem variables’ of roles and social relations, wliich differentiated typically 
traditional and modem societies. Traditional societies were given the general label 
‘ascriptiveparticularistic’ industrial societies are ‘acquisitive universalistic’^^ .
Germani (1965), also drawing from Weber, offered a comparable polar* 
conceptualisation of the core differences between ‘traditional’, primitive, or pre- 
industrial societies and their modern counterparts. He argues that the normative 
fr ameworks for social action in pre-industrial societies tend to be prescriptive rather 
than elective (and rational). He also contended that wliilst in modern society, change 
is tire norm and is both promoted and managed by its normative frameworks, in 
traditional societies, change is resisted and regarded as pathological, in the 
Durkheimian sense. Traditional societies, according to Germani, tend to have a
arrangements which advanced or impeded development and those who, from a Marxist perspective, 
developed critical theories of neo-imperialism.
Interestingly, the contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum asserts that the cultural anthropology 
of a previous era imagined homogeneity where there is really diversity because of a methodological 
error: ‘for often the anthropologist selected a single ‘native informant’ and built the picture of the 
culture on this basis’ (2000:49). She does not, however, give any proofs for this assertion.
This polarising schemata can be summaiised as follows; firstly, roles and relations in ‘traditional 
societies’ tended to be affective (roles or activities are undertaken for their intrinsic gratification) whilst 
in modem societies roles tended to be infoimed by non-affective instrumental rationality. Secondly, 
roles in traditional societies tended to be particularistic and bound by social conventions, which are not 
transferable rather than being ‘universal’. Thirdly, some roles in traditional societies tend to be 
evaluated ascriptively, that is, on the basis of socially defined categories (age, sex, or lineage, for 
example), rather than in terms of actual performance or merit. Finally, modem societies tend to be 
characterised by the allocation of specific bureaucratic roles and relations whereas, in tiaditional 
societies, roles aie ‘diffuse’, or multi-functional. A further dimension as to whether individuals in
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smaller number of multi-functional institutions rather than the proliferation of 
specialised and differentiated mstitutions of modem societies.
Engineering Transition
Transition fiom one form of society to another involved engineering fundamental 
changes in roles and relationships. Three main kinds of change were discussed as 
being necessary for the transition to modernity. Firstly, the disentangling of the 
individual from close primary bonds was understood as being essential. Secondly, 
changes in the social roles and relations as depicted in the reified societal forms 
described above. Ascriptive orderings of role had to make way for str atification based 
on patterns of acquisition, merit and labour* demand in the market. Thirdly, Larrain 
notes that a change in personhood was deemed a requirement for* the transition to 
modernity.
Tn tr aditional societies, a kind of personality predominates which is suited to 
the internalisation of prescriptive nor*ms whereas in industrial societies there is 
an emphasis on the kind of personality which internalises elective norms, that 
is to say, personalities able to choose between various courses of action’ 
(1989: 90).
The entrepreneur was one such ‘type’ held as being essential to the transition to 
moder*n society. McClelland (1966) generalised historically and geographically from 
Weber’s theories of the ‘Spirit of Capitalism’ to develop a theor y of the psychological 
factors that underlie economic success, on the premise that certain types of societies 
tended to promote in its members the predilection for achievement (understood in 
terms of material gain)^’. McClelland concluded that the entrepreneurial personality 
and drive could be instilled in children through education^*.
traditional societies tended to be motivated by collective, rather than private interests or vice versa was 
left an open question by Parsons.
McClelland’s methods were preposterous; he measured various societies ‘achievement rating’ 
thr ough analysis of childr en’s fantasies (looking for entr epreneur ial tendencies) and then compared this 
with the amount of electricity generated in that country (an indicator of economic development), 
finding a high correlation!
Hobart links the promotion of the entrepreneurial personality as a way of countering the 
homogenising tendencies of Marxist theory to ‘transactionalism; ‘the antliropological resuscitation of
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Changes would also have to be wrought in the relationsliips between civil society and 
the State; local forms of association, such as indigenous communities had to be 
integi'ated into statutory bmeaucratic norms and brought to participate in the political 
life of the nation. In addition, the relationships forged in different societies between 
knowledge, rationality, belief and technology had to conform to the disciplinary and 
productive boundaries that characterise modern societies. DaMatta notes that, up until 
1960, Brazilian anthropological studies were based on an evolutionist schema that 
envisaged the integration of tribal groups within the national system as being parallel 
to a movement from ‘primitive mores’ to the values and life-ways of civilisation. 
DaMatta argues, however, that
‘this schema forgets Üiat indigenous societies are not in fact uniform blocks 
capable of being integrated into the national order . . .  tenitorial, political and 
economic integration can occur* without automatic assimilation of other* 
spheres of tribal life. A tribal group may be economically assimilated while 
remaining relatively isolated in terms of Idnship system, ceremonial and 
religious beliefs’ (1993: 129).
Asychronicity and * Aspiration ’
Germani {op.cit.) envisaged change towards modem capitalist society as occurring in 
a patchy and incongruent manner, allovring Hie formation of ‘intermediary’ societies 
where traditional moralities and institutions persist and individuals live in and out of 
mutually contradictory spheres of life, for example, production and religious belief. 
Centre-periphery relations where urban ar eas and particular* social groupings develop 
faster and accrue more capital than r*ur*al areas and other* social groupings occur* as a 
result of this ‘asynclnonic’ development. The extremes of financial inequality that 
now characterise developing countries appear* to bear* out tliis view* .^ This was seen 
by some theorists as a necessary, if unfortunate stage:
utilitarianism, in which rational individuals set out self interestedly to maximise their utility, whether 
defined as wealth, power or status’ (1993: 8).
Thin makes the point that the tendency to uncritically use 'inequality' as a short-hand for 'financial 
inequality' is itself a version of commodity fetishism perhaps best described as money fetishism. There 
are important differences in the kinds of inequality that have been altered by development; while
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‘Unhappiness and discontentment in the sense of wanting more than is 
obtainable at any moment is to be generated. The suffering and dislocation 
that may be caused in the process may be objectionable, but it appears to be 
the price that has to be paid for economic development; the condition of 
economic progress’ (Sadie 1960: 302)^ ®.
Germani also argued that as higher levels of consumption became established among 
certain social categories, this would produce an ‘aspiration effect’ upon the rest of the 
population. A similar notion featured in modernisation theory’s talce on teclinological 
change; ‘the difhrsion of modern technology is supposed to provide an example (a 
demonstration effect’) to progressive farmers’ (Hobart 1993: 13). Germani observed 
that imderdeveloped nations, whilst having the aspirations of developed countries, 
would not be able to establish provisions such as welfare initially but would exhibit 
patterns of conspicuous consumption among traditional elites and newly established 
middle classes, thus producing social inequality and conflict until the economy had 
diversified and caught up with industrialised nations.
On the whole, modernisation theory was based upon a ‘faith’ in progress and the short 
lived optimism of the 1950s with regar d to global economic development, rather than 
upon in-depth studies of the relative viability of different economic and social models 
in different settings.
financial inequality in and between nations has tended to rise over the past century, other forms of 
mequality such as life expectancy, access to health care, diinking water, and education have been 
massively reduced (pers. comm.)
This theory has its contemporary equivalents and has been the topic of many empirical studies, 
BaiTO, for example argues that ‘higher inequality tends to retard growth in poor countries and 
encourage growth in richer places. The Kuznets crnve - whereby inequality first increases and later 
decreases during the process of economic development - emerges as a clear empirical regularity’ 
(1999). The implication would be that strategies that promote greater equality in ‘poor countries’ would 
encomage growth. This means the redistribution of the resoiu*ces gained by the richer sectors of 
society, or fi*om those who benefit extraneously, in a period of economic development. From his 
analysis of the relationship between poverty, growth and inequality, Lai concludes that ‘alleviating 
poverty is not synonymous with reducing the mequality of income’ (1985: 10). Fundamental 
disagreement between economists seems to be the norm. This is alarming in the sense that their 
decision making and professional judgement has both great prestige and huge importance for the 
livelihoods of those affected by economic policies. Chambers, dr awing on empirical research on the 
degree of disagreement between top economists which shows very low levels of consensus on 
fundamental issues, declares that ‘practical economic policy is an area where economists can be deeply 
uncertain, widely divided and often wrong’ (1997: 52-3)
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These theories clearly leave gaping holes if one is interested in a satisfactory account 
of well being. Hobart notes that ‘the categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ are 
vague and idealised constructions . . .  the process of development is defined 
teleogically by reference to the supposed state of the dominant party’ (1993: 6). 
Gardner and Lewis argue that modernisation theory’s ‘assumption that all change 
mevitably follows the Western Model is both breathtakingly ethnocentric and 
empirically incorrect’ (1996: 14). Some of the major failings of modernisation theory, 
then, are as follows.
Disenchanting Modernisation
The initial optimism of modernisation theorists was worn away by the realisation that 
development projects, despite huge investment were not achieving the desired results. 
There ar e various dimensions to the perceived inadequacy of modernisation theory.
Firstly, development was manifestly not achieving what it was supposed to. Studies of 
the effects of development have resulted in ‘a much keener realisation that the new 
states are indeed in something of a fix’ (Geertz 2001: 24). Corbridge reflects that ‘in 
the wake of continuing famine in Afirica, a lost decade of development in Latin 
America, and the tragedy of Rwanda, it can be difficult to credit the spirit of optimism 
that marked the Golden Years of the 1950s and 1960s’ (1995: 4).
A widespread disenchantment with development’s telos tempered efforts to move 
towards the original unproblematic modernist representations of what a developed 
society should be. The kinds of societies that were emerging as a result of 
development, such as vast shantytowns with appalling sanitation and rife with 
preventable diseases and malnutrition, were obviously abenations of what developers 
had envisaged. Economic development was envisaged as entailing the movement of 
‘imder-employed peasants’ in rural areas to urban industrial centres, combined with 
the transition fiom subsistence agriculture to cash cropping. The evidence seemed to 
indicate that the global economic system, whilst causing ecological destmction 
tlrrough developed countries’ uncontrolled consmnption and waste was also foisting 
this destructive, egocentric lifestyle upon the societies of developing countries.
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It has also become clear that economic development has had unequal benefits and has 
frequently created nevy Idnds of poverty and social marginalisation (Chambers 1983, 
1997; Ferguson 1986; Grillo 1997). Gross levels of economic growth in Third World 
countries had scarcely changed by the late 1960s and poverty levels had increased. 
Orthodox economics, being primarily focused upon efficiency in the deployment of 
resour ces, had no logical remit to include the ethical considerations of the equitable 
distribution of income or the relief of poverty. Lai notes that a fundamental difficulty 
is that ‘we lack a consensus about the ethical system for judging the desirability of a 
particular distribution of income’ (1985: 10). The idea that economic growth in some 
sectors would spread to others automatically (‘trickle-down’) has proven to be naïve. 
Development literature clearly shows that rapid economic growth does not guarantee 
the eradication of dire poverty (for instance, Brazil) whilst also showing that where 
economic growth is stagnant, poverty can be held at bay (for example Costa Rica).
Lai however, argues that the standard economic presumption that real wages will rise 
as the demand for labour* grows, relative to its supply, is universally valid; ‘the fruits 
of growth, even in India, will tlierefore trickle down’ (1985: 12). His conclusions ar e 
based upon a mathematical formalist surplus labour theory, which does not take 
various factors into consideration. More recent research has shown that capital 
accumulation does have a limited trickle down effect to cer*tain sectors, which results 
in greater inequality between groups. Government mterventionist strategies are 
required if wealth is to be re-distributed more equitably (Aghion and Bolton 1997: 
151-172). The redistribution of resour ces depends upon factors such as the provision 
of policies that are effective in improving living standards of the poor, ‘augment their 
capabilities, such as building human capital, or expand their oppoi*tunities, such as 
more equal land distribution and employment groivth in manufacturing or services’ 
(Ahuja et.al. 1997: 291). These measures are generally inadequately provided for in 
developing countries.
As noted above, poverty levels have often increased in countries where there has been 
economic growth. Sen has shown that increasing inequality can also occur within 
households (1981). Whilst economic inequality was anticipated in modernisation 
theoi*y as a function of economic growth, and tlie fact that societies are composed of
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people with different amounts of power, access to resources and interests was 
recognised, the processes tlnough which these different sectors were to eventually 
benefit from development was not understood contextually.
It became evident that new economic opportunities and structures can cause the 
exacerbation of existing tensions and the emergence of new conflicts at a local or 
national level. The modernist view of tlie ‘poor’ was often simplistic. The benefits 
and burdens of development inteiwentions have proven to be unequally divided 
between groups that are differentiated by criteria such as ethnic identity, class, caste, 
geography, sex or access to education (Hill 1986).
However, wliilst, in relation to the unguaided optimism of the 1950s and 1960s, 
development has fallen short of its promise, the argument that development has been a 
complete failure is difficult to sustain. The Human Development Reports published by 
the UN show a fairly balanced representation of both the shortcomings and challenges 
of development as well as clear evidence of progr ess. For example, life expectancy in 
all developing countries rose from 46 to 62 years, infant mortality per 1000 live births 
fell from 170 to 150, the proportion of people with access to clean drinking water has 
reportedly risen from 10% to 60%, adult literacy has risen from 46% to 69% and 
diseases such as smallpox have been all but eradicated (Human Development Reports 
1995 and 1996).
In relation to reviewing modernisation theory it is important to aclaiowledge that, in 
general there has been a con*espondence between patterns of economic growth and 
poverty reduction and also to consider tliat no country has reduced poverty without 
economic growth. Alongside this, however, it is important to note that whilst the 
percentages of development indicators may show improvements, with population 
increases, the absolute numbers of people afflicted by poverty rises accordingly. It is 
also important to look at the impact of economic growth on the quality of life of 
different social groups. Overall poverty reduction can occm* whilst the living 
conditions of the ‘poorest’ worsens.
The assumption of an unproblematic emulation of Western economic development 
has proven to be simplistic and erroneous. There are two related dimensions to this
135
critique. Firstly, economic activity is often integrated with quite different values, 
practices and rationales (Dilley 1992; Epstein 1962, 1973; Sahlins 1994). Nussbaum 
disclaims the ‘obtuse’ universalising assumption that people are all simply rational 
agents in the global market;
‘seeldng to maximise utility whatever their traditions or context. . . neglecting 
tradition and context and their role in constructing desire and preference, 
neglecting the many different conceptions of Üie good that citizens of different 
nations have and their urgent need to be able to live in accordance with these 
conceptions’ (2000: 32).
This is related to the wrong headed pedagogical presupposition that developing 
countries can, and should, learn from the particular historical paths trodden by 
developed countries. Gardner and Lewis observe that ‘anthropological research has 
continually shown that development comes in many shapes and forms; we cannot 
generalise about transitions from one ‘type’ of society to another’ (1996: 14). Arce 
and Long support this view, writing that ‘in modernisation theory, economic, 
teclmological and demographic conditions, and the organisation of appropriate social 
institutions and value frameworks, were located as functionally segmented orders and 
thus treated by experts as separate from the multifarious and at times contradictory 
experiences and practice of everyday life’ (2000: 5).
Secondly, assuming the superiority of Western Imowledge over local and/or 
indigenous knowledge in terms of economic and material gains in difficult 
circumstances has often proven to be mistalcen (Croll and Parkin 1992; Hobart 1993, 
Long 1992). Modern, developed societies are depicted as being rational, 
technologically sopliisticated, secular*, universalistic and profit-motivated, wliilst 
imderdeveloped societies are understood as being held back by tradition, 
particularistic irrational modes of thought and wwrnotivated to profit. In his skilful 
dissection of development’s persistent mistalces, or ‘embedded eiTors’, Chambers 
contends that;
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Tn matters amenable to investigation by hard science, development 
professionals are inclined to believe that ‘we know’, and that om* technology is 
superior’ (Chambers 1997: 19).
It is clear that there are many areas in which these claims are true, in particular with 
regard to aspects of boüi medical science and engineering. However, the generalised 
confidence that Western Imowledge is superior has often proven to be mistaken. 
Firstly, there are examples where Western scientists have been categorically wrong 
and local knowledge has proven to be superior* in terms of the desired goals. The 
scope of this thesis does not permit me to cite examples^ \  Secondly, whilst Western 
scientific Imowledge has often offered something usefrrl, it has sometimes been 
imposed inappropriately, at tlie expense of other aspects of the quality of life, in ways 
wliich have clearly done more harm than good (Hill 1986; Mair 1984).
A further misapprehension in modernisation theory is the idea that ‘poor’ people are 
not motivated to serve their best interests. Hence the arguments cited above to the 
effect that an ‘aspiration effect’ is required or that the entreprenemial spirit has to be 
inculcated. This myopic and ethnocentric moder*nist assmnption reduced well being to 
market viability. Lai, for example, appears to be arguing from a formalist perspective 
in his argument that people’s ‘best interests’ can be understood in economic terms;
‘The most basic misconception underlying much of development economics 
has been a rejection of the behavioural assumption that, either as producers or 
consumers, people . . . would act economically; when the oppor*tunity of an 
advantage was presented to them they would take it’ (1985: 11)
As noted above, an implicit assumption in Western economic reasoning is that 
hierarchy, inequality and competition are necessary.
See Chambers (1997), especially chapter 2, where he presents a literature review which amounts to a 
litany of the most pernicious and enduring errors made by development professionals. Amongst other 
topics, he discusses; The Green revolution, Wheeled tool carriers, Wood-fuel forecasts, People’s 
relationship with the environment. Human made desertification, Himalayan environmental degradation. 
Soil erosion in Afr ica, Pastoralism and Integrated Rural Development Programmes.
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However, at this juncture, I would like underline the conclusions of research that has |
shown that people in ‘undeveloped countries’ often know far better strategies than 
those of development planners to optimise then livelihood in a sustainable manner in |
difficult circumstances (Croll and Parkin 1992). Indigenous concepts of how to use i
natural resources, or their concept of work may be radically different from that of |
maximising neo-classical economics but this does not mean that indigenous people j
are somehow ignorant about how to best achieve well being and efficiency, that is, 
optimising a balance between various components in complex livelihoods. I
A related failing in modernisation theory is the depiction of ‘tradition’, or local 
loiowledge as an obstacle. In practice, until fairly recently, local cultur e was generally 
sidelined by planners or treated as a constraint. Viewing local people’s perspectives 
as being obstacles to development has proven to be counterproductive and has 
resulted in disastrously inappropriate development interventions (Mair 1984).
A further key presupposition in modernisation tlieory is that underdevelopment can be 
imderstood in terms of a number of obstacles or lacks that can be dealt with 
pragmatically (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 14) such as opening up markets by 
improving transport links. Again, especially with regard to the more mar ginalised and 
disempowered sectors of society, this approach has often proved to be simplistic.
The idea, which had been central to development rhetoric, of the US being at the apex 
of a social evolutionary scale became imtenable as the ecological consequences and 
non-sustainability of industrialisation have become obvious. Illich was one of the 
leading frgmes to draw attention to the myth of unlimited economic growth:
‘Dming the late 1960s, it has become evident that less than 10 per cent of the 
human race consumes more than 50 per cent of die world’s resources, and 
produces 90 per cent of the physical pollution which thr eatens to extinguish 
the biosphere’ (1973: 149).
Equally, awareness has grown that die social and political models that are prevalent in 
the modern west are themselves deeply flawed, as Chambers asserts; ‘Socially, in 
terms of well being, for many in the North, the experience is of increasing
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unemployment, job insecmity, crime, drug abuse and anti-social anomie. 
Simultaneously, for the privileged of both North and South, the visual social reality 
perceived or repressed includes mass slaughter, genocide, starvation, cliild soldiers, 
mutilation by land mines, and the like, brought literally home on television screens’ 
(1997:4).
From the mid-1960s omvards, ‘Dependency Theory’ assumed ascendancy in 
academic chdes and has provided an ideological basis for much of the work of 
development NGOs. Modernisation theory was tempered to reflect concerns about 
increasing poverty and in tlie 1970s, even the World Bank began to incorporate ideas 
about ‘redistribution with growth (Corbridge 1995).
In the most basic terms, the fundamental difference between modernisation theory and 
dependency theory is that the former envisages poverty in terms of domestic 
considerations whilst the latter is predicated on the claim that poverty and 
poweriessness are largely caused by the exploitative incorporation of ‘marginal’ areas 
into larger systems. In fact, dependency theory arguably constitutes modernisation 
theory’s most vital critique in its assertion that underdevelopment has to be 
imderstood relationally in terms of historic systems of unequal political and economic 
exchange. However, as we will exariime below, dependency theory has proven to be 
equally prone to many of the criticisms levelled against modernisation theory.
Dependency Theory
From the late 1960s onwards, ‘Dependency Theory’ seized upon ‘Modernisation 
Theory’s’ uncritical perspective on the power asymmetries hilierent to development 
and its omission of wider historical processes in its explanatory framework. 
‘Dependency theory’ is often refened to as if it constitutes a single, coherent 
theoretical paradigm. In fact, there are important fractures within this body of 
theories^^.
There are 3 main sfrands identified in the literature. Firstly there is the theory that underdevelopment 
is caused in dependent areas by central economies and further, that within the dynamic of this 
relationship, peripheral economies caimot progress within a capitalist economic model (e.g. Frank 
1969). Secondly, the emphasis upon the obstacles to development that the central economy constitutes, 
whilst not asserting that capitalism is doomed to be futile for peripheral areas. Thirdly, a closer focus
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Adopting a neo-Marxist perspective^^, dependency theorists understood development 
to be, in the final analysis, a continuation of imperialist and colonialist forces, where 
the putatively emancipatory goals of poverty reduction were to be disbelieved (Franlc 
1969, Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Rather than seeing poorer countries as being under­
developed prior to their contact with the North, dependency theorists argued that 
poorer countries were actively made ‘under-developed’ in both ideological and real 
teims by the capitalist interests of the North. Franlc proposed that marginal areas have 
a higher standard of living when their relationship to urban centres is weakest (1969). 
Poorer countries provided a peripheral source of raw materials and labour for the 
richer countries central to the world economy (Wallerstein 1974). Frank argued that 
global capitalism was responsible for the underdevelopment of Latin America fiom 
the 16^** centuiy onwards (1969).
From a ‘Dependency’ perspective it was considered paradoxical, absuid and 
disingenuous to posit wealthy developed countries as models for the projected 
economic development of developing countries primaiily because the capitalist 
system depended upon the incorporation of peripheral areas which could be plundered 
(Cardoso 1977; Frank 1966)^ ^^ . Caidoso however, predicted that the pessimistic views 
of Frank, (who argued that only Socialist revolution along the lines of Cuba or China 
could prevent the disastrous incoiporation of poor countries into an exploitative 
relationship) would not be borne out by history (1977). The economic successes of 
countries that were regarded as being peripheral to the world capitalist system, for 
example in the Far East, along with the collapse of socialist states have made certain 
aspects of Franlc’s arguments less credible. Larrain argues, however, that on the basis 
of this evidence, the critique of dependency theory went too far; ‘in describing new 
dynamic processes of industiialisation in certain less developed countries it hastily 
jumped to the conclusion that the Third World was disappeaiing’ (1989: 210).
on local systems of dependency without necessarily extiapolating the underdevelopment of local aieas 
to a global system of dependency (e.g. Cardoso and Faletto 1979).
^ Lairain argues that whilst several important Marxist theorists have disowned dependency theory as 
being at variance with Marxism, ‘to say that dependency theory is not Marxist is a wild exaggeration. 
There is no point in denying the Marxist origins of most dependency approaches’ (1989:194)
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Centre-Periphery Metaphors
The core premises of tliis view continue to have explanatoiy power and persist in 
contemporary critiques of development. Lairain contends that The dependency 
approach, in so far as it constitutes the application of historical materialism to the 
analysis of peripheral capitalist countries, is not dead’ (1989: 210). According to 
dependency theory, an unequal centre-periphery relationship reoccurs at every level 
(ui'ban/ruial, educated/uneducated, politically influential/politically powerless etc.). 
Hobail; notes that the use of various metaphors m modernisation theory both reflect 
and promote this dynamic; spatial metaphors of up/down and centre/periphery are 
compounded by ‘a sexual metaphor in which the powerful, superior, male West 
imposes itself upon wealc inferior, captivated (and female) otliers’ (1993: 6). 
Chambers argues that value-laden words pervade the whole fabric of development;
‘Language has played a trick on us, accommodating and affinning the cultural 
imperialism of tire fust world . . .  the usage of ‘primitive’ has shifted from 
‘original’ and ancient’ towards the negative sense of backward’ (1991: 172)^ .^
Dependency theorists ar gue that these binary oppositions at the level of development 
discourse, ar e indicative of the continuation of inequality, the strategies of Northern 
countries to maintain a position of superiority and reflect the institutionalisation and 
professionalisation of these dynamics.
Dimensions of Dependence
The relationship was understood as being one of dependence in various ways. Poorer 
countries were not granted the capital to develop the tecluiology or the specialised 
skills that advanced manufacturing required, nor indeed the wealth to consume 
specialised or luxury products and were simply used as a soiuce for materials at a
In more general terms, dependency theorists used variants of standard socialist critiques of 
capitalism, citing the inevitable conflict between workers and owners, boom and bust business cycles, 
unemployment and poverty.
Chambers provides an extensive list of value laden dichotomies that refer to Western professional 
biases, for example: urban/rmal, industrial/agricultural, high cost/low cost, predictable/unpredictable, 
modern/tiaditional, maiketed/subsistence, visible/invisible, educated/illiterate, male/female, adult/child, 
rich/poor, accessible/remote, office/field, tidy/untidy, major/minor etc. (1991: 172-4).
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price decided upon by those in power. The negotiating capacity of poorer countries 
was diminished by their lack of relative economic power and, tlirough the granting of 
unrepayable loans by institutions created by the countries of the North, were forced to 
re-structure their economies on the instructions of these mstitutions. It was suimised 
that the middle classes in underdeveloped countries were in alliance with First World 
and metiopolitan interests and Üiat it was in their interests to maintain a social and 
economic order of dependence. Thus Third World export oriented countries 
developed, where it was not uncommon to have endemic malnutrition in regions 
devoted to producing the coffee or tobacco demanded by international markets.
World Systems Theory and Local Complexity
Marxist-infoimed concerns with wider systems of colonial political economies in the 
1960s and 1970s were generally at variance with the finely detailed ethnograpliic 
aspirations of interpretative social anthropologists. World systems theory, whilst 
being a form of dependency theory, made greater efforts to make sense of the 
dynamics between global and local forms of cultural determination. The need for an 
explanatory model to apprehend the obvious realities of global asymmetry was held in 
tension with the burgeoning anthropological resistance to grand narratives. This is 
captured by Marcus and Fischer:
‘The ethnographic task lies ahead of reshaping oui' dominant macro­
frameworks for the understanding of historical political economy, such as 
capitalism, so that they can represent the actual diversity and complexity of 
local situations for which they try to account in general terms’ (1986: 88).
This is a question that recurs time and again in the walce of world system theory. 
Wallerstein sought to make world system theory the basis of a school with a 
politically committed vision (see also Marcus and Fischer 1986: 81). However, its 
enduring significance has been the dissemination of a radical explanatory model for 
the phenomena of development which, by virtue of its simple foundations, became 
widely diffused in social science. The fundamentally political perspective of 
dependency theory and world systems theory has engendered a politicisation of 
development in theory and practice as reflected in the agendas of NGOs and
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government agencies. These theories also ‘force(d) international relations onto the 
anthropological agenda (Gledhill 1994: 6). Gardner and Lewis ar gue that
‘by focusing upon the ways in which profit for some is connected to loss for 
others, neo-Marxist analysis remains an important contribution to the 
understanding of development, even if as an analytical tool it is sometimes a 
little blunt’ (1996: 19).
World systems theory continues to be at the heart of contemporary critiques of 
development practice (Kay 1989). Mar cus and Fischer concur*;
‘What is important is the impetus the debate about it (world systems theory) 
gave to political economy research. Rather than hardening into dogma or a 
1950s style paradigm, the so-called world systems theory sur*vives today 
primarily as a general orientation tliat thrives on detailed studies of regions 
and liistorical periods . . . political economists have focused their attention on 
close analyses of the historic and etlinographic conditions of regions and 
locales’ (1986: 81).
Wliat remains problematic is how to represent the embedding of richly described local 
cultural worlds in laiger hnpersonal systems of political economy. Indeed the effort to 
reconcile political economic theories with a global scope witli attention to local 
realities has been abandoned by many. Appadurai, for instance, argues that ‘the new 
global economy has to be understood as a complex, overlappmg, disjunctive order 
which cannot any longer be understood in tei*ms of existing centre-periphery models’ 
(1990: 296). Aiticulating the complexities o f ‘disorganised capitalism’ within a world 
systems model has proved to be very difficult.
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Disaffection with Dependency
Wliilst these appai’ently radical theories, as descriptive models on a global level of 
analysis aie highly plausible in both historical and contemporary settings, and bring to 
light key political points passed over by modernisation theoiy, their fundamental 
discrediting of the roots of development as being inherently exploitative does not 
readily provide a basis for realistic solutions.
Dependency theory tended to reify ideas such as ‘class’ or ‘capitalism’ uncritically. A 
certain air of learned helplessness pervaded eaiiy dependency theory in the sense that 
nothing but a radical solution, involving establishing an alternative to capitalism 
would do. Franlc for example, ai'gued that for underdeveloped countries, economic 
independence could only be achieved by means of a socialist revolution (1969).
Implicit in deterministic Mai'xist theory is the contiadiction ‘that neutralises all the 
anthropological good intentions’ (Sahlins 1994: 413), that is, whilst insisting that 
‘peripheral peoples’ should have the power to shape their own material conditions 
according to their own world view, Mai'xist and cultuial ecologist theory impose the 
meta-narrative that world views ai e derivative of these material conditions.
Dependency theory is also guilty of the homogenisation of local populations, cultuial 
realities and Imowledges, frequently presenting them fatalistically as constituting a 
passive victim cultuie. This is appaient in Tenbruck’s grim waining that
‘History proceeds by the formation and dissolution of peoples, languages, 
cultures, nations, states, and will continue to do so more than ever in our era of 
global development’ (1990: 204).
Thus, dependency theory shaies with modernisation theory a basic assumption of the 
inexorable course of liistory. It imposes a teleology similai* to tliat of modernisation 
theoiy and in so doing approaches local histories in tenns of their giadual
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incorporation into capitalism whilst anticipating that then* integiity is bound to be 
lost^ .^ Featherstone argues that there is now general academic agreement that;
Tt is misleading to conceive of a global cultuie as necessarily entailing the 
wealcening of the sovereignty of nation states which, under the impetus of 
some form of teleological evolutionism or other master logic will necessarily 
become absorbed into larger units and eventually a world state which produces 
cultural homogeneity and integration’ (1990: 1).
What is problematic for many contemporary theorists is that the argmnents 
imderpinning dependency theory are rooted in an interpretation of the underlying 
motivations of development as stemming from a grand theory of power that seeks to 
elucidate the whole history of Western liistory and society. Leys, noting the 
similarities in language between dependency theory and modernisation theoiy 
contends that;
Tt is not really an accident that these simplistic pairings, 
developed/underdeveloped, centre/periphery, dominant/dependent resemble 
those of bourgeois development theory (traditional/modern, ricli/poor, 
advanced/backward, etc.) they are basically polemical inversion of them’ 
(1977: 92).
In dependency theory there is a general difficulty in recognising the pro-active and 
creative practices of people affected by development in opposition, modification, 
collusion or support. Salilins criticises this tendency; The explanatory principle, as 
Shineberg says is that There must be a white man behind every brown’ (1967: 214)’ 
(1994: 412). Salilins also argues, citing Wolf (1982), that an overblown historical 
materialist perspective renders colonised and ‘peripheral’ peoples nothing more than 
victims and silent witnesses of tlieir subjugation. On this view, ‘it had seemed that 
there was notliing left for anthropology to do but the global ethnography of
Frank, whilst often depicted as a dogmatist with regard to an all encompassing world system in fact, 
equivocated about whether the world capitalist system would necessarily encompass or incorporate 
pre-modern or ‘pre-capitalist’ economies. In ‘Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America’ 
(1969), Frank gives a monolithic version of the world system whereas in ‘Dependent Accumulation
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capitalism’ (1994: 412). Wolf echoed these views, criticising the treatment ‘of history 
as a process without a subject’ (1982: 79 see also Homborg 1992 and 1994). The 
denial of agency and cultural integrity constitutes, as Sahlins captures it, a ‘super 
stmctui al expression of the very imperialism it despises’ (1994: 413).
The assumption that areas peripheral to the global market would stagnate has also 
proved to be mistaken. Long (1977) for instance, rather than beginning his analysis at 
a macro level, undertook research in Peru which revealed the flourishing of new 
markets in remote areas that were not in a subservient relationsliip to an urban or 
industrial centie. Wliilst conducting research on community kitchens in the 
settlements on the margins of Lima, I was struck by the proactive political, social and 
economic initiatives, such as land invasions, pressure groups, education and local 
forms of social welfare that had characterised the history of the ‘shantytowns’ of 
Lima and Callao^’. In Chapter 11,1 look at this research in greater depth.
Sahlins pursues this idea furtlier and is concerned to show that the presuppositions of 
dependency theory may be odds witli what happens in practice; the goods of 
development are often welcomed, subsumed and transformed within the dynamics of 
a given cultural setting according to local meanings;
‘From the point of view of the indigenous people, the exploitation by the 
world system may well be an enrichment of the local system. Even as there is 
a net transfer of labour power to the métropole through unequal exchange 
rates, the hinterland peoples are acquiring more goods of extraordinary social 
value with less effort than they ever could in tire days of their ancestors’ 
(1994: 415).
A further difficulty with dependency theory is the way in which it has been 
appropriated for specious political purposes. Gledhill, for instance, contends that 
dependency theory provided a rationale for the dictatorial presidencies of Latin
and Underdevelopment’ (1978), he argues that world capitalism will not necessarily dissolve ‘pre­
capitalist modes of production’ (see Larrain 1989: 127)
The sti iving of the inhabitants of the settlements to improve then living conditions and the life 
chances of their childr en could, however, only achieve so much in the face of then disadvantageous 
and marginalised social, economic and political position.
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America to talce control, using the pretext that they were protecting their nation from 
imperialistic Northern interests; ‘dependency theory thus not merely proved weak at 
explaining variety in political responses to under-development in scientific terms; it 
was sometimes coopted by the torturers’ (1994: 6). Dependency discourse is broad 
enough to allow various competing ideologies to justify their interventions. Appadurai 
argues similarly that the fear of Americanisation or some other form of 
homogenisation, ‘can be exploited by nation states in relation to tlieir own minorities 
by posing global commoditisation as more ‘real’ than the threat of its own hegemonic 
strategies’ (1986: 296).
Finally, Ortner complains that the political economy model that miderlies dependency 
theory is too economic and not political enough:
‘One hears a lot about wages, the market, the cash nexus, economic 
exploitation, underdevelopment, and so forth, but not enough about the 
relations of power, domination, manipulation, control and the like which those 
economic relations play into, and which for actors constitute much of the 
experience of the pain of economic injustice’ (1994: 387)
In shorl, the anthr opological response to dependency theory has been to insist upon a 
more accurate and more nuanced groimding of economic relations in local contexts 
without pre-empting the dynamics. Nevertheless, in broad terms, the underlying 
premises of dependency theory remain compelling and influential in the way 
anthropologists look at global capitalism and the imperialistic dynamics of 
development.
With these observations in mind, over the next two chapters, I will trace some of the 
major historical developments in anthropological theory that I consider to be relevant 
to the antluopological response to development, that is, I will be looking at the 
theoretical resources for an ethical approach to applied antluopology.
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Chapter 6
‘Practical Values’: Slow Steps Towards a Relevant Anthropology
In this chapter, I am concerned to elucidate the mutually efficacious relations that 
exist between the development of antliropological theory and the involvement of 
anthropologists in development practice.
Grillo (1997) tacldes the tliinking behind distinctions between development 
anthropology and the anthropology o f development (Charsley 1982) noting that these 
aie often confounded due to their conceptual inextricability, each being a necessaiy 
counterpart to the other. Development anthiopology is understood as the application 
of anthropological loiowledge and/or methodologies to development policy and 
practice. The anthropology of development is understood as the analysis of 
development as a cultural, social, political, economic and moral phenomenon. The 
difficulties and dangers of making false distinctions between knowledge ‘for 
understanding’ and ‘for action’ was also discussed by Long and Long (1992) arguing 
that cross fertilisation between both fields should not be discouiaged by different 
writing styles and goals. This chapter looks at development anthropology through the 
shifting perspectives of the anthropology of development^ and seeks to highlight the 
major mutual influences between theoretical change and development practice. Two 
anthropologists actively involved in both theory and development practice contend 
that:
‘The insights gleaned from loiowledge produced primarily for academic 
puiposes can have important effects upon the ways in wliich development is 
understood. This in turn can affect practical action and policy’ (Gardner and 
Lewis 1996: 50)
This contention will be examined over the next two chapters.
* The 3 main areas where anthropologists have analysed development are firstly, looking at the cultural 
and social impact of economic change, secondly, the impact of development interventions and thirdly, 
‘studying up’ the development community.
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The ^Practical Values  ^of Anthropology
The term ‘applied antliropology’ is often attributed to Pitt-Rivers in 1881 and it 
appears to have been first taught in 1906, as a diploma in Oxford (Howard: 1993). 
Temple promoted the idea of anthropology as a ‘practical science’ in the colonial 
context in 1914 (Grillo 1985: 5; Gardner and Lewis 1996: 29) and Radcliffe-Brown 
taught applied antliropology in the 1920s (Kuper 1987). Malinowski promoted the 
study of social change as a derivative and lesser branch of mainstieam theoretical 
academic anthropology (Grillo 1985: 9).
‘Overseas Development’ is not the only area where anthropologists applied their 
loiowledge and methodologies^, but has centrality to the British understanding of 
‘applied anthropology’ as a result of its formative beginnings in colonial Afirica. The 
history is different in the US where applied anthropology is rooted in the early 
experiences of anthropologists in the ‘Office of Indian Affairs’ .^
Applied Anthropology; A Subversive History?
If one looks at the pre-history of the current involvement of anthropologists in 
development, it becomes apparent that avowedly political ethnographic work on the 
impact of government policies had been undertaken before there was any recognised 
institutionalised relationship between the discipline of anthropology and State 
authorities. For example, the anthropologist Vincent shows that ethnologists working 
ft'om the Smithsonian Institution did not only make public tlie injustices that white 
society imposed upon Native Americans but undertook to confront the federal 
bureaucracy on numerous occasions (1990: 52-5). Asad’s (1973) well known critique 
of ethnographers of the colonial period for failing to examine their relationship with 
the phenomena of colonialism and for acquiescing to a view that colonialism was 
either inevitable or actually benign is understood as being only part of the story by
 ^From the eailiest days of the discipline, anthropologists have been involved in, for example, counter­
insurgency activities for the US government, inner-city community health care, management, and 
attitudes to work and productivity in production lines (see Schwartzman 1993 for a brief history).
 ^ US State fimded applied anthropology was properly launched following the 1934 Indian 
Reorganisation Act (Foster 1969: 200). It should be acknowledged that alongside efforts to bolster 
indigenous institutions to facilitate economic and social regeneration, an important angle was figuring
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various theorists. Running through the whole of this thesis is in fact an exploration of 
Vincent’s contention that ‘it is historically inaccurate to regard the discipline simply 
as a form of colonial ideology’ (1990: 2). In the contemporary context, Gardner and 
Lewis optimistically insist that;
‘Rather than necessarily being trapped within the dominant discourses of 
development. . .  the anthropology of development can be used to challenge its 
key assumptions and representations, both working within it towards 
constructive change, and providing alternative ways of seeing which questions 
the very foimdations of developmental thought’ (1996: 50)
This argument can be seen as being derivative of, or being parallel to theoretical 
moves made a decade earlier. Clifford, for instance, in his survey of the relationship 
between ethnography and power concludes that:
‘Ethnogmphic work has always been enmeshed in a world of enduring and 
changing power inequalities, and it continues to be implicated. It enacts power 
relations but its function within these relations is complex, often ambivalent, 
potentially counter-hegemonic’ (1986: 9).
The ways in which anthropologists have sought to subvert, rather then just ‘question’ 
dominant discourses and enhance the lives of those affected by development is a 
cential theme of this thesis. It is significant that the first anthropological societies, 
both in the UK and the US, had their origins in the humanitarian movements of the 
19^  ^ Century. Groups that had successfully campaigned for tlie abolishment of 
slavery"  ^became concerned with the welfai'e of the indigenous peoples of the colonies. 
Differences in approach within the nascent societies of ethnogiaphers and 
anthropological theorists were appaient from the beginning. ‘The Aborigines 
Protection Society’, which had been established in 1838 in London, was fractured by 
a group of members who, rather than siding with missionaries who wished to bring 
the benefits of European civilisation to indigenous peoples, sought to study them in
out how entienched ‘Indian’ cultural values and attitudes could be adjusted so as to align the 
indigenous population with the White majority. (Barnett 1956)
 ^The slave trade was abolished in 1807 and the Emancipation Act was passed in 1833.
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‘pristine condition’ instead. Reining (1962) notes that the motivation to form the 
resulting putatively more scientific ‘Ethnological Society of London’ was considered 
suspect by the British public who regarded it as a ‘rather sentimental negrophile 
organisation with a thin veneer of scientific pretension’ and considered etlinology to 
be ‘an inexact and tentative science with little practical value or popular interest 
(1962: 593). A fundamental split developed within the Society over the question of 
whether there were different races of human beings with different physical, 
intellectual and moral endowments. Those who wished to question the psychic unity 
of humanity foimed the ‘Anthropological Society of London’ (Eddy and Partridge 
1987: 4). The pamphlets produced by this Society made frequent claims that 
anthropology was a ‘hard science’ with practical applications that could benefit 
mankind in terms of order and progiess. Reining writes tliat the anthropologists of this 
gi'oup;
‘were filled with confidence in their new science and felt it had limitless 
potentiality for the betterment of man. They also considered tliemselves to be 
able to view man dispassionately on a scientific basis as contrasted with the 
previous ‘metaphysical’ view. They would admit no subject to be out of 
bounds to them, maldng a particular point that no philosophy or religion was 
exempt fr om their inquhies’ (1962: 596).
In the mid 19* Century, the society was criticised from both Chiistian and liberal 
political groups who agreed that all human ‘races’ should be considered as being 
equal. This lively period was followed by the collapse of the Society and its 
amalgamation with the Ethnological Society to form the ‘Anthropological Institute’. 
Discussing the practical applications of the subject became a minor concern as the 
members of tlie institute sought to gain greater academic rigoui' and respectability. 
Tyler’s establishment of anthropology at Oxford in 1883 was a key moment in the 
graduation of the subject from a pastime or hobby to an acknowledged academic 
subject. In general, anthropologists steered clear of the previous enthusiasm of
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applying their discipline with a few exceptions^ until Malinowsld championed it in 
1938, as if it was a relatively novel idea:
‘The anthropologist with all his highly vaunted technique of fieldwork, his 
scientific acumen and his humanistic outlook, has so far kept aloof from the 
fierce battle of opinions about the future and welfare of native races’ (1938: 
x).
It would seem that this uneasy relationship between anthropology’s humanitarian 
values and its scientific practical applicability is emblematic of the sub-discipline of 
applied anthropology. In this chapter, I will explore the creative tensions that exist 
between the sociological fi*ameworks that anthropologists grappled with to apprehend 
different social realities and their growing understanding of the often drastic changes 
that Western expansion was causing. Herzfeld ai'gues, in relation to the tension 
between positivistic and humanitarian directions in anthropology that ‘while we find 
that [this] basic dilemma is umesolved, one constructive spin that we can put on it is 
by capitalising on the productive discomfort it generates’ (2001: 154)
The Unfolding of Applied Anthropology
Applied antliropology was shaped by both the opportunities presented to 
anthropologists and the theoretical oitliodoxies that dominated the universities of the 
time. From the emergence of the discipline, a proportion of British anthropologists 
courted the colonial administrators, presenting themselves as scientists whose insights 
could have great utility for those ruling overseas territories^. Opportunities came not 
only fi'om government funding, as Gledhill notes; ‘Rockefeller money not only 
supported the development of American anthropology within the United States’ 
growing international sphere of interest, but much of the classic fieldwork of British 
anthi’opologists in the 1920s and 1930s’ (1994: 3). Grillo argues that the tension
 ^ For instance, British anthiopologists began to be employed fiom 1908 onwards under tlie rubric of 
indirect rule in Afiica. Radcliffe Brown wrote an article in 1930 entitled 'Anthropology as Public 
Service and Malinowsld's Contribution to It' (Foster 1969: 187).
 ^ ‘In the case of East and West Africa we want to know all about the native in order to develop his 
capacity to the fullest extent, and gradually to increase that capacity so that he may, in the future, assist 
in the administration of the Government and of the business of his own country . . .  the more we look
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within anthropology concerning its relationship to development in teiins of both 
critique and utility is as relevant today:
‘Anthropologists in development and other applied fields often still feel 
obliged to ‘sell’ anthropology . . . The British journal Anthropology in Action 
was pai'tly created in order to provide a forum in which applied 
antluopologists could present their wares’ (1997: 5)
However, despite this marketing of the discipline (and contiaiy to contemporary 
theorising that depicts anthropology as the active handmaiden of colonialism), Kuper 
ai'gues that, particularly before WWII, ‘the British government and the public were 
not easily stirred to a sense of the possible uses of anthiopology [and] the colonial 
government were equally unimpressed (1987: 103). The inescapable conclusion is 
that there was never much of a demand for applied anthropology from Wliitehall or 
the colonial governments’ (op.cit 116). Evans-Pritchaid famously commented; 
‘During the fifteen years in which I have worked on sociological problems in the 
same region I was never once asked my advice on any question at all’ (1946: 97). 
Gledhill also notes that the Royal Anthiopological Institute approached the 
government formally on several occasions, but the official response towards 
antlu'opology remained one of suspicion (1994: 3). Funding for anthropological 
research actually increased at the same time that Britain abandoned the colonial 
territories, in the 1950s. The anthropological and ethnological work undertaken by 
missionaries fai* outweighed the anthiopological research papers of the colonial 
administiation, at least until the 1940s.
In general, whilst anthiopologists may have been paid, on occasions, to undertake ‘the 
little studies dieamt up by the administrators’ (Kuper 1987: 112), over the colonial 
period, most saw tlieir future in academia and so dedicated themselves to writing the 
scholaiiy works that were acceptable to the British universities of the time.
upon tlie native in South Afiica as a scientific problem the less we shall feel he is a social danger’ 
(Nathan 1914: 67, cited in Kuper 1987: 102)
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Meetings and Mutual Antipathies
The mutual antipathy between academia and application can be understood m valions 
ways. Anthropologists working for the colonial administrations were often in an 
unenviable position, being denigrated by purely academic anthropologists whilst also 
being treated with some suspicion by District Administrators. The polarity between 
the ‘muscular colonial antliropologist’ and the recalcitiant ‘ivory tower scholar’ was 
apparent at an early stage. Frazer, for example, in 1908 humbly declared, of himself 
as an anthropologist:
‘He is no seer to discern, no prophet to foretell a coming heaven on eai1h, no 
mountebanlc with a sovran remedy for every ill, no Red Cross Knight to head a 
crusade against misery and want, against disease and death, against all the 
horrid spectres that war on poor humanity. He is only a student.. .who cannot, 
dare not tell you what ought to be . . . ’ (Inaugural lecture at Liverpool).
Academic anthropologists tended to discredit the intellectual demands and content of 
applied work, as well as shunning what some considered to be its dubious moral 
status; ‘A continuing divergence between mainstream academic anthropology and 
applied anthropology promoted a feeling among many university based staff that only 
the second-rate anthropologists carried out applied work, while the ‘real’ 
anthropologists worked on loftier, self-deterinined subject matter’ (Gardner and Lewis 
1996: 36). Mair described applied anthropology as ‘an occupation for the half-baked’ 
(1969: 8) whilst Kuper notes that ‘it was regarded by the more mandarin as less 
demanding intellectually, and therefore as best suited to women’ (1987: 110).
The ‘image problem’ for anthropologists vis-à-vis colonial administrators was 
predicated upon a disapproval of their allegedly romantic tendencies and suspicion 
about the proximity they had to native peoples. The discipline contemporaneously is 
still sometimes viewed by other development professionals as a ‘wealc or soft 
discipline which has yet to malce any significant impact on policy and planning
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I(Nyamwaya 1997: 197/. Wilson notes anthropology has been lambasted as ‘the last i
bastion of cultuial absolutism, and anthr opologists as pur veyors of exotica’ (1997: 3).
Anthropologists were considered by some administr ators to be perfectly positioned to 
cause problems or complicate the agenda of extending the reach of the mar ket into the 
colonial territories. This view had some basis as many anthropologists, in principle, 
resented colonial intrusions into traditional societies, having grave doubts about their 
future well being imder colonial administration; ‘the image of the pathetic remnants 
of Australian and North American tr ibes hamited them’ (Kuper 1987: 106).
However, during the colonial period, before WWII, patron-client relationships 
between some anthropologists and the colonial administrators were sporadically 
established. Applied anthropological studies during the colonial period focused 
primarily on administrative issues, such as interpreting traditional law, systems of 
land distribution, labour arrangements, traditional authority, and local economic 
systems. Alongside this, antluopologists also undertook relatively independent 
scholarly work focused upon the meeting of indigenous cultures with colonial 
administrations through social research institutions, such as the International Institute 
of African Languages and Cultures (set up in 1926), or the Rhodes Livingstone 
Institute (1930 onwards), whose work and insights I will discuss below.
One aspect of the alleged moral turpitude of the anthropology of the colonial period 
was its silence with regard to the subjugation of whole peoples to colonial rule (Asad 
1973). Anthropological involvement was often confined to the ostensibly value 
neutral or detached domain of administration where wider questions were not asked 
(Barnett 1956). The failure of anthropologists to speak with a coherent and critical 
political voice meant tliat the colonial authorities’ stereotyping antluopologists as 
being romantics interested in salvaging information from disappearing cultures was 
not hard to uphold.
’ Kaufmann shows how in contemporary development practice, policy makers can still view 
anthiopologists as being unnecessarily complicated and sometimes consider their inputs to ‘constrain 
project design and implementation’ as social participation throws up conflicts of interest (1997: 122).
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Shortly after WWII, Fortes challenged the stereotype of the romantic anthropologist 
seeking only to preserve the ‘unspoiled savage’ from trade, Christianity and 
goveriunent and to keep them as museum pieces (1945: 223). Simultaneously, 
however, he also warned that as ‘primitive societies’ were broken up and their 
members dispersed, there would be a danger of creating rabbles of ‘acquisitive or 
exploited individuals . . .  the prey of irrational mob impulses if they cease to have 
common cultural values’ {loc. .cit.). Fortes illustrates here the initial difficulty in 
explicatmg the natur e of social change (and in conceptualising the social realities that 
emerged thr ough the brealdng up of traditional settlements by labour migration, for 
instance) in terms of the anthropological theoretical frameworks of the time. As will 
be seen below, members of the Rhodes Livingstone Institute later undertook seminal 
studies on this anticipated ‘détribalisation’ in newly established mining towns to find 
the enduring presence of traditional bonds in these settings (Epstein 1958; 1956).
Colonialism and Anthropology *s Theoretical Conveniences
The theoretical phases that were in currency during the colonial period were 
evolutionism, diffrisionism and frmctionalism, each with different implications for the 
anthropological engagement with colonial administrations. Anthropologists of this 
period had largely moved towards the adoption of a functionalist and, later, a 
structural functionalist perspective. Meanwhile the colonial administration was 
permeated by a paternalist and evolutionist ethos. The officials of this time, in 
Kuper’s words, ‘saw themselves as bringing the benefits of civilisation, with a 
minimum of the ills, to backward peoples who might -  after centuries of evolution -  
reach the stage where they could be entrusted with their own fates’ (1987: 118).
Resistance to enforced rapid social change would seem to be inherent to 
frmctionalism. There was, within this paradigm, a presumption that change foisted 
upon traditional societies would lead to calamitous disintegration. This concern 
engendered an increasing focus on understanding ‘social cohesion’. The 
predominance of functionalism meant that ‘the tendency to study societies as if they 
were static remained stiong in the period up until the Second World War (Gaidner 
and Lewis 1996: 27). Wolf obseiwes, fuither, that in the 1950s, there was a similai* 
conceptual blindness to social change among anthropologists working in the Americas
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who ‘tended to short-circuit four centuries of Mstoiy, to draw a direct line between the 
pre-Colombian past and the Indian present’ (1986: 326).
Additionally, cultural relativism, as a logical extension of functionalism, raised ethical 
concerns about the validity of importing Western values into traditional societies. In 
functionalism, then, there would seem to be grounds for a genuine antipathy to the 
colonial project. It would seem plausible that antluopologists trained in functionalist 
theory where traditional societies were represented as integrated wholes, and where 
rapid change was assumed to be pathological, would have instincts incommensurate 
with progressive capitalist colonial administration^.
British anthropologists, at this time did not however, achieve a radical critique of 
colonialism and their recalcitrance with regard to ‘progress’ was interpreted as 
romanticism and nostalgia for untouched societies, exhibiting ‘the (singularly 
western) romantic fantasy of the desirability of a return to native wisdom 
mysteriously in touch with human nature’ (Hobart 1993: 5) .^ DaMatta observes that a 
similar dichotomy emerged in the Brazilian view of its indigenous other:
‘The “Indian” is an outsider, giving rise to romantic fantasies of the noble 
savage who has to be either isolated and protected from the evils of 
civilisation or be eliminated from the national landscape for incapacity to talce 
part in modern progress’ (1993: 122).
Critiques of anthropology’s uncritical participation in the colonial project (Asad 1973, 
Ferguson 1990, Escobar 1988, 1992) do not refer solely to the instances where 
antluopologists willingly furnished administrators with information to be used for 
their imperial purposes. The theoretical orthodoxies of the period, in particular the
Boas, incidentally, had a direct influence on US immigration policy, which was tending towards 
favouring the influx of British or Nortliern European gioups as these ‘races’ were considered to be 
‘superior’ or more likely to integrate with the US population. Boas argued against this view using 
illustrations from both physical and cultural anthropology.
 ^ Taylor aigues that in Western society, the romantic rebellion continually recurs: ‘The Romantic 
Rebellion continues undiminished, returning ever in unpredictable new forms -  Dadaism, surrealism, 
the yearning of the hippie, the contemporary cult of the unrepressed consciousness. With all this 
surrounding us we caimot avoid being referred back to the first great synthesis which was meant to 
resolve our central dilemma [between expressive imity and radical autonomy]: which failed but which 
remains somehow unsurpassed’ (Taylor 1978: 49-50)
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lack of focus on the histoiy of colonialism itself, lie behind anthropology’s belated 
resistance to the negative effects of colonialism on the people who were the subjects 
of their etlinographies.
An important paradox of tliis era, then, is that, whilst the anthropologists of this 
period ostensibly opposed the intiusion of colonial powers into what they considered 
to be stable and coherent cultures, functionalism seems to have been a peculiaiiy 
appropriate, naive and compliant theory vis-à-vis the colonial authorities. Relativistic 
functionalist anthiopologists are considered in a number of important critiques as 
unconscious contiibutors to the justification of the colonial project, which depended 
upon a ‘savage’ or ‘primitive’ ‘other’ (Asad 1973, for instance). Arce and Long are 
concerned to wain against pernicious conceptions of ahistorical and reified traditional 
societies, whose ‘exoticism revealed to the West the need for these backwaid societies 
to strive for development and cultural modernity’ (2000: 5). Kuper argues that, on this 
basis, there is an enduring suspicion of the anthi'opologist in ex-colonial countries as 
‘he was the specialist in the study of colonial peoples; because, by identifying his 
study in practice as the study of the coloured man, he contributed to the devaluation of 
their humanity’ (1987: 120), to be identified with the erstwhile ‘primitive’ or 
‘savage’ of the evolutionists’ {op.cit: 119). Secondly, by liighlighting native cultmal 
values, anthiopologists paved the way for colonial administiators to ally themselves 
with the more conseivative tmditional leaders whilst discrediting progressive, or more 
radical elements. Gledhill aigues that the coercive colonial use of anthiopological data 
was double edged: ‘The authorities were interested in witchcraft accusations and 
blood feuds with a view to stamping out what was not acceptable to European 
‘civilisation’. Yet there were some aieas of indigenous practice, such as customaiy 
law on property rights, which colonial regimes sought to manipulate for their own 
ends, and might even codify as law recognised by the colonial state’ (1994: 1)^ .^ The
This paradoxical aspect of pationising the Other as being ‘different’ is as old as anthropology. An 
edition of ''The Popular Magazine o f Anthropology’ in 1866 simultaneously promulgated the
thesis that ‘the Negro’ could not be expected to attain the civilised standards of Europeans due to moral 
and mental differences whilst also criticising the slaughter of aborigines in Queensland. The irony that 
die white settlers were using these very arguments as a justification for their genocide did not appear to 
have occmred to the writers (Reining 1962: 599).
“ There were, of couise, important exceptions, for example, Gluckman, Kuper, Heilman Worsely, see 
Kuper 1987: 99-120.
Conversely, according to Nelmi, the colonial authorities in India encouraged the ‘disruptive, 
obscm antist, reactionary, sectarian and opportunist element in the country as a way of underscoring the 
appearance of the relative coherence and scientism of the British (inNussbaum 2000: 39).
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resulting identification of anthropology with the positioning of native peoples as 
subjects of colonialism had profound moral consequences that continue to surface in 
antlu’opological ethics talk today (Mathur 1989).
Whilst fimctionalism was attiactive as a framework for writing coherent 
ethnographies, it became increasingly untenable to write credibly without reference to 
the ineluctable social and political forces that were imposing themselves upon 
‘tmditional’ societies. However, wltilst studies of effects of change on traditional 
societies were more frequently imdertalcen, the majority of studies in the 1940s and 
50s continued to be functionalist in perspective, describing the ahistorical unchanging 
foundations of social stability and order in paiticular societies. Studies of change were 
sometimes inserted as a single chapter in otherwise orthodox monographs. Gledhill 
contends that;
‘The analyses of mainstream academic anthropology, in both Britain and the 
United States, proved incapable of confr onting the fact that its object of study 
was a world structured by Western colonial expansion and capitalist 
imperialism in a systematic way’ (1994: 4, cf. Marcus and Fischer 1986: 84).
It is widely aclorowledged that, during this period, ‘the anthropologist did not tr eat the 
total colonial situation in a scholarly fashion. Few studied settlers and administiators 
for example, and this robbed tlieir work of a vital dimension of reality’ (Kuper 1987: 
119). Evans-Pritchard, for example, is charged for noting without reproof the raids of 
the British colonial authorities on Nuer settlements which he acknowledged to include 
the machine-guiming of camps. Cockbuiu and St.Clair also observe that ‘Nor did he 
regard this rending of Nuer society by the British as a topic worthy of inclusion in his 
description of stiusses in Nuer society’ (2001)
Looking back at functionalism, contemporary insights allow us to discern that the 
iixelevance of anthropological theory to the rapid and often catastrophic change of this 
period was the orthodox belief in ‘the thinglike natuie of society which failed to ask
iin any systematic way where the thing comes from and how it might change’ (Oifrier 
1994: 403). The functionalist problematic marked out a limited range of language and 
concepts for apprehending this particular historical juncture. Functionalism then, can
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be seen as containing a failure, or refusal, to deal with the total colonial reality in 
terms of disparate economic, political and cultural power (cf. Grimshaw and Hart 
1993: 14-29; cf. Marcus and Fischer 1986: 77-84).
The key interest of anthropological research and theory was the deterministic 
structure of social systems and a concern with the maintenance of equilibrium. 
Structural-Functionalist ‘political anthropology’ focused upon the institutional 
relationships of power and decision making within bounded societies. The range of 
issues that British social anthropologists tackled at this time was relatively Ihnited. 
Scholars focused on kinship theory; marriage, law, property, religion and politics 
were largely understood in terms of segmentary or lineage systems. Also, the majority 
of research was undertalcen in British colonial dependencies^^.
Introducing Agency and Power: Slow Steps Towards Greater Relevance
Both Leach and Gluckman^"*, whilst developing innovative approaches with regard to 
the ways in which social tensions were manipulated by groups and individuals, 
positioned their work at this stage in relation to lineage theory (Gluckman 1950; 
Leach 1954). Their work was indicative of a burgeoning interest in new ways of 
imderstanding political systems. In different ways, both sought to explicate the ways 
in which social tensions, oppositions and norms or political activity were actively 
manipulated and resolved within particular frameworks.
Gluckman observed that political oppositions between factions in Zululand, rather 
than forming part of a balanced equilibrium, involved the increasing exploitation of 
one group by another, which had superior power through Government support (1940). 
This recognition of the disintegrative dynamics of social systems affected by external
During the 1950s, fimding for anthropological research from the British goveriunent increased. An 
increasing number of studies focused on such issues as cash cropping, urban life and the formation of 
trade unions. The Colonial Social Science Research Council (CSSRC) and, to a limited extent colonial 
government commissioned anthropological research on land tenure and labour migration. However, as 
noted above, anthropological data and insights were used veiy selectively and pragmatically by the 
colonial administrations; ‘tlie economist and rural development expert were the new gurus’ (Kuper 
1987).
Gluckman, along with other South African colleagues, had a predilection to understanding social 
anthropology in political terms: ‘At a time when their British based contemporaries tended to avert 
tlieir eyes from the realities of power and deprivation in the colonial societies, they found it difficult to 
ignore the contexts of the systems which they investigated’ (Kuper 1987: 144).
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pressures was combined with a commitment to a conventional organicist view in 
which deep conflicts were contained in durable social systems. In 1958, he gave an 
important analysis of the complex relationships and structural oppositions between 
white authorities, Zulu chiefs and local people. This work set out an exploration of 
the ways in which social equilibrium was achieved through highly complex processes 
of conflicts and oppositions (not in the French structuralist sense, but involving actual 
shifting factions of individuals) held in tension. His later analyses of Central African 
societies as totalities, that is, incorporating the impacts of Europeans on African 
‘cultuie-groups’ included the historical analysis of periods of relative stability and 
conflict. One area of interest was the ways in which ‘intermediary’ individuals, such 
as village headmen had to deal with the dual demands of the colonial authorities and 
local people.
Ortner characterises the ‘Manchester School’ in terms of the ‘stress that the normal 
state of society is not one of solidarity and harmonious integration of parts, but rather 
one of conflict and contradiction’ (1994: 376). An important analytic question then, 
was how group solidarity was maintained in such a way as to encompass enduring 
social division and conflict.
The members of the Rhodes-Livingstone fellows were, to different extents, influenced 
by Marxist theory although this was implicit m their work. Gluclanan, who had 
established the research school within the Rhodes Livingstone Institute, became 
Professor of Social anthropology at Manchester University, bringing a number of his 
fellows with him. The resulting department, which had effectively been brought 
together in the field, had particular interests, most notably exploring the dynamics 
between conflict, schism and equilibrium in particular societies (Gluckman 1958, 
1963, Turner 1957).
The theoretical directions taken, therefore, were simultaneously influenced by 
experiences in colonial dependencies and influential in the perspectives adopted by 
applied anthropologists. Members of tlie ‘Manchester School’ were also beginning to 
explicitly focus on the nature of power and change in the colonial territories. The 
historical context of particular* peoples and tlie understanding of change as being a 
constant aspect of social life (rather than something revolutionary) began to figure in
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anthropological analysis. This realisation foundational for the long tenn 
intertwining of anthropology with development.
Epstein (1958), for example, undertook important studies of the conflicting norms and 
allegiances that urban workers who had moved from rural areas experienced between 
their identification with tribal loyalties and values in the face of new occupational and 
political exigencies (see also Godfrey and Monica Wilson’s book; The Analysis o f 
Social Change [1945], based upon fieldwork in British East Africa). Processes of 
appropriating labour for industrial centres and plantations were described as 
undermining the cultural, economic and political life at a village and tribal level. Men 
fr om rural areas thr oughout Africa frequently travelled back and forth between city or 
mine and village without sufficient remimeration thus diminishing agricultural 
production, causing economic difficulties and disrupting kinship obligations*^.
As well as looldng at social change in terms of the effects of extraneous influences, a 
number of iimovative works looked at dynamism ‘within’ particular societies. 
Turner’s ‘social dramas’, for instance, constituted a step forward in the analysis of 
conflict and power differentials in complex settings in terms of shared symbols. 
Taking forward Gluckman’s theoretical line. Turner concluded that, in Ndembu 
society, ‘conflict is endemic in the social structure but a set of mechanisms exist 
whereby conflict itself is pressed into the service of affirming group unity’ (1957: 
129). Ndembu symbols were deciphered in terms of their utility in allowing social 
transformations that simultaneously allowed individuals to jostle for power (the 
pragmatics of symbols), resolve conflicts and strengthen ‘solidarity’ (1967). Turner’s 
focus on the interpersonal dynamics between individuals and collectivities presaged 
aspects of methodological individualism, aWiough he continued to view social 
systems in terms of hidden stmctural principles, which could be discerned by studying 
the symbols that upheld tliis coherence. Herzfeld writes of ‘a certain aiidity in 
Turner’s attempts to subordinate all rituals to a pre-existing schema that is especially 
cmde when dealing with the massive happenings staged by modem buieaucratic 
states’ (2001:257).
This problem had been identified earlier; Wilson suggested to the Colonial authorities that the 
disruptive effects of male migration would be eased if the populations of whole villages were able to 
resettle near industrial centies (Wilson 1941).
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Firth and Nadel, in different ways, sought to subvert idealist structuralism, that is, the 
idea of social structure as the central organising principle of social analysis, which 
dominated the discipline, ‘demanding that greater attention be given to the 
iiTepressibly selfish, manipulative individual’ (Kuper 1987: 129). Nadel argued that 
structures should be regarded as heuristics that should be subordinated to purpose and 
utility in the explanation of social theory (1957). Firth, in a neo-Malinowsldan manner 
focused upon die ‘calculating man’ and individual choice making and sought to 
distinguish ‘social organisation’ from social structuie, with the former to be 
understood as involving the maldng of strategic decisions and the exercise of choice 
(1951). This ‘approach to action theory has counterparts in contemporary theory and 
will be dr.cussed in the next chapter.
Leach was interested in how different ideal social systems were symbolised and 
approximated to during the perpetual processes of tr ansformation in Highland Burma 
(1954). Leach’s work constituted a brilliant step forward at the time. This work, by 
virtue of it’s relatively novel situating of a society in a larger regional context, 
according to Ortner ‘has been something of an unclassifiable (if admired) freak’ 
(1994: 386). Leach sought to develop a dynamic theory for anthropology at a time 
when, in Firtli’s words, the anthropological tr eatment of institutions in change tended 
to be ‘mainly descriptive, or where it became abstract the concepts (were) apt to 
become over-elaborate, highly artificial, and out of relation to the real world of 
observed human actions in specific societies’ (foreword to 1964 edition of ‘Political 
Systems of Highland Burma’).
At the core of Leach’s critique of static structuralist approaches were two insights, 
firstly the thesis that seeking for power is the basis of social choice and secondly that 
all societies maintain a precarious balance at any one time and ar e really in a constant 
state of flux and potential change. He argued that current understandings of social 
structure which he calls ‘equilibrium assumptions’ should be imderstood not as 
inescapable structures but '‘as i f  models that are modified by groups in their dynamic 
acquisition of power. Wliilst Leach continued to present reductionist ar guments about
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social meanings in relation to stmctme*^, his exploration of the mediating space 
between structuie and practice was a very important forerunner to the actor-oriented 
approaches of anthiopologists such as Comaroff (1985), Long (1997), Long and Long 
(1992), Lewis (1996), de Vries (1992), Preston (1994), for instance.
Analyses that combined a focus on the ways in which individuals made choices 
between cross-cutting ties in the context of an overbeaiing structure which was being 
imposed by colonial and capitalist powers opened the way to a more relevant political 
antlu'opology. Equally, the insight that ideal structures provided a schema and norms 
(both for social gioups and for antluopologists), that diverse individuals either 
followed or diverged from, led to speculation about the actual underlying 
determinants of political behavioui', such as ecological and material pressuies or 
related ideas of status. Baines, for example, contended that ‘we need to watch these 
systems in action, to study tactics and stiategy, not merely the rules of the game’ 
(1980: 301). Leach’s radical contention was that social noims, rather than determining 
a social group’s distribution of wealth and power, seiwed as an inchoate and pmposely 
ambiguous legitimation for the ongoing stmggle between individuals and factions 
(1961)".
Whilst I have focused on the development of anthropological theory in Britain, 
alternative paradigms were being advanced thi'oughout the 1960s elsewhere. Of 
paiticulai' importance are the cultural or symbolic antluopology of the US, cultural 
ecology and French structuialism. I will discuss these briefly in terms of their 
relationship to applied anthropology.
Proponents o f ‘Symbolic Anthropology’ were less concerned with looking at the ways 
in which shared symbols were efficacious in terms of a social system and more 
interested in ‘the question of how symbols shape the ways social actors see, feel and 
thinlc about the world, or, in otlrer words, how symbols operate as vehicles of cultur e’ 
(Ortner 1994: 375). Semantic anthropology was part of the ‘qrriet revolution which
‘According to Leach, Kachin statements about the supernatural world are ‘in the last analysis, 
nothing more than ways of describing the formal relationships that exist between real persons and real 
group in ordinaiy society’ (Asad 1986: 151)
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had led anthiopology from a concern with function to a concern with meaning’ 
(Fardon 1987). Geertz, in paiticular pioneered a framework that gave pre-eminence to 
the ways in wliich social relations derived from actors’ interpretations and intentional 
choices, or ‘symbolic action’ (1973). Individuals were envisaged as actively 
interpreting their institutional and interpersonal contexts thus reproducing but also 
modifying and transforming them.
Those puisuing semantic anthiopology considered their perspectives to be relevant to 
social issues in the sense that by insisting upon the importance of understanding the 
meanings of non-Westem peoples, they were building a counter-hegemonic argument 
for the right of these peoples to determine their own futures. Also, Apthorpe’s study 
of development discourse in 1986 presaged tlie contemporary interest in unpicking the 
presuppositions and motives inherent in development’s orthodoxies; ‘the semiotic 
avenue into cultural analysis of policy has an original contribution to malce to the 
study of development’ (1986: 388).
There was growing recognition in social science generally that the crucial area of 
interest should be the dynamics between the component parts of Berger and 
Luckman’s triptych: ‘Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man 
[sic] is a social product’ (1967: 61). Social science had focused upon the latter two 
and was begiiming to focus more on human intentionality and creativity. Again, these 
developments have relevance to agency oriented theories of social action which, in 
turn have important implications for applied anthropology.
Lévi-Straussian Stmcturalism, however, in contradistinction to this theoretical
current, was a paradigm that was felt to be at variance with tire instincts of
anthropologists concerned with social change and power struggles in a number of
ways* .^ An important aside here is that Lévi-Strauss’s body of work should be 
carefully distinguished from ‘the ‘cook-book’ Structuralism that followed Lévi- 
Strauss’s lead’ (Ar dener 1985: 53) in terms of lasting impact.
Leach, as well as Needliam (1973), also took up aspects of Lévi-Straussian structuralism, although 
rather than considering universal structures of mind to be paiallel to social structures, they considered 
the creations of mind (myth and ritual) to reflect (and resolve) social structures and the tensions therein.
Perhaps paradoxically, Lévi-Sti auss actually considered himself to be fundamentally influenced by 
Marx.
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The thoroughly abstract conceptualisation of underlying structures in Structuralism 
was far removed from an interest in the everyday interactions of individuals in 
specific settings and mled out examining intentionality. Also, ‘meaning’ was 
understood in cognitive terms and was, as such, divorced from a concern with ethos. 
Similaiiy the analysis of meaning in terms of binary oppositions was arbitrary in 
terms of values. An interest in reflecting on the operations of power within and 
between social groups could not be undertaken on the basis of the idea that ‘structure’ 
was parallel to the universal human mind, rather than in a mutually efficacious 
relationship with intentional human beings. Par don points out that:
‘To differing extents, each of them [French structuralism, American cultural 
antliropology] transposed the assumptions of structural fimctionalism from 
their behaviomal referent to an ideational domain. What was kept in 
equilibrium was not society or the social system but a systematically 
integrated set of ideas, which assmed ontological security or meaningful 
interaction or personal integrity’ (1987: 4)
Asad is concerned that, by studying this ideational realm on its own terms, attention 
is diverted away fr om the material contexts that imderpin the negotiation of these 
meanings. Fur ther, he argues that a central ethical problem with structuralism is that, 
rather than being concerned with historically situated speech, it engenders the 
‘attribution of implicit meanings to an alien practice regardless o f whether they are 
recognised by its agents’ 161; cf. 1983, emphasis original).
However, on a brighter note, Lévi-Strauss, as Lechte argues; ‘shows the complexity 
of non-industrialised cultures wliich the West — often through its anthropologists - has 
assumed to be equivalent to tire childhood of mankind and who, through that fact, 
were deemed to be more primitive and more simplistic than the West in tlieir 
thinldng’ (1994: 76). Further, taking Lévi-Strauss’s universalist theory of structure 
and mind to its logical conclusion gives no basis for a placing different societies in 
any kind of hierarchical schema.
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The important contribution of post-structuralism to the anthropological critique of 
development is discussed below in the next chapter where I will discuss how the 
strong reactions that strircturalism caused in the academic commimity was very 
salutary, especially with regard to stimulating debate on ‘practice’ and ‘agency’. 
(Barnes 1980; Bourdieu 1977; Geertz 1983; Sahlins 1981; Giddens 1979).
Theoretical Movements and the Demise o f Colonialism
From the late 1950s through to the 1970s, applied anthropology’s niche as part of the 
colonial administration was removed. The role of anthropologists in the UK 
government Foreign and Commonwealth Office was minimal in the 1960s and, as 
was discussed in the last chapter, development, at this time, was largely driven by 
economists and engineers. The lack of opportimity was accompanied by a generalised 
disaffection for applied anthropology.
Clifford characterises this period in terms of an emerging anti-imperialist mood in 
academic circles; ‘A rapid decade, firom 1950 to 1960, saw the end of empire become 
a vddely accepted project, if not an accomplished fac t. . . Imperial relations, formal 
and informal, were no longer the accepted rule of the game’ (1986: 10). Herzfeld 
notes that this had reverberations in antliropology; ‘as anthropologists turned against 
the colonial underpinnings of their discipline, they not surprisingly became 
increasingly critical of development’s assumptions as well’ (2001: 153).
Alongside growing recognition of the ineffectual or compliant role played by 
anthropologists in tlie colonial periods, controversial instances of anthropologists 
being involved in coimter-insurgency activities (most famously ‘Project Camelot’^^ ) 
strengthened academic anthropologists’ wariness towards applied anthropology.
The accusation has been made that the wary distance, that many anthropologists 
car efully maintained, fiom the political and economic stnrggles of those among whom
The goal of Project Camelot in Chile was enhancing the U.S Army’s role in counterinsurgency. 
Chile in fact, at this time had a long record of peaceful governmental succession. Subsequent to the 
project Allende was violently overthrown and Pinochet was installed as dictator, with the help of the 
CIA. Anthropologists and other social scientists had been involved in ‘spying activities’ and in
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they were conducting research was often based upon spurious arguments. Gardner and 
Lewis, for instance, ar gue that a notable aspect of the discipline (at least in the West) 
in the 1960s was its preciousness, recalcitrance and diffidence:
‘Few anthropologists had attempted to forge linlcs with professionals in other 
fields. Anthr opologists in general gained a reputation for being over concerned 
with the intellectual independence of their academic agendas and 
umealistically inhibited about the dangers of ‘selling out’ (1996: 37)
Meanwhile, economists and agriculturists were making their mark in development 
policy and practice at both a macro and micro level. Antliropology, until this time, 
was primarily a theoretical pur suit within the walls of the academy and there was very 
little cross-disciplinary collaboration with practical sciences such as agricultme and 
economics. Anthropology’s potential contribution to these areas was decidedly slow 
in coming to finition. However, the current close involvement of anthropology witli 
rnral development did, however, have some important harbingers (see Rhoades 1984). 
Geertz, for instance, made an ambitious and important anthropological analysis of 
rural development in Indonesia that explicated the complex social, cultural, political 
and economic inter-relationships involved (1963)^ ®.
It was not until the 1960s, when the theoretical advances of the ‘Manchester School’ 
began to be felt, that anthropologists in the UK began to go beyond imderstanding 
societies as equilibrium systems where an individual’s behavioiu' could be explained 
with reference to social structure and order. Kuper contends that, in the 1960s, 
‘economics and ecology, began to re-emerge as issues of primary importance’ (1987: 
140). In the US, in the 1960s onwards, anthropologists were becoming increasingly 
involved in researcliing and formulating social policy on issues such as appropriate 
technology and the delivery of medical services, for example (Hoben 1982).
The US contmuation of materialist evolutionist anthropology diverged into various 
strands that had important implications for contemporary theory. Unlike Morgan and
providing information used by the US. The subsequent outcry led the AAA to revise its statement on 
ethics.
Peddlers and Princes (1963) and Agricultmal Involution (1963)
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Tyler, Steward (1953 and 1955) for instance, did not propound a general theory of 
evolution whereby societies progressed through proscribed stages of social, political 
and technological advancement (variously understood in terms of ‘historical 
dialectics’, ‘greater capture of energy’ etc.). Prior to this challenge, tire diverse 
positions witlr the evolutionary fold shared a focus on changes that were generated 
within closed cultures (Sahlins 1964: 135-136). Steward was more concerned to look 
at the adaptations of par ticular societies to then' changing ecological circumstances 
(1955). Sahlins took this fur'ther to focus on the adaptation of societies to the 
impingement of exter*nal forces (natural and social) as well as the opportunities they 
offered. This theoretical development is seen by Oitner in terms of ‘a large scale 
rejection of the study of the inner workings of both cultur e in the American sense and 
society in tire British sense’ (1994: 378). The great shift of the so-called cultural 
ecological approaches, whilst retaining a neo-evolutionary perspective, was 
scepticism that societal change was mainly generated ‘from within’ for adaptation 
purposes and that cultures were closed systems^\ In this sense, this theor-y was an 
impor-tant forerunner of dependency theory.
There appear s to be disagreement about tire general nature and theoretical direction of 
antliropology in the 1970s. Kuper, for example, contends that in the 1970s and 1980s, 
anthropologists in the UK ‘were intellectually conservative, more interested in 
‘cognitive’ matters and less in sociological problems than hitherto; parochial, both 
with reference to international developments in their discipline and to relevant 
developments in other disciplines; and evidently still fascinated by ethnographic 
detail’ (1987: 189-190). Tliis strong contention is countered by other theoretical 
conunentators. Fiske and Chambers, for instance, opine that ‘in the 1970s, 
antliropology students demanded more attention to the relevance of anthropology to 
‘pressing human needs’ well as better preparation for the uncertain job market they
Non-evolutionist cultural ecological theoiy became an important offshoot of these theoretical 
developments (Harris 1966; Rappapoit 1967). Social systems were understood in terms of the 
optimisation of a given society’s material requirements and possibilities. Han'is, for example, 
interpreted Aztec human sacrifice in teims of the protein requiiements of the population at the time. 
Symbolic antliropologists’ postulation of the mediating status of culture with regard to all human action 
was therefore challenged by the cultural ecologist’s direct identification of social system and protein 
requirements, food chains or seasonal variations in rainfall.
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would soon be joining (1997: 284)^ .^ The dissonance may have been one of different 
generations.
An impression of tlieoretical haziness in the 1970s is discerned by Pardon; ‘our 
intellectual accountants have reached no consensus about what distinguished the 
1970s brand of anthropology or whether it was produced at a profit’ (1987: 1). 
However, directly disagreeing with Kuper’s appraisal. Pardon extricates important 
advancements in the ‘sense of relevance’ of antliropology to social concerns over this 
period. Anthropologists moved outside traditional categories and began to directly 
examine the relationships between polity and economy, change and continuity, old 
and new, society and the individual. Riches noted ‘that matters of power ar e being 
ignored is a common cry of criticism these days (1987: 84; cf. 1970; Kapferer 1976). 
Ortner enjoins that ‘the anthropology of the 1970s was much more obviously and 
transparently tied to real world events than tliat of tlie preceding period’ (1994: 382). 
Gardner and Lewis would agree, attesting that tliere was a conterminous emergence of 
critical approaches in anthropological theory and new poverty-focused development 
strategies that involved anthropological insights; ‘anthropologists from the 1970s 
onwards were tlierefore able to make some impact on the allocation of developmerrt 
resources to low-incorne groups’ (1996: 48).
The 1970s also saw an increased interest in ethnographies that subverted the image of 
tire anthropologist as an authoritative and objective observer. There had been what 
Clifford calls ‘earlier disturbances’^ ,^ to the emergent self-reflexive fieldwork account 
but this period saw the publication of a number of key texts in this tradition (for 
instance Dirmont 1978; Rabinow 1977, Malinowski’s Trobriand diaries 1967).
Social theorists such as Durklreim, Weber and Parsons had been far more prominent 
than Mar*x in social science prior to the end of the 1960s. The emergence of radical 
social movements (die women’s movement and anti-Vietnam Wai' protests, for 
instance) botii fiielled, and was informed by, a proliferation of critical theory and
^ Although, as Kuper notes, only 10% of the articles in ‘Man’ in the 1970s focused upon ‘exchange, 
enti-epreneurship and other economising matters’, whilst ‘race and ethnic relations in Britain (were) 
were hardly ever discussed (Kuper 1987:189).
For example, Lévi Strauss’s ‘Tristes Tropiques’ (1975), Smith Bowen’s ‘Return to Laughter’ (1954), 
Maybury“Lewis’s ‘The Savage and the Innocent’ (1965).
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rethinking of the presuppositions underlying Western institutions (including 
academia).
Structuial Marxist approaches sought to imcover the asymmetrical social relations that 
lay beneath the ‘superstructural’ level, that is, the values, beliefs and linguistic and 
social classifications that malce social life intelligible^" .^ Linkages were made between 
material realities, social relations and the level of ideas and cultural conceptions in 
any given social setting. Culture was understood in ideological terms, where existing 
power inequalities were legitimised and mystified by fetishism.
This perspective, whilst insisting upon a deterministic conceptualisation of capitalist 
political economy, at its best, embedded the analysis of everyday life and social 
meaning in relation to stmctuies and, as such, allowed for pioneering ethnographic 
linking of the macro and micro (e.g. Taussig 1980; Willis 1981).
However, in the sense that cultme was understood as legitimising ideology (that is, 
maintaining the existing social order and being the immediate relationship people 
have to the world), structural Marxist analyses had an imintended affinity with 
functionalist analysis. Also, whilst putatively being concerned with exploitation. 
Structural Marxism, according to Lechte, actually says very little about how ideology 
is related, in practice to the bour geois maintenance of the status quo and what can be 
done about this (1994: 40). Fmther, the analytical apparatus of structmal Marxism, 
apart fiom neo-evolutionary branches, ‘was largely non-historical, a factor which, 
again, tied it to earlier forms of anthr opology’ (Ortner 1994: 385)^ .^
In short, the rich but confusing theoretical developments of the 1970s yielded many 
important insights, not least what Pardon calls the ‘convulsions which accompanied
^ The 1960s had seen fierce debates and reassessments among Marxists stimulated by contemporary 
events such as Kliruschev’s denunciation of Stalin oppressive rule (which had been putatively carried 
out on Mai*xist principles), the student revolutions (especially Paris) and the failui e of working class 
revolutions globally.
Althusser, the leading proponent of structur al Marxism, rejected ‘humanist’ tendencies in Marxist 
thought (those that ascribed efficacy and transcendence to the individual in the face of historical 
processes, for instance, Gramsci (1971) and, drawing on Lacan, insisted on the ‘death of the subject’, 
that we are mere puppets led by impersonal forces. However, Althusser saw Marxism as a scientific 
approach to grasping the nature of historical change and therefore providing a strategy to bring about 
working class revolution (1965, 1976). The doctrine of the ‘death of the subject’ contrasts sharply with 
the perspective of ‘Critical Theoiy’, which made a strong defence of the subjectivity of individuals.
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antliropology’s brealcout from a comfortably self-referential universe of meanings’ 
(1987: 7). Ardener, wilting about the decline of ‘modernism’ in Social Anthiopology, 
marks the 1970s in terms of a profound dislocation of some of the discipline’s 
presuppositions; ‘by the middle 1970s . . . the genuine failuie of Stinctuialism had 
become the chief problem. Its collapse took with it the revisionist Marxism that was 
associated with it. The rubble bulled most of tlie debate. That was the final collapse of 
Modernism in social anthiopology’ (1985: 54).
Building upon this, the 1980s was characterised by a resuigence of interest in, and 
deconsti'uction of, the classic texts of twentieth centuiy anthiopology ‘and the serious 
historical study of the development of the anthropological discipline reflected a new 
and critical awaieness of the responsibility anthropologists owed to their project’ 
(Pardon 1987: 3). This movement was pait of a wider phenomenon that reverberated 
tlii'ough the social sciences and the ‘arts’. Polio wing the publication of ‘Writing 
Culture’ (Clifford and Marcus 1986) and ‘Anthiopology as Culture Critique’ (Mai'cus 
and Pischer 1984) there was an intense period of anthropological self-criticism 
paiticulaiiy with regal'd to the positioning and representational orthodoxies of 
Western scholaiship vis-à-vis cultural others. ‘Under the labels post-modernism and 
then cultuial studies, a bracing self-critical self-examination was initiated by many 
practising scholais in the social sciences and humanities’ (Maicus 1999: 6).
In the mid eighties, Maicus claimed that, in anthiopology, ‘ “high” theoretical 
discourse -  the body of theories that unify a field -  is in disaiiay’ (1986: 166). 
Emerging fr om this theoretical complexity, Marcus believed tliat the most worthwhile 
developments were those which focused upon micro-social description, contextuality 
and the point of view of the actor thus allowing a ‘bottom-up reformulation of classic 
questions’ Qoc. cit.). Interpretative analysis was becoming firmly established as a new 
orthodoxy in academic anthropology although Marcus argued that these ‘meaning 
perspectives’, wliilst challenging positivistic structuialist paradigms, had not yet 
developed so as to be able to offer meaningful explanations of the linkages between 
micro and macro settings^^. The emerging ‘practice’ perspective sought to respond to
Boardieu’s ‘Outline of a Theory of Practice’ is singled out as the key exception. Marcus also 
proposes Solzhenitsyn’s ‘The Fust Circle’ as an inspiration for the combining the depiction of real 
laiger systems with the meanings these have at a local level.
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this ‘central problem for social theory’ by merging materialist (‘what had been 
characterised as ‘Marxist’) and idealist (Weberian) frameworks into a compatible and 
coherent theoretical project (Habermas 1973; Giddens 1979).
In the next chapter, I will look at these themes, with a particular focus on the 
dynamics of power and personal agency in the conceptualisation of development.
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Chapter 7
Theoretical Resources for Applied Anthropology in Development
In the last chapter, I gave an indication of the ways in which anthropologists’ (tardy) 
espousal of an anti-imperialist perspective and involvement in radical or mainstream 
social justice concerns and activities was related to important theoretical shifts. This 
chapter continues this endeavour, looking at the substance of these theoretical 
developments in largely abstract terms. My central aim in this chapter is to locate the 
principal theoretical resources that anthropologists draw upon in their applied work in 
development.
There are a number of broad areas where anthropologists have sought to apprehend 
the nature of power, intentionality, change and authority in their ethnographic 
analyses. The theoretical approaches to social change and the workings of power 
within and between societies that have predominated over the last three decades, in 
comparison to previous eras, are more difficult to categorise coherently in terms of 
particular schools of thought. This is primarily due to widespread attacks on grand 
narratives and the ‘isms’ associated with them. Approaches have proven to be highly 
eclectic; crossing disciplinary boundaries more than in the past. It could be said that 
this subversion of the idea of coherent and discrete intellectual traditions is intrinsic to 
social anthropology because ‘our fine-grained ethnographies never quite fit the grand 
theory’ (Parkin 1995: 144). Nevertheless, it is still worth attempting to pin down the 
major perspectives and starting points for analysis. Here I consider particular 
theoretical positions to offer a shorthand and provisional way of describing general 
tendencies.
In an attempt to unearth the main insights that have relevance to the anthropology of 
development, I have delineated this discussion into following categories:
° Understanding Social Change 
° Political Economy Approaches
o Agency-oriented theories of social action moving towards ‘Practice’
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° Pervasive Power and Knowledge 
° Local Complexity and ‘Lack of Fit’
° Feminist Anthropology and Development 
° Post-modern applied anthiopology
Understanding Social Change
I have already covered the important developments in die understanding of social 
change from the theoretical foundation of structuial functionalism. Before going on to 
look at fru'ther developments in the understanding of change, I will briefly reiterate 
the main advancements of these theories.
In the last chapter, I looked at the recognition of the fact that the relative stability of 
traditional societies was being profoundly and often irrevocably disrupted by political 
and economic changes tliat had been conceived externally. Labour migration was 
observed to cause disruption to local kinship aiiangements, to the stability of 
individual families and to the agricultmal output of rural settlements. This perspective 
of rural-urban relations has close correspondence to the centie-periphery models of 
world systems theory. Also, alongside the effort to develop theoretical models that 
allowed for the explication of external impingement, change itself came to be 
miderstood as being perpetual and caused by individuals and groups in the acquisition 
of power. There was a gradual erosion of the anthiopological insistence that all 
scliism and conflict could be understood in terms of a laiger harmony.
By necessity, then, anthiopologists, trying to keep up with the radical changes that 
traditional livelihoods were undergoing as a result of development interventions, 
stimulated new theoretical innovations and an appreciation of the complex and 
differential natme of change. Geertz’s (1963) observations of the effects of the 
agricultmal transformation (from labour intensive, subsistence farming towards wage- 
labom', mechanisation and cash crops) on dispossessed peasants and subsistence 
farmers in Indonesia was an important antecedent for the basic needs and ‘faimers 
first ‘movements (Chambers et al 1989). Geertz related micro-level analysis of 
subsistence farmers with a wider social and cultural understanding of the political 
oppoitunities that post-independence wealthy landowners seized to create a lai'ge
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export market which excised taxes from peasants thus creating a two tier structure in 
agricultmal production. He also discerned the social problems that ai'ose when 
teclmological progiess in agiicultui*al caused the massive displacement of rmal 
labom*. Geertz concluded that ’a radical increase in agricultmal production and a 
significant reduction or rmal un- (or under-) employment seem for the moment to be 
directly contradictory ambitions’ (2001: 25; cf. Epstein 1962; Farmer 1977; Peai'se 
1980). These views were often home out in the analysis of the Green Revolution 
where it was widely fomid that the benefits of teclmological innovations and increases 
in agricultmal production were distributed according to existing power inequalities in 
a given locality. Indeed, the previous relations of stable inequality were often 
exacerbated as competition increased (Epstein 1962). There was a growing realisation 
tliat the natme of the impact of economic and technological change is diverse, being 
contingent upon the social, cultmal, political and ecological context.
Social change fiom the perspective of ‘practice’, which will be discussed below, is 
not always envisaged in terms of one definable class rising to replace another, 
bringing with it a new social order. Rather change may involve alterations m the 
meanings that are invested in existing social relations and institutions. This may be 
influenced by the catalytic effect of new opportunities or the intrusions of outside 
interests.
Sahlins (1976, 1981, and 1994), as discussed in the last chapter, promoted this way of 
imderstanding social change. His arguments offer a great deal to the conceptual 
apparatus of applied anthropologists. Recognising the diversity of views, and relative 
positions, in relation to resomces and political power in any given social setting, 
Sahlins argued that different constituent social groups will respond differentially to 
the inti'oduction of novel political, economic and cultural phenomena*.
Sahlins’ example (1980) of Captain Cook arriving in Hawaii and being apprehended 
in terms of local meanings has parallels with the dynamics of a development project
' In the development context, Sahlins perspective sheds light on the idea of development as the 
expansion of choice, or freedom, as Herzfeld mites; ‘the premise that development gives local 
communities tlie freedom to set their own agendas may actually be a means of securing that collusion, 
or at least that of a local elite anxious to co-operate in anything that will further its own short tenn 
interests’ (2001: 154).
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being offered to, or foisted upon indigenous peoples. Sahlins’ theoretical 
apprehension of these settings is as follows. Existing networks of relationships and 
characteristic modes of relating socially in a setting facing external impingement are 
arguably put under strains which may lead to hansfbimations in stiuctural and social 
configurations as well as in terms of new idioms of relating. Sahlins’ assumption that 
social groups will have different ‘interests’, does not mean that enduring social 
networks and positionalities will be torn asunder by conflict when new and 
differential opportunities arise. Rather, traditional or conventional ways of relating 
will continue to be used by actors but as new interests cause these relationships to be 
invested with different meanings, they will be altered structurally. As Sahlins puts it;
‘Their differential relationships with Europeans thereby endowed their own 
relationships to each other with novel functional content. This is structmal 
transformation. The values acquired in practice return to structme as new 
relationships between its categories’ (1980: 50).
This alteration of meaning, which may take generations, both reproducing power 
relations and realigning them, according to Sahlms, is no less a revolution than the 
actual displacement and replacement of social groups. Contemporary equivalents of 
this thesis insist that it is important to recognise the ways in which Western discomse 
becomes embedded in new cultmal settings. This is captured by Arce and Long:
‘Thus science, politics, economics, technology, the environment, religion etc. 
acquire their own operating principles and explanatory laws with the 
consequence that we are prevented from comprehending the manifold ways in 
which modernity in fact reproduces itself as a complex set of ideas and 
practices thr ough the proliferation of hybrid forms’ (Ar ce and Long 2000: 7).
Notes of caution, however, have been raised about this. Sahlins, for instance, has been 
accused of simplifying his encultmation argument by resorting to an ethnocentric 
'interest’ perspective. Ortner, for instance, argues that ‘he does not really grapple with 
the full range of thought and feeling that moves actors to act, and to act in complex 
ways’ (1994: 400). Sahlins also underplays the aspects of cultural life that remain 
fairly constant and maintain certain kinds of social relationships despite radical
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changes in practice and new ‘interests’. Similarly, from the perspective of Bourdieu 
(1977), for example, power is diffused through social relationships as much by being 
inscribed into the everyday, the intimate and the domestic as by being negotiated at a 
political, economic and institutional level. Change or encultmation, then, as well as 
being a longitudinal process in terms of the ‘whole social sphere’ may accelerate in 
one area of social life while being resisted or frrelevant to other areas (such as the 
domestic or religious).
Political Economy Approaches
Following on from these question of how best to conceptualise social change in the 
development arena, the ‘political economy approach’ analyses transfonnations in the 
local settings typically studied by anthropologists in terms of external impingements 
and/or new opportunities (typically colonialism and capitalist encompassment). This 
perspective was discussed in Chapter 5 in terms of the thinking of development 
planners and I will not reiterate the main aspects here. However, I will make a few 
points and clarifications that are relevant to the conceptual apparatus of applied 
anthropology as contemporary political economy approaches are more grounded 
theoretically than the incipient versions discussed in Chapter 5.
Political economy approaches occupy a spectrum that begins with highly 
deterministic approaches to the impact of the global market on ‘local cultures’ to 
those that give greater emphasis to the internal dynamics of a given society and its 
responses to external realities. Ortner characterises these less teleological approaches 
as follows;
"External impingements are taken into account, but there is a greater effort to 
delineate forces of both stability and change at work within a given system, as 
well as the social and cultural filters operating to select and/or reinterpret 
whatever may be coming in from the outside (Ortner 1994: 402).
The key differences of most political economy approaches to those of structural 
Marxism, along with the strong historical perspective, relate to the scale and starting 
point for analysis. Dependency Theorists started with a macro-economic theory and
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combined this with analyses of the ways in which social groups have been affected by 
capitalist encompassment and penetration. Reflection on the nature of change 
concentrated upon the ways in which ‘peripheral’ areas were coerced into dependent 
and disadvantageous social and economic relationships. Building on this, newer 
approaches, responding to the challenge set out by Sahlins, set out to intenogate the 
exploitative dynamics of capitalism on local settings in a less deterministic manner 
than those approaches outlined in Chapter 5. Comaroff (1985: 3), for instance, deeply 
influenced by the practice theory of Bourdieu, seeks to ‘examine the reciprocal 
interplay of human practice, social structure, and symbolic mediation, an interplay 
contained within the process of articulation between a peripheral community and a set 
of encompassing sociocultural features’.
The phenomenon of Western modes of thought becoming entangled with local 
epistemologies, values and frameworks for action was increasingly looked at as an 
important aspect of change. ComarofTs (1985) study of the Tshidi of South Africa 
provides a good example of this. Here he details how Evangelical Christian ideas 
served as a ‘vanguard of colonialism’ and gradually became inextricable from the 
values and predispositions of the industrial work place, becoming ‘engaged with 
indigenous social systems, triggermg internal tr'ansformations in productive power 
relations and anticipating the more pervasive structural changes that were soon to 
follow’ (1985: 2). Paradoxically, the Tshidi’s expression of resistance to exploitation 
later found expression in ‘a biblically validated defiance’. The intertwining of 
Christian and local idioms in particular* rituals became indirect, although also 
imambiguous, expressions of dissent and resistance to ‘the authority of the hegemonic 
order’ {loc. cit).
This recognition of the correspondence between the ‘production’ of cultur al meaning 
and symbols and material and political ‘realities’ (Bourdieu 1977) has led to 
important developments in social theory.
Agency-oriented theories of social action moving towards * Practice^
The ‘practice’ approach seeks to find a middle way between these approaches by 
focusing on the experience of the individual actor caught in a dialectic tension with
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society. Political anthropology, according to Faidon (1987: 3), in the 1960s, ‘tended 
to represent itself in terms of a coherent development in the coui'se of which a static, 
typological and systems orientation was replaced by processual and transactional 
approaches that paid more attention to actors and events’. The idea of distinct, 
relatively internally coherent, durable ‘cultures’ where a clearly structured system of 
relations between persons, institutions and defined symbols has gradually unravelled 
in antluopological theory as critical and actor oriented perspectives have gained 
groimd. Agency oriented approaches emphasise micro-developmental processes, 
transactions between actors, the plasticity of symbolic meanings and the strategies of 
individuals often contending with competing norms and split allegiances. Looldng at 
the reasoning and intentions of actors is deemed just as important as studying social 
structure abstractly, as Herzfeld argues; ‘the present focus on agency and practice 
demands that we always open up moral issues for debate rather than closing them 
down with peremptory partiality’ (2001: 153).
‘Practice’ approaches, whilst focusing on the individual’s intentionality and creativity, 
nevertheless, generally involve a strong idea of the influence of the social setting on 
the experience and behaviour* of individuals. In this sense, the practice approach 
diverges fiom previous theoretical paradigms that had focused on the autonomy of 
actors. Husserl’s phenomenology and offshoots such as Gofiman’s ‘symbolic 
interactionism’ (1959) or* tlie transactionalism of anthropologists such as Kapferer 
(1976), for instance, envisaged social str*uctures or ‘social organisation’ as non­
determining fiameworks or* ‘negotiated orders’. There was disagreement about the 
extent to which these fiameworks ‘conditioned’ behaviour*. An important question 
that arose was whether an individual’s motivations should be analysed in relation to 
longer term developmental goals, which are often influenced by cultural ‘visions of 
the good’ (becoming), or* in relation to shorter term tactical strategies (getting).
As the anthropological versions of these latter* approaches, in part, represent a reaction 
to the overly deterministic theoretical approaches, any conceptualisation of a reified 
‘shiicture’ is conspicuously absent^. Riches, for instance, argues that meaning at the 
level of conscious action is of central importance in this form of enquiry:
 ^ Historically, agency oriented approaches predated or were parallel to fimctionalism, structural 
functionalism and stiuctuialism thiough Mai-x, Weber, Sartie, Gramsci, Husserl, Simmel etc. although
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‘The idea of objective macro-forms -  such as larger aggregates or structures 
which transcend the experience of individual actors -  is unacceptable to the 
interactionist: such objective forms are not encapsulated as actor’s meaning’ 
(1987:98).
In contrast to the above, Ortner announces that ‘the newer practice theorists share a 
view that “the system” does in fact have a very powerful, even determining effect 
upon human action and the shape of events’ (1994: 390). In this sense, these 
approaches are strongly influenced by post-stiucturalist perspectives^.
A strong focus in the ‘practice’ approach is exploring how, and why, ‘structures’ 
(social stratification, social roles, systems etc.) aie actually produced and modified by 
intentional actors (Giddens 1979). This is balanced, or held in tension with the idea of 
the ‘pervasive’, ‘hegemonic’"* workings of power, or the domination of culture over 
the individual, which had been most fully elaborated in stroctural Marxism. Whilst 
‘practice’ perspectives envisage ‘cultme’ in terms of the enabling of individuals to 
interact intelligibly, to meet their basic needs and to establish and maintain visions of 
the good, the ‘darker’, manipulative aspect of power is also central to this theoretical 
direction. A basic assmnption of the practice approach is that ‘in any actual society 
there are specific inequalities in means and therefore in capacity to realise [the whole 
social] process’ (Williams 1977: 109). The practice approach then, containing an 
intrinsic methodological focus on the asymmetry of power in social relations has a 
particular appeal for applied anthropologists.
the significance and impact of these approaches in social anthropology, in the UK at least, was patchy 
until the 1970s. Kuper (1992) proposes that, even now, anthropological theory can be divided into 2 
broad camps; tliose who lean towards Malinowski (basic needs of man, calculations, strategy, and 
mdividual agents) and those who follow Dui'kheim (collective representations, the socially constituted 
individual).
 ^ Foucault, for instance, believing that actor’s intended and unintended consequences add up to a 
meaningful whole speaks of the ‘machinery of power . . . implanted hi bodies, slipped in beneath 
modes of conduct, made into a principle of classification and intelligibility, established as a raison 
d ’être and a natural order of disorder’ (1980: 44).
‘‘ Williams, in liis commentary on Gramsci, defines hegemony as ‘in the shongest sense a ‘culture’, but 
a culture which has to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of pai’ticular classes’ (1977: 
110)
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Also whilst, in the sixties, theorists spoke in terms of a cleai* demaication between 
Mai*xist ‘materialism’ and Weberian ‘idealism’, within the practice perspective, the 
materialist aspects of Weber were stressed alongside the ‘human’ aspects of Marx.
The ‘practice approach’ rather than separating the cultural and material aspects of 
social life and then deciding which has a causative influence on the other, sets out to 
consider the ‘whole social process’ as it is actually lived, played and worked out in |
‘practice’. The idea of ‘practice’ is related to the ways in which people’s interactions |
in the ‘everyday order’ (Comaroff 1985) contiibute to, or reflect the distribution of j
power in a given setting.
In the ‘practice approach’, a given cultural reality is understood to have differential 
enabling and constraining effects on different social groups. Therefore, certain kinds 
of social relations, that ar e advantageous to some and not to others, are maintained by 
the very nature of everyday practice. Culture is understood to influence and to 
condition behaviour at a deep level through ‘socialisation’ (in the Durldieimian sense 
through both ritual and the influences of the everyday). Particular cultural realities 
provide a particular, albeit alterable and flexible, range of concepts, of 
appropriateness, of emotional expression and developmental aspiration which enable 
as well as constrain in particular* configurations (Rabinow 1977; Bourdieu 1977;
Foucault 1980). The ‘system’ is thus reproduced whilst also being modified by the 
behaviour* of conditioned individuals.
There is obviously an intrinsic tension in practice approaches. On the one hand, there 
is the belief that asymmetry in power relations is inextricable fiom an understanding 
of social life. On the other, there is a commitment to grasping the complexities of the 
motivations of the actor* without imposing teleological theoretical frameworks.
This tension is also apparent in the thinldng of applied anthropologists. In relation to 
the former* issue, applied anthropologists working in development are explicitly 
concerned with asymmetries between and within social groups and are interested in 
either narrowing these or prevent them firom being exacerbated by a development 
intervention. In terms of the second issue, applied anthropologists, rather than 
adopting a Hobbesian view of human natur e, ar*e also interested in the complex webs 
of relationships and motivations that are informed by different values and
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epistemologies. ‘Community Development’ approaches, for instance, do not write off 
cultmal values as ‘ideology’ but set out to understand and promote the social forces of 
cohesion, reciprocity, communication and co-operation in a given setting.
The antluopological emphasis on understanding contextualised agency or ‘social 
perfonnance’ forms the basis of anthropological critiques of the asymmetry and 
mutual unintelligibility between development planners fiom the farmer’s or 
indigenous or ‘emic’ perspective (Chamber 1983; Richards 1993). The coping skills, 
lorowledge, improvisational capacities and values shared by individuals in particular* 
settings are, in the final analysis, often more cr*ucial to their* subsistence and well 
being than tlie macroscopic formulations of planners (incidences of drought, famine 
and social conflict may, however, take matters out of the local control). Richard’s 
account of cultivation as ‘performance’ emphasises this perspective:
‘A central point that modern social theory requires us to grasp is that social 
life is simply not conigible by outside observers. Outsiders may be able to 
rebuild the set (or to mix a metaphor, move the goal posts) but they do not 
malce the action’ (1993: 71)
Long (1977) and Long and Long (1992), fiom what Grillo calls the ‘Wageningen 
perspective’, made an impor*tant contribution to the actor oriented perspective in the 
anthr opology of development. Arce and Long, leading proponents of this Wageningen 
approach write that;
‘We are sometimes seen as being intellectually aggressive because we always 
take a strong stance against simplistic and reductionist diagnoses of the 
‘modern condition’, as well as against theories that deny (even if implicitly) 
the force of people’s own capacities and abilities to intervene and shape the 
conditions of social life’ (2000:1).
Consideration of the potentially active and strategic effor*ts of ‘marginal social 
groups’ is now incorporated into a great deal of development policy although there is 
still recognition that social groups may be systematically marginalised by social and 
economic forces (Lewis 1996). In this sense, an important and hopeful implication of
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agency based, or action oriented theories is that oppression and poverty are neither 
inevitable nor uncontrollable.
Lewis, for example, sets out how notions of individuals’ motivations are considered in 
contemporary anthropological analysis of poverty that recognises the cultural 
embeddedness of action. Individuals’ str ategies for survival and/or profit are balanced 
and shaped by existing cohesive social networks and responsibilities;
‘Where prevailing poverty -  or the ever real prospect of it - encourages the 
constant search for strategic advantage through cheating and deceit, 
constrained only by the possibility of discovery and sanction within one’s 
immediate community. This Hobbesian image of a society and its people 
living under conditions of extr eme scarcity, hovering on the brink of disaster, 
existing precariously at the boundary between co-operative and competitive 
behaviour* is modified by the analysis of a sustained str*uctur*e of transactions 
across communities’ (1996: 4).
Lewis appears to be basing his analysis on transactionalist theory. I tliink that, at this 
stage, it is impor*tant to note a number of important conceptual pitfalls in the whole 
area of ‘agency’. Modern social theory has struggled to formulate analytical models 
which facilitate an understanding of the dynamics between the control of resources 
and the capacity to malce decisions (power), institutions (structure) and the role and 
perfor-mance of individuals (agency). Indeed, Giddens considers the elucidation of 
these dynamics to be the central problem of contemporary social theory (1979). 
Dependency theory was shown in the previous chapter to construe individuals to be 
passive in the face of economic forces whilst moder*nisation theory assumed that 
traditional societies somehow constrained individuals fiom being active self- 
maximising agents. In both cases, the initiative and potential framework for action is 
assumed to be guided by the ‘hidden hand’ of impersonal capitalist, or revolutionary, 
forces, somehow not realising that ‘the stage is dead without the actors’ (Richards: 
1993). On some transactionalist theories, agency is sometimes identified directly with 
the values of the modem market economy, as Hobart malces clear;
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‘Agency at first seems vested in the enterprising individual. But he or she only 
responds to market forces, the patters of which ar e elucidated by economists, 
planners and others. It is the market itself which determines what happens’ 
(1993: 13).
The anthropological insight resists these tautological tendencies to insist that the 
actual agency of individuals is complex, variable and unpredictable and caimot be 
captured in a facile theoretical fiamework. It is clearly important to look at manifold 
ways in which people are motivated and also how this varies culturally. It is 
theoretically facile to assume that people are always tactically chasing productive 
goals or seeking to transform their social and political environment for their personal 
benefit.
Social life involves contending with all sorts of complexities, responsibilities, 
biu'dens, routinised behaviom s, as well as tlie expression of shared values, which may 
unfold over tlie course of longitudinal developmental strategies. Considering the 
embedded self in this way requires looking at the particular ‘visions of the good’ that 
are shared in different social settings (Canithers 1991; Kuper 1992; Strathem 1993; 
Overing and Passes 2000). Ortner explains the implications of this approach:
‘Intrinsic to this latter perspective is a sense of motive and action as shaped 
not only by problems being solved, and gains being sought, but by images and 
ideals of what constitutes goodness -  in people, in relationships, and in 
conditions of life’ (1994: 396).
This is a key insight. Talcing on board this sense of the relativity of ‘visions of the 
good’, ideas of normative life cycles and how western versions, as exported by 
development, at a planning level, often obliviate these, is obviously crucial for the 
consideration of the ethics of development^.
 ^ Equally, the temptation to characterise so called western institutions as straightforward conduits of 
imperialism should be resisted; tlie rejection of essentialist and homogenising characterisations of non- 
Westem cultures should be accompanied by an appreciation of the complexities and ambiguities of 
Western culture. On this basis, Herzfeld emphasises that ‘an agency based approach must recognise
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Agency oriented tlieories of social action’ have fed into development practice in 
important ways (for instance ‘Faimer’ or ‘People First’ movements, slogans such as 
‘Helping People to Help themselves’). The stress on understanding contextualised 
practice and the relativity of peoples’ motivations and ‘visions of the good’ are crucial 
to the foimulation of methodologies to incorporate indigenous knowledge, 
pai'ticipatory development and self-determination.
Conceptualising Power and Knowledge
Conceptually and methodologically, there is an important distinction to be made 
between focusing on the 'knowledge of power', that is, focusing on what we know 
about power and the 'power of knowledge' meaning considering the efficacy and force 
of laiowledge (Fardon 1987:1-20). I will look at these in tui*n.
Knowledge o f Power
Using ‘power’ as an explanatory concept is notoriously complex, often leading to 
endless regressions that ar e questionable in terms of their applicability to alleviating 
social injustice or chronic poverty. Power is usually identified in anthropological 
theoiy in terms of either its perceived effects or by looking at the nature of the 
processes of its production. It is vaiiously conceptualised in terms of ‘power to do 
sometliing’, ‘power over something or somebody’ and thirdly in terms of a decentred 
invisible ideological pervasive force. In this section, my aim is to isolate the ways in 
which theoretical imderstandings of knowledge and power have been picked up on by 
anthi'opologists engaged in the practice, or critique of, development.
Grasping ‘power’ as the object of analysis (Icnowledge of power) is sought tlirough 
observing what seem to be power’s visible effects; in any given social organisational 
context, there are those who gain and those who lose. This can be looked at in teims 
of the differential distributions of degrees of fieedom, self-determination, ‘goods’, or 
decision maldng power. Nelson and Wright point out that power is experienced in the 
face to face encounters of eveiyday life as well as through the worldngs of systems. ‘
the huge range of possibilities for action, benign and malevolent, hi all forms of government and 
administration’ (2001:233).
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“The family” is experienced in personalised, face to face relations within a household, 
but those experiences aie not idiosyncratic; they aie systematic, heavily imbued with 
ideology, with some aspects subject to intervention and conhol by die state’ (2001: 7).
Keeping tliis in mind, analyses of the visible signs of the possession of power (such as 
accumulated wealth, juridical power, social status, military might, educational status, 
for example) have also been complemented by considering the ways in wliich power 
is inscribed into non-disputed practices. Bouidieu (1977), for instance, aigues that 
doxic or uncontested laiowledge constitutes the natuialised manifestation of power 
relations. Fardon obsei*ves, similarly, that we cannot always ‘read off power from 
observable events; certain issues may be kept from view or suppressed ideologically. 
On this basis, ‘the aiea of non-disputes becomes relevant to oui* judgement of the 
distribution of power’ (Faidon 1987: 9). ‘Power’ is understood in this invisible sense 
in terms of a relation, rather than a possession.
A conceptual difficulty that often crops up in anthropological considerations of 
modernity, arises from the observation that the self-determination of an exploited 
social group may talce the form of the acquisition of the very means of exclusive 
power that they were ‘oppressed’ by. Whilst this group may make gains in teims of 
status and economic well being, the pre-existing and diffuse dynamics of power have 
not changed. The social group, by dint of their elevation within a capitalist economy, 
for instance, wliilst now wielding more of the attributes of power is still within the 
wider system. Nelson and Wright characterise this theorisation as follows;
‘Inadvertently, however, and ‘behind their backs’, the invisible side effect 
logic of the development appaiatus (will) be incorporating the marginalised in 
even more distant clusterings of power, undemiining their resistance’ (2001: 
11).
Power is envisaged in post-stiuctuialist theory as permeating tlnough the institutions, 
values, categories and ‘common sense’ of given settings. On this view, Dirks et al 
observe that ‘politics was inscribed into the textuie of the everyday’ and that ‘the 
effects of these shifts on the concept of power have been multiple’ (1994: 4). In its 
most basic form, this perspective boils down to the commonsensical (or ‘vulgar’)
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Mai*xist notion of society as a totality made up of elements that express economic 
relations. This omnipresence of power is what Foucault called ‘the government of 
childi en, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick’ (1982: 221).
In different ways, both Foucault’s notion of discouise and Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony^, as ‘dominant ideology theses’, ‘emphasise the degree to which cultme is 
grounded in unequal relationships and is differentially related to people and groups in 
different social positions’ (Dirks et at 1994: 3) .^ Foucault's maxim is that power is 
ever present in the regularities of laiowledge and practice which he calls 'regimes of 
ti'uth' (1983: 133). Fardon encapsulates Foucault’s core argument; ‘the antinomy of 
power and ti'uth is rescinded in favom* of a composite power-knowledge itself 
productive of truth’ (1987: 5).
This apprehension of laiowledge, from the perspective of power, evokes an interest in 
how laiowledge is socially, historically and politically constructed, how all forms of 
knowledge are inherently political and how discourses have real effects that are 
instrumental in the maintenance of particular social orders. Anthropologists, on the 
whole, whilst diawing upon these approaches, have resisted a wholehearted 
acceptance of Foucault’s unification of power and knowledge. There aie various 
antluopological apprehensions of these dynamics that are very relevant to applied 
anthiopology and the critique of development. I covered some of these perspectives in 
relation to the coiTespondences between colonialism and development in teims of 
dichotomous evaluations between the modem and traditional, for example, in Chapter 
5.
The realisation that much of applied anthropology has been talcing place within what 
Escobai* (1995) calls the ‘dominant discomse’ began to stimulate discussion about 
anthropology’s potential to challenge its hegemony and to draw attention to other, less 
visible discomses’ (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 41). This apprehension of development 
as a discomse opened the way to a radical rethinking of the presuppositions of 
development thinking. As cultme was understood in teims of in teims of contested
Gramsci emphasised ‘practice’ and the historical actor..
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meanings, development, as a bundle of values and epistemologies, was increasingly 
understood as a contingent social constmct. On this basis, anthropologists 
increasingly turned to deciphering the ways in which the phenomena of development 
can be seen to construct social environments in paificular ways.
From a macroscopic perspective, Escobar stresses the ideological background to 
development and argues that the West extended its power over the developing world 
by depicting it in terms of ‘abnormalities’ which, ‘with the guidance of the West, 
could be cured, a strategy that enabled the creation of a ‘field of intei*vention of 
power’ and permitted increasing intervention in the lives of people living in the Third 
World (1985: 387). Secondly, as development became an area of scientific study, 
problems that were clearly political were presented as ‘scientific’ problems that could 
be solved by Western expertise. Thndly, development was mstitutionalised nationally 
and internationally creating a
‘multiplicity of sites of power which produce regulations and guidelines to 
control the activities of local people and villages and bind them to certain 
socio-economic practices and beliefs. In controlling development practice, 
these local and global institutions have constituted a system of disciplinary 
power which aims to produce normalised individuals -  through these political 
strategies, ‘development colonised reality . . . became reality’ (Escobar 1995: 
214^
From this vantage point, the anthropologist Ferguson contends that ‘the thought and 
actions of development bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by tlie world of acceptable 
statements and utterances within which they live’ (1990: 18) .^ This conceptualisation 
of pervasive, decentred power over everyone and everything, however, leads to a 
problematic denial of the competence of actors to know what the ‘real’ locus nature of 
power is. This is exemplified by Foucault’s apparently patronising assertion that:
’ Foucault’s perspectives goes beyond envisaging individuals as fulfilling prescribed functions, having 
the insight to see social reality as involving perpetual interpretation, negotiation, jostling for authority 
and control of the definition of reality.
® Hobart envisages 3 incommensurable and co-existent discourses in the development relationship; that 
of local people, of professional developers and of the state or national government (1993: 12). Grillo 
notes that Escobai* opts for three different kinds of discourse in development; ‘the developers, those
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‘People Imow what they do; they frequently laiow why they do what they do; 
but what they don’t knoM> is what they do does’ (in Ortner 1994: 187).
There aie various strands to this line of argumentation or ‘dominant ideology thesis’. 
One version is that people are surmised to have differential ideas of self-interest and 
aspiration, that is, social groups in an oppressed position have a distorted perception 
of self-interest ‘thiough the ideological manipulations of a privileged category 
marshalling superior resources for monitoring their position and disseminating 
information to obscure their self-interested machinations’ (Faidon 1987: 9) .^ Lulces’ 
explication of this dynamic is;
‘A exercises power over B by influencing, shaping or determining his very 
wants . . .  As a result B accepts his role in the existing order of things and no 
conflict aiises (1974: 23-24 my emphasis).
A related theorisation, is that offetishisation, that is, where both the ‘oppressed’ and 
the ‘oppressors’ are mystified by the same ideology, with differential effects (see 
Homborg 1992).
Ferguson (1990), on the basis of fieldwork in Lesotho tracing the history of 
development intervention from the 1970s, contends that whilst development projects 
often failed in terms of their explicit objectives, a wider result was that the reach and 
conti'ol of the state into the lives of marginalised communities was neveifrieless 
stiengthened. Development discourse, according to Ferguson, in this context, was 
selective in terms of the use of data and the way it was represented. Although the 
development project failed to meet its stated objectives, the final result was an 
endorsement of the role of the State***. Problems, such as marginalisation of particular 
groups, which local people would explain in terms of social and political dynamics 
ai e represented by the developers in terms of the lack of technical inputs that they can
who are developed, and those who resist development’ (1997: 16). The question of the 
communicability of different bodies of knowledge or discourses is discussed in the next section.
 ^This reasoning is the basis of the critique of ‘subjective welfarism’ in utilitarian economics, which 
will be looked at in Chapter 9.
190
provide. In this way, by representing the causes of inequality in politically neutral 
terms, the State legitimated its role. Ferguson, in his argument that development can 
be used as a means to increase social control and reproduce social relations of 
inequality, sees a wider coherence in the ‘unintended’ consequences of development 
projects.
However, whilst theorisations based on a ‘dominant ideology thesis’ offer a ready 
made framework for analysing the ideological aspects of development thinldng, 
institutions and practice, there are limits to the usefiilness of this model. Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of power as decentied and subjectless, not possessed by any one 
social category, institutions or individual but somehow invisibly animating society 
and perpetuating different forms of subjugation, in ways that cannot be predicted by 
plotting the various interests of contending gioups is actually depoliticising. This view 
begs the question of how, if everyone is controlled by the invisible sway of decentred 
power, can empowerment be possible without peipetuating the same controlling 
system? This thesis would seem to render meaningless any effort to address the 
oppressive aspects of power.
Charles Taylor (2000: 172) argues that this vision of power is an over-simplification 
and ‘leaves too much out’:
‘Foucault’s oppositions between the old model of power, based on 
sovereignty/obedience, and the new one based on domination/subjugation 
leaves out eveiything in Western history which has been animated by civic 
humanism or analogous movements . . . without this in one’s conceptual 
aimouiy. Western history and societies become incomprehensible’.
Ferguson and Escobar*, however, do, in fact, delimit their treatment of Foucault to 
argue that it is possible to step outside the ‘dominant development discourse’. This is 
obviously crucial for development anthropology. They insist that it is possible to 
analyse reflectively about the political embeddedness of development interventions
Hobart would agree that there is more going on than achieving the explicit objectives of projects, 
arguing that ‘most development projects fell seriously short’ (1993: 3).
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and also to resist the imposition of harmful ideas and policies (see Escobar’s 
discussion of social movements in Latin America 1992b).
Again, going back to the theme of local transmutations of ‘modernity’ which was 
introduced with reference to Sahlins earlier in the chapter, a difficulty that results 
fi'om an over-emphasis on studying development on its own terms is that scant 
attention is paid to local imderstandings of power, value, efficacy and Imowledge. 
Anthropologists have shown in persuasive accoimts that there is little point in 
examining global development strategies in isolation from the ways that they are 
tiansfbrmed, filtered, adapted and altered in local social contexts. This is Mosse’s 
contention:
‘Wliat is often omitted is an analysis of power through which global 
development concepts mould and are moulded by existing social and political 
relationships. Practitioners sometimes assume they are creating new local 
institutions when they are, in fact, recombining existing roles, relationships of 
power and social status’ (2001: 144).
This leads on to consideration of the difficulty that anthropologists have had to 
conceptualise ‘power’ in cross-cultural terms. Riches (1987), for instance, argues that 
‘power’ is our (Western) representational model for understanding aspects of social 
action. The implication is that we are bound to end up with a misapprehension if we 
set about trying to understand the intentions and meanings which motivate actors in 
cultural settings different from our ovm if we pre-empt the meaning of ‘power’. 
Anthropologists have sought to explicate notions comparable to ‘power’ in different 
settings.
Strathem interprets power relations in terms of culturally specific constmctions of 
personal agency in Melanesian societies and the ways in wliich individuals are 
credited and ascribed with empowering features that are recognised in particular* 
contexts (1987: 61-82). Power is understood here in a wider Weberian sense of 
agency that does not necessarily entail subjugation. Pardon picks up on Strathem’s 
comparison of Melanesian conceptualisations of potent agency with Afr ican ideas that 
tend to be related more to formal role or office and less to personal attributes (1987:
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11). Parkin similarly shows how the communication of credible and powerful 
Imowledge is contingent on the way in which the act of communication is construed 
by the participants; the power of statements inheres not solely in then formal meaning 
(1985b: 49-60). Acknowledging the importance of explicating the varying cultural 
construction of potent individuals is relevant to the interpersonal dynamics of 
knowledge exchange in development projects. Nelson and Wright’s (2001) volume on 
participatory development explores some of these dynamics.
The next section looks specifically at anthropological depictions of the interplay 
between Western rationalist knowledges and ‘local’ knowledge. In anticipation of this 
section, 1 will now discuss further permutations of power and Imowledge.
Power of Knowledge
Knowledge may be regarded as ‘powerful’ or otherwise by virtue of who bears it and 
puts it into practice. Ceilain kinds of Imowledge may be distinguished from others and 
raised to a particular status whilst others are denigrated. In relation to the process of 
acquisition of knowledge; individuals and groups may be excluded or may be required 
to undergo displacement or subjugation to an alien ideology or morality to gain 
privileged knowledge. Hobart writes with regard to the rhetoric of the spatial and 
visual metaphors of knowledge prevalent in Western practice, that ‘the greater the 
superiority of the obseiwer, the more objective and rational the surveilling gaze’ 
(1995: 52).
Knowledge may be conceived as being instrumental for a particular* group, (for 
example the developers) or for the continuance of a particular social order. The 
central difficulty of this Idnd of analysis is the facility of imputing uniform interests 
and aims to individuals within a given category. As Pardon says; ‘behind the 
mechairics of this analysis must lie assumptions about the extent to which ideational 
or normative consensus is, in fact, a precondition of par*ticular* forms of collective life’ 
(1987: 8). Putting ascriptive boundai’ies aioimd 'powerful' and 'powerless' groups fails 
to recognise the heterogeneity of interests and aims within and between social 
categories. These issues lead to the consideration of the complexity of outsider/insider 
relations in terms of representations and the difficulty of apprehending the dynamics
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of knowledge within local groups which may be masked by the appearance of 
consensus (Mosse 1994: 508).
Local Complexity and %ack of F if
On-going debates within anthropology regarding the (in)commensurability of 
different cultur al tr aditions, local Icnowledges and ways of self understanding explore 
the significance, in development practice of relativistic approaches to the ‘other’ 
(Firfh 1985; Hobart 1993; Hastrup 1995; MacIntyre 1997; Mason 2000, Overing 
1985; Parkin 1985a),
Anthropologists, in the 1990s increasingly adopted an ‘anti-rationalist’ approach to 
social knowledge. Vitebsky, for instance, from a relativistic perspective states that 
particular' bodies of knowledge, including western scientific paradigms ‘rather than 
being categories of any absolute philosophy, can be little more than folk categories of 
tire people who use these words’ (1993: 100). Similarly, Ingold argues that ‘human 
beings do not construct the world in a certain way by virtue of what they ar e, but by 
vir*tue of their conceptions of the possibilities of being. And these possibilities are 
limited orrly by the power of the imagination’ (1995:63).
In 1985, Overing ar gued that the analytical concern with the tr uth-value of statements 
often sheds very little light upon the extr apolated cultural meanings of statements that 
can only be understood by Icnowing the social world fr-om which they emerge and 
have efficacy. The elevation of tlie criteria of trmth-value and the connection between 
statements that are characteristic of a given culture and its apparent mastery of the 
material world for productive pmposes led philosophers to impute superiority to 
Western rationality. Overing challenged these views on two levels, firstly, by 
signalling the ethnographic perspective that often contextualises the intended meaning 
of utterances beyond their formal appear ance, and secondly, by highlighting the moral 
import of imderstanding other cultural realities before imputing value judgements of 
superior or inferior status to them according to our criteria. Agreeing with Overing’s 
critique of the conceptual blindness of Western rationality, Hastrup observes it is 
important to recognise that ‘reason never worked on its own. It invariably got stuck.
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and history moved as much by irrational impulses and uncontrolled emotion as by 
rational calculation’ (2001: 10).
Hobait is particularly concerned with the status of Western ‘scientific ’ knowledge vis- 
à-vis local knowledges. He argues that development practice tends to impose 
quantitative understandings upon realities that are perceived locally in qualitative 
terms; ‘kinds of food become cash crops and human activities become labour*. What is 
lumped together here is often regarded by the peoples concerned as heterogeneous 
and qualitatively diverse in practice’ (1993: 6). Wagner would agree in his argument 
that sociological scientism ‘has ‘nickeled and dimed’ (i.e. devalued and debased) 
human realities to death’ (1991, in Overing and Passes 2000: 9).
Shnilarly, Hobait builds on critiques of both ‘liberal’ modernisation theory and 
‘radical’ dependency theory in terms of their blindness to different ‘knowledges’, for 
example, different cultural constructions of the relationship between land, work, 
productivity, change, economy and well being. The shared antluopological argument 
is that a fimdamental error shared by both modernisation and dependency theories, 
which continue to influence development practice, is that they are based upon a 
rationalist epistemology and motivated by instrumental concerns that are legitimated 
by ‘science’ and efficacy. Whilst antluopologists have been to the fore in making 
criticisms of exclusionary economic or technological models of development, Hobart 
warns that, ‘despite some well-rehearsed differences, sociological theories of 
development often involve presuppositions drawn from the same rationalist scientific 
epistemology. Whilst these critics may be critical of certain assumptions of 
economists, the effect is to replicate the dominant epistemology in a subtler guise . .  . 
these critics may unwittingly be caught up in helping to perpetuate what they claim to 
criticise’ (1993: 5).
Building on these insights, this strand of the anthropological critique of development 
roots its arguments on the observation of ‘embedded’, non-modern, or indigenous 
cultural realities. The reasoning is related to Winch's (1964) contention that the 
intelligibility, or criteria of logic which would explain given actions inheres in and is 
relative to particular contexts or 'modes of life'. Hobart et al (1993), situating their 
observations in rural areas, describe the plurality of knowledges and practices with
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which people malce meaningful, productive, moral and aesthetically pleasing then 
relationsliips with the land and with each other. They explore the ways in which 
different development contexts aie endowed wiüi particulai* meanings, languages, 
aesthetics, shared interpretations and appropriate behaviours. Their arguments 
emphasise the creativity of development’s ‘beneficiaries’ and describe local 
knowledges in their vernacular forms, as more about Imowing how than 'knowing as' 
or 'knowing that' (Cohen 1993: 31), that local knowledges can be better understood as 
'performance' (the playing of an instrument rather than a dramaturgical metaphor) 
(Richards, 1993: 61-78), as practical, pragmatic, factual, detailed and personal, 
sensible to the particularities of place, occasion and circumstance, subject to testing 
and modification, involving theory and metaphysical presuppositions, can be 
considered as social activity, (Hobart 1993: 1-30) involve dialogue, negotiation and 
conceptualisations of agency which differ from that of western specialist Imowledge 
(Parkin 1985(b): 135-51).
Rather than conceiving of knowledge as an abstract conceptual scheme, this approach 
gives priority to the sense given to things in practice and which are intelligible as par t 
of a lar ger (but not determining) context. The focus of this approach is precisely the 
meanings and concepts that arrimate, create, define and differentiate objects and 
activities in rural livelihoods. This stress on local and individual meanings and 
contingencies without reifying cultme is antithetical to reductive explanations of 
objects, environment, people, and actions that stem from instrumental and economic 
paradigms. Further, this perspective, rather than focusing solely on the material and 
ecological effects of technological systems, or on the meanings which societies 
impute to them, allows for the description of the processes by which materiality and 
technological systems are both formative of, and formed by, cultural and/or 
interpersonal dynamics.
Issues of Encompassment and Incompatibility
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On the basis of these arguments, a concern in applied anthropology in relation to 
relativistic approaches, is the recognition that development, which inevitably involves 
articulating world-views which flow from different histories, requires the 
consideration of ‘how, and how far*, issues of boundedness and incompatibility come 
into play’ (Harris 1995: 109). The translation of relative Icnowledges is inextricable 
fr om considerations of relative power* (Asad 1986).
One of the most crucial questions that arises here is whether the encompassment of 
these indigenous societies by capitalist society necessarily denies, or makes 
impossible, their integrity. This argument brings us to a central moral and theoretical 
difficulty for anthropologists in their conceptualisation of tire relationship between 
what is characterised as ‘the West’ and those societies that can be considered as ‘pre’ 
or ‘non’ moder*n. Homborg (1992 and 1994) gives useful insights here.
Whereas Sahlins’ contention was that capitalism is a species of culture, ‘a curious 
cultmal scheme’ (1993: 384), Hornborg argues that ‘capitalism and culture are 
phenomena belonging to different orders, if not altogether opposed to each other . . . 
for some reason he (Sahlins) does not want to concede the fundamental asymmetry 
between the West and the Rest’ (1994: 239-240).
The argument advanced by Homborg is that capitalism is a denial of culture in the 
sense that it thrives on the decontextualisation, re-evaluation and pricing of the 
elements that are constitutive of particular, local, experience-near* cultmal realities 
which have intrinsic value (at the very least are valuable for those who ‘belong’ to 
specific communities). As was discussed above, Sahlins objects to the idea that, in the 
final analysis, people of indigenous, non-modem, or ‘peripheral’ cultmes will 
necessar ily be engulfed by capitalist systems of meaning and ar gues that these people 
equally can, and do, in tum, ‘culturally encompass’ or* construct Western culture 
according to their own presuppositions. Homborg contests this ‘sympathetic’ view, 
stating that;
‘It is not a question of Western “peoples” encompassing other “peoples”, but 
of the conceptual universe of modernity encompassing and dominating pre­
modem universes . . . And the brute fact of the matter is that “pre-moder*nity”
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cannot encompass modernity, because, in terms of self-reflexivity, the latter 
transcends the former . . .  and such movements are irreversible . . .  no attempt 
to champion the constructions of the encompassed will help to empower them’ 
(1994: 240).
Whilst, as Sahlins argues, the peoples of ‘the Rest’ may integrate aspects of Western 
culture into their own symbolic schemes, the manner in which the ‘West’ 
encompasses ‘the Rest’ is by ‘asymmetrical subsumption’. By this Hornborg means 
that ‘the submission to the concept-cw/w-institution of general-purpose money is an 
implicit admission to new, decontextualising modes of self-objectification (notions- 
CMW-relations of products, prices, profits, labour time, wages, etc.) quite sufficient for 
the imperialist scheme of modernity to run its pervasively dissolvent course’ (/oc. 
cit.).
The crux of the matter, here, is that whilst it is important to recognise that intrinsic to 
all ‘cultures’ is a capacity to respond creatively to the meanings and practices of other 
cultural realities, there is, undeniably, something particular about modem Western 
capitalist and instrumental foims in the reduction, decontextualisation and 
disembedding of local cultures. When one looks at the history of the indigenous 
peoples of South America vis-à-vis Western society, for instance, this view seems 
compelling, to say the very least.
Nevertheless, whilst some indigenous societies continue to exist more or less ‘intact’, 
or unmolested, the vast majority of indigenous peoples have, to greater or lesser 
extents, been encompassed by capitalist expansion in terms of their ‘work’ and 
‘productive’ capacities for example. Applied anthropologists generally, work in this 
arena of conflicting values. Marcus (1986) writes that, whilst anthropologists have 
aimed to moved away from ethnography that depicts a ‘primitive’ other, there remain 
two narrative postures that are reminiscent, or constitute positive transformations, of 
this history. The first he calls ‘before the deluge’, or ‘salvage’ anthropology, where 
the ethnographer purports to depict a society in its original state, before impending 
transformation. The second he calls the ‘redemptive mode’ as it involves the 
explanation of the social life of societies that have undergone imdeniable 
transformations in terms of the surviving traces and enduring values of a previously
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existing (pre-contact) cultural system (e.g. Comaroff 1985; Gow 1991). Whilst 
Marcus seems to be critical of tliese ‘manoeuvres’, both of these approaches have 
parallels in, and provide important insights for, applied anthropology in the effort to 
deal with the dichotomy described above.
In his conceptualisation of overlapping or merging knowledges, Hobart evokes a 
theorisation of the conceptual encompassment of local knowledges as they are 
rendered ‘ignorant’ and ‘obsolete’ by the more dominant and unscrupulous practices 
flowing from Western economic and technological models. As Hobart’s volume 
presents a number of persuasive ethnographic case studies of these very processes, his 
theorisations are compelling. Nevertheless, there are empirical difficulties with 
Hobart’s conception of a world ‘with on the one hand a series of relatively discrete 
‘local’ or indigenous’ knowledges (plural). . .  on the other there is ‘western scientific 
Imowledge’ (singular') which consistently imderestimates the value of these 
Imowledges’(Grillo 1997: 13). Hobart does seem to essentialise these as being 
discrete ‘bodies of Imowledge’ with the result that he focuses upon the separ ateness of 
these ways of Imowing^ \  Grillo’s assessment of Hobar't’s perspective is that
‘He does not go quite so far as to say so, but his thinking implies cultural 
solipsism: ‘local’ knowledges are grormded in such different philosophical 
foundations from ‘Western’ knowledge that communication between them is 
in fact impossible; rationalities are not shared or share-able’ (1997: 14)
Applied anthropologists, if they ar e concer-ned vrith the defence of indigenous visions 
of the good, necessarily have to temper this epistemological and normative relativism 
in then* endeavours to communicate the indigenous perspective in development 
plarming.
A minority of social anthropologists are quite open about their belief that western 
scientific Imowledge is a ‘superior’ form of Imowing in tlie material realm at least.
Elsewhere, Hobart describes a moment which felt like an instance of incommensurability, ‘One 
woman leaving the theatre performance remarked:
Pragma kaliwat duweg, tiang atenga mati kedek 
(The actors were so clever I nearly died laughing)
To claim I knew what she meant would be laughable’ (Hobart 1995: 68)
199
Gellner, for instance argues that Western scientific Imowledge, by dint of its very 
efficacy will replace non-western belief systems (Gellner 1993 and 1995; cf. Kuper 
1992). On tins basis, Gellner argues that societies that do not have access to western 
teclniology are objectively deprived. He goes fuifher to imply that western teclmology 
necessarily carries western culture with it. Parkin counters this view to assert that 
while this teclmology constitutes foims part of ‘globally homogenising influence, it 
does not follow that all else of a society’s beliefs and practices aie displaced by this 
technological Imowledge’ (1995: 148). Parkin’s (1995: 149) view here, using the 
example of the uptalce of western medicine Imowledge in Islamic contexts, is that the 
undoubted benefits of Western medical treatments are spreading thioughout the world 
and are principally used to treat acute physical illnesses. However, non-Western 
peoples typically continue to benefit from their tiaditional medical Imowledge with 
regard to mental health, psychosomatic illnesses and in the maintenance of good 
health. What is happening, he argues is ‘not a wholesale demonstration of 
technological superiority by bio-medicine but rather a re-organisation of partially 
overlapping areas of competence as between it and pre-existing therapies’.
Clearly indigenous knowledges and ways of being exist because they are valued 
aspects of the creation of well being. As such they demand to be valued in the 
development process. Parkin observes that ‘it is precisely against the power and 
seeming inevitability of technological homogenisation that many so-called counter­
cultures arise or existing cultural practices and beliefs are re-accentuated (1995: 148).
On the basis of these arguments, the key issues for development practice are 
cormtering the ignorance that plarmers have of the significant ways of knowing and 
valuing that are intrinsic to indigenous well being and which are intertwined with 
their traditional livelihoods. De Coppet and Hornborg’s arguments that development 
is bedevilled by a conceptual and normative blindness to indigenous world-views and 
versions of well being because of the restructuring of whole societies that comes with 
instrumental capitalism, imply that indigenous societies need to be defended as 
‘wholes’ (as we tried to do through land rights in Bolivia, for instance). Applied 
anthropologists, on the whole, though, work in contexts where ‘modernity’ and 
‘capitalism’ are aheady ubiquitous and therefore need to work in the resulting context 
of hybridised cultural and political forms (see Croll and Parkin 1992).
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Feminist Anthropologies and Development
A crucial part of the aforementioned ‘politicisation’ of anthropology has been the 
significant advances and enrichment of feminist thought in the discipline. This has 
also formed an important aspect of the anthropological critique of development 
practice.
Schrijvers writes, however, that feminist theory should not be seen as a mere addition 
to the ‘view from below’ perspectives that were being developed more generally; 
‘theoretical and methodological rules which had been excluded women’s perspectives 
had to be changed’ (1995: 20)^ .^ Grillo agrees, ar guing that ‘the great volume of work 
since 1970 concerned with gender . . . has not simply ‘illuminated’ the cultural 
dimensions of development but transformed ways of thinking about social, economic 
and political relations’ (1997: 6). Gardner and Lewis, in fact, see the pressure that 
came from feminist critiques of many andocentric anthropological assumptions as ‘the 
precursor to the increasingly reflexive nature of anthropology in the 1980s and into 
the 1990s’ (1996: 62).
An important contribution to development critique was the dissection of the 
differential impacts of economic change on women and men (Boresup 1970). An 
further line of research and critique has been tlrat of the ‘féminisation of subsistence’ 
(Gardner and Lewis 1996: 60-61). Schrijvers also notes that black feminist critiques 
of the assumptions of the ‘learned voices of white women’ (such as ‘universalising 
theories of male oppression and female solidarity) have highlighted the often very 
different social dynamics that women in non-Western settings experience (1995: 21; 
Overing and Passes’ 2000: 4-5).
Study of the intricate economic and social relations that women are involved in on a 
daily basis has resulted in theoretical and methodological advances for apprehending 
complex social inequality; ‘it has become clear* that ethnic and race relations cross cut
Schrijvers also makes the persuasive contention that women anthropologists, already Imowing the 
feeling of ‘otherness’ and the struggle to be recognised as subjects rather than objects, have
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gender, as do class, culture and age’ (Schrijvers 1995: 21). These insights have made 
an impact on development planning, as well as stimulating a radical rethink of 
familiar anthropological categories (such as ‘the household’, ‘work’, ‘decision 
malcing’, and ‘production’ for instance) in terms of the dynamics between men and 
women in different cultmal contexts.
This ‘grormded theory’ would meet with the approval of the feminist philosopher, 
Martha Nussbaum who complains that
‘Some feminist philosophy, particularly the type influenced by postmodernist 
literary theory, has involved a type of abstraction that tmns the mind away 
from reality, and that does not help us see or imderstand real women’s life 
better. A focus on real cases and on empirical facts can help us to identify the 
salient features tlrat a political theory should not efface or ignore’ (2000: 11).
This leads on to the next topic.
The Mixed Blessings of Post-^modernism for Development Anthropology
There would appear to be inherent contradictions between post-modernist 
antliropology and development on a number of coimts. Firstly, development policy 
and planning depends upon ‘objectivity’ and gives credence to positivistic 
comparative studies. Rosalind Eyben^^ ar gues that development plarmers have to rely 
upon notions of ‘objectivity and certainty’ to inform strategies for change (2000), 
whereas she holds post-modernist approaches to be inherently relativistic. The 
assumption here seems to be that to be post-modernist is to lack an empfrical 
approach. However, proponents of hermeneutic approaches (which are often 
considered as being co-valent vritli post-modernism, e.g. by Gellner 1993) would 
coimter that their empirical observations are central to the task of deconstructing the 
very ««empirical assumptions of theoretical models such as structural-functionalism,
‘consciously tiled to mediate between the positions of the subject and the object in anthropological 
research’ (Joe. cit.).
An anthropologist who became the Head of the Social Development Division of DFID. She is 
credited as having made significant changes to the conceptualisation of social development in the
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or Marxism, for example. Grillo argues that the themes that converge in post­
modernism and reflexivity ‘make an unlikely bed-fellow for applied anthropology’ 
but that these strands do nevertheless come together in the ideas and practices 
constituting the anthropology of development (1997: 1-2). This is an interesting ar ea 
for discussion not least because of the str ong reactions that it evokes.
On the one hand, post-modernist tendencies in social anthropology are criticised as 
being ‘vapid generalisations relatively imanchored in either ethnography or history’ or 
‘retreats into the terrifying complexity of the ‘local’ or insistent claims that grand 
narrative is dead and there is nothing that we can really know’ (Gledhill 2000: 206). 
Kuper, in a recent interview exclaimed that the post-modernist ‘movement’ is 
‘extremely dangerous for the development of anthropology . . . extremely destructive 
of what seemed to me to be the most important kinds of antluopology, which were 
serious, empirical, comparative, addressing major issues of theoretical importance and 
public concern. All of this was being frittered away by a kind of rather superficial 
extreme relativism of a very adolescent kind’ (in Fausto and Neiburg 2002: 311)^\
The charge that post-modernism is problematic ethically is also made. Di Leonardo, 
for example asserts that ‘there is no place for any morally evaluative or politically 
cormnitted stance within the disintegrating logic of post-structuralism. It is 
fundamentally nihilist’ (1991: 24). A related point is also made by Gellner who 
accuses post-modernists of being apolitical and thus treating all ideologies as being 
equivalent (1993).
There is also an issue about whether academics overly concerned with post-modemity 
risk becoming incomprehensible to all but themselves and irrelevant to the concerns 
of the everyday, as Barnes And Dimcan contend: ‘It is highly debatable whether the 
crises of representation extends beyond a tiny coterie of hyper-educated intellectuals . 
. .  the claims for a post-modern era are overdrawn in that they erroneously generalise 
from an intellectual elite to the population at large’ (1992: 251).
British Government’s overseas aid programmes, principally making the concept of the ‘social’ more 
centr al, alongside economic and technological approaches.
Kuper, m an earlier article (1992), in his promotion of a more positivistic approach to social 
anthropology (as opposed to North American cultural anthropology) disputed the post-modernist
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The consternation implicit in this views seems to be based on the shared argument 
that the post-modernist alleged obsession with endless difference, with ‘contested 
meanings’, ‘heteroglossia’, deconstruction and irony amounts to an exclusively 
academic perspective that has no vision of the good, or basis upon which to make 
generalisations cross culturally.
If these critiques did reflect the natui e of post-modern approaches, the charges would 
be serious. However, the views given above approach being glib, or at least rhetorical, 
as they stress the excesses of post-modernism and rely upon definitions that are closer 
to caricature than reality. Parkin makes this point (albeit with an idiosyncratic and 
slightly mind-boggling use of this metaphor); ‘the post-modernist horse that [Gellner] 
depicts and spends much energy gleefully flogging probably had very few punters’ 
(1995: 145)'\
Because the label ‘post-modernist’ is often used loosely almost as a ‘catch-all’ term 
and is attributed to groups of theorists whose common interests and concerns are only 
vaguely connected, the charge that post-modernism is apolitical is facile. What might 
be more acciuate to say is that there no defined political agenda among those who 
pursue a post-modernist approach. The inscription of political sensibilities into 
ethnography have opened up through a diverse movement of experimental writing 
associated with post-modernism. As Gledhill states: ‘One of the major contentions 
which has been made by this broad and disparate movement is that ethnographic 
writing should represent the ‘polyphony’ present in all cultural settings’ (1994: 223). 
The resulting lack of definition in terms of one political or ethical stance or another 
stems from the fact that the most basic rmderpinning of this diffuse movement is a 
thoroughgoing scepticism of explanations based on grand narratives. Both Gellner 
and Kuper seem to be falling into the trap of essentialising post-modernism in order to 
pur sue their respective agendas of promoting western scientific Imowledge and ‘(neo) 
positivism’ (Kuper’s own wording 1992).
obseivation that etlinographers inevitably bring their own personalities and cultural backgrounds into 
their work.
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With regard to the charge that post-modernist approaches are nihilistic, it would seem 
sensible to argue as follows. The empirical observation that there are different ways 
of knowing and valuing that are efficacious in the construction of meaningful life- 
worlds and that all of these different realities caimot be reduced to one form of 
evaluative discourse or explanation does not preclude the attribution of value per se.
It is clearly unfair to contend that anthropologists, setting out to account for their 
ethical positions are indulging in what Gellner writes off as ‘indulgent hermeneutic- 
subjectivist excess’ (1993: 7). The practice of development anthropology directly 
affects the lives of project ‘beneficiaries’ and the aspect of self-reflexivity in this 
work is not so much focused upon meditating upon one’s self as on the impact (in 
terms of both process and end-state) of the presuppositions, meanings and categories 
of the institutions that the anthropologist is involved with. Geertz wains against 
exaggerated versions of post-modernist relativism when describing a kind of par alysis 
among the generation of anthropologists studying in the eighties; ‘They are harassed 
by grave inner rmceifainties amounting almost to a sort of epistemological 
hypochondria, concerning how one can Icnow that anything one says about other 
forms of life is a matter of fact so’ (1988: 71). Notwithstanding this counsel against 
the excesses of navel gazing and unproductive ruminations, reflexive anthropological 
practice, which has been profoimdly influenced by post-modernism, in reality, is more 
concerned with the dialogical aspects of work, such as resisting the imposition of our 
categories upon other people’s life worlds.
It also seems fair to claim that the irony of post-modernism is that it can be de­
politicising. They also warn of the dangers of a kind of hyper-criticism where any 
initiative talcen by those in a position of supposed relative wealth or power is surmised 
to be at the service of domination, ‘those from the North become silenced, unable to 
act beyond producing hostile critiques of the work of those who ar e involved . . . they 
detract while adding nothing’ (1996: 157). Asad (1973), for instance, is sceptical 
about the significance of anthropological efforls to subvert or resist the dominant 
colonial agenda. He writes these ‘largely isolated efforts’ off as reflecting a naïve 
‘bourgeois consciousness’, that is, one that stems from a social theory that does not
To ‘flog a dead horse’ is to waste time on an impossible cause. To mix another metaphor, Gellner 
would probably be quite happy to let sleeping (post-modernist) horses lie.
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consider social practice as always an embodiment of relations of power and 
inequality. Asad’s assertion might elicit the frustrated response that ‘you’re damned if 
you do, you’re damned if you don’t ’.
I would argue that the insights and concerns attributed to post-modernism that remain 
highly relevant and conceptually useful to development anthropology are as follows.
Firstly the recognition that the presence of the antluopologist in the research setting 
has profound effects on the construction of data that needs to be acloiowledged.
Secondly, attention to the way in which the anthropologist’s initial raw data is 
manufactured and constructed iuto material for publication, dissemination and 
decision making is of the utmost importance. Throughout the process of representing 
social life, significant choices are being made in the use of language, the conceptual 
framework and the literary devices deployed. The rules of the construction of 
representations must themselves be subject to interpretation.
Thirdly, a priority for development anthropology is vigilance about the ways that 
concepts that may stem fr om one cultural background are imposed upon the data. As 
Fardon writes, the terms ‘global’ and ‘local’ work off one another ‘through mutual 
provocation (literally calling forth of one another)’ (1995: 2). As local and 
universalised knowledges are pmveyed from positions of relative power, close 
attention is requfred to tlie imiversalising assumptions that are carried by particular 
representations of the other.
Political post-modernism
On this basis, Johannsen sees post-modernism as a highly political reaction against 
monolithic authority. On this basis, she attempts the synthesis of directions within the 
discipline of social anthropology, which are often depicted as being antithetical in her 
definition of 'Post-modern applied anthropologists' (1992). Her starting point is that 
both of these bodies of knowledge, applied and post-modern, recognise explicitly that 
anthropology is inevitably an intervention in the lives of otliers, whether it is 
undertaken for the production of wiitten texts in academia or forming part of the
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design or implementation of actual projects. This understanding of the antliropologist 
is quite different fiom the functionalist image of participant observation as ‘the 
intervention of die social antluopologist at a point in time and a point in space in 
wliich he or she behaved like an ideal metering device’ (Aidener 1985: 57).
Johannsen advocates collaboration between these fields, arguing that there is a 
convergence of theoretical, methodological and ethical concerns:
‘The meticulous, self-critical recording of the process of cultuml 
representation as exercised by post-modernist ethnography could be a souice 
of guidance for interventions in applied anthropology. On the other hand, the 
conclusions of interventionist applied anthi opology could contribute to solving 
some of the dilemmas identified, but as yet umesolved, by interpretative 
anthiopology’ (1992: 71).
Johannsen wants to challenge the idea that applied anthiopology is necessarily a 
poorer or simplistic version of it's academic counteipart; it can offer unique insights 
tluough the praxis of involvement and through the experience of sharing the 
aspirations and goals of informants. Also, the easy identification often made of 
applied antluopology with scientistic rationalities and interpretative anthropology 
with a more humanistic approach are shown to be simplistic in terms of both the 
experience of anthropologists and the theoretical hnportance of understanding the role 
of values and subjectivity in development projects (as I hope I conveyed in this 
chapter). The contribution of interpretative and epistemologically relativistic 
approaches to applied anthropology involves the ‘self-critical concern with ethical 
responsibilities in the representation of a culture’ and the emphasis on a ‘self­
consciously ethical ethnography’ (1992: 74). Such ideas as the establishment of 
dialogue, the primacy given to actor's meanings and the dispersal of authority as 
pioneered in interpretative anthropology can be usefully translated to the practicalities 
of intervention.
Johannsen also criticises aspects of interpretative anthropology, echoing fustly 
Spencer (1989) in the assertion that more emphasis and effort is given to describing 
dialogue with informants than to the dialogue itself and, secondly, Watson (1989) in
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Ms argument that the avoidance of textual dominance in the production of academic 
texts is impossible. In an optimistic conclusion, however, notwithstanding these 
observations, Johannsen suggests that anthropology would do well to fashion 
mechanisms wMch facilitate local people's production of their own texts, aspirations 
and cultural representations. Post-modern applied antluopologists, she proclaims, let 
the people represent themselves.
Post-Modernism and Neo-Liberalism
WMlst essentialising and writing off post-modernism is a mistake, as I mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter, meta-theoretical attempts to define parlicular* theoretical 
moments is more usefully seen as efforts to grasp general tendencies. My view is that 
post-modernist approaches, wMlst offering a great deal to development anthropology 
ar e also peculiarly convenient to the global neo-liberal political economic agenda. The 
paradox seems to be that, wMlst post-modernist approaches recognise the failings of 
tlieoretical grand narratives to capture local realities or particular perspectives, the 
extrapolation of tMs observation to form a coherent critique of the way in wMch grand 
narratives inform tlie very real workings of institutions with often pernicious results 
for particular social gr oups is lacking.
Development antMopologists have sifted tlirough the benefits and pitfalls of post­
modernist approaches vis-à-vis their concern with the real-world impact of values and 
ideas fironi a comparative perspective. Development anthropologists acknowledge the 
post-modernist rmcovering of the partiality of representations and efforts to take apar t 
ethnocentric, dualistic and totalitarian paradigms. However, development 
anthropologists specifically concerned with confronting, subverting and opposing 
asymmetric power relations that cause poverty and injustice are interested in more 
than deconstruction.
A key goal for development anthropologists is facilitating processes whereby the 
versions of reality that are kept in place by relatively powerful social groups are 
challenged and transformed by the representations of the relatively powerless. Many 
development anthropologists are strongly committed to universalist, cross-cultmal 
norms of justice, equality and rights (at least in relation to political institutions). Their
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argument, as will be covered in Chapters 9, 10 and 11, is that this universalism does 
not necessarily obviate cultural differences. Arce and Long, for instance, as scholars 
dedicated to studying development from a ‘practice’ and avowedly realist perspective, 
have tlie shared ‘aim of arguing against those (mostly of a post-modernist position) 
who are for the ‘end of development’ as if the critical issues of social transformation 
and planned intervention are simply spirited away with the demise of 
developmentalism and the tum to neo-liberal thinking’ (2000: xi). 1 would support 
this argument.
In the previous chapter 1 discussed the charge that functionalism, (due to its naïve 
relativism) was peculiarly suited to the colonial agenda. In the contemporary context, 
a number of theorists contend tlrat post-modernism, for all the critiques it generates, in 
effect, plays an overall compliant role within the neo-liberal agenda that is dominant 
globally. Post-modernist approaches fail to make strong generalisable statements 
about human value that can cormter Western individualistic, liberal, procedur al ethics. 
On an apparently positive note, the mood of post-modernism has close 
correspondence to the liberal ideal of affirming the right of individuals and groups to 
pmsue their particular* visions of the good in a mosaic of cultures, interests and 
communities. However, a consequence of this co-valence is that the criticisms that are 
levelled at liberal theory therefore also have relevance to the etliical implications of 
post-modernism.
What is problematic is that both of these perspectives, if it is possible to generalise, 
lack a rational and credible basis for* consensus over how to establish common 
political and social goals. Without such a basis, it is difficult to establish limits for the 
excessive freedoms of wester*n consumers, for example, tlrat are objectively causing 
irreparable environmental damage. The lack of agreement on moral commitments 
often means that the winning positions are tliose with the most prestigious backers 
and ‘whose proponents shout the loudest’ (Nussbaum 2000: 300). As grand narratives 
are anathema to post-modernism, it is difficult for proponents to malce statements of 
phenomena (such as social exploitation) in more than a piecemeal fashion. Looking 
specifically at feminist anthropology. Joke Schrijvers is concer*ned that:
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‘Post-modernist preoccupations with discourses, representations and texts 
have increasingly undeimined the direct link between politics and feminist 
studies that was so clear in the beginning . . . post-modernism can support an 
extremely relativistic and amoral attitude, which implicitly embraces a 
political choice: the liberal, sui'vival-of-the-fittesf, and the taken for granted 
attitude which entails talcing sides with the more powerful voices in society’ 
(1995:21; 1993).
As I argued in the opening chapters, the idea of the ‘policy’ of the discipline of social 
anthropology is best understood in broad and implicit terms, that is in terms of 
patterns of behaviom* that have a net outcome. The implicit net policy of the discipline 
of social anthropology vis-à-vis social injustice is a product of the intuitions and 
theories of anthropologists; some of these are thoroughly examined whilst others 
remain inchoate. The same post-modernist, liberal mood which perwades wider 
society is also dominant in the academy. My view is that the resulting lack of ethical 
and political coherence from social anthropology as a discipline ill serves the cause of 
social justice.
Theoretical Resources for an Ethical Applied Anthropology
In this chapter I have tried to consolidate the theoretical gains that I consider to be 
basic resomces for the conceptualisation of an ethical approach to applied 
anthropology in development.
At the beginning of tlie chapter, I explored the ways in wliich social anthropologists 
have apprehended social change. Here I stressed tlie relevance of political economic 
approaches which sought to explicate the impingement of Western, capitalist 
frameworks upon ‘non’ or ‘pre’ modern societies. Here I noted the importance of non- 
teleological approaches which combined materialistic and ideational perspectives.
I emphasised the importance of ‘action oriented’ perspectives which look at the 
agency of individuals in different settings and which recognise the complexity and 
fluidity of sociality animated by different visions of the good. Here I noted that 
seeking to imderstand the motivations and aspirations of individuals contextually has
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been important for the applied anthropological insistence on self-determination and 
participation in development projects. Applied anthropologists working in 
development have an interest in elucidating and often cormtering the asymmetries 
between and within social groups in the development process. They are also interested 
in the different visions of the good lived out by different groups which are, in many 
ways, insepar able from aspects of their traditional livelihoods and forms of sociality. I 
have also sought to highlight the importance of recognising that ‘people actively 
engage in shaping their ovm worlds, rather than their actions being wholly pre­
ordained by capitalism or the intervention of the state’ (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 59; 
cf. Long and Long 1992: 33).
As was discussed, the possibility of transcending oppressive forces is a hopeful 
implication of agency based, or action oriented theories. This approach imderiies the 
influence anthropologists have exerted upon policy makers to, in Nelson and Wright’s 
words ‘enable categories of people traditionally objectified and silenced to be 
recognised as legitimate knowers; to define themselves, increase their imderstanding 
of their circumstances and act upon that knowledge’ (2001: 11).
As anthropology has moved away from stmctural, normative and teleological 
theorisations towards a more dialectical, person and meaning centred perspective, the 
critique of development practice has evolved similarly. Interpretative anthropology, 
with it's subject of interest being rnind-created worlds, draws quite different 
conclusions from a view of people in rural areas as populations and resources fixed 
within a deterministic causal order of necessary rmiformities. The anthropological 
contribution to development is distinctive in that it makes a speciality of the 
translation or management of relative moralities and Imowledges. The consequences 
of the Western scientific and bureaucratic approach, which imposes par ticular discrete 
disciplinary understandings on reality, which might be quite different from local 
meanings trouble Arce and Long (2000: 1) who argue that ‘systematic modes of 
‘ignorance’ arise out of ‘the specialisation and thus fragmentation of development 
expertise, and from the inappropriateness of rationalist assumptions in assessing the 
success or otherwise of economics and social systems’.
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Within the Western tradition, despite the preponderance of liberal individualist and 
capitalist forces, there are ethical resources that social anthropologists, as well as 
indigenous and mar ginalised peoples can draw upon in the construction and defence 
of different traditions of well being. I will explore this over the next thr ee chapters.
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C h a p te r  8
Western Thinking on Global Poverty
Thirty years ago, the philosopher Peter Singer explored the moral implications of 
global poverty vis-à-vis wealthy individuals and nations. From his deliberations, he 
arrived at the conclusion that there ar e no valid rational justifications for way in which 
people of relatively affluent societies (do not) respond to the extreme deprivation of 
those in faraway places.
‘The whole way we look at moral issues -  our moral and conceptual scheme -  
needs to be altered, and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for 
granted in our' society’ (1996: 230).
The gist of Singer’s utilitarian argument is that suffering and death from lack of food, 
shelter and medical care are unnecessary evils and, if we can prevent Üiese from 
reciui'ing without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we 
should be morally boimd to do i t \  He uses the following compelling analogy:
‘If I am walldng past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to 
wade in and pull the cliild out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but 
this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very 
bad thing’ Qoc. cit.).
Singer recognises the radicality of this argrrment within the milieu of Western secular* 
society; ‘It may still be thought that my conclusions are so wildly out of line with 
what everyone else thinks and has always thought that there must be something vyrong 
with the argument somewhere’ (loc. cit.). Whilst this view, which prescribes making a 
strong cormection between personal responsibility and public action, may rankle 
Wester*n liberal sensibilities. Singer maintains that the logic is irresistible.
' The idea that all persons should be respected on the same basis, as equally valid, is fundamental to 
Singer’s understanding of utilitarianism.
213
I will keep this challenge in mind in my review of the major conceptual moral 
controversies and agendas that are intrinsic to development and my analysis of how 
these have been articulated in terms of the maxims that are fundamental to Western 
moral and political traditions.
The Background of Development Ethics
The subject matter of the next two chapters, ‘development ethics’, is a quintessentially 
multi-disciplinary endeavour*. Crocker argues that this emerging field should be 
practised as a “multidisciplinary cross-cultural ‘moral dialogue’” (1996: 457). 
Tlrroughout the chapter, whilst I emphasise the aspects of tliis field that are of 
particular importance for the ethics of applied anthropology, I will reiterate that my 
centr al focus is the conceptual and moral resour ces that are available and brought into 
play in Western cultur e when deliberating about the morality of development.
These same issues will echo tluoughout the thesis as I seek to contextualise them in 
the world of applied anthropology. Delimiting my discussion of development ethics to 
what is relevant to the tliesis topic (the moral and ethical dilemmas of social 
antliropologists working in development) requires leaving out far more than I have 
included^. This field is one which is characterised by a continual expansion of areas of 
enquiry and can verge on becoming amorphous, covering everything from indigenous 
cosmologies to macro economics. I have therefore sought to be as concise and
 ^ ‘What should take place in World Development? What ends should poor countries pursue? What 
should be theh fundamental economic, cultural and political goals? . . . Should the concept (of 
development) be ethically positive, negative, or neutral? Should development be descriptive, 
prescriptive, or both? How should the benefits and bmdens of development be distiibuted? What 
ethical and other value issues emerge in development policies and practices and how should these be 
resolved? What moral responsibilities if any, do rich countries, regions and classes have towards 
impoverished countiies, regions and classes? What international structures are called for by 
international or global justice? What can ‘developed’ areas learn from ‘developing’ countries with 
respect to their own ‘authentic’ development? Who ought to decide these questions? Social ‘insiders’, 
‘outsiders’, or both? Technical experts, government officials, the market, social scientists, 
philosophers, the people? Which people? How or by what procedures or methods should these ‘should’ 
questions be answered? By internal or external criticism and enquiry? What are the implications of 
political realism and moral scepticism for the possibility and practice of development ethics?” (Crocker 
1991:457)
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selective as possible in my treatment of the major debates that ar e of relevance to my 
topic.
Characteristics of the Contemporary Development Context 
Globalised Polarised Disassembly
Development thinking has been hansfbimed by the colossal changes in the world 
economy, political relations and the opening of world-wide communication that have 
occurred over the last few decades. The vested interests of the erstwhile dominant 
economic cenhes polarised in the West and East to fund development programmes 
that were fairly stable from the 1940s to the end of 1980s have altered radically. 
Wliilst capital accumulation has decentralised dramatically, tliis process has been 
uneven and unequal. The view that the development of the North has a directly 
exploitative relationship with the underdevelopment of the Soutli, which had the 
status of a presupposition in academic circles in the ‘pre-globalisation era’^  has been 
seriously undeimined with the emergence of new centres of capital accumulation in 
the ‘third world’. However, the global economy is configured such that the 
discernment of systematically exploitative relationships between different regions and 
within all regions remains obvious. Alongside the identity based cultural and social 
fracturing of the modernist statist project, an unquestionable feature of globalisation is 
new forms of social and economic polarisation and the concomitant increased 
vulnerability and deprivation of different social gr oups and regions.
Geertz observes that massive changes in the lands of alliances and concerns that 
characterise world politics (a process that he calls “disassembly”) requires new 
theoretical apprehensions:
‘The shattering of larger coherences, or seeming such, into smaller ones,
imcertainly connected one with anotlier, has made relating local realities vrith
 ^I use this term advisedly; whilst the volume of international tiade, the speed, ubiquity and peneti ation 
of global communication and the sophistication of world wide institutional arrangements has increased 
exponentially over the last 20 yeais in particular, the world economy was already highly integrated in 
the late nineteenth centuiy (Hirst and Thompson 1996).
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overaiching ones, “the world mound here” with the world overall, extiemely 
difficult. . .  In a splmtered world, we must address the splinters” (2001: 221)
The integrative tendencies of economic globalisation and the greater emphasis given 
to global institutions such as the UN have been countered by fiagmentary or 
‘centiifugaT tendencies of differentiation. The idea of ‘identity’, whether rooted in 
region, religion, nation, ethnicity, or sexual orientation has become an increasingly 
persuasive idiom for resistance against modernist, imperialist and statist hegemony. 
Whereas previous models of development were cast in tenns of effecting change 
thi'ough the apparatus of the modernist state through homogenising, and 
democratising forces, where ethnic identity, for instance, was rendered secondary to 
national unity, contemporary considerations of development now acknowledge stiong 
forces that resist hegemonic cultural assimilation. Whilst Western culture is clearly 
the dominant and fastest growing political, economic and social system globally, this 
does not imply that members of other cultuies simply accommodate themselves to this 
reality. Rapport observes that the view that ‘through reactionary measures as diverse 
as religious fundamentalism and female circumcision, ethnic militancy and romantic 
localism (other cultures) are sporadically maldng war against the West as best they 
can’ is in common currency (1997). Although one might wish to examine the 
dynamics by wliich cultur*al practices come to be understood as being ‘reactionary’ as 
opposed to ‘traditional’ and fiom whose perspective. Further, it is important to note 
that the non-confiontational ways in which members of other cultures adapt and 
respond to Western culture are also significant.
Highly organised ethnic groups armed with human rights legislation and appeals to 
international bodies positively set out to acquire greater control of the decision 
making power with regard to resour ces that was previously the exclusive provenance 
of the state. Wilson asserts that ‘the language of human rights has moved in to fill the 
vacuum left by the demise of grand political nar ratives in the aftermath of tire Cold 
War' (1997: 1). This re-ethnification of social groups'  ^ compounded by the internal 
differentiation of nation states alongside the mcreasing mobility of capital tlrrough
Globally the numbers of people identifying themselves with a particular indigenous group/tradition 
has increased over the last 20 years.
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tians-national corporations has resulted in an apparent generalised weakening of the 
state’s ability to centralise and control all resources.
It could be asserted that in this dynamic, the minimalist state is a ‘mask for expanded 
state domination, and its accompanying programmes of deregulation, privatisation 
and ‘outsourcing’ as new and more effective techrriques for managing a social body 
dismembered by capitalist restr ucturing’(Gledhill 1997: 101-102). It is true to observe 
that the protectionist role of the State can disempower those in receipt of welfare 
tlrr ough the denial of autonomy and heterogeneity. However, the neo-liberal stress on 
‘self-help’ often emphasises individual efforts and pays scant attention to structural 
conditions which systematically disadvantage groups and individuals. The idea of 
‘self-help’ can be sometimes paradoxically based upon an extremely patronising view 
of the economically disadvantaged, somehow not aclcnowledging the ingenuity, hard 
work and sheer endurance that tire poor have to draw upon to smwive in very difficult 
circumstances. The neo-liberal insistence on individual responsibility is ironic in the 
sense that tlrere is simultaneously a moral stigmatisation of poverty and an ethical 
validation of voting on the basis of self interest, thus perpetuating conditions of 
poverty (also see Gledlrill 1997: 88). In either case, self help or welfarism, the state’s 
strategy amoimts to the inhibition of the challenging of domination.
Friedman (1998) argues that as new global elites have emerged, in the ‘old centres’ 
(the EU and the US), social inequality has deepened both locally and globally. In the 
US, for example, in the last decade, whilst the Gross National Product reached a 
liistoric high, over the same period, poverty, homelessness and hunger progressively 
increased. A clear indicator of this is that cliild poverty increased to over 20% . There 
are important variations in the extent to which nation states assume responsibility for 
the welfare of their citizens. In the EU, for example, a strong version of social 
contract ensures that the majority of those whose income is below that of the poverty 
line ar e assisted financially whilst in the US only 0.5% of those below the poverty line 
are raised above it with government assistance (Hacker 1997), With these variations 
talcen into consideration, there is still a clear* downward trend in the extent to which 




With the demise of the Cold Wai*, Western government’s efforts to win over the 
loyalties of Third World states by promising the redistribution of wealtli tlrrough 
“partnership in progress”, has arguably petered out to be largely replaced by an 
international agenda chiefly concerned with risk management, démocratisation and 
strategic investment m a culturally polycentric world, albeit one that has clearly 
polarised concentrations of power. Chambers asserts that ‘global power is now 
concentrated in the North, and especially in Washington. The North is now less 
concerned with what happens in the South’ (1997: 4). The previous strategic interest 
in influencing tliird world governments ideologically has been replaced by a concern 
to perpetuate the prosperity of the Northern countr ies tlrr ough controlling the terms of 
trade as well as a ‘rnsh to ward off the flood of immigrants, to contain regional wars, 
to undercut illicit trade and to contain environmental disasters’ (Sachs 1993: 3). 
Gar dner and Lewis attempt to capture a fr ame of this fast moving pictur e:
‘Development, both as theory and as practice, is increasingly polarised. While 
multilateral agencies such as the World Barrie or United Nations agencies 
embrace neo-liberal agendas of structural adjustment, ftee trade and ‘human 
development’, others stress empowerment and the primacy of indigenous 
social movements. As the notion of development loses credibility, 
development practice is becoming increasingly eclectic. This can be both 
confusing and directionless, and liberating; a source of potential creativity’ 
(Gardner and Lewis 1996: 22)
Whilst rights criteria have been made more available to disadvantaged peoples as a set 
of tools to protect their well being and self-determination, it is also contended that the 
individualising tendencies of economic and cultural globalisation have undermined 
their social cohesion and sense of belonging (Lariain 1989, Gledhill 1994, 2001). 
Increasing pressure has been exerted on indigenous peoples and other minorities in 
their efforts to retain tlieir cultural par ticularity and traditional ways of life and well 
being. The use of rights language by identity based groups has increased as a function 
of the inequality, insecurity and fragmentation that is concomitant with the neo-liberal 
economic policies of many developing coimtries, thus accentuating and politicising
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cultural difference. The particular vision of economic development associated with 
globalisation is dominated almost everywhere by neo-liberal theory and practice. 
These theories advocate the liberalisation of capital in the pursuit of profit, often to 
the cost of social goals. There is general agreement in the development community 
that the international and national regulation of these market forces is the single 
greatest priority in pro-poor policy advocacy (e.g. Leys: 1977) .^
In recent years, civil society organisations have played an increasingly significant role 
in the formulation of international treaties^. NGOs’ responses to changing world 
conditions have continued to evolve as they have elaborated new visions of 
development practice, maldng increasing use of the human rights framework for their 
activities. NGOs’ practice and internal organisation have changed in order to form 
new alliances, partnerships and forms of solidarity locally, nationally and 
internationally with an increasing emphasis on advocacy and political pressure, 
combined and integrated with their traditional roles of service delivery and capacity 
building.
‘Chief among these changes are a movement from ‘development-as-delivery’ 
to ‘development-as-leverage’ ; new relationships with corporations, elements 
of states, the military, international institutions and other groups in civil 
society; and new skills and capacities to mediate these linkages.’ (Edwards et 
al 1999: 117).
The role of NGOs and other CSOs has shifted towards the agenda of monitoring, 
pressurising and negotiating with States and private interests to fulfil their obligations 
and have consequently foimd that rmderstanding the ways in which policy is created, 
and influencing those processes requires different tools from project management^.
 ^ On the topic of globalisation, the UN Millennium Fonim, which consists of representatives of civil 
society and NGOs world-wide concluded that ‘while it offers significant opportunities for people to 
share and learn fiom each other, in its cunently miregulated fonn, it increases inequities between and 
within countries, undeimines local tradition and cultures and escalates disparities between the rich and 
poor, thereby marginalising large numbers of people in urban and rural areas’ (Statement of the 
Millennium Forum at the UN Millennium Summit, Sep. 2000.
Particularly the Summit Conferences of Beijing, Cairo, Copenhagen, Istanbul, Rio and Vienna.
 ^Edwards defines the 4 key challenges for NGOs as:
1. How to mobilise a genuinely inclusive civil society at every level of the world system;
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Key Words and the State of the World
The numbers of people who view the world from contexts where the word ‘remote’ 
means places of economic and military power, wealth and privilege far* outnumber the 
those who share a Western outlook. Chambers captmes this sense of the relativity of 
experience and perspective;
‘For others, from the farming or fisliing village, the pastoralists camp, the 
small town or the city slum, the details differ, for each is local and special. For 
them, the world is not a global presence that has penetrated the living room, as 
in the North, but a specific outside, a particular suiTounding of people, 
resouices, services, opportunities, tlueats and conditions’ (Chambers 1997: 4).
Notwithstanding the importance of apprehending local experiences of deprivation, 
this can be complemented by looking at the wider pictuie. Conventional frguies, 
whilst not captming the diverse realities and causes of poverty, can at least give an 
idea of the major frguies, trends and contiasts.
Globally, the numbers of people living in absolute poverty continues to increase. 
There aie a number of factors alongside income poverty that contribute to the 
experience of deprivation. These aie the interlinked dimensions of ‘physical 
weakness, isolation, vulnerability and powerlessness’ (Chambers 1997: 7; 1983: 108- 
39). I will now give a brief oveiwiew of some of these realities and how they aie 
experienced before beginning my discussion of the moral and etliical issues that 
emerge.
Uncertainty and Vulnerability: Most localities across the globe aie subject to, and 
feel the impact of iiTegular and unexpected changes in maikets, prices, services, and
2. How to hold other institutions accountable for their actions and ensure that they respond to social 
and envhonmental needs;
3. How to ensure that international regimes are both implemented effectively and work to the benefit 
of poor people and poor countries;
4. How to ensure that gains made at the global level are translated into concrete benefits at the grass­
roots (1999: 129)
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supplies. Additionally, die negotiation of new forms of governance means that there 
aie constant changes in institutional aiTangements and in die civil order.
Less control: The globalisation of the maiicet means that people at a local level as 
well as nation states have less control over their economies.
Polarisation: As mentioned above, die gap between the rich and poor continues to 
grow both locally and globally. In 1999, in the US, this gap had reached the widest 
since records began. The income of the poorest 20% of the US population continues 
to decrease whilst that of the richest 20% has increased by 20%.^. Between countiies, 
a huge ‘consumption gap’ exists between industrialised and developing countiies. The 
world's richest countries, widi 20 per cent of global population, account for 86 per 
cent of total private consumption, whereas the poorest 20 per cent of the world's 
people account for just 1.3 per cent.
Endemic Poverty: Most of the countries of the ‘developing world’ are termed as 
"low-income, food deficit countiies" by the Food and Agricultuie Organization of the 
United Nations (FAG). The criteria for this definition is not producing sufficient food 
to meet the nutritional requirement of their people in addition to not being able to 
afford sufficient imports to cover the shortfall^.
Unwarranted Deprivation: The fact that children are the primaiy victims of world 
hunger has to be considered in any discussion of development morality. At least 70% 
of the malnouiished people of the world ai e childien. Approximately forty thousand 
childien die of starvation every day. The moral philosopher La Follette stresses the 
innocent and helpless natuie of the majority of the victims of starvation; ‘unless
These changes are understood by 
° Increased automation;
° Increased manufacturing in developing countries;
° Increased reliance on temporary/low-wage workers;
° The decline of unions;
“ More single parent femilies.
 ^ In these countiies, 800 million people are chronically malnourished and 2 billion people lack food 
secuiity. Nearly 60 per cent of the population of ‘developing countiies’ lack basic sanitation, one 
quarter lack adequate housing, and 20 per cent do not have access to modem healtli seivices. The 
World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that about 1.1 billion people do not have access to clean 
water.
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others provide adequate food, water, and care, children will suffer and die’ (1996: 1; 
cf. WHO 1974: 677, 679).
Structural Causes and Vicious Circles: Whilst sepaiating the world into distinct and 
opposed classes oversimplifies reality, there do appear to be generally stable groups 
(at different levels; social groups within nations and differences between nations), 
who live in structurally guaranteed asymmetric relations. The economically and 
politically powerful have multi-faceted interlocking privileges, advantages and 
resources wliich aie pro-actively drawn upon to maintain their superior position. The 
marginalised and impoverished, in turn, have multiple interlocking disabilities, 
vulnerabilities as well as a chionic lack of bargaining power which contrive to make it 
virtually impossible to engage on an equal footing with the relatively powerful^®.
Preventability: Whilst our sensibilities are shocked hy the bare facts of global 
inequity and the resulting scale of human suffering, the global response to poverty by 
those in power has been a fr action of both what it could be and what is necessary to 
eradicate it. We aie more aware of what is going on everywhere in the world and it is 
obvious that the levels of poverty that exist today aie an unnecessary evil. For 
instance, the UNDP calculates that the cost of eradicating poverty would be only 1% 
of global income.
The Moral Imperatives of Development Deliberation
Global resources amount to many times more than human requirements. At the same 
time the number of people living in conditions of extreme destitution and 
powerlessness continues to increase. Chambers wants to rouse a reaction in maldng 
tills provocative point;
Developing countiies, in order to pay their foreign debts, have to give then best land over to cash 
crops, while subsistence food faimers are pushed to smvive on marginal land nearer deserts or up steep 
hillsides where the soil is eroded away. Brazil, for example, is the second largest agricultural exporter 
in the world, yet 60 per cent of its population suffers varying degrees of malnutrition.
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‘That some nations should be rich and others poor can even seem inevitable . .
. These deep divisions seem rooted in the sort o f people we are^ (1997: 2)
The very fact that there have been improvements shows that even with the efforts 
made, which are a fraction of what could be done and despite having to fight against 
systematic exploitation, poveity is not inevitable^ ^  and the extremes of inequality that 
characterise the modern world are unnecessary. This reality occurs as a result of 
people’s choices, assumptions, actions and decisions not to act or assist. Singer’s 
melancholic reflection is that;
‘The suffering and death that are occurring . . .  are not inevitable, not 
unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term . . . Unfortunately, human 
beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the individual level, people 
have, with very few exceptions, not responded in any significant way’ (1996: 
229).
More recently, the economists Dreze and Sen concur* that there is ‘no real evidence to 
doubt that all famines in the modern world are preventable by human action’ (in 
Crocker 1996: 216). Nevertheless, the spending priorities of the developed nations 
quite clearly reflect an overwhelming interest in maintaining their superior position 
and expensive consumption habits. Whilst a gr eat deal is loiowri about the numbers of 
people now living and the resources tliat they need to live on, we seem to be living out 
what George Orwell called the ultimate obscenity; one half of tire world watching the 
other half starve, laiowing that tliey could do something about it.
On the other hand, there appears to be greater understanding of the dynamics of 
global poverty and a bmgeoning will to act on behalf of those who lack power and 
whose livelihoods are vulnerable. This is evidenced by the increasing support and 
influence of inter*national NGOs and the increasing attention to poverty reduction 
among the official development agencies. Chambers, in his analysis of the role played 
by development professionals argues tliat a powerful driving force in the development
For instance, child death rates in developing countries are less than half what they were in 1960,
223
effort, alongside political and economic manoeuvring, is the spirit of ‘selflessness, 
generosity, commitment to others and the fulfilment these qualities bring’ (1997: 13).
He ar gues fiirther that all of the actions of development agencies are considered, 
consented to, resisted and carried out by individuals; ‘people are complex and diverse. 
People can choose how to behave and what to do’ {loc. cit.). In the following sections, 
I will look at the kind of moral deliberations individuals involved in development 
might have.
Moral or Technical Deliberations?
Notwithstanding the contention just made, the question of whether global poverty is 
fundamentally a moral or, instead, a technicalproblem  remains a moot point. By 
dint of the fact that development is perceived as a matter of specialist, teclmical and 
pedagogical input (rather than to do with the overconsimiption of the affluent 
countries and the rules of international trade tliat benefit the richer nations), those 
without ‘specialist Imowledge^^’ may feel justified in relinquishing responsibility. 
Indeed, the rationale for the involvement of anthropologists in development is partly 
that they are deemed to have specialist laiowledge and skills. A common role for 
anthropologists is to ensure that projects are culturally appropriate and really in time 
with people’s aspirations. However, it seems obvious that whilst there may be 
contexts in which expert knowledge is required before proceeding, the gr oss causes of 
mass starvation throughout the world ar e surely not outwith the boimds of everyday 
laiowledge and expertise.
The dissonance between our* moral intuitions about poverty and the inadequacy of 
Western society’s actual response through programmes of solidarity and support 
remains puzzling. Is this because people do not cormect their feelings of empathy or 
sympathy to be coimected to moral responsibility? Perhaps Singer’s assertion is 
wrong and people do respond both locally and globally but find that the achievement 
of human well being is very difficult and complex.
Improving the social, economic and technological order in different settings and in international 
relations.
Social affahs, social policy, foreign policy. Social Anthropology, economics, agricultme, medicine, 
management, for example.
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My view is that, in the final analysis, a moral response must underlie the ensuing 
teclmical, social and political deliberations of development discourse. Certainly, as 
Crocker asserts, ‘the moral dimension of development theory and practice is just as 
important as the scientific and policy components’ (1996: 206). The Cambridge 
philosopher Onora O’Neill writes that intrinsic to development discourse is proformd 
moral content; ‘social inquiry itself is no matter of ethically neutral facts. The debates 
between different experts often show that their disputes are already moral debates’ 
(1996: 88). Facts and values are inevitably intertwined because what we perceive, or 
discern, as the ethically salient features of a given situation reflects our* moral values. 
Ethical reflection plays a critical, guiding and also an interpretative role in relation to 
social reality and change:
‘An ethic proposes norms for assessing present social institutions, envisaging 
futme alter*natives, and assigning moral obligations. An ethic provides a basis 
for deciding how agents should act in particular circumstances . . . how we 
‘read’ the situation, as well as how we describe and classify it, will be a 
function of om* value coimnitments and even our* moral sensitivities’ (Crocker* 
1996:213)
For instance, if reflecting about the recuri'ing famines of the Horn of Africa, our* initial 
responses are likely to be emotional and fuelled by an intuitive sense of right and 
wrong. Thinlcing these reactions through will branch out to different ethical positions.
A Kantian might say that we should help the malnourished in the short term as hunger 
prevents them fr om being autonomous agents and we should also support them in the 
future to achieve long ter*m autonomy. A neo-Malthusian utilitarian response might be 
that the famine is a natural process that should be allowed to run its course as, in the 
end, there will be a more sustainable population left over, as well as hard lessons 
learned. Adherents of a human rights perspective might stress the international duties 
to respond to others’ ‘r*ight to food’ and bemoan the fact that cer*tain rights, such as 
this one are still not ‘positive’ or* obligatory vis-à-vis the richer nations. 
Communitarians would advocate solidarity with those suffering and suggest that the 
richer nations can afford to cut then* own consumption and redistribute wealth more
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equitably. In each case, the socio-political philosophical position talcen will seize on 
different aspects of the problem and, from each perspective, the implications for 
action and the resulting demands ar e very different.
In the next chapter, I will look at the implications of a number of key ethical models 
that are central to development ethics. First, before considering the ways in which our 
moral response branches out, I will now look at what the bases of moral deliberation 
for development thinking might be in temis of Western moral discourse. This next 
section constitutes a series of discrete but accumulative arguments that amount to an 
assertion that Western society (of which social anthropology is a product) has a moral 
responsibility to respond to global poverty that is greater than what has been achieved 
thus far*.
A Universally Resonant Intuition
On an intuitive level, it seems beside the point to ask whether or not we should give 
aid when we become awaie of the plight of emaciated families staggering across 
parched fields towards food stations. As Crocker aigues, ‘we should not take seriously 
those who insist that no action be talcen imtil an ar gument is found to justify the view 
that the rich in the Noifii should help the poor in the South’ (1996: 212). There does 
not seem to be any good reason to contest whether we should alleviate their suffering 
and assist them to hnprove tlieir long term prospects. La Follette (1996), echoing 
Chaiies Taylor (2001), argues that our initial reactions of sympathetic care for 
suffering children should be taken seriously as the basis of our* moral response, that is, 
we should act on these instinctive intuitions
Nussbaum also insists that any moral philosophy has to be grounded in the idea of 
human dignity which has cross cultural resonance and intuitive power:
The scope of this thesis precludes a proper discussion on ‘intuitions’ in ethics. Here, I present my 
belief that certain facts that are ethically ineducible can be, and are, intuited for the most part cross 
cultmally. I simply refer to the uncontroversial intuition that all human beings are worthy of, and need 
to be recognised as separate moral agents with certain requirements that should be met to make their 
flouiishing possible. Obviously, further discussions should ensue from this position as to what further 
iireducibly ethical properties, or facts are intuited. Social constructivists use the idea of intuition in a 
different way, not in a pre-political or pre-cultural way but rather to describe the plurality of higher 
order intuitions as functions of different life worlds. The related topic of Aristotle’s assertion that ethics 
and morality need to be gi ounded in an idea of human nature is discussed in the next chapter.
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‘For we see a human being as having woitli as an end, a kind of awe mspiring 
sometliing that malces it honible to see this person beaten down by the 
cuixents of chance - and wonderful, at tlie same time, to witness the way in 
which chance has not completely eclipsed the humanity of the person’ (2000: 
73)
La Follette (1996) asserts that those theorists who aigue that we should not give aid; 
‘go to gieat pains to show that this sympathetic response should be constiained. They 
typically claim that assisting the hungry will demand too much of us, or that 
assistance would be useless and probably detrimental’ (1996: 5). On some libertarian 
views, it is inadvisable for the state to respond to the appeals of those in need as a 
matter of course: ‘In this rigorously methodologically individualist conception, 
involuntaiy, stiucturally imposed situations aie convenient fictions dreamed up by 
totalitarian wolves masquerading as liberal humanist sheep’ (Gledhill 1994: 80).
Notwithstanding these objections, the uige to respond to the avoidable suffering of 
others is, I believe, the appropriate starting point for a discussion on the morality of 
development practice. I discuss the implications of the Kantian insistence on treating 
others as ends rather than means in the next chapter.
The ironic stance of post-modern thought which stems fiom perspectivist roots, whilst 
not supporting the idea of universal ‘human nature’ that can be intuited or worked out 
rationally, can still, according to the philosopher Rorty (1986) and the social 
anthropologist Rapport (1997), support a political position that insists upon the 
intrinsic value of each individual life. Whilst post-modernists consider all truths to be 
relative, recognising the fact that all human beings can feel pain^ ,^ experience joy, be 
creative and gain fulfilment in different ways can form the basis of an ironically
The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham held that the fact that all human beings have the 
possibility of experiencing pain and pleasure provides a basis for equality. Whilst humans behave so as 
to maximise pleasure and avoid pain, correct political action should be based upon inculcating the 
principle of all people seeking the gieatest utility for all. He also held (in a way similar to post­
modernists) such ideas as ‘natural rights’ to be fictions or ‘nonsense upon stilts’ which, nevertheless, 
were useful for the ordering of society (Harrison 1983). MacIntyre similarly argued that the belief in 
natural rights is ‘one with belief in witches and unicorns’ (1997: 67)
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universal ethic. On this basis, leaving ideas of ‘Truth’ aside, the individual has an 
meplaceable value.
The Question of Restitution
An important question within development ethics is whether the West has been 
causally responsible for global poverty; ‘Did we, individually or collectively, cause 
their hunger or create the enviromnent which made their hunger and malnouiisliment 
more likely?’ (La Follette 1996: 3). Several important theorists argue convincingly 
that the affluent nations are collectively historically responsible for many of the 
difficulties that developing countries now experience (O’Neill 1993; Sen 1996; 
Crocker 1996; Balalaishnan / Naiayan 1996). On this account, poverty exists, in part, 
due to the colonial disruption of economies that were previously comparatively 
viable. For example, the view that imperial powers systematically prevented forms of 
trade or manufacture and encouiaged the production of goods that did not compete 
with the industries of the developed world (coffee, oil, rubber, for instance) 
constitutes a widely accepted argument.
Responsibility and Acknowledged Dependence
A further, and in my view, more persuasive argument for responsibility complements 
the above. This is the view that there is an onus to counter global poverty regardless 
of the imperialistic dynamics described above. La Follette asserts that we have a basic 
moral responsibility that is independent o f blame: ‘This shared responsibility springs 
from our* common vulnerability, and from our* ability to respond to others who are 
similarity situated Qoc. cit.). All human beings are vulnerable to dangers that are 
outwith our* control and foresight and therefore ‘shared responsibility and sympathy 
conspire to create the sense that we should go to the aid of those who cannot alleviate 
their own acute needs’ {loc. cit.; cf. MacIntyre 1999: 120-155). Whilst a great deal of 
attention is given to ‘liberty’ in Western moral and political pliilosophy, this clearly 
has to be counter balanced by the mundane and everyday experiences of finitude, 
weakness, poverty and mutual dependence, as I will ar gue in the next Chapter.
2 2 8
The Condition of Connectedness
As the inter-dependency between the developed and undeveloped world is 
undeniable, it is not sufficient to argue that those who are unaffected by multiple 
deprivation can avoid contributing to poverty by simply going about their everyday 
lives. Chambers underlines this point; ‘Humankind is closer together, and tlie 
peripheries ar e closer to the centres of power, than ever before’ (1997: 14)
Given this condition of connectedness, Singer and Chambers concur that our 
obligation to mitigate the causes of deprivation is not lessened by the number of 
people who, in respect to that evil, are in the same situation as we aie (although 
Singer recognises that, psychologically, there is a big difference)*^. With regard to our 
reactions (as affluent Westerners) to poverty on a global level it is generally argued 
that if everyone contributed a little, the accumulated total will be sufficient, that is, 
extraordinary lengths are not required by individuals. This hypothetical premise, 
however, as pointed out by Singer, is unlikely to ever come true and morally, more is 
often required than doing the minimum in the vain hope that everyone else will do the 
same.
Solidarity with Strangers
The commitment to abide with the requirements of assuring the well being of others is 
obviously taxing, especially as the principle of universal solidarity talces no account of 
distance:
This echoes the well Icnown speech made by Nehru on the eve of the Independence of India:' . . .  for 
all the nations and people are too closely knit together today for any one of them to imagine that it can 
live apart. Peace has been said to be indivisible; so is fieedom, so is prosperity now, and so also is 
disaster in this One World that can no longer be split into isolated fiagments’ (Speech delivered in the 
Constituent Assembly, New Delhi, 1947. (in Nussbaum 2000: 10).
Singer is a utilitaiian and this particular argument would be described more specifically as 
countering ‘rule-utilitarianism whereby ‘the right action is that which is consistent with those rules 
which would maximise utility if all accepted them’ (Crisp and Chappell 2000: 909)
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Tf we accept any principle of impartiality, universalisability, equality or 
whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far 
away from us (or we are far away from him)’ (Singer 1996: 231)**.
La Follette suspects that the greatest obstacle to helping those in chronic need is that 
most people do not feel any personal bond with people of poor, developing countries. 
However, as Aidener observes, ‘Anthropological works and anthropological lives are 
very closely meshed’ (1985: 54). For anthropologists who have worked closely with 
people who are struggling with the realities of poverty, the connection is almost 
certainly going to be there. It is important to remember that tlie idea of ‘poverty’ is 
relative; indigenous people healthily living far away from urban centres but without 
Western material plenty, caimot be described as being ‘poor’, although they might be 
categorised as such in development reports. Anthropologists may be concerned to 
contr ibute to their well being thr ough less tangible means than contributing directly to 
development projects, such as tlnough communicating and teaching indigenous 
versions of well being and dignity (e.g. Goldman’s [1963] work on the Cubeo of North 
West Amazon where he describes their ideas of quality of life in terms of their 
harmonious relationships involving lar ge networks of close social and personal bonds 
and conceptions of fertility and fecundity (Santos-Granero 2000: 270).
Moral Equivocation
Notwithstanding the assertions just made, in Western moral discourse, there are many 
readily available reasons for not responding wholeheartedly to those who experience 
multiple deprivations. Whilst trying har d not to homogenise the diversity of opinion 
and perspectives in the West, I tentatively propose that the following features of 
Western culture are efficacious in tlie continuation of global poverty as described 
above. My opinion is that whilst there is obviously an almost endless diversity of
It is interesting to note that a distinction is often made between ‘development ethics’ and 
‘international ethics’; Amartya Sen, for instance, in his recent book. Development as Freedom  ^
explicitly separates these fields of enquiry in his focus upon how state policies should engender an 
ethic based upon the principles of ‘human capabilities’. Martha Nussbaum departing from a similar 
starting point attempts a definition of internationally applicable principles of human capabilities but, 
like Sen, does not extend her argument to international ethics in the sense of connections and 
responsibilities between peoples/nations.
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dynamic cultural realities in the countries of Europe and the USA, certain patterns, or 
net results point to common tendencies in Western thinldng.
A Minimalist Ethic: Western distinctions between duty and charity are often based 
upon a liberal minimalist ethic concerned chiefly with what makes life tolerable. Acts 
wliich impact upon the safety or liberty of others are prohibited. The arguments 
against a moral code that demands more than this are that, inevitably, there will be 
problems with compliance or the abuse of authority. Acts based upon charity, 
generosity or inspiration, add to the quality of living but are not requirements. In a 
subsequent section, I discuss various critiques of tliis minimalist ethic.
Sacrifice as Anathema: The idea tliat we have to sacrifice something in order to 
balance the extr emes of inequality is present in Western consciousness but has little 
evocative power in terms of individuals changing their lives radically for the sake of 
strangers. Western liberal morality contains a hierarchy of values which ranks 
subjective personal fulfilment higher than solidarity. The obligation to give up things 
that we feel that we have a right to is anathema to the standard liberal morality that 
infuses our* culture. La Follette asserts that Western culture largely opts for a 
minimalist . . . version of morality with regard to public action which sets 
‘expectations which all but the most wealc-willed and self-centred person can satisfy’ 
(1996: 15).
Learned Helplessness: Faced with the statistics given above, resignation is a common 
response; human nature is like that, there will always be rich and poor and solutions 
are never going to be easy to find. Chambers echoes this observation; ‘Much that 
happens in a vast scale is neither accountable, nor under effective control . . . Such 
global trends present themselves, like the weather, as hazards to be observed and 
forecast fallibly, but seemingly outside human control’ (1997: 12).
Pessimism: A milder form of resignation is pessimism. The realities of economic 
development, as touched upon above, clearly favour those who are already in 
positions of power and, ar guably, always will* .^
It is reasonable to conclude that contemporary political anangements are simply not compatible with 
international justice. Economic development requires capital investment, technological innovation and
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Blaming the Victim: The objection is sometimes raised tliat we cannot be responsible 
for those in chronic need when they are the cause of tlieir own difficulties, whether 
this be because of corruption, bad management, wastefulness, laziness or whatever^**.
Theoretical Fundamentalisms: As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, in their 
extreme forms, both Marxist and neo-liberal theory do not attribute sufficient agency 
to the individual to change liis or her life and surroundings in a self-conscious and 
intentional way. On the former view, material forces are what determine the couise of 
history whilst on the latter this is decided by a simplistic understanding of human 
beings as self-maximisers. Other fimdamentalisms can be used to justify not assisting 
those in need. Neo-Malthusians, for instance malce comparisons between the lives of 
the well off to the plight of passengers on a life-boat, who can rescue those around 
them only at the risk of sinking and drowning everybody (Hardin 1996).
'Kindness that can KilT: A  pragmatic objection to aid might be that ‘thiowing our 
money’ at what we perceive as poor countiies is a simplistic reaction, albeit motivated 
by good intentions. For instance, a common example given is that as the direct 
delivery of fiee food can send market food prices plummeting, causing a disincentive 
for farmers to grow food, this kind of aid may be counter productive. In this 
circumstance, the maxim of assisting those afflicted with malnutrition will in actual 
fact, mean delimiting food aid. Caplan argues further that ‘to receive charity from aid
trading opportunities, all tliree of which are relatively scarce in most developing countries. 
International capital can be athacted by developing countiies only if they offer favourable investment 
opportunities. Investment is based upon potential profit rather than neediness. As a result of this, rural 
development for instance, is chronically under funded as, generally speaking, investors consider it to 
offer poor returns (depending on the state of the market and the trade tariffs imposed on different 
countries and products). Investors are more likely to put capital into the manufacture of expensive 
luxury items. Developing countries are often forced to attract investment by bypassing human rights 
standards, for example in ‘export processing zones’ where long hours, dangerous working conditions 
and low remuneration are the norm. Further, even when Third World products are potentially cheaper, 
developed countries may discourage their import so as to avert competition with the high earning 
producers of the richer counti ies.
However, as noted above, the majority of the victims of multiple deprivation are actually children 
who are ‘paradigmatically hmocent since they are neither causally nor morally responsible for their 
plight. They did not cause drought, parched land, soil erosion, and over-population; nor are they 
responsible for social, political, and economic anangements which make it more difficult for their 
parents to obtain food. If anyone were ever an innocent victim, the children who suffer and die fi*om 
hunger are’ (La Follette 1996: 213). It is also obvious that the marginalised and malnourished have 
little say in the way that they will be affected by adverse environmental conditions or callous 
governmental policies.
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workers is to be outside the normal mechanisms of reciprocity, and thus marginalised, 
even dehumanised’ (1994: 20; cf. Douglas 1977). Also, the objection is often raised 
that aid often does not reach the people it is intended for, and is swallowed up by 
cormpt officials or NGOs. These arguments are plausible in the paradoxical sense that 
it is risky to hand over resources to countries that are extremely polarised in the 
distribution of wealth^*.
Responding to Poverty as a Moral Imperative
In this chapter, I have sought to lay out some of the core issues of development ethics 
and also, the key features and characteristics of the development context. These 
themes will be looked at in more punctual terms in the next chapter.
On the basis of the arguments made above in the penultimate section, it would seem 
logical to ar gue that revising our* curr ent global economic and political arxangements 
is a matter of '"justice ’, something that is not morally optional. Going back to Singer’s 
challenge, I submit that responding to global poverty is not a supererogatory act, (one 
that is good to do but not wrong not to do); it is a binding moral requirement or* duty 
(Singer 1996; cf. Heyd 1982). The issue of poverty overseas, then, is primarily a 
moral issue although there ar e fur ther, ensuing secondary questions of a sociological, 
anthropological, economic and political nature. For those who are concerned with the 
inequalities endemic in the world, considering how to establish just relations opens up 
many new questions.
The next chapter draws upon both the moral imperatives and abdications or 
qualifications that have been described above. In the next chapter, I try to move 
beyond a ‘tout noir' version of Western morality to focus on the moral resources that 
I believe anthropologists can draw upon to contribute to an ethical applied 
anthropology. I discuss the political, social, cultural and economic models that have 
characterised Western approaches to development policy and practice. The discussion 
moves towards a description of the positive rights based and capabilities approaches
Angola for example, ‘earns $3-5 billion a year fiom natur al resources, and yet every three minutes an 
Angolan child dies fiom a preventable disease’ (Oxfam report to UN Security Council). However, this
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to development which have emerged as a result of sustained critiques of other 
approaches, philosophical reflection and lessons learned in practice.




The Moral Possibilities of the Dynamics of Western Driven Development as 
Social Change
So far, I have sought to establish and make clear that the particular distribution of 
wealth that characterises the modem world is unbalanced and inequitable. 1 have also 
argued that Western rationalist and individualist economic theory has directly anti­
human consequences. What is of interest is how these facts are interpreted and dealt 
with in Western reasoning through its particular social inheritances.
On the whole, when I refer to Western moral reasoning, I am speaking of the 
dominant liberal individualist tradition. The communitarian tradition in the West, 
which can be traced back to Roman ideas of ‘sensus communis ’ (and beyond) is often 
wrongly maligned by associating it with collectivism and the mutilation of individual 
freedom and autonomy for the sake of collective structures. Communitarianism, in 
fact, is usually far more subtle than its critics suggest and seeks to articulate the 
importance of ‘belonging’ and relating to others as well as the myriad ways in which 
mutual well being can be achieved in different social forms.
One of my contentions in this chapter is that whilst important qualifications have to be 
made, development ethics cannot be properly conceived without a simultaneous, 
albeit very careful, espousal of universal values and a focus on the embedded, 
contingent and contextual nature of the social construction of well being. The position 
that I adopt tends towards the communitarian and seeks to draw attention to the 
failings of liberal individualism. My view is that the dominance of neo-liberal values 
directly creates poverty and the dislocation of viable life-worlds. Development 
ethicists, in general, argue against the gradual global erosion of policies of 
redistribution and social cohesion. Nevertheless, these concerns involve ‘swimming 
against the current’ when articulated through the conceptual framework of the 
Western moral tradition and the practice of neo-liberalism.
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^Development Ethics^ and Social Change
Development is ostensibly about trying to alleviate the suffering of those affected by 
hunger, famine and preventable disease and to assist them to gain die social, 
economic and cultural resources to make them less vulnerable to these problems. In 
Copenhagen 1995, through the UN, the global community committed itself to the goal 
of ‘eradicating poverty in the world, thiough decisive national actions and 
international co-operation, as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative for 
humankind’ (WSSD, 1995).
Clearly, ethical development strategies must focus on the sustainability of livelihoods. 
In the case of many indigenous gi'oups, this means that they should be assisted in 
defending their livelihoods from the social fragmentation that often accompanied the 
encroacliment of market forces. In wider, capitalist society, addressing chronic need 
means bringing about long term, sustained and in-depth change in social relationships 
and institutions. In their current thinking and, increasingly in their practice, both 
official and non-governmental development agencies have established a reasonably 
stable set of concepts and shared understandings about what ‘good practice’ and 
beneficial social change means. This generalised consensus brings together a number 
of areas:
° Hmnan rights have been in the ascendancy in development tlrinking, especially 
over the last 6 years; the phrase ‘all human riglits for all’ which is sprinkled 
throughout recent development literature captures this approach. (The difficulty, 
(that will be discussed shortly) is that, in practice, ‘positive’ rights are given far- 
less emphasis than ‘negative’ rights which are associated with liberal 
individualism;
° Interventions seek to ensure that tlie most vulnerable individuals and groups have 
the means to maintain a basic livelihood (or have employment possibilities) 
locally and have recourse to ‘safety net’ resources in times of need;
° This often entails ‘capacity building’ of various kinds (to assist individuals to be 
able to compete in local markets, to leam skills, to create co-operatives, to Icnow 
their rights, for instance);
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° The State, in developing countiies, as fai* as is possible, is expected to provide 
basic services (such as clean water, health, education) whilst not neglecting to 
expand the market locally and globally (although, for many theorists, tliis market 
mentality is itself the problem);
° Alongside this is the effort to strengthen the possibilities for poor and 
marginalised groups to play an active part in political decision making and to 
insist upon tire accountability of politicians and bureaucrats.
I will now look in greater detail at the ways in which this consensus has come about.
The Compromises and Possibilities o f Modern Liberalism
At this stage, it is necessary to briefly discuss the model of ‘Modern Liberalism’, 
which, as the dominant and fastest growing political system in tlie world, constitutes 
the primary conceptual context for development thinking. Gledhill makes the 
cautionary remark that, ‘liberalism is a far from a uniform doctrine as far* as 
conceptions of social justice are concerned’ (1994: 79). With this in mind, I admit that 
in my char acterisation of liberalism here, I run the risk of being over-schematic, as the 
different philosophical cuixents that run into liberalism mingle and combine in 
countless forms. Nevertheless, I am going to malce an attempt at a summary of the 
main themes. Briefly here, I aim to map out the reasoning beliind modern liberalism 
as concisely as possible*. Further* implications of this model for development etliics 
are discussed throughout the chapter and also, in the next chapter*.
At one level, development policy and practice is deeply influenced by the maxims that 
underlie this approach. At anotlier, critical voices in development, whilst being 
acutely aware of its failings, because of its very ubiquity and persuasive force, still 
feel that it is necessary to work within it - trying to curb its excesses. Grasping the 
real-politick of tire contemporary political and economic order is essential for those 
who hope to work successfully on behalf of, or with, the poorest and marginalised.
 ^ Space does not permit a discussion of the relationship between liberalism and democracy. My 
discussion on rights below, however, does allude to the dynamics between social exclusion and 
political participation and representation.
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There are different ways of approaching ‘distributive justice’. The philosopher 
Nozick, a rights-based libertarian espouses ‘procedural justice’ which is based upon 
the principle that any economic distribution is ‘just’ if the process by which it comes 
about is itself ‘just’ (1974; MacIntyre gives an excellent critique of Nozick in 1997: 
244-255). Examples of approaches that are based on procedural reasoning are 
Libertarianism and its expression, Capitalism. On this view, ‘freedom’ is defined in 
terms of individuals not being constrained; and the right of not being interfered with 
(unless they harm others), the government’s role should be minimal, paying for the 
care of other people should be optional, the state should not be involved in the 
redistribution of resources. Whilst liberal individualists put a good face on this, 
str essing tire benefits of freedom, the logic of this approach leaves perplexing gaps. 
One comes across counter intuitive and odd assertions such as that to be deprived of 
food by tire unintended consequences of other’s action is not to be deprived of 
freedom (Nozick 1974). This abstract idea seems at odds with our intuitive sense. 
Freedom here also becomes segregated fr om the social and material conditions tlrat 
are necessary for human beings to function together. The conception of ‘rights’ here 
ignores the question of whether or not the thing that 1 assert that 1 have ‘a right to’ is 
somethirrg that 1 really need, will benefit fr om, or whether the exercising of this right 
will be in harmony with, or intelligible within, a particular* social setting.
Perhaps what malces this system so problematic is tliat it is grounded in a simple 
belief that human beings are basically motivated by narrow self-interest where the 
possessive individual, rightly or wrongly conceives of himself as utterly sovereign in 
his moral authority. Clearly there ar e gaping holes in this view of human natur e and of 
relating, as I argued in the last chapter. From this belief stems the rationale that 
competition creates the most efficient economic system. Capitalism incorporates a 
process view of distributive justice^ where material and social inequality are entirely 
natural. State or community intervention should be kept to a minimum as this is seen 
as menacing and unnecessarily compromising the self-realisation and rights^ of 
individuals.
 ^Looking at capitalist society in terms of the ‘end-state’, the idea of meritocracy is also central, that is, 
tlie idea that those who have achieved wealth have done so by their own ingenuity and hard work. 
^MacIntyre notes that ‘there is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly translated 
by our expression ‘a right’ until near the close of the middle ages: the concept lacks any means of
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All alternate approach to procédural justice is to consider ‘end-state justice’ which 
looks at the actual distribution of wealth and freedom in a society. Socialism, on this 
basis, stresses justice more than efficiency. Freedom here is imderstood in terms of 
not being oppressed as a result of being deprived of basic requirements such as 
nurfuring, education and health care. This seems to be based on the self evident 
observation expressed by Nussbaum ‘the various liberties of choice have various 
material preconditions, in whose absence there is merely a simulacrum of choice’ 
(2000: 53). The obvious implication is that, if a society’s economic and political 
frameworks mean that certain groups are routinely disadvantaged, redistribution of 
resources is necessary.
Approaches to distributive justice can also be understood in terms of rights. 
Libertarianism, for instance recognises negative rights, whereas its antithesis, 
socialism str*esses positive rights'*. On the latter view, rights are recognised to have 
only a spectral reality for those who are not able to exercise these rights as a result of 
disempowerment, marginalisation, oppression or discrimination. At the opposite end 
of the spectrum from liberfarianism, ‘radical egalitarian’ approaches negate the idea 
that there is any good reason why some people should have access to more resources 
than others and assert that there is no justification for subordinating the lives of some 
individuals to allow the excessive freedoms of others. The phrase ‘from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his need’, associated with Karl Marx, 
captur es this ethos^.
However, the socialist insistence that ‘need’, rather than merit, contribution, or effort 
should be singled out as the criteria for distributive justice is seriously contested. 
Rawls^, for example, argues that justice is not the only moral issue in economic 
matters; efficiency, liberiy and tolerance are also moral values or ‘virtues’ that play a
expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin or Arabic, classical or medieval, before about 1400, let alone in 
Old English, or in Japanese even as late as the mid-nineteenth century (1997: 69).
'* Negative rights are those which protect basic civil and political freedoms. Positive rights are those 
social, economic and cultural rights to the material, social and cultural conditions that are necessary to 
be able to exercise basic freedoms.
 ^ This phrase actually originated with the ‘early French socialists of the Utopian school and was 
officially adopted by German socialists in 1875’ (Rescher 1966: 73).
 ^Wlio is considered to be ‘at the forefr ont of modern attempts to reconcile liberal concerns with liberty 
and social equality’ (Gledhill 1997: 84)
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role in the creation of human well being and societal order (Rawls 1971). Whilst 
being committed to measured redistribution, Rawls’ liberal warning is against 
political approaches that impose material equality by claiming an excessively heavy 
toll on individual liberty.
Modern Liberalism, then, talces on board some of the above objections to 
libertarianism in the recognition that people through no fault of their own sometimes 
caimot compete with otliers and caimot provide for themselves. On this basis, 
navigating between these different positions, modern liberalism constitutes a mixed 
political and economic system, characterised by the constant negotiation of 
compromises.
Modem Western democracies, in theory, have sought to strike a balance between 
liberty and equality so that no social groups are so vulnerable that their welfare is 
impossible whilst taxes are kept down so as not ‘to rob’ others of liberty. Rapport 
captures the liberal solution as being rooted in ‘a universalistic procedmal justice and 
a compromise: a curtailing of tlie final end of absolute liberty of each individual so as 
to malce room for that of others, and also a curtailing of expectations concerning the 
everyday reach of deep understanding or love’ (1997: 184)
Nevertheless, one can not deny that the compromises of liberalism ar e fraught with 
continuous shrill argumentation and often result in a generalised and electorally 
decisive tolerance for the existence of poverty and marginalisation. A standard 
consensus in liberal societies is that the State can legitimately neglect certain social, 
cultural and economic rights^.
This brings us back to development ethics. It is important to note how these basic 
political philosophies provide a backgrormd picture here. Development ethicists have 
sought to formulate ways of comparatively gauging the well being of individuals and 
social groups cross-culturally. This corresponds to the international liberal agenda of 
agreeing overlapping, or universal values that are broad enough to embrace the 
diversity of cultural and political settings. This endeavour requires looking at
’ Gledliill gives a good analysis of this phenomenon in the US over the last 20 year s (1997).
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distributive ethics, political liberalism and the ways in which different visions of the 
good and corresponding ideas of conduct can co-exist. Within this broad agenda there 
ar e a number of approaches to development thinking that need to be singled out. As I 
discuss these, I will also introduce a number of critical perspectives that reveal the 
manifold difficulties of liberal individualist approaches to achieve societal well being.
Dominant Paradigms for Development
Here I look critically (and as concisely as possible) at a number of dominant 
approaches to development with the aim of tracing the emergence of the ‘capabilities 
approach’ which has become an increasingly important way of thinking about etliical 
and effective human development^. My aim in this subsection is to identify which 
theoretical presuppositions have been used to judge one approach or argument as 
being superior to others in the field of development ethics.
Commodity based Approaches
The identification between successful development and liigher ‘gross national 
product’ (GNP) has a central place in economic development policy and planning. 
This approach malces the apparently elementary mistake of assuming that the 
expansion of goods and services can be used as a barometer of societal well being as 
well as a way of making comparisons between nations in terms of ‘quality of life’. 
The plain fact that commodities are valuable only to the extent that tliey ar e available 
(and valuable) to people has often been circumnavigated by many orthodox 
development economists (see Corbridge 1995, Sen 1989, Frank 1966, Lai 1985 and 
Booth 1985, for instance). If the entitlement of all people to goods and services within 
a nation happened to be more or less equal, tliere would be a logic to using tire total 
amount of wealth as a measure of basic economic well being. However, as Sen 
affirms, ‘that assumption is a non-starter’ (1996: 118). Firstly, the actual distribution 
of wealth is not specified and, further, the connection between income and other 
factors (parameters such as gender, age, ethnic group, geographical area) is not
The UNDP’s Human Development Reports since 1994 have adopted an evolving capabilities 
approach.
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explored^. Additionally, no information about the conelation between income and 
other measur es of well being (or goods, such as education, health, nutritional status 
employment, political and other freedoms etc.) is forllicoming.
In his seminal book, ‘Poverty and Famines’, Amartya Sen (1981) corrected what had 
been received wisdom in his argument tliat famine is not so much caused by a 
shortage of food but rather the fact that large numbers of people have somehow lost 
their entitlements. Entitlements are rmderstood in terms of people’s capacity to obtain 
food, to control land and malce independent decisions regarding the production and 
reservation of food and other commodities. Sen looks at entitlements hr relation to 
social groups, households as well as attending to individuals within households. Due 
to the fact that nearly every part of the world is linlced up as part of local or global 
exchange economies (traditional and purely subsistence economies are now scarce 
globally) hunger is less likely to be caused by a lack of availability of food (as a result 
of crop failure or some other ‘act of God’) than by a lack of entitlement to food. 
Polanyi (1944) had argued similarly that, apart from large scale natural disasters, 
starvation has been uncommon in ‘pre-capitalist’ societies that often enjoyed 
sustainable abundance and that trading food at the expense of local production for 
consumption has been a contributory factor to recent famines. Whilst there are local 
production failures, what is significant is that those who are first to suffer from this 
are those who have ‘low entitlement status’, for instance those without work, land, the 
marginalised, the wealc or those who have meagr e networks of support. The fact of 
starvation does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of food available to a 
population as a whole but does imply the relative poverty of those affected. Also, 
starvation itself is far* less likely to be the cause of death than any one of the easily 
preventable diseases tliat the malnourished ar e susceptible to (de Waal 1989,2000). In 
short, as chronic malnourishrnent occurs in places (or understood in global terms) 
where there is an abundance of food, the issue is now understood to be people’s 
access to or command over available resources. In previous chapters, I looked at other
 ^A deal' example is that, according to the UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1997, whilst the 
GNP per capita of Honduras, Pakistan and Zimbabwe were at similar levels, gender inequality in 
Pakistan was markedly worse.
Relevant factors to be considered when looking at tlie distribution of food; age, sex, whether 
pregnant or lactating, metabolic rate, body size, activity levels, medical condition, climatic conditions, 
social needs of communal life, education, access to medical services, social class, ethnic group (Sen 
1996:188)
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failings of the commodity based approach in terms of devastating social 
fragmentation through such phenomena as labour* migration and rural displacement 
which may well be form pail of a general upswing in a country’s GNP.
The GNP approach, then, has clear* drawbacks and blind spots as a way of grasping, 
promoting or comparing human well being. The very fact of its preponderance in 
development, combined with how little sense it malces, confirms the assertion that the 
operation of Western political and institutional forces attahis only a pretence of 
rationality.
Utilitarian Approaches
‘Utilitarian economics’ is used prevalently as a model for development policy (Lai 
1985). Utilitarianism, according to Weale, ‘is a social ethic that may be interpreted as 
giving a pre-eminent place to the idea that the welfar*e of ‘society’ should be the over­
riding goal of public policy’ (2000: 927). Similar* problems to tlie commodity based 
approach are immediately apparent. However, to say this is not to deny that certain 
aspects of utilitarian approaches have contr ibuted to socially beneficial practices. This 
reformist perspective explicitly recognises that social arrangements can be altered so 
as to maximise ‘happiness’. Utilitarian reasoning emerged as a consequence of the 
Enlightenment’s discarding of hierarchical, ‘superstitious’ and teleological modes of 
moral reasoning and constitutes an attempt to formulate a rational way of reconciling 
the Enlightenment’s stress on the autonomous individual moral agent pursuing his 
own ends with a balanced social order^\ On this basis, utilitarian reasoning supports 
social engineering approaches such as tlie welfare state, national health services and 
social work provision tliat characterise many Western democracies. Welfarist 
approaches have focused on ‘utilities’ as the standard of value and, on this basis, 
policy decisions are based upon the average, or total, ‘satisfaction’ or ‘utility’ of a 
given population. However, as a basis for* social development, utilitarianism has a 
number of fatal flaws.
“ Rapport (1997) advocates a comparable combination of the Nietzschean self with Mill’s 
utilitarianism.
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Immediately, it can be noted that this focus on averages and majorities results in the 
same inattention to the particularity of individual well being or that of specific social 
groups, hi short, in a region where a majority expresses satisfaction about a good such 
as educational provision, it is possible that a minority have utterly no access 
whatsoever. Making decisions based on general levels of ‘utility’ will inevitably mean 
that some goods will be ‘traded off against others.
Secondly, going by the logic of utilitarian tlieory, focused upon die goal of gaining 
happiness for the greatest number, it is possible to interpret the alleviation of 
malnutrition and other deprivations as ‘secondary goals’ that do not necessarily have 
the status of moral imperatives. The neglect of certain sectors of the population for the 
‘greater good’ may be considered to be just^^. O’Neill claims that some utilitarians, 
‘in their darkest Malthusian moments thought that average happiness might best be 
maximised not by improving the lot of the poor but by minimising their numbers, and 
so have advocated policies of har sh neglect of the poorest and most desperate’ (1996: 
104).
A further difficulty is that on utilitarian versions, ‘well being’ is not necessarily 
understood in terms of ‘active doing and being’ but rather, in terms of ‘satisfaction’. 
This is one of Nussbaurn’s central criticisms; ‘One thing we want to Icriow is how 
individuals feel about what is happening to them, whether dissatisfied, or satisfied. 
But we also want to know what they are actually able to do and to be’ (2000: 63). It 
seems apparent then that ‘confining attention to utilities amounts to seeing people in a 
highly limited way’ (Sen 1996: 188). The question of ‘well being’ is surely 
inextricable from healthy human functioning or flourishing and how this is aided and 
constrained by the circumstances in which individuals exist. A utilitarian approach to 
public action does not elicit sufficient information to allow decisions to be made 
regarding well bemg on an individual basis. The polymorphous nature of ‘well being’ 
and the radically different ways in which this can be acliieved mean that utilitarian 
assessments always risk being crudely reductionist. This point is expressed by 
MacIntyre: ‘Different pleasures and different happinesses are to a large degree
Intrinsic to neo-liberal approaches to economic development is the conflict between launclihig 
policies that are bound to destroy the viability of fragile livelihoods so as to promote economic 
expansion.
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incommensui'able: there aie no scales of quantity or quality on wliich to weigh them’ 
(1997: 64).
Fouithly, from certain lands of utilitaiian reasoning, paternalistic approaches, that 
subvert the self-determination of individuals and groups, are endorsed (see Crocker 
1996: 224). The utilitarian recognition that people may not be able to achieve 
autonomy is a strength in the sense that there is provision for those who, for whatever 
reason, can not acquire the means for a dignified life without support. The assistance 
they receive, however, does not necessarily lead to greater independence or autonomy 
(which as we will see in the next section is a central commitment of Kantian ethics). 
In this sense, utilitarian approaches do not necessarily endorse empowerment, ‘bottom 
up’ or participatory planning.
A fifth serious difficulty aiises when one considers the controversial issue of 
‘subjective welfarism’ (which is tlie utilitarian attempt to mitigate their reliance on 
averages). On this metliod of establishing economic policies, an individual or group’s 
‘utility’ is gauged according to assessments of whether their ‘subjective preferences’ 
aie being satisfied. Nussbaum (2000) argues that ‘social conditioning’ shapes the 
content of people’s ‘preferences’ and insists that some sectors of society may be 
conditioned to accept ways of living that are ‘objectively’ beneath universally agieed 
standards of human dignity. On this theory of ‘adaptive preferences’, the idea is 
asserted that the ‘possibilities of being’ imposed upon individual or gioup come to 
delimit their preferences (Nussbaum 2000: 136)^ .^ Nussbaum sees this as dangerous 
because subjectivist views could be used by economic planners to justify the ‘quiet 
acceptance of deprivation’ (2000: 139). Sen aigues similaily tliat: ‘judging 
importance by the mental metric of happiness or desfre fulfilment can talce a deeply 
biased foim due to the fact tliat the mental reactions often reflect defeatist 
compromises with hai'sh reality induced by hopelessness . . .  the hopeless underdog 
loses the courage to desire a better deal and leains to talce pleasuie in small mercies. 
The deprivations appear muffled and muted in the metric of utilities’ (1996: 189). 
Weale malces a similai* observation, ‘happy slaves might be better off changing their 
preferences than having them satisfied’ (2000: 927). The converse also seems
As captured in Aesop’s fable of the sour giapes.
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plausible; that people living in relatively luxurious circumstances have adapted their 
preferences and expectations to unieasonable levels.
I would stress here that this whole debate clear ly traverses dangerous ground in the 
sense that by insisting on ‘universal standards’ of what constitutes ‘well being’, policy 
malcers can easily become overbearingly paternalistic and pre-empt what particular 
groups consider to be a good and fulfilling life by prescribing all sorts of Western 
improvements such as certain kinds of education leading to certain lands of 
employment. This possibility immediately ranldes anthropological sensibilities that 
have been alerted to the anngant and obtuse Western tendency to systematically deny 
others’ intelligence and relative ideas of well being.
Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, there is something to be said for the 
establishment of certain universal standards (problematics as they ar e) that oppressed 
groups can appeal to vis-à-vis their government’s intransigence over issues such as 
labour* or linguistic rights.
Basic Needs; The Influence o f Kant
Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ has reverberated throughout development thinking. 
For our purposes, the key features are as follows, the emphasis on the inviolability of 
the ‘person’, the obligation to provide all with ‘basic needs’, and the belief that moral 
principles have to be founded upon autonomous reason and ‘self-given laws’, not by 
appealing to theological or metaphysical claims about the nature of the good. The 
implications of Kantian theor*y for development ethics are manifold but, as we will 
see, limited in important moral respects.
Basic to this approach is the assertion that, in all moral deliberation, we should appeal 
to the Supreme Principle of Morality, or* ‘categorical imperative’. There are many 
different versions of this principle, however, for illustrative purposes, I will 
concentrate on one known as ‘The Formula of the End in Itself:
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‘Act in such a way that you always tt'eat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person o f any other, never simply as a means but always at 
the same time as an end’ (Kant 1998)
This principle sets out the minimal conditions for just interaction, that is, that each 
party uses their autonomy in such a way that this does not subordinate the autonomy 
of others. There are tluee main implications of this maxim for development policy. 
Fhstly, the exercise of this principle precludes disingenuousness or coercion in the 
relations between individuals or groups. Secondly projects should not be paternalistic 
in then* outcomes and thirdly the basic needs of all human beings aie a requhement 
for their autonomous action and should be provided for. I will go through these in 
turn.
Non-Coercion: O’ Neill presents the following argument; ‘in Kant’s view, acts done 
on maxims that endanger, coerce or deceive others, and thus cannot in principle, have 
the consent of those others, aie wiong’ (1996: 98). This means that when one group 
cannot realistically refuse entering into an economic relationship that will not benefit 
them, they are being used as a means rather than an end by the other pai*ty. A concrete 
example of this might be the IMF withliolding indispensable funding to an indebted 
country, if certain structural adjustments that will cause the devastation of the 
livelihoods of lar ge sectors of tlie population, ar e not undertaken^" .^ The possibility of 
free consent and dissent is precluded by the coercive nature of the relationship. 
Respect for autonomy here would ensure that the weaker par ty had the possibility of 
opting out of the economic ar rangement.
Non-paternalistic Projects: If Kantian maxhns constitute an obligation to assist others 
to be in a position to act for* themselves, this would imply that preference must be 
given to non-patei*nalistic, empowering, capacity building and ‘bottom up’ 
development interventions*^.
So as to obtain continuing funds, states indebted to tlie IMF have had to assent to economic measures 
which have included opening markets to foreign investors, cutting social expenditure (including basic 
welfare spending on health, food aid and subsidies), devaluating the local currency drastically, selling 
food stores, diverting agiiculture from food crops to cash crops etc.
As was discussed above, utilitai ian approaches may justify paternalistic approaches.
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A difficulty here though is that Kantians may impose rigid standards of what ‘rational 
autonomy’ is, Kant, after all asserted that, as MacIntyre puts it, ‘if the rules of 
morality are rational, tlrey must be the same for all rational beings, in just the way that 
the rules of arithmetic are’ (1997: 44). Kant also denied that one’s understanding of 
happiness, or desires, could be used as a guide to moral action, in fact, happiness and 
morality are segregated domains. The implication here is that Kantian moral theory 
may purport to offer a ‘superior’ version of morality based on practical reason, 
independent of circumstances and conditions in relation to the moralities of particular 
social groups. This sense of superiority and disengagement from the affective 
dimensions of morality may be used for the paternalist justification that those who, by 
Kantian standards, are not acting as rational agents, are not capable of acting 
autonomously and need to be treated like children or as if they have mental health 
problems (see Mason 2000, for an illustration of this tendency).
Basic Needs: Nussbaum implies that Kant’s theory is best understood in terms of 
individualistic and negative rights when she writes that ‘Marx was departing from 
Kant in some important respects, by stressing (along with Aristotle) that the major 
powers of a human being need material support and cannot be what they are without 
it’ (2000: 73). However, arguably, Kantian theory can be extrapolated to support the 
provision of positive rights, albeit in a limited sense. Whilst Kantian theory is 
fr equently assimilated to theories of civil and political human rights, it also involves a 
strong conceptualisation of human obligations, that is, just action requires more than 
non-interfererrce. Given that the state of relative poweriessness that accompanies 
poverty malces autonomous action a practical impossibility, the Kantian maxim of 
treating others as ends would demand tliat those in vulnerable circumstances should 
be assisted to rise above a certain threshold that would allow autonomy. As O’Neill 
affirms;
‘Since finite rational beings cannot generally achieve their aims without some 
help and support fr om others, a refirsal of help and support amounts to failure 
to treat others as rational and autonomous beings’ (1996: 99).
Contributing to the improvement of others’ material and institutional prospects can 
assist them in acquiring or regaining autonomy. Kant recognised the natmal limits of
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individual autonomy and the universality of vulnerability (fmitude). As well as being 
constrained by material factors, human beings aie also inevitably bound to different 
kinds of (mutual or asymmetiical) dependence.
The problem here, though, is that different gioups will often disagree with each 
other’s values, and therefore, in practice, will not support the autonomy of those with 
whom they compete. For this reason, Kant’s theory ends up being compelling only in 
the minimalist sense of not heating others as means. The alleviation of other’s need 
when they aie unable to act autonomously, constitutes the summit of Kantian 
obligation, but then only if the autonomy of the other is not considered to thr eaten 
one’s own autonomy. For this reason, the Kantian approach is understood as 
under-pinning ‘basic needs’ approaches to development.
A further supposed advantage of a Kantian approach is as follows. In the endless 
diversity of context in which development ethics need to be applied, Kantians argue 
that, as their ethics is not framed by local contingencies, but involves reasoning based 
upon ‘rmiversal principles’ it can form the basis for moral reasoning in relation to any 
eventuality. Rather than seeldng to ranlc actions or institutional aiTangements in terms 
of ‘goods’ or ‘utilities’, Kant’s ethical theory is drawn upon to decide whether 
proposed actions are ‘just’ or otherwise. O’Neill argues that the advantage of Kantian 
reasoning, being less sensitive to gaps in our causal, or local larowledge, ‘may help us 
to reach conclusions that ar e broadly accur ate even if imprecise . . .  we do not need to 
be able to generate a complete list of available actions in order to determine whether 
proposed lines of action are not unjust and whether they are beneficent’ (1996: 103- 
104)‘®.
However, from an anthr opological point of view, tliis is clearly maldng a virtue of a 
serious limitation. Following Kant’s universalist deontology may be cormter-intuitive 
at times since obeying a single rationalist principle may mean putting aside other- 
moral considerations, or aspects of human well being otlier tlian their rational
The philosopher Scheler’s view of ethics was overtly anti-Kantian, ranldng personal values highest-  
these personal values were based not on the ‘ego’ but on the idea of the person being able to know (or 
intuit) real values which should precede botli utilitar ian and Kantian ideas and calculations of goods 
(Dunlop 1991). A fundamental premiss of Kant’s thought is that we do not have a substantive account
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autonomy. The individualistic and rationalist basis of Kantian thought may delimit its 
scope to apprehend the affective basis of moral communities. Wilson, writing about 
the ways in which legal drought and language exists in a dialectical relationship with 
social relations, being contingent - both constituted by and constituting them - argues 
that;
‘Kantian universalism . . . obscures the imtidiness of everyday life by 
accepting the compromise of categorical certainties. An existential 
etlmography of rights, on the other hand, shows humans replete with feelings, 
engaged in their brute material existence and enmeshed in the complexities of 
their social world’ (1997: 15)
This characteristically Kantian excision of emotion, aesthetics and desire in the 
calculation of ‘right action’ is, problematic to say the least for the ethics of applied 
anthropology. The severe dislocation of ‘reason’ from other aspects of being human 
makes Kantian theory awkward and dangerously limited in apprehending the real and 
efficacious ways in which these are conjoined in moral practice. Drawing upon 
Amazonian ethnography, Overing ar gues that
‘it is only by aclarowledging aesthetics in the broader sense of its meaning, 
where beauty in daily practice is understood as an expression of moral and 
political value, that anthropologists can begin to perceive the characteristics 
and affective conditions of everyday social life in Amazonia, and indigenous 
reasoning about them’ (2000: 18).
This requires the kind of embedded or thick descriptiorr that is anathema to Kantian 
procedural ethics. Nevertheless, m relation to political ethics and the workings of 
development institutions, the Kantian imperatives of non-coercion, basic needs and 
non-paternalism continue to be evoked in theory at least, if not in practice.
of the good. By contrast, Scheler’s thought was fundamentally Catholic, deriving from Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas and seeking to combine their respective emphases on love and reason.
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The ‘Capabilities^ Consensus
Chambers states that ‘a massive sliift in priorities and thinldng has been taking place, 
from things and infrastiuctui'e to people and capabilities.’ (1997: 9). The capabilities 
model constitutes a framework for ethically assessing the institutions, policies and 
actions of development and has been adopted on this basis by tlie United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP):
‘The purpose of development is to create an environment in which all people 
can expand their capabilities, and opportunities can be enlarged for both 
present and future generations’ (Human Development Report 1994: 13).
This approach, then, focuses on human ‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings’ rather than 
‘satisfaction’ or ‘resources’. The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has also talcen up and 
adapted this approach, finding that it had close corTespondence to her interest in 
Ar istotelian ethics and Marxist ideas of human fimctioning, particularly the view that 
affiliation and reciprocity with others is an intrinsic part of being fully human*’. 
Nussbaum’s ar guments ar e based upon a specific concern with the position of women 
particularly in the developing world. However, on the basis that women’s views are 
systematically suppressed and marginalised to varying degrees, throughout the world, 
thinking from this perspective can be used to usefully extrapolate insights for other 
relatively miacknowledged and disadvantaged groups. Another important feminist 
philosopher. Luce Irigaray, argues that the philosophy, written overwhelmingly by 
men, that has formed Western culture corrld not have been achieved without the 
background presence of women who largely played a supportive role (1985). She 
ar gues that a thoroughly partial philosophy has been the outcome. A shnilar argument 
can be made for those who suffer multiple deprivations. They, like women throughout 
the course of history, have not been afforded the fr eedom and opportunity to articulate 
their perspectives to the same extent as the privileged minority.
Noam Chomslcy makes the following challenge to academics: ‘Intellectuals are in a position to 
expose the lies of governments, to analyse actions according to their causes and motives and often 
hidden intentions . , ,  For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisme, the facilities 
and the tiaming to seek the truth lying hidden beneath the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, 
ideology, and class interest through which events of cuirent histoiy ai e presented to us’ (1967: 324).
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Nussbaum advocates the Aristotelian idea that the central task of ethics is exploring 
the ways in which people can become, or are impeded in becoming, ‘fiilly human’. 
All people are considered to be bearers of ‘capabilities’. These are ‘basic powers of 
choice that malce a moral claim for opportunities to be realised and to flourish’ 
(Nussbaum 2000: 298). Capabilities are tliose functions of human life that are 
understood to be necessary to be able to live a fully human life. From the capabilities 
perspective, concepts such as ‘resources’, ‘commodities’, ‘utilities’, ‘needs’ or 
‘rights’ play a subsidiary role and, essentially can never be more than means to the 
end of human well being.
Nussbaum considers the various ‘functions’ that are necessary for human life and 
bases moral judgement on the criteria of whether or not individuals or social groups 
within different settings are able to fiilfrl these functions or not. This approach focuses 
upon how a given context affects what an individual is actually in a position to do. 
This is different from looking at either the individual’s ‘satisfaction’ with his or her 
context and his or her role in it (utility) or calculating the resources that available to 
an individual (commodity). Nussbaum’s list of ‘central human functional capabilities’ 
is as follows: 1. Life, 2. Bodily Health, 3. Bodily Integrity, 3. Sense, Imagination and 
Thought; 5. Emotions; 6. Practical Reason; 7. Affiliation; 8. Other species; 9. Play, 
10. Control over one’s environment (material and political)*^.
Rather than looldng at the basic material resoirrces that should be provided for 
individuals and groups, this approach focuses upon ensuring that the conditions that 
are required for human beings to be able to fulfil then capabilities are available to all. 
The social goal is to ensure that individuals do not live in conditions in which they 
cannot function in a truly human manner*^. The focus of the capabilities approach
Finer distinctions are ‘basic capabilities’ - that is the rudimentary capacities for being human 
(rationality, empathy, language etc.); the ‘internal capabilities’; the development of the basic 
capabilities to a state where they can be enjoyed and shared. These (such as the capacity to interact 
healthily) require nurturing and example. Finally there are ‘combined capabilities’ which are the 
possibilities that come into fruition when the internal capabilities can be exercised because of necessary 
external conditions also being in place 
This is not to say that a person living without fulfilling these central capabilities should be somehow 
regarded as being sub-human. The capabilities model is not intended as a description of what it is to be 
human but rather about the human functions that should be there for hmnan flourisliing and fulfilment. 
Also, both Sen and Nussbaum stress that the responsibility for attaining the capabilities can only be the 
responsibility of individuals although the provision for the possibility of fulfilling them should be a 
matter of governments in collaboiution with civil society and society in general.
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then, is upon finding a cross-cultuial way of evaluating and comparing the idea of 
‘quality of life’ in terms of what individuals are able to actually do, or become 
according to their own volition in particulai* contexts (ibid. 35). From an 
anthropological perspective then, it is interesting to note that there is scope in the 
capabilities approach for appreciating and supporting cultuially specific ways of 
realising well being that do not depend upon Western economic or social 
presuppositions.
Adding important perspectives that derive from botli Marx and Aristotle^**, Nussbaum 
argues that ‘fulfilment’ is a more worthwhile concept than ‘autonomy’ and the 
associated idea of ‘basic needs’. Sen’s work, also shows that a fhiitfiil approach to 
development policy is to look at the ways in which individuals and groups are 
frustrated in tlieir attempts to live their lives ‘to the fiill’. On this basis, ‘economic 
development is best seen as an expansion of people’s ‘capabilities”  (1996: 187) 
which can be understood as independence, sldlls and the conditions (nurturing, 
education and resources) in which to develop them. As with the rights approach, 
however, the way in which ‘fulfilment’ is understood and implemented may be 
influenced by dominant agendas.
My view is that the capabilities approach constitutes an enhancement of the rights 
approach as it embraces political liberties, str esses the importance of obligations that 
can be put on to goverrrments but also has a finer and more culturally flexible grasp of 
human agency, flourishing and possibility. Civil and Political rights, from the 
capabilities perspective, if enshrined in law, ar e really the means, or guarantees that 
certain obstacles (such as discrimination) that might get in the way of a person’s well 
being, flourishing or dignity, can be removed. Economic, Social and Cultural rights 
are not so easily realised but can be understood as aspirations of what the basic 
requirements for well being are and which should be progressively achieved in a 
society committed to these rights.
An important distinction here is that whilst Nussbaum dr aws from Marxist Aristotelianism and refers 
to Catholic Thomistic Aristotelianism (whose best Icnown proponents are Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor both of whom are practising Catholics), as a liberal egalitar ian, she is anxious to point 
out that her approach is not illiberal in terms of deciding for people what thefr vision of the good 
should be. She argues that Marxist versions and some Thomistic versions are flawed in this sense.
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Rights, unless they are secured or exercised, are really nominal or fictitious whereas 
‘capabilities’ describe the actual conditions of whether a person is able to live in a 
way that meets the minimum requirements of human dignity. Economic rights could 
be interpreted in terms of how much a group or individual ‘gets’ and this may not take 
into consideration the different amounts of resources that will be required for different 
people in different circumstances to be able to function within their own idea of well 
being and dignity. In this sense then, rights are a way of understanding the means 
required for well being. One of the difficulties with rights is that they do not 
necessarily tr anslate into duties and, if duties are connected to rights, there may be 
disagreement about who carxies the responsibility to fulfil them.
Before concluding, I will now consider a theme which has surfaced occasionally up 
imtil this point but which needs to be looked at in greater detail, that is, the question 
of universal values.
Meaningful Universality?
In general, people seek not the way o f their ancestors but the good’
Aristotle
A contentious area in the field of development ethics is whether, or to what extent, 
cultural or moral relativism should preclude formulating universal norms for 
development practice and cross-cultural comparison. Nevertheless, both Nussbaum 
and Sen are in ‘strong agreement about the poverty of cultural relativism and the need 
for universal norms in the development policy arena’ (Nussbaum 2000: 13). By 
necessity, and for pragmatic reasons, development ethicists must look at the kinds of 
reasoning that characterise the public domain, that is, the abstract considerations of 
distributive justice, political and economic models, the obligations that can be put on 
governmental bodies, for instance.
Nevertheless, as applied anthropology is ostensibly concerned with assisting 
individuals and social groups in achieving the eveiyday and ordinary fulfilments that 
are necessary for dignified human living, there is a clear' exigency to imderstand and
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uphold what this means for different people(s) in particular' settings. Herskovits’ 1947 
asser'tion in the American Antlrropological Association’s statement on human rights 
that ‘the individual realised his personality through his culture, hence respect for 
individual differences entail a respect for cultural differences’ (1947: 541) remains 
compelling. Alongside this long-standing anthropological commitment to specificity, 
it has to be recognised that the achievement of well being, for any social group, is 
cer*tain to be under the aegis or oppression of particular social institutions and political 
systems. For this reason, it is also essential to look at how these political settings 
impact upon, constrain, protect, or even inspire, particular gr oups in their pursuit of a 
‘good life’. In this sense, applied anthropology has to entail the consideration of what 
the constitutive elements of a good society might be. Here, the interests of 
development ethics and applied social anthropology surely converge.
Whilst social anthropologists are often sceptical of universal norms (especially if 
based upon an idea of a ‘knowable essence’ of being human, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 10), it seems clear that the very ubiquity of development demands the 
formulation of a strongly universalist normative response that contains an insistence 
on pluralism. This project is correctly complicated by the anthropological demand for 
sensitivity to context. The discipline of Social Anthropology has obviously 
contributed to the view that there is independent merit and value in different and 
contrasting cultmal schemata for the individuals involved. However, a difficulty with 
this elastic perspective, in practice, is that without an overarching scheme for 
arbitrating between competing world views, contradictions and conflicts between the 
local and the global can not be resolved and cross crrltural standards are difficult to 
arrive at. In practice, members of indigenous societies often need to appeal to 
rmiversal standards in their efforts to safeguard their specificity.
On this basis, Nussbaum has sought to articulate an ethics for development which can 
be the object of ‘an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have ver*y 
different comprehensive conceptions of the good’ (2000: 5). This is close to the 
Rawlsian idea of social co-operation (1971). Her contention is that there are cer*tain 
indispensable principles that any credible ethical model can not do without. These 
considerations are explicitly applied to the morality of practical reason and social and 
political aiTangements. Addiessing herself to a ‘broad interdisciplinary audience,’
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Nussbaum sets out ‘the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic 
constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the 
governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity 
requires’ (2000: 5)^ *. The capabilities approach, described above, constitutes her 
formulation of a universally applicable model of basic human functioning.
Asserting the importance of being able to work with cross cultural categories, 
Nussbaum presents a series of counter arguments to what she considers to be the thr ee 
principal challenges to universalism in ethics. She assents that there have often been 
arrogant versions of universalism but answers that this need not be the case. She 
double guesses some communitarian perspectives in her controversial assertion that 
whilst it is true that ‘theorists often come from nations that have been oppressors 
(2000: 35) and there have been ‘obtuse ways of thinldng across cultural boimdaries . .
. which typically assumed that the ways of the colonial power were progressive and 
enlightened (and) the ways of the colonised peoples primitive . . . universal values 
may even be necessary for an adequate critique o f colonialism itself (2000: 31) and 
‘we require a set of values that give us ‘a critical purchase on cultural particulars’ 
(2000: 51). Again, here, as was noted with regard to rights based thinking, which 
singles out the individual as the object of moral allegiance, cultur al realities which are 
perceived to delimit the well being, freedom or dignity of individuals are (in a 
paternalistic mode) rendered suspect.
She looks firstly at the ‘argument from culture’ which amounts to a respect for the 
different visions of the good people share in different contexts, even though these 
visions of the good will often disagr ee. The example given by Nussbaum is the ‘anti- 
Westernising’ position in India which says that Indian culture, through Islam and 
Hinduism, has powerful norms of female deference and self-sacrifice which can lead 
to lives equally, or more fulfilling than careerist, stressful high divorce rate lives of 
Western women (2000: 41). A powerfully argued philosophical basis for 
epistemological, ethical and cognitive relativism can be formd in tlie work of Nelson
Scope does not permit looldng at the permutations of the particular anangements that should be put 
in place for the provision of a threshold level for cential human capabilities in terms of the 
responsibilities and self-help. As will be noted in the discussion on rights, this is obviously an issue that 
is contested heavily. Also, some of the capabilities, such as ‘being able to use the imagination’ would 
something a government might be able to contribute to but not guarantee.
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Goodman (1978) who argues that the linguistic categories and symbols that we 
construct mediate our perception, and understanding, of the world(s) we inhabit. We 
make, rather than encounter worlds. Different configurations of symbols are bound to 
be incommensurable with others which means that there can never be one version of 
the truth, that is, there are many worlds that imbue value, well being and purpose to 
people’s lives (See also Overing’s ethnogiaphic contextualisation of this perspective 
among the Piaroa [1990]).
The position talcen here by Nussbaum is that universal noims should not preclude the 
choice of people to live ‘üaditional’ lives, but only on the condition that they have in 
place alternative cultuial, political and economic choices. There is recognition of the 
facility with which ‘tiaditional’ cultures have been depicted in terms which 
homogenise their members rather than recognising that, in every cultur al setting there 
is contestation, change and negotiation. For some time now, social anthropologists 
have been worlcing with an unreified idea of culture, that is, recognising heterogeneity 
and hybridity and denying ideas of discrete ‘cultures’ being hermetically sealed.
Appeals to cultural relativism ‘fail’, Nussbaimi confidently argues, because ‘people 
ar e resourceful borrowers of ideas . . .  the ideas of every culture turn up inside every 
other’ (2000; 48-9) and, anyway, more blatantly, ‘why should we follow the local 
ideas, rather than the best ideas we can find?’ {loc. cit my emphasis). Her logic is 
that if in a given setting, we give one particular- world view ‘tire last word’, ‘we 
deprive ourselves of any more norms of toleration or respect that could help us limit 
the intolerance of cultures’ {loc. cit.). Rapport, on this point, gives the following 
example;
‘The correct defence of the liberal West in not handing over Rushdie to 
Khoemeni’s fatwah is not ‘This is how we do things here’, but ‘This is the 
right thing to do: this is how things ought to be done everywhere’ 
(forthcoming - ‘Culture is no Excuse’ in Social Anthropology’).
On this account, then, cultur al relativism is potentially antithetical to the toleration of 
diversity, despite the fact that this might seem counter intuitive in terms of older 
social anthropological reifications of culture. It seems to me that Nussbaum is either
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working with an idea of cultural relativism that anthropologists understand as being 
naïve, (Gellner’s aforementioned caricatures) or, more likely, she is using this 
argument only with respect to instances where particular- ‘cultures' systematically 
condone the maltreatment of individuals or gr oups. She contends that substantive and 
universal ethical principles can be constructed out of lar gely ‘imcontroversiaT and 
minimal ideas of human functioning^^ that do not require profound substantive 
agreement. She fur-ther asserts that this framework is not in conflict with descriptive 
relativism, that is the recognition of diversity in moral reasoning and by extension, 
that human ‘capabilities’ can be fulfilled in a myriad of ways.
To postulate that one of the universal values should be ‘personal choice’ would then, 
be considered offensive to only the most authoritar-ian traditions; we should ‘reflect 
before we conclude that women witliout options really endorse the lives they lead’ 
(Nussbaum 2000: 43)^ .^
A difficulty that Nussbaum (or Rapport) do not seem to take into consideration here, 
though, is that, generally speaking, the commutation of norms and practices between 
different moral traditions is not a neutral process. That is, cultural borrowing tends to 
be ‘top down’, driven by the active interests of those who embody and represent the 
globally dominant individuating and culturally homogenismg agenda. The ‘last word’ 
she refers to somehow always ends up being spoken in a Western liberal idiom. 
Traditional communities ar e, generally speaking, in a state of siege.
Nussbaum’s answer to this criticism is that the liberal argirment proposes an 
overar ching political framework within which not just individual liber-ty, but the rights 
of self ascribed ‘cultures’ is affirmed and guaranteed (but always asser-ting the pre­
eminence of individual rights). This appeals to social anthropologists who ascribe to 
the view that individual agency makes sense only within a shared universe of 
meanings and that some very pai-ticular kinds of human agency and well being depend
This approach is known in philosophy as ‘conshuctivism in ethics’ -  which could be confusing in 
relation to ‘social constructivist’ views of ethics, some version of which are thoroughly relativistic. 
(O’Neill 1989; Rawls 1971)
^ The choice of individuals to submit themselves to harmful cultural practices might be, in the liberal 
view, a case of ‘mournful realism’ where a choice which is considered to be the best in bad 
ch cumstances is made.
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upon the continuation of distinct cultuiai realities (Hastinp 1997; Gledhill 1994; 
Overing 1985).
Nussbaum sets out to refute that the ‘argument from the good o f diversity’ sufficiently 
challenges the validity of universal norms. This argument, she says, boils down to the 
statement that ‘our- world is rich in part because we don't all agree on a single set of 
categories but speak many different languages of value’ (2000: 50). That is, the world 
becomes a poorer place with every diminishment of cultural expression, idiom, 
cosmology, impoverished as living cultures perish to be remembered in journals and 
museums.
Not necessarily so, asserts Nussbaum. Diversity is a good thing, she affirms, and it 
would be a bad thing if the ‘materialism and aggressiveness’ that are part of the value 
system of ‘America’ was emulated needlessly elsewhere {loc. cit.). Making an 
interesting distinction between ‘languages’ (which, she says, ‘do not harm people’^ '*) 
and ‘cultures’ (the practices of some which frequently do), she asserts that aspects of 
life that are normalised in a given cultmal setting, such as female genital mutilation or 
the stoning of ‘adulterous women’ can be understood to be universally wrong:
‘Insofar- as there is diversity worth preserving in the various cultures, it is 
perhaps not in traditions of sex hierarchy, any more than in traditions of 
slavery that we should search for it’ (2000: 51).
The possibility of maldng moral judgements about particular cultural practices in 
terms of human dignity and the access of individuals to fundamental requirements for 
flomishing is therefore affirmed. Communities, or traditions, on this account (much 
like political organisations) can only be justified by the contribution, or otherwise 
they make to the possibilities of individuals to function in a way that reflects human 
dignity, defined in universal terms^^. An anthropological affirmation of this 
perspective is given by Rapport:
This is obviously a highly questionable distinction given the dichotomous evaluations ascribed to 
traditional vei-sus modern societies in colonial discourse for instance.
Greenhough gives an interesting and controversial discussion on why Bengalis when stricken by 
famine did not riot but progressively neglected and resigned individuals of lower status to death. His 
thesis is that this mode of reacting was based upon a hierarchical value system (1982; Dumont 1986).
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‘For I wish to work out an ethic for anthropology which will condemn 
Nazism, religious fundamentalism, female circumcision, infanticide and suttee 
because of the huit they cause to individuals, because of the haim which 
accrues in those social milieux where an ethic of interpersonal tolerance is not 
managed: the violation of individual integrity, the threat to individual’s 
conscious potential, the ideological prioritising of the community above and 
beyond the individuals who at any one moment constitute if  (1997: 181).
This is in contiadistinction to Herskovits’ contention that noims tliat aie paiticular to 
a given cultuie should never be supplanted by values that have originated extraneous 
to this settmg, as if there is a ‘moral rectitude’ intrinsic to every discrete culture 
(Wilson 1997: 1-27). Again, Nussbaum, and Rapport are looking negatively at 
instances in pai ticulai* ‘cultuies’ where the rights of paiticulai' categories of people are 
not respected. I would argue that great care has to be taken here as it is all too easy for 
Western commentators to constiuct entire arguments ai'ound these negative 
obseiwations which can potentially, by extrapolation, be used to discredit the whole 
(reified) morality that is implicit within these particulai* cultuies. It is also easy to use 
these observations in terms of a complementary opposition which validates Western 
society, (‘there is no suttee here’) whilst failing to mention the very grave failings of 
the West, past and present. In a personal communication to Rapport, Rorty asserted 
that ‘the cmelty and humiliation that paves the way for universal liberal democracy is 
a necessary evil, like the cruelty and humiliation involved in socialising a child’ (in 
Rapport 1997: 186). This appeal s to be a bold and honest statement of his belief in the 
superior maturity of liberal mdividualism vis-à-vis ‘illiberal’ political and cultural 
systems that need to ‘grow up’. Nevertheless, without wishing to make too much of 
Rorty’s comment, it is obviously doubtful that his idea of good parenting would meet 
widespread approval. Learning to use cmelty and humiliation would seem to be 
anathema to the achievement of well being in most societies and one can think of 
many ways in which ‘Western cultuie’ appeals ‘infantile fiom the perspective of other 
cultuies.
Lastly, Nussbaum examines what she calls the ‘argument from paternalism’', ‘when 
we use a set of universal norms as benchmarks for the world's various societies . . .  we
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show too little respect for people's freedom as agents’ (2000: 51). As a liberal, 
Nussbaum clearly wants to affirm the rights of people to make their own choices 
about their values and indeed this very value (which is at the basis of such liberties as 
freedom of religion and of association, among others) is one that she asserts as being 
valid universally. Again she only envisages that being patemalistically liberal, or 
encouiaging the inculcation of equal employment rights or education for all, for 
instance, as being a difficulty for illiberal gioups with regard to whom she insists that 
individuals should have the possibility of opting in or out of on the basis of personal 
choice:
Tn that way, any bill of rights is ‘paternalistic,’ vis-à-vis families or gioups . . 
. that treat people with insufficient or unequal respect, if paternalism means 
simply telling people that they cannot behave in some way that they have 
haditionally behaved and want to behave’ (2000: 53).
At a political level, Nussbaum is reiterating the standard Rawlsian liberal argument 
that a cosmopolitan overlapping consensus can be based on the piinciples of all 
human beings being free and equal, as all reasonable views can endorse tliis, albeit 
fr om different perspectives.
Rawls sought to establish a model through which a given society’s economic, social 
and political institutions could be gauged in terms of their ability in allowing ‘the 
adequate development and exercise of their moral powers and a fair share of the all- 
pui'pose means essential for advancing the their determinate (permissible) conceptions 
of the good’ (1993: 187, in Gledliill 1994: 87). The idea of paternalism is important 
with respect to the point made earlier that vulnerable individuals and groups may not 
have access, in practice, to the rights that aie enshiined in their country’s constitution. 
The State, then, should, in some cases, be positively ‘paternalistic’ in protecting those 
who aie disadvantaged, maiginalised and abused.
Let me recapitulate. 1 have sought to simplify the complexity of the compromises of 
modern liberalism as this forms the main background picture for the consideration of 
development ethics and is the most prevalent ethical framework in Western politics 
and institutional practices.
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The most hopeftil framework for development ethics that I have come across is the 
‘capabilities approach’ which postulates an idea of human well being which can be 
achieved in different ways without necessarily making a fetish of commodities, 
machines, buieaucracy or individualism. The strength of this approach is that it 
provides scope for the explication of the achievement of well being in terms that do 
not necessai'ily involve the domineering and often negative Western intenogation of 
whether particular societies have the necessary ingredients (‘rights’, commodities, 
certain kinds of knowledge) that ar e deemed necessaiy in the West.
Nevertheless, as with all frameworks, the capabilities approach in the hands of policy 
makers of an individualist persuasion is likely to be twisted in paiticulai* directions 
that are unlikely to favoui* communitaiian or ecological aspirations. For this reason, 
the dual imperative for applied anthropologists, in my view, is to subvert this 
dominant agenda through firstly by facilitating the understanding of particulai* 
communitarian social ethics while critiquing Western liberal individualism within the 
development discomse and secondly, supporting the aspects of the rights discourse 




The Western Moral Tradition in Pieces;
The Virtues of a Universal Social Teleology for the Anthropology of 
Development
It has been one of my central contentions that the realisation of individual identity and 
morality can not happen in isolation from the social life (or spheres of sociality) to 
which one cannot help belonging (in variable ways). Taylor argues that moral 
intuitions are drawn upon by the individual in particular ‘moral spaces’, where 
feelings form as central a role as rationality; ‘identity is intimately linked to 
orientation in a moral space’ (1985a: 28) which implies that ‘social actors not only 
acquire a sense of what is natural, they also acquire strongly motivating sense of what 
is desirable. They not only know, they also care’. In practical life, knowledge so often 
isolated as cognition in theory is not independent of emotion and evaluation’ (Hastrup 
1995: 118; see also Rosaldo 1986). Overing and Passes for instance, drawing from a 
number of Amerindian ethnographies, conclude that Amazonian peoples ‘desire 
above all else a high degree of emotional comfort in daily life, a stress substantiated 
by the political and moral one that sets as first priority the achievement of conviviality 
in the productive relations of community life. (2000: 1-2).
Also, one of the themes that has reverberated throughout the thesis, that is, the tension 
between universalism and cultural/ethical relativism will be looked at in greater detail. 
My contention is that comparative social anthropology, if it aspires to a be a self­
consciously moral discipline across the board of its interests and applications, also 
needs to make an attempt at conceptualising the universals of human well being. As 1 
will argue, because the construction o f cultures is universally human, and also, as 
being human implies belonging to some form of community (not just ‘Society’), the 
achievement of well being can only be understood in relation to individuals embedded 
in particular cultural inter-subjectivities. The rhetoric of this chapter, in terms of the 
ethics of the anthropological grasp of the ‘individual’ vis-à-vis the ‘social’, is 
fortuitously perfectly encapsulated by de Coppet:
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‘But is a reverence for the rights of the human person truly incompatible with 
a judgement that societies also deserve respect? To refuse them such respect 
means spinning all differences, all specific cultmal identities. What is worse, 
the refiisal to take into account this communal social dimension inherent in the 
human condition, far from offering protection against totalitaiian deviations, 
may lead to them. The intention to recognise only individuals often assumes 
the character of a destructive mania’ (de Coppet 1993; 62)
Anthropological Moral Ontologies of the Self
Moral philosophy and social anthropology often ask the same questions, albeit to 
different ends. Practitioners of the former have often dealt with the concepts that are 
used to understand morality in different times and places as if they were part of a 
limited catalogue of timeless ideas whilst those of the latter, more often than not, have 
sought to describe the ways in which particular moral concepts are efficacious in the 
flux of specific cultural settings. A key concern shared by these disciplines is 
conceptualising the relationships between the individual, society and natme.
There appeals to be disagieement, if not confiision, about how social anthropologists 
can, or should, conceive of a moral ontology of the self in society. This scepticism is 
kept in tension with the generalised intuition that there is a definable commonality 
that all human beings shaie. The philosopher Nussbaum, for instance, declares that:
‘We should work to malce all human beings part of om* community of dialogue 
and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, 
and give the circle that defines our humanity, special attention and respect’ 
(1996: 9).
The anthropologist Engelke notes that this idea ‘is not far from what some, perhaps 
many, anthropology professors would admit to as one of their agendas in an 
introductoiy anthropology couise’ (1999: 316). A perennial anthropological question, 
however, is whether different discuisive practices aie ‘simply unhanslateable and 
incommensurable, or is there some possible middle ground?’ (Ai'ce and Long 2000: 
3). Overing’s position on this point is that extreme relativism ‘ . . .  is a stance that no
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anthropologist would seriously hold’ as ‘we wish to . . . encourage points of contact 
between cultures, not discourage them, or the idea of them. Our business is, after all, 
translation’ (1985: 3). The difficulty, she emphasises, is coming to agreement about 
what defines this commonality both in ontological terms and with regard to 
conceptualising the idea of ‘well being’, ‘basic needs’, or ‘rights’ cross-culturally. A 
further concern is the way in which ‘universals’ are utilised by dominant agendas. 
This is obviously a dynamic that has been of concern to anthropologists in 
development witnessing the persistence of colonial characterisations of non-modern 
societies in terms that facilitate their dismantling.
The Social Anthropological Wariness of Discussing ‘Human Nature^
Notwithstanding this wariness, it would seem that an obvious starting point in the 
consideration of an ethics for applied anthropology would be to malce an attempt at 
some basic definition of what a human being is and what a human being’s basic needs 
and requirements for fulfilment are. However, fiom a pragmatic point of view, the 
aim of reaching agreement about human natur e is considered to be just too big a task. 
It would mean descending into depths of reflection that will not necessarily yield 
answers that are relevant to the ingent questions about social life that anthropology 
asks. On this basis, the anthropologist Wilson dismisses the appropriateness of 
considering questions of human nature in anthr opological investigations:
‘We can afford to be agnostic about such cabalistic musings. The question of 
human nature is a metaphysical one which cannot be answered on 
phenomenological grounds, and we should bracket it and proceed with our* 
contingent and historical investigations’ (1997: 14).
Indeed, the extent to which anthropologists should theorise on definitions of human 
nature at all is contested and contentious. Gledhill, for instance, makes the claim that 
‘antliropologists are not social and political philosophers, and our* role is lar gely one 
of obser*ving how these developments manifest themselves in practice’ (2001: 20). 
Another anthropologist, Wendy James completely disagrees, arguing conversely, that 
‘our central concern with human nature differentiates anthropology from other 
disciplines’ (in Ingold 1996: 45). I thinlc it is worth noting that whilst Rorty asserts
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that ‘no such discipline as philosophical anthropology is required as a preface to 
politics, but only history and sociology’ (in Gledhill 1997: 89), it is also cleai* that 
some conceptualisation or other of moral ontology, is inevitably present in any 
attempt to describe and construct theories around social action, in any case. Whilst the 
ontological question itself, in metaphysical terms is usually considered to be out of 
social anthiopology’s scope, working definitions of human natuie, each with different 
moral implications continue to evolve in social science and to have efficacy in the 
workings of society \
The consensus among social anthropologists is that the creation of cultuies is 
constitutionally human and also that the trope of ‘culture’ figures as the cential way 
employed by humans to apprehend and describe om* social relations. This is highly 
significant in moral tenns, especially if one considers that societies differ so radically 
in their ways of achieving well being. An understanding of the cultural, social, and 
historical backgrounds in which individuals are embedded is obviously fundamental 
to any consideration of moral ontology. On tliis basis, interpretative anthropology has 
focused on the description of the paiticular, concrete, local manifestations of human 
beings rather than on the universal, constant and abstract principles proposed by the 
Enlightenment.
Anthropological Defence of the Particular and the West*s Hijacking of Universals
Wilson asserts that ‘for most anthropologists, the category of human nature is one of 
the more offensive ways of imposing the prejudices of ‘Western culture’ {ibid. : 5, my 
emphasis). Charles Taylor points out that, on this basis, discussing human natuie is 
resisted in contemporary social science:
‘The very words ring bells. We fear that we may be setting up some reified 
image, in face of die changing foims of human life in histoiy, that we may be 
prisoners of some insidious ethnocentiism’ (1985: vii).
Geertz, for example, argues that cultural and biological factors must be considered as being 
intertwined; ‘between the cultural pattern, the body, and the brain, a positive feedback system was 
created in which each shaped the progress of the other’ (1973: 48). The sociologist. Parsons conceived 
of human beings as ‘a synthesised combination of living organism and a “personality system” (1978: 
331 ; emphasis original).
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This diffidence within the discipline of social anthropology to making statements 
about human nature with universal pretensions would appear to be based on two main 
foundations. Firstly, there might be the awareness that certain versions of human 
moral ontology have served as justifications for limiting the category of being human, 
or what is ‘natural’, to a certain group, class or echelon, or for defining others as 
being ‘sub-human’ or ‘perverse’. The idea of complete unity, for the social historian 
Isaiah Berlin (1994), who evokes the European totalitarian experience, cannot be 
separated from the silencing of those who disagree with the dominant agenda. The 
implied argument is that, as Kerr observes ‘the only way of saving humanity from 
oppression of some kind or other is precisely to give up once and for all the aspiration 
to resolve oui' moral and political differences completely’ (1997: 153). Taylor 
proposes that another reason for the suppression of essentialist moral ontology is 
partly because the pluralist nature of our' societies makes it much easier to live that 
way (2000).
Secondly, anthropologists arguably understand their disciplinary rhetoric and/or 
responsibility vis-à-vis other academic approaches that are more prone to easy 
generalisations as specialising in the articulation and expression of difference and 
alterity. This defence of otherness as part of anthropology’s disciplinary mantra, thus 
postpones, or at least problematises facile theoretical asphations to the global 
reconciliation of humanity (especially in terms of naturalist or behaviourist 
paradigms). A key point, tlien, is that antliropologists, recognising the embeddedness 
of the self in partially incommensurable social settings, consider it an important 
aspect of their disciplinary ethic to stress that the creation of cultural differences is a 
universal social strategy that requires a measured relativism. There are various further 
important reasons for the anthropological paean for difference, some of which, in my 
view, can be taken too far.
Fragmentation, Antagonism and Contextuality
Going back to the ‘post-culturaT dynamics discussed at the beginning of the chapter, 
it could be argued that post-modern ethnography stresses difference because it could 
not be othei-wise. This is Stephen Tyler’s argument:
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‘We confirm in our ethnographies our consciousness of the fragmentary nature 
of the post-modern world, for nothing so well defines our world as an absence 
of a synthesising allegory, or perhaps it is only a paralysis of choice brought 
on by our loiowledge of the inexhaustible supply of such allegories that make 
us refuse the moment of aesthetic totalisation, the story of stories, the 
hypostatised whole’ (1986: 132)
On this view, the depiction of fragmentation then, simply reflects the social world as 
it really is. As Bhabha notes, in Western academia, there has been increasing 
recognition of the ‘devastating implications of the issues of contextuality and 
indeterminancies in human life for the construction of abstract systems, based on 
clearly derived and universal principles of justice, morality and discourse (Bhabha 
1995: 236; cf. Rorty 1980). Anthropology, in the task of evoking different life worlds 
has felt more keenly than other disciplines, the necessity of discarding or at least 
problematising these universals for categorising social life. This is clearly one of the 
discipline’s more important contributions to development discourse.
Also, through the influence of theorists such as Marx, Freud and Foucault, there is a 
strong Nietzschean and Hobbesian influence in post-structuralist social theory that 
envisages unity or conviviality to be essentially illusory and hiding what Tyler calls a
‘ . . .  “lower” gyre of the unconscious, where dwell in mutual antagonism the 
dark forces . . . and the demonic rational powers of “underlying structures” -  
into the past, in memory, the mind carnal and incarnate’ (Tyler 1986: 133).
Foucault in fact, when asked who opposes who ‘in those exercises of power which 
constitute social, cultural, and intellectual life’ answered, that it is ‘all against a l l . . .  
Who fights against whom? We all fight each other. And there is always within each of 
us something that fights something else’ (in MacIntyre 1999: 53). Cultural 
representations, on this view, are understood as expressing particular* (sometimes 
unconscious) interests. Foucault has sought to demonstrate how this underlying drive 
to power is concealed through pretensions to neutrality, procedure and the 
disinterested perfonnance of traditions (as discussed in Chapter 7). This
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overwhelmingly negative view casts an unflaggingly cynical eye on every aspect of 
social life and, in my view does not amount to an adequate framework for 
apprehending different moral traditions.
Invocations of holism in different cultural realities, or social scientifically contrived 
systems, which depict functional integration, are now generally understood in social 
anthropology as ‘tropes’, that is ‘vehicles that carry imagination from the part to the 
whole’. Tyler argues that ‘laiowing them for what they are, whether mechanistic or 
organisrnic, malces us suspect the rational order they impose’ (op.cit 132).
I would caution here, though, that this radical distancing of the idea of ‘society’ away 
from the imagined ‘Individual’ diverts emphasis fi*om the distinct possibility that 
society is actually valuable and valued^ something involving an ineradicable sense of 
belonging, as something other than an arbitrary ideology. Consider the contrast in 
outlook here. From Overing and Passes (2000: 2) there is agreement that one of the 
characteristics of Amerindian sociality is an intense and self-aware commitment to 
conviviality and to the achievement of the sociable life together but nevertheless, ‘the 
self who belongs to the collective is an independent self, and the very creation of the 
collective self is dependent upon such autonomous selves who have the 
cognitive/affective sldlls for congenial, social interaction’ (see also de Coppet 1993 
for a discussion on societas and universitas).
Post-Modernist Non-Ontologies
Another important influence in contemporary social anthropology is obviously post­
modernism. Post-modernist theory and ethnography explicitly resists universalising 
meta-nairatives or any attempt to pin down human natuie. Lyotard, (1984) for 
instance, ai gues that the philosophical discouise of modernity and the Enlightenment 
gi'and narratives, (progress, universal justice, peace, sensus communis and Truth) aie 
anachi’onistic as they have been overtalcen by dynamics that they do not properly 
describe. Lyotard’s view is tiiat the comfort provided by the teleological visions 
provided by Maix, Hegel or Kant, for example, are chimerical; it has become clear 
that humanity is manifestly not progiessing in the manner proposed by any of these 
theories.
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Lyotard propounds the tolerant, post-modern view that there exist any number of ‘fhst 
order natural pragmatic naiTatives’, each of them having a right to express its own 
distinctive values, belief system or criteria for what should count as a ‘truthful’ or 
’valid’ statement. This perspective has close correspondence to contemporaiy 
anthi'opological method.
Lyotard advocates ‘dissensus’, that is, a proliferation of differing views on issues of 
ethical, or political concern. Because, epistemologically, post-modernism is sceptical 
of any possibility of universally valid truth or knowledge, the ethical implications of 
Lyotard’s theory of knowledge are that it would be wrong to apply one monological 
set of criteria definmg justice and truth, to evaluate, criticise and judge the narratives, 
practices, or beliefs of others who may have quite different ternis of reference, 
priorities and explanatoiy frameworks.
An observation I would make here, though, is that whilst post-modernist 
methodological approaches (‘polyphony’, ‘heteroglossia’, irony etc.) are worthwhile 
pragmatic and theoretical perspectives to be taken up, in the moral lives of individual 
anthropologists, not believing in moral absolutes is generally counter intuitive. 
Gaidner and Lewis (both involved in development) state this boldly;
‘There are moral absolutes in the world; people aie not merely atomised 
individuals, endlessly fragmented by diversity, with wholly different 
perceptions and experiences. People have a right to basic material needs; they 
also have a right to fulfil their individual potential; whether this involves 
becoming literate, retaining their cultural identity or their freedom, having the 
means to generate an income or whatever. Yet many millions of people 
throughout the world aie denied these rights’ (1996: 157)
Whilst post-modernists stress diversity, a strong case can be made for the argument 
that the causes of human misery are depressingly unifoim and can therefore be 
addressed in reasonably straightforward ways that do not necessaiily obliviate cultural 
difference.
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Valions authors, whilst assenting that the principle of tlie '‘différend’ is important, 
criticise Lyotard’s claims as amounting to a collapse of moral and intellectual nerve. 
Lehman warns that ‘most seriously, a contempt for ontology does not suggest good 
prospects for a post-modern environmental ethic. The issue of nature’s intrinsic value 
will tend to be dismissed as nonsense’ (2000: 439). The claim made by Morris is that 
post-modernism’s ‘exaggerated reaction against Caitesian metaphysics and positivism 
. . . invokes a rather bleak scenario, where the choice we are given is between two 
extremes: absolutism or nihilism.’ (1997: 315). This counter- reaction against post­
modernism is based upon an objection to perspectivism, that is, the belief that there is 
no ‘real world’ without the human mental construction of it. The contrasting realist 
perspective, asserts that our moral reasoning must be based upon certain universal 
realities. Wliilst the refusal to impose reified universal moral categories 
indiscriminately, is unquestionably salutary, for Gellner, for instance, it would be 
going too far to deny any idea of universal truths. As a strong proponent of 
universalism in anthropology, he argues that:
‘One simply cannot understand oui* shared social condition unless one starts 
from the indisputable fact that genuine knowledge of nature is possible and 
has occuiTed and has totally transformed the terms of reference in which 
human societies operate’ (1995: 8).
Between these positions, there seems to be a sensible general consensus that there are, 
in fact, moral absolutes but tliat social knowledge can only be the work of an 
embodied agent interacting with others. Anthropological critiques of Kant’s 
universalising ethics centre around the objection that moral judgements only make 
sense, or given weight of feeling, in the context of paiticular life-worlds, traditions, 
communities, language games, fomis of sociality, moral economies etc. (Overing 
1985). This principled emphasis on cultural relativism which is based on the empirical 
observation that moral life has to be understood in specific contexts has important 
implications. Anthropologists have set about deconstructing the presuppositions of 
Western thought in terms of their inappropriate imposition (either in theory, or in 
development programmes) on non-Westem cultures and have highlighted the 
resulting moral difficulties.
271
I began this chapter with an assertion that the Western moral tradition, paiticularly the 
stress on individualww, the excision of the aesthetic, emotional and spiritual from 
social morality and the emphasis on coercion in moral matters as cairied and 
commutated through the mechanisms of development, can be experienced as 
aggressive by non-modern societies. I will give a brief discussion on these issues.
Conceptualising the Individual in Society and Vice Versa
At the level of the individual in society, a major tension regulaiiy surfaces in Western 
formulations of explanatoiy frameworks through which to articulate an understanding 
of moral ontology. The tension I refer to is that between the necessity of belonging in 
some way to a moral community and the concomitant feai* of intimidated conformism 
in closed societies, or what Ken* calls ‘ conventionalism, according to which what 
passes for loiowledge, truth etc., is no more than the shared beliefs of a paiticulai* 
restricted community’ (Kerr 1997: 137). This fear is the motivation of Nussbaum’s 
series of arguments that were discussed in the last chapter, that it is a moral 
imperative that the rights of the individual should supersede respect for a cultuial 
reality as a whole.
‘Belonging^ and Moral Ontology
Taylor, in his critique of the Enlightenment conception of rationality and autonomy 
argues that the idea of ‘autonomy’ (which he defines as freedom and the ability to be 
impartial) should be complemented by the idea of ‘authenticity’. For Taylor, 
‘authenticity’ means the contextualisation of freedom in terms of our interdependence 
with Natuie and with regard to paiticulai* shared other-regarding values and virtues 
(2000).
The Enlightenment, from this perspective, constituted a ‘catastrophic’ departure from 
generic and individual man’s dialogic relationship with the aichaic or sacred, however 
this be conceived^. Taylor notes that Dostoyevsky once ‘identified Descartes’ cogito
 ^ Of course, across modem global culture there are many versions of the re-sacralisation of the 
community (sometimes in racialist, hierarchical or conventionalist forms), or the re-establishment a 
meaningful relationship with Nature mingled with technocratic, individualist and utilitarian ways of
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as the root of the modem evil. What he was opposing was the belief that humans 
affiiin their dignity in separation from the world’ (2000: 452). Similarly, the Jewish 
theologian, Martin Buber asserts that the rediscovery of this link is urgent; ‘the strict 
anthropological question (what is human nature?) . . . becomes insistent in times 
when, as it were, the original contact between the universe and man is dissolved and 
man finds liimself a stranger and solitary in the world’ (1958: 132). Taylor goes 
further to argue that the Romantic critique holds the Enlightenment, in its separation 
of facts fr om values, as responsible for the breaking of the social bond, as well as with 
drat with nature; of cutting human beings off from ‘relations of meaningful 
solidarity’, of ‘Idlling spontaneity’ (2000: 150). In the capitalist or technological 
vision so prevalent in the modem West, Kerr argues ‘we have a completely de- 
sacralised vision of the cosmos, and the community itself is not regarded as sacred. 
On the contrary it exists largely to serve productive goals, it is an instrument designed 
for the furtherance of individual goals, at least on the standard liberal view' (1997: 
150). MacIntyre agrees:
‘For liberal individualism, a community is simply an arena in which 
individuals each pursue their own self-chosen conception of the good life, and 
political institutions exist to provide that degree of order which makes such 
self-determined activity possible . . .  it is, on the liberal view, no part of the 
legitimate function of government to inculcate any one moral outlook’ (1997: 
195).
The moral ontology envisaged by Taylor, which has been discussed above, is one that 
simultaneously resists disengaged instrumental modes of reasoning, means-end 
utilitarian, procedural ethics, Cartesian dualism, the decentred, atomised self and non­
realist ontologies (which, incidentally, approximates to a smnmary of neo-liberalism). 
Taylor’s intent is to invite us to give credence to certain moral intuitions, which he 
believes to be universal and which, rather than being rendered valid, by crrlturally 
contingent criteria or individual idiosyncrasies, ar e with variable levels of faithfulness
being. The failure of Marxism and capitalism, as well as communitarianism in its organicist, 
hierarchical and conventionalist versions is the failure to be what Taylor calls ‘dialogue societies’ 
(1968: 160).
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told through the medium of cultural narratives but nevertheless, stand independently 
of these and offer standar ds by which these can be judged.
Taylor’s point is that social philosophies such as the means-end individualism and 
utilitar ianism of the Enlightenment, raise human beings above Nature and any idea of 
the existence of the ‘good’ beyond self reference. He argues that ‘there is something 
ultimately tail chasing, self-referring in an infinite regress about this’ (Taylor 2000: 
160). The stress Taylor puts on connectedness (botli to Nature and to other human 
beings) is related to his warning that liberal individualist and instrumental ideas of 
separation easily become affirmations of domination. Nature and the demands of 
society do not just constrain freedom, but should, ideally guide the exercise of 
autonomy.
Nietzsche^s Individual; ‘Creatio ex Niliilo*
Rapport argues from an avowedly anthropocentric perspective that our moral 
deliberations should be based upon on the category of the self-creating individual as a 
unique, subjective, self-conscious agent. He explicitly sets out an ‘ontological’ and 
‘moral’ agenda in a series of essays that are, among other things, committed to 
promote an approach to anthropological investigation tliat envisages society, culture 
or any collectivity as being constituted by self-conscious and creative individuals 
(1997). Where Rapport’s version of moral ontology departs from Taylor’s is his 
conferring of the power of creatio ex nihilo upon ‘transcendent individuals’. This 
view is based upon an interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectival theory of truth, 
which, in MacIntyre’s words, depends upon an appreciation of
‘ . .  . the multiplicity of perspectives from which the world can be viewed and 
the multiplicity of idioms by means of which it can be char acterised . . .  but no 
single world which they are of or about. To believe in such a world would be 
the illusion of supposing that “a world would still remain over after one 
subtracted the perspective” [Nietzsche Der Wille zur Macht, 567] ’ {1990: 36).
Rapport pronounces that individuals are ‘divine in their originality, their creativity, 
their imiqueness, but they are mortal, short-lived actors, and the substance of tlieir
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creations is perspectival, not factual or complete . . .  they are merely beautiful in what 
they do, in the substance of their original creations’ (1997: 4). He wants to keep the 
idea of God alive, but ‘under a new name: Individual’. The moral ontology 
propounded (which is also intended rhetorically as a reaction to the reductionist 
tendencies of social science) is exemplified as follows:
‘The transcendent individual, the individual who writes herself, and, in the 
process, rewrites the socio-cultural environment around her, is most fully a 
Nietzschean one. It is the essential, objective, inherent nature of the individual 
self, Nietzsche believed, to be self-caused and free’ {ibid.).
Acknowledged Dependence
The difficulty with this view in terms of formulating an anthi'opological ethic is the 
idea of ‘man as his own measure’ and the perspectivist Nietzschean claim to the effect 
that reality is simply what we human beings make of it, or project on to it. Also, there 
is the obvious tautology of Nietzsche’s assertion; to claim that there is no non- 
perspectival truth is itself asserting a non-perspectival theory of truth^. However, this 
perspectival approach now operates widely in social anthropology as a pragmatic 
approach to tr-uth and representation.
A fur-ther difficulty in Nietzsche’s moral ontology, is the potential lack of 
acknowledgement of the inter-dependence of human beings, societies and the natur*al 
environment inlierent in this view' .^ MacIntyre, without denying the value of 
individuality, argues that ‘the necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence 
(are) the vh'tues of acknowledged dependence’ (1999: 120). Whilst an inalienable
 ^Habennas makes the same observation of post-modernism, that it constitutes a perfoimative enor in 
making a universalistic claim that no universal truths exist (1973: 185-210). Nietzsche, however, 
recognised that perspectivalism as a claim was non-perspectival. ‘That's why he argued for a reality 
beneath intellection: something coiporeal, individual and existential. Last century Sartre phrased it as 
'existence preceding essence'; i.e. the meanings and identities we make (our essences; our cultures) are 
undercut by the reality of our existence (our bodies and our capacities to think and create meanings and 
identities), i.e. an existential reality undercuts all cultmal (and social) ones’ (Rapport - pers.comm). 
This seems to be a realist argument.
 ^Rapport, following Rorty, aigues that Nietzsche’s obsession with his own self can be best tempered 
by John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian doctrine of not ‘hindering or despoiling the individuality of another’ 
(1997: 4). I will argue in a later section that this argument has proven to be inadequate as either a
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aspect of being human is fragility and inter-dependence, this has often been 
overlooked in moral philosophy. He proposes that greater attention should be given to 
‘the vulnerability and disability that pervade human life, in early childhood, in old age 
and during those periods when we are injured or physically or mentally ill, and the 
extent of our consequent dependence on others’ (1999: 155). Equally importantly, he 
furtlier asserts that Nietzsche’s achievement is based upon a perspective that can only 
ever be imaginary:
‘Nietzsche in a heroic series of acts isolated himself by ridding himself, so far* 
as is humanely possible, of the commitments required by tire virtues of 
aclarowledged dependence. He was then able to tell us from that new vantage 
point how human nature and the human condition appear from it’ (1999: 162).
An ethic that does not acknowledge interdependence is obviously incomplete and is 
also an ethic that is particularly convenient for those who wish to deny responsibility 
for the well being of others. In short, an ethic that is built around the figure of a 
disengaged individual utterly free to pursue his or her own subjective ends is a 
peculiarly Western fantasy.
MacIntyre argues that Nietzsche’s ‘great man’, (which he, MacIntyre, considers to 
epitomise the greatest challenge to Aristotelian virtue ethics) by choosing to isolate 
himself (believing that all versions of morality were nothing more than disguised 
versions of the will to power) fr om all shared visions of the good, by refusing to enter 
into relationships based upon the author*ity of a shared moral tradition debars himself 
from ever knowing and appreciating the good in others. This suspicious moral 
solipsism has tragic consequences for the individual and offers nothing to ameliorate 
the moral crises of the contemporary world^. MacIntyre argues that in many ways.
personal or global ethic, as Lehman argues, ‘To say the least, modem environmental theorists are more 
aware of the dangers of instiumentalism and anthropocentrism’ (2001: 435)
 ^For example, ‘A great man, a man whom nature has constructed and invented in the grand style -  
what is he? . . .If he cannot lead, he goes alone; then it happens that he may snarl at some things he 
meets on the way . . .  he wants no “sympathetic heait”, but servants, tools; in his intercoui se with men 
he is always intent on making something out of them. He knows he is incommunicable: he finds it 
tasteless to be familiar: and when one thinks he is, he usually is not. When not speaking to himself, he 
wears a mask. He rather lies than tells the truth: it requires more spirit and will There is a solitude 
within him that is inaccessible to praise or blame, his ovm justice that is beyond appeal’ (Nietzsche 
1962: note 962).
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‘Nietzsche is the moral philosopher of the present age’ (op.cit: 114) as he perceived 
most clearly the failme of rational secular accounts of the nature and status of 
morality (op.cit: 256). Nietzsche jeers at the notion of basing morality on ‘real’ moral 
intuitions in Taylor’s sense, or on the rational foundations of the Enlightenment. The 
implication is that ‘morality’ can be nothing but a series of disguises for the will to 
power.
MacIntyre argues that wliilst it is true that ‘the Enlightenment has failed’, Nietzsche’s 
negative solution, whilst having a certain plausibility, can only be truly vindicated if 
the Enlightenment’s reaction against the Aristotelian (or virtue ethics) tradition can be 
shown not to be misconceived and mistaken. In other words, MacIntyre argues that 
the Aristotelian tradition still stands as a way to a better life. Whilst seeing Nietzsche 
as the most thoroughgoing critic of the morality of the Enlightenment, MacIntyr e 
argues that he is also the ‘ultimate antagonist of the Aristotelian tradition’ (op.cit: 
259). However, the conclusion that MacIntyre reaches is that Nietzsche’s ‘pseudo­
concept’ (although sadly not a fiction) of the ‘great man’ represents ‘individualism’s 
final attempt to escape firom itself (loc. cit.) and considers that the two great 
antagonistic views of viewing the world (sufiused through social science) ar e liberal 
individualism and the Aristotelian tradition^. The antagonistic rivalry between liberal 
individualism and the Aristotelian tradition is the central and most important debate to 
be considered in om* deliberations over the moral and ethical base of the social 
sciences:
‘The differences between the two rim very deep. They extend beyond ethics 
and morality to the understanding of human action, so that rival conceptions of 
the social sciences, of their limits and their possibilities, ar e intimately boimd 
up with the antagonistic confrontation of these two ways of viewing the 
human world.’ (MacIntyre: loc. cit.).
 ^The Nietzschean tradition if it can be called as such, as a moral force, has certainly not produced a 
world that its originator would have approved of, Maclntyie argues that Nietzsche, if suddenly 
transported to a contemporary context would find life as unpalatable as Aristotle might.
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The anthi’opologist Hohart, malces a similar identification; ‘Collectivism and 
individualism in one form or another are entrenched intellectual positions in a long 
running battle’ (1993: 8).
Communitarian Critiques of Liberal Individualism
The Enlightenment endorsement of the disengagement and abstraction of the 
individual from constitutive attachments and demands meant that ‘morality’ came to 
be seen in tenns of decontextualised ‘rights’. Whilst this paradigm has assumed the 
status of a global ethic, Taylor reminds us that ‘what is peculiar to the modem West is 
that its favoured formulation for the principle of respect has come to be seen in terms 
of rights’ (2000: 256). Alongside positively defending individuals from oppression, a 
negative aspect of this conceptualisation of human freedom is the accompanying 
asphation to be free from the limitations of natirre and the demands that arise from the 
condition of vulnerability. On this view, ideas of right and wrong are based upon 
consequentualist, minimalist ethics, and instrumental calculations of sur*vival.
Wlrilst on the standard liberal view, it is desirable (and hopefully possible) for each 
individual to piusue his or her own ends, fi*om a ‘virtue ethics’ perspective, it is 
difficult to conceptualise of the achievement of liberty and equality at a societal level 
without fraternity (or sorority). Virtue ethics, rather than looking primarily at the 
consequences of actions (utilitarianism) or fulfilling one’s duty for duty’s sake (Kant), 
is concerned with the kind of person one’s actions exhibit and requires one to be (Kerr 
2002: 115). Viitue ethics also involves considering the nature of a ‘good human life’ 
and therefore, what human beings must be like, and how they must behave, if they are 
to achieve their shared vision of the good. This is expressed by the Thomist 
theologian Kerr;
‘We have to discover the place in our conceptual system for the concept of the 
good as the object of our allegiance -  of om* love -  the good as the privileged 
focus that dr aws our attention and opens om* moral world’ (1997: 139).
Overing and Passes also assert tliat, among the moral tr aditions of the West, the virtue 
centred perspective has the closest correspondence to Amazonian peoples’ adherence
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to an ethics ‘primaiily centred upon the quality of ‘the good life’ which is engendered 
through the artful practices^ and skills of those who personally and intimately interact 
in everyday life . . .  the interactive relationships that might lead to the creation of a 
high quality of personal relations among those within the same life-world, such as, for 
instance, those concerned with the care, trust and responsibility for raising of 
children’ (2000: 4)
The liberal principle of non-interference in the pmsuit of subjective happiness, in the 
experience of the vulnerable and powerless might be felt as neglect (Gilligan 1987: 
170). Liberal theorists take a defensive view of versions of morality that place the 
sense of concern for the good of others too centrally or which value interdependence 
above independence; the idea of a version of morality that perlains to one group in 
society becoming a constraint upon the whole is rejected. The warning is broadcast 
that Communitarianism is ‘often hierarchical, and always exclusionary with regard to 
those who do not belong’. The danger is expressed of being subsumed, into a moral 
community that denies freedom and autonomy. As Rapport argues, individuals, after 
all ‘have the right to resist and opt out of the norms and expectations of particular 
social and cultmal groupings and chart their own comse’ (2000: 166-7). Fearing 
totalitarianism, where the individual becomes incidental to the group ethos, the 
ar gument is made that:
‘To decry the seeming atomism of individually conceived human rights . . .  is 
to wish to replace a politics of individual rights with a politics of common 
good, and an emphasis on collective life and the supreme value of the 
community’ (Rapport 2000: 167).
However, notwithstanding this defence of individuals ft om malign totalitarian forces, 
I would agree with Baler’s argument that, as a moral perspective, the minimalist, 
rights based model, by default, constitutes its own kind of totalitarianism, in that it 
prevents the flourishing of other versions of well being. The achievement of a society 
where an ethics of care are felt in practice would require a ‘closer co-operation ftom 
others than respect for rights and justice (would) ensme’ (1995: 44). Also, in a rights
’ ‘Artful’ is used in the old sense of being characterised by ‘art, beauty’ and not in the modern sense of 
‘using deceit or cunning’ (footnote from original).
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based world, those who do actively engage in the care of others can easily be taken 
advantage of. They usually end up being conveniently rewarded as the minority who 
salve the consciences of the less altruistic many; those who catch those who fall by 
the wayside in a competitive and sometimes callous society. Baier argues:
‘Volunteer forces of those who accept an ethic of care, operating within a 
society where power is exercised and the institutions redesigned, or 
maintained by those who accept a less communal ethic of minimally 
constrained self-advancement, will not be the solution.’ (1995: 44)
This is, of cour se, the precise role of many NGOs who seek to mitigate the impact of 
neo-liberal policies.
Ethics and the Social Embeddedness o f the Self
Thinking, in terms of its potentiality, is arguably, ‘the most consequential of social 
acts’ (Geertz 2001: 21). Addressing the social nature of thought has gained greater 
currency in moral philosophy and social science following Wittgenstein’s argument 
that we cannot properly conceive of thought in terms of private languages; language is 
essentially public^ (1953).
In order to consider the natur e of moral experiences, an attempt to apprehend the 
relationship between individual thought and social action is essential. MacIntyre 
asserts that
‘Rational enquiry is essentially social and, like other types of social activity ..
. it depends for its success on the virtues of those who engage in it, and it 
requires relationships and evaluative commitments of a particular kind . . .  it is 
something we undertake from within our shared mode of practice’ (1999:156- 
7).
 ^Wittgenstein argued that analytical philosophy, througli the metaphysical extension of ideas or words, 
considers them in isolation from their use, and should ask the question whether these words/ideas aie 
ever actually used in this way in the language in which they are at home. Murdoch argues that whilst 
we may have ‘inner’ introspectible objects (images, talking to ourselves etc.), inner words ‘mean’ in
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Hastrup argues that ‘there can be no moral agency at all without a sense of shared 
moral space; there can be no sense of self for that matter. To know who you are is to 
loiow how to orient yourself in a moral space, to experience yourself among other 
selves’ (2001: 14, see also Taylor 2000: 35). Morality has been conceptualised in 
terms of rationality, feelings, social organisation, religious belief, power and ideas of 
false consciousness. It could be argued that the discipline of anthropology, by 
privileging one perspective on morality over another, has historically dealt with 
questions of morality in ways that oversimplify the reality of human beings’ 
experience. For example, an easy identification of morality with social structure 
excises, or diminishes, the crucial role of human agency (Berger and Luclonaim 
1967). The western tendency to analytically separate the dimensions of human nature 
and experience, rationality from emotion, mind from body and so on, has resulted in 
truncated descriptions of moral agency. Hastrup argues that
‘A good many features of social life and of cultural judgement simply defy the 
labels of rationality or irrationality . .  .This has important consequences for the 
linlc between universal and local standar ds. They cannot simply be measured 
against each other as more or less rational, according to an absolute (if 
arbitr ary) scale of reason. Vast ar eas of moral conduct are neither articulated 
in language nor reducible to reason’ (Hastrup 2001: 11)
Her contention, that thought is fundamentally ‘social’, requires reflection on how to 
understand the relationships between the specificity of cultural realities, moralities 
and different manners and modes of thinking. Her point is that ‘the semantic features 
of language are public features’ (1995: 183) although this does not impose uniformity 
in the ways these meanings can be interpreted by individuals.
Recent ethnographies of Amazonian peoples concur that, ‘social talk . .  . pertains to a 
language of affect and intimacy that conjoins thinking and the sensual life . their 
’emotion talk’ is also ‘social talk’ in that they consider the management of then 
affective life vis-à-vis other people to be constitutive of moral thought and practical
the same way as outer words; and I can know my imagery because I know the public things which it is 
o f  (1971: 14).
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reason’ (Overing and Passes 2000: 3). The question here might be whether the 
semantic separations between the public from the private, the rational and the 
emotional etc., that characterises Western discourse, presents an obstacle for our 
understanding of the very real and substantive linkages between these abstracted 
areas. The scientific method separates fact and value, whereas in social reality, facts 
emerge through, and are intertwined with, our moral reactions and emotions. Speech 
acts fulfil their purpose insofar* as there is a degree of intelligibility both for* the 
speaker and the listener in terms of the context of a shar ed social practice, no matter* 
how fleeting. This intelligibility clearly depends upon the agents having knowledge 
of, and abilities within, a shared social context (see also MacIntyre 1999: 30).
An important adjunct, however, is considering the question of individual human 
agency. Whilst it appears clear that an individual’s conduct inevitably flows from the 
accumulated experiences and decisions that form his or her personality:
'^Action involves character, which involves choice -  and the form of choice 
attains its perfection m the distinction between Yes and No . . . though the 
concept of sheer motion is non-ethical, action implies the ethical, the human 
personality’ (Burke: 1966: 11, emphasis original).
So, the anthropological balancing act involves appreciating the social embeddedness 
of the self with the individuality and agency of the person (which is quite different 
from individualwm). Todorov argues that ‘it is said that liber*ty is the distinctive trait 
of the human species. It is cer*tain that my milieu pushes me to reproduce the 
behaviour* it valorises; but the possibility of uprooting myself from it also exists’ 
(1984a: 428). The idea of the individual moral agent and his or her* relationship to 
society is complex and has to be apprehended in relative terms that appreciates the 
ways in which individuals construct life-worlds which reflect and allow the realisation 
of their values.
The Discontents of Modem Western Liberal Individualist Society
A  society can be imagined in which justice reigns supreme, where individuals are 
secure in their* contracts, have equal opportunities, par*ticipate in political debate,
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where there are no restrictions on association and there is education, health and 
welfare for all at an adequate level, where women and men are equal in front of the 
law and torture and prejudice are dealt with severely.
What is disturbing for some contemporary moral philosophers and social theorists is 
that this world is entirely compatible with misery, boredom and alienation. As Baier 
argues, people in such a society may well be Tonely, driven to suicide, apathetic 
about their work . . . find their lives meaningless and have no wish to leave offspring 
to face the same meaningless existence’ (1988: 44). Similarly, as Simmel writes of 
life in the metropolis, ‘indifference and . . .  antipathy protect us’ (in Josephson 1972: 
154). MacIntyre complains that ‘modern society is indeed, at least in surface 
appearance, nothing but a collection of strangers, each pursuing his or her interests 
rmder minimal constraints’ (1997: 250-51). Fernandez observes that the Weberian 
thesis ‘about the ‘unprecedented condition of inner loneliness of the individual’ of 
which Marx also spoke, which was an increasing condition of modern life (Weber 
1930), a product of bureaucratic rationalisation and tire resultant isolating 
compartmentalisation of life’ continues to have currency in contemporary social 
tlieory (1995: 36) .^
I argued in Chapter 4 that the question of the ethics of development should be fr amed 
in terms of ‘what makes life fulfilling’ rather than in terms of the ethics that are built 
up to protect the impersonal smooth functioning of a merely tolerant liberal 
democratic society. I also argued that for anthropology to be relevant, it must talce 
seriously non-modem visions of the good. Overing and Passes, for instance, stress the 
importance of recognising;
‘the enormous valorisation hi which the indigenous peoples of Amazonia 
place upon good humour, affective comfort and a sociable mutuality in their 
everyday, intimate relations and practices of everyday living. The fact that 
many Amazonian peoples equate sociality with the convivial personal is not 
trivial to om- anthropological task. Their quest for a convivial sociality is the
 ^ Through 4 brief vignettes, Fernandez describes the ways in which individuals consciously, or 
unconsciously, in order to counter this disaffection and disenchantment, which is a consequence of the
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product of a powerful and egalitarian ethics and social philosophy, where 
humour, generosity and goodwill provide its sustenance; whereas our 
anthropological tools of the trade have been created to unfold the grave 
structur es of hierarchy and formal order’ (2000: 17).
Some of the limits of these ‘grave structures’ ar e as follows.
The Wrongs of Rights
The language of rights has never been as prominent in development discom se as it is 
today. There are various ways that anthropologists have responded to this emerging 
rights agenda as the universal language of development aspiration. For now, I would 
like to briefly mention two moral philosopher’s critiques of Western ethical models 
Annette Baier and Alasdair MacIntyre (Charles Taylor’s critiques are sprinkled 
tliroughout the thesis). Then shared view is that rights-based ethics hold a doubtful or 
incomplete role as the foundation of hrrman well being or flourishing.
Baier argues that the liberal orthodox stress on obligation as the key moral concept 
emphasises such questions as ‘On what basis should a person/group he obliged to do 
something?’ or ‘Who should be deprived of what freedom for the sake of what right?’ 
The question, hr its barest form is how, in a ‘just society’ can coercion be justified? 
The concept of obligation becomes central to a moral system char acterised by the idea 
of punishment and the justified limitation of freedom. Baier argues further that the 
modem model of contr actual obligation is based upon a very ‘cool’ relationship where 
only minimal trust is placed on the obliging person, and for whom considerable 
punitive power is required (1995: 13, 116).
In concentrating on obligations, rather than virtues, modern moral theorists have 
chosen to look at the cases where more trust is placed in enforcers of obligations than 
is placed in ordinary moral agents, the bearers of the obligations. Such a notion of 
improper trust, Baier aigues, where the upholding of morality depends upon the 
trusting of others to coerce, distorts oui' moral vision to suppose that all obligations
‘decommunalisation of modem life’, proceed towards a re-enchantment through somehow becoming 
part of a meaningful whole 1995).
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conform to what is in fact an abnormally coercive model. The resulting emphasis on 
coercion results in a distortion of our moral vision where what is right is associated 
with enforcement rather than virtue. This is the essential paradox of the modem 
notion of freedom. If this type of coercive stmcture of morality is regarded as the 
backbone of our moral gaze, then ‘undoubtedly life will be nasty, emotionally poor 
and worse than brutish’ {op.cit: 14).
This modern Western emphasis on obligation is considered in some feminist theory to 
be specifically masculine. The argument, in simple terms, is that contemporary men, 
in the West, generally understand morality in terms of obligation, contr act and justice 
as this reflects their attachment to personal autonomy and independence. Women, in 
contr ast, are more communitarian and view morality with reference to the virtues and 
qualities comiected with the bringing up of children, that is, the engendering of love, 
care, tmst and co-operation (Gilligan 1987). Overing argues that this argument would 
be difficult to sustain in Amazonia;
‘For the Piaroa, the values of care and tmst are relevant equally to the 
judgements of both men and women for they relate to notions about living an 
acceptable type of human life on earfh. At the same time, the right to personal 
autonomy is likewise an un-gendered value. In other words the western 
tendency to see communitarian values to be on the side of the female and the 
value of freedom to be basically a male perspective ill fits the Piaroa’ 
(pers.comm.).
Nevertheless, whilst Gilligan’s theorisation does not fit Amazonian life-ways, her 
critique is important in the sense that it reveals something of the West’s skewed 
emphasis on liberty as something opposed to certain basic responsibilities or aspects 
of human mutuality.
A further difficulty in tlie West arises from another tendency in the West that, as 
Taylor argues, the only ethics generated beyond the quest for self-fulfilment in our 
age is that of ‘procedural fairness’ (1989: 508). Hastrup concurs, asserting that to 
build a moral community on a sense of fan* trial and perceive it as a ‘culture’ that may 
embrace everyone is strildngly modernist (2001: 12). The corollary of tliis is a neglect
285
of the extr apolation of virtues, such as trust, care, or generosity that can attribute a 
greater meaning to interpersonal relationships than the mere negotiation of contr acts. I 
shall now look briefly at MacIntyre’s critique.
The Incommensurable Fragments of Modern Liberal Society and Arbitrary Power
In everyday moral reasoning, tradition and socially particular views of virtue endure 
and are mixed with characteristically modern and individualistic concepts such as 
rights or utility. MacIntyre adds to his demonstration of the fictitious nature of both 
the concepts of 'rights ’ and 'utility' by elaborating on the highly specific properties of 
these fictions. He further claims that a central characteristic of these moral fictions is 
that, as they were conceived to serve different purposes, claims invoking rights are 
incommensurable with claims centred on utility or on justice.
MacIntyre argues that the dispute between these two positions cannot be settled by 
appealing to abstract reason. If we accept the starling points of analytical liberal 
theorists such as Robert Nozick (1974) or John Rawls (1971), we should agree with 
their conclusions, for their accormts are internally coherent. The problem is that 
neither theorist can show why we should accept their starling point to hegin with. 
Furlher, he argues that whilst these positions have intractably opposed premises, they 
do share a number of, mostly negative, similarities. Firstly, in both, there is 
recognition that the achievement of justice for one party inevitably has a cost to some 
other. This means that different social groups have a stake in deciding wliich version 
of distributive justice achieves prominence in a given context. Secondly, he notes that 
both theorists build their arguments on individualistic premises; the notion of 
community is absent from Nozick’s version and a pre-supposition of Rawls’ view is 
that ‘we must expect to disagree with others about what the good life for human 
beings is and must exclude this firom our understanding of justice’ {op.cit: 250)^ ®.
This division between law making and individual morality was a component of Adam Ferguson’s 
Enlightenment view of the status of law in relation to individual morality: ‘We are not to expect that 
the laws of any country are to be framed as so many lessons of morality . . . Laws, whether civil or 
political, are expedients of policy to adjust to the pretensions of parties, and to secure the peace of 
society (Principles of Moral and Political Science ii. 144).
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Also, as one of MacIntyre’s central tenets is that moral philosophy is an abstract 
reflection of the actual moral positions puzzled over by people in their everyday lives, 
he argues that whilst neither positions make any reference to virtue or tradition in 
their argumentation, in social reality, individuals do in their reasoning and intuitions. 
For instance, it is argued that Rawls and Nozick delimit the relevance of the past in 
their respective formulations of the principles of justice, albeit in different ways. 
Rawls’ appraisal of justice is entirely based upon contemporary patterns of equality 
and inequality, not how these came to be. For Nozick, the past is only relevant in 
terms of previous legitimate hansactions; if someone has lawfully inherited a fortune, 
it is his to enjoy; the present day distribution of resources, no matter how unequal, is 
not factored into his conceptualisation^ \  A related observation is that neither theorist 
makes any reference to desert, or merit in their accounts of justice, something that 
MacIntyre contrasts again with moral reasoning in everyday life. The real life 
counterpar-ts of Nozick and Rawls might appeal, respectively, to such ideas as a 
working person being entitled to enjoy what he has earned, or that the poor are 
undeserving of the misery they were born into and should be given the same 
opportunities as others.
MacIntyre’s point, drawing from these accumulated observations is that Rawls and 
Nozick share a view in which individuals are primary, and society secondary, in the 
formulation of moral or social bonds, the idea of desert, in contrast, ‘is at home only 
in the context of a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of 
the good for man and of the good of that community and where individuals identify 
their interests with reference to these goods’ {op.cit: 250).
MacIntyre therefore argues that this liberal-individualist view of social life as an 
aggregate of voluntary, rational, abstracted individuals with prior interests excludes 
the possibility of conceptualising morality in terms of the shared visions, virtues and 
tasks that are requhed to achieve par ticular versions of human well being. In everyday 
moral reasoning, then, as opposed to the abstractions of Western moral categories.
“ It is also worth noting that the excision of the past from Rawls’ account of justice makes claims for 
retribution impossible. Similar ly Nozick’s lack of consideration of historically illegitimate entitlements 
(such as those which benefit the present owners of most of the Highlands of Scotland, or Amazonia, for 
example) where land was gained through violence, gives no scope for retrospective justice to benefit 
indigenous peoples, for example.
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tradition and socially particular views of virtue endure and are mixed with 
‘characteristically modern and individualistic concepts such as rights or utility’ 
{op.cit: 252). This causes a discrepancy between tlie representation of public 
discourse on rights and utility as being rational and coherent and what is actually 
happening. To make sense of the moralities that are operative in the creation of the 
achievement of well being, we have to think about the kinds of values and beliefs that 
aie embedded in particular communities.
This leads us to an important insight for the understanding of the politics of modem 
societies, and indeed, the tensions that arise through the negotiations of development. 
MacIntyre (1997) depicts modem, public culture as being characterised by the tension 
between an individualistic set of claims made in terms of ‘rights’ and another set of 
claims made through bureaucratic institutions, which are expressed in terms of 
‘utility’. As both rights and utility are ‘incommensurable fictions’, it follows that the 
modem moral idiom, as MacIntyre (1997: 71) explains, ‘can at best provide a 
semblance of rationality for tlie modem political process, but not its reality’.
It is clear that contemporary moral controversies, both public and private, ar e notable 
for their interminable nature, which is due to the incommensurability of the premises 
of different positions and also disagreement about the constitutive goods and telos of 
moral debate. In addition, as MacIntyre observes, the contending parties in 
contemporary moral debate are often arbitrarily positioned (1997:1-22, 256). On this 
view, we have passed from states of relative order to a contemporary state of 
confusion^^. This is not to say tliat people are necessarily any less ‘moral’ than they
The three salient characteristics, in summary then, of contemporary moral debate are as follows:
“ Different positions are based upon incommensuiable premises and their resolution becomes a 
matter of the relative and arbitraiy power of each contending party, thus making ‘shrillness’, 
‘unmasking’ and defensiveness notable features of moral debate today, 
a There is a paradoxical air to moral disagreement: whilst the mode of impersonality, purporting to 
rational argumentation is used, for example, refeiTing to supposedly shared standaids of justice or 
duty, in reality, the force of moral argument depends upon the context of the utterance and the 
relative positions of the speakers.
° The range of moral sources that provide the background to contemporaiy debates is wide and 
heterogeneous and the term ‘moral pluralism’ is often used complacently, as if it means a set of 
definable perspectives engaged in ordered dialogue. The reality is that, as noted above, the 
countless moral cultures in the contemporaiy world (and the faint and selective reflection of these 
provided by moral philosophy) are generally constituted by ‘an unharmonious melange of ill- 
assorted fragments’. The evaluative expressions that are used in moral discourse today have taken 
on new and different meanings fr om those with which they were invested in the historical contexts 
from which they have now been deprived.
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would be if pait of a coherent moral tradition, but that it is much more difficult to 
settle disputes and to Imow how to proceed morally under present conditions.
It could be argued that moral debate has, and always has been interminable, and this is 
not a feature unique to our modem contemporaiy cultiue. MacIntyre answers this by 
refeiTing to the claims of emotivism. He asserts that certain profound difficulties in 
Western moral reasoning have resulted from emotivism being not just a philosopliical 
phenomenon, but a key characteristic of modern culture: ‘we live in a specifically 
emotivist culture . . .  a wide vaiiety of oui' concepts and modes of behavioui' -  and not 
only our explicitly moral debates and judgements - presuppose the tmth of 
emotivism.’ (1997: 22). Emotivism, essentially, pui'ports to be an account of all moral 
expressions, being the ‘doctrine that all evaluative judgements and more specifically 
all moral judgements aie nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of 
attitude or feeling, insofar as they aie moral or evaluative in character’ {op.cit.: 1997: 
12). According to emotivism, evaluative statements aie likely to be imperative in 
nature rather than statements of fact based on practical reason or shared values.
What is of concern here, and this is the point, is the fact that the language of rights 
and utility, and the fragmented rationality that characterises it, simply conceals the 
arbitiary powers that scramble towards the resolution of competing claims. This 
pattern is manifest in the extremes of inequality between different social groups in 
contemporaiy society. Homborg recognises that this dynamic often operates to the 
cost of traditional cultures:
‘The ideology of abstract utility emerges as the legitimation of Western 
market expansion. Parallel to the social process whereby the market conspires 
to subsume all local cultures, its own tautological cosmology aspires to engulf 
all local systems of meaning’ (1992: 3; see also Gudeman 1986, 1989 and 
Taussig 1980).
So, in the fragmentation and irrationality of public and political discomse which 
involves the contestation of incommensurable claims based on individualistic, 
procedural rights discourses, as opposed to bmeaucratic and institutional narratives 
that focus on utility as a legitimation for decision and finally a myriad of survivals in
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the modem consciousness of other moral traditions, the end result is that instmmental 
forces usually driven by economic interests exert the most dominant influence. This 
assertion, then, if tr ue, means that development ethics is faced by the inexorable 
persuasive force of arbitrary economic powers.
Given that achieving a shared version of practical reason for public moral deliberation 
is obviously a tall order, in the meantime, a more realistic response might be one of 
resistance or ‘opting out’. Indigenous communities, for instance, may elect, as far as 
possible, not to engage with Western political and economic realities. 
Anthropologists, in their insistence that societies and parficular moral traditions, 
rather than being oppressive ideological str'uctui'es that the individual is best to free 
him or her self from, constitute arenas where relational values and particulai* virtues 
are lived out and nurtured for the well being of embedded individuals. Another point 
of resistance is making plain the poverty of rights based ethics as a route to well 
being.
The Virtues and Social Teleology
The supposedly morally neutral stance of the development plamier, or the social 
scientist involved in development can be traced back to the philosophical and social 
beginnings of the ‘facts first’ approach to social action which rejected Aristotelian 
teleological frameworks for evaluative claims. The philosophers of the Enlightenment 
believed themselves to have left behind the ‘Daiic Ages’ by shining light on reality, on 
unadulterated facts, without being encumbered by Aristotelian teleological ideas and 
‘visions of the good’ about natuie, and humanity’s place in it. Aiistotle (1953) 
depicted human beings as being in pursuit of goods (or ends) that were intrinsic to 
their nature, and their capacity to achieve these goods depended upon the vfrtues and 
vices that they acquired thiough reason, education, discipline, and repetition. Here, 
unlike the distinction made in the Enlightenment, morality and reason were not placed 
in different spheres of enquiry and the focus was primarily on what it is ‘good to be’, 
rather than what it is ‘good to do’. The excision of references to intentions, desires 
and emotions as well as reasons for action in the Enlightenment science of human 
behaviour reduced the enquiry into human action to a foim of mechanics. This is part 
of anthropology’s sociological inheritance, a consequence of which is that, in the
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effort to apprehend what well being means, anthi’opologists are forced to shed 
Western moral categories and reconsider pre-modem ethics.
Aristotle proposed his own metaphysical biology as the basis for morality and the 
definition of the human telos. He reasoned that as human beings are of the same 
species, essentially, we share the same telos. The problem of distinction between 
capacities or ‘virtues’ wlrich should or should not inform morality is based, for 
Aristotle, on the idea that some capacities promote human flourishing or happiness 
(eudaimonid) whilst others do not and those who fail to attain or actualise these 
capacities, or virtues, will never reach their full potential. The major difficulty in 
revisiting Aristotle is the whole idea of universal telos based on human nature or 
capacities as a grounding for morality; primarily because people and cultures are so 
different, it is problematic to define a shared telos. Secondly, even if a shared telos 
could be defined, the question remains as to what description of human nature this is 
based on and how tliis is shaped by dominant agendas.
In his characterisation of the core virtues, MacIntyre (1997) argues that we can 
ground the shared telos that people aspire to together, not on Aristotle’s ideas of 
human nature, but on a teleology of social traditions. The moral traditions of which 
one forms a part, through the narrative history of each individual life, provide a 
shared, significant social aspiration that can be viewed as the telos that ascertain the 
virtues for that society. In his bringing together of different traditions of virtue, 
MacIntyre explores how ‘virtue’ has been variously understood in different 
tr aditionsIntim ately related to each of these apprehensions of virtue is a vision of a 
particular- kind of society. Indeed, a common feature to all accounts is a necessary 
background goal of social and moral life that can orient the moral agent and enable 
distinctions to be made between vice and virtue. Without such a shared vision in a
For example, the Homeric account is based upon a rigid demarcation of social roles; an individual 
can be considered as virtuous to the extent that he or she fulfils a prescribed role. The social role is 
therefore the determinant and prior concept of this version of viitue. Aristotle’s account of the virtues, 
as outlined previously, is based upon the idea of the telos of the human being as determining which 
human qualities can be called vii*tues, that is, those which lead to the achievement of this telos 
(eiidaimonia). This same basic idea is common to the virtues depicted in the New Testament and 
Thomas Aquinas, although there are some important differences. According to MacIntyre, Jane 
Austen’s theory of the virtues is a mixtme of Christian and Homeric viitues. Benjamin Franklin’s 
version denotes usefiil, practical and tluifty viitues that are clearly oriented towards the external goals 
of success, prosperity, and (Protestant) salvation.
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shaied ti'adition, the virtues can not be made intelligible. The virtues are channels 
thiough which relationships are defined between people who share agreed puiposes 
and standards.
Sadly, it is outwith the scope of this thesis to look properly at the social teleologies 
and particular viitue-ethics that are lived out in different groups and how 
antlu'opologists have represented these. Nevertheless on tlie basis of reading the 
contributions to Overing and Passes volume. The Anthiopology of Love and Anger 
(The Aestlietics of Conviviality in Native Amazonia), I will make the ai'gument that 
the self-aware, nuanced and highly skilled achievement of well being in Amazonian 
societies which involves the nuituring of a shared vision of the good can not be 
apprehended by the acrimonious tensions, trade-offs and compromises that 
characterise modem liberalism.
The relevance of virtue-ethics for the ethics of applied antliropology is two-fold. 
Firstly, as noted above, by considering the cultuially specific visions of the good tliat 
characterise paiticular cultural settings in terms that do not originate from the Western 
moral tradition, tlie anthropologist is more likely to be able to communicate the 
aspirations that pertain to the society as a whole. As I argued at the beginning of the 
chapter, the Western individuating agenda, botli in theory and practice, dismantles 
life-worlds that are the very setting where well being is acliieved. Many of the 
features of pre-modem virtue based moral thinking have resonance with the moralities 
of non-modern societies, such as the indigenous peoples of Amazonia and therefore 
this perspective provides a model more likely to be able to facilitate the description of 
what well being means in these societies. Secondly, a virtue based perspective, which 
requires a definition of tlie good, or shared telos, either within a practice (such as 
development) or tradition or between traditions, is also pertinent to the dilemmas that 
present themselves in om* chaotically developing world as, rather than resorting to 
social pessimism, it requires an active search for agreement on the shared good for 
individuals and groups.
A paradox that emerges from this chapter in relation to the ways in which applied 
anthropologists might approach the issue of development and the aspirations of 
indigenous peoples is that whilst, as I have argued with regar d to Amazonian peoples.
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the rights ethic does not captur e their way of achieving well being, indigenous peoples 
are, in the contemporary context, often obliged to utilise the rights agenda in order to 
maintain their distance ftom the acrimony of a rights based, liberal individualist 
world. I will explore tlirs paradox in the next chapter.
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Chapter 11
Using Rights to Subvert the Neo-Liberal Agenda in Development? Perspectives 
from NGOs
In my treatment of the rights framework here, I set out to elicit an interpretation that is 
especially relevant to efforts to mitigate the impact of exclusionary neo-liberal models 
of development. In previous chapters I tried to establish that rights based thinking is 
left wanting in terms of apprehending the nuances of social ethics and the myriad 
ways in which well being is achieved. But I have also argued that rights constitute a 
set of tools that are now intrinsic to, and ineluctable within, the development 
landscape. In short, what I am going to suggest in this chapter, is that social 
anthropologists can and should engage with rights as one strand of their pursuit of an 
ethical approach to working in development.
My understanding of this emphasis is influenced by research I undertook (on DFID’s 
behalf) on the ways in which policy makers in the major UK based development 
NGOs* interpreted a rights based agenda in development. This research involved 
writing three reports. The central objective of the first of these^ was to present an 
analysis of the views, policies and practices of UK based NGOs on a ‘rights based’ 
approach to development. This was carried out through questionnaires and interviews 
with individuals responsible for policy in 15 UK based development NGOs. I have 
organised this chapter around the categories that these development professionals 
tended to use when speaking about their rights based work.
For the second report^, I undertook a desk based study of 17 DFID funded project 
reports. Some of these had been funded through DFID’s ‘Joint Funding Scheme’
' Action Aid, CAFOD (Catholic Fund for Overseas Development), CARE INTERNATIONAL, 
Christian Aid, CIIR (Catholic Institute for International Relations), CORD (Christian Outreach Relief 
and Development), EWD (Empowering Widows in Development), FARM AFRICA, IDS, ODI 
(Overseas Development Institute), OXFAM GB, Save the Children, SCIAF (Scottish Catholic 
International Aid Fund), War on Want, WATERAID, Womankind World-wide.
 ^ ‘Implementing a Rights Based Approach to Development: Policies, Practices and Reflections of UK 
Based Non- Governmental Development Organisations’.
 ^ ‘A Review of the ways in which projects funded by the Joint Funding Scheme in Central and South 
America reflected a ‘rights based approach’ to development’.
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(JFS), others through its successor the ‘Civil Society Challenge Fund’ (CSCF/. Here 
I identified project goals, approaches and wider objectives with rights criteria. The 
fiequency of occurrence of rights compatible goals was recorded and ranlced. This 
was complemented by textual analysis of the project reports fi*om proposal through to 
final evaluation.
Another aspect of this consultation involved reseaich in Lima and Callao, Pern to 
assess a project entitled ‘Pilot Training Programme for the Promotion of Women’s 
Economic Rights in Peru’ .^ The project was designed collaboratively by the UK based 
NGO ‘Womankind Worldwide’ and the Peruvian women’s rights organisation 
Asociacion Aurora Vivar with further input from Federacion de Centrales de 
Comedores Populares y  Autogestionarios de Lima y  Callao (FECCPAALC). The aim 
of the analysis, which was fiamed in terms of DFID’s Civil Society Depai'tment’s 
agenda of supporting initiatives which, whilst having a clear poverty focus, seek to 
enhance people’s loiowledge of, and access to, their rights, was to locate good 
practice and pinpoint the conceptual strengths of this project.
In tliis chapter, whilst I draw upon some of the content of these reports, my mam 
focus is to explicate the particular reasonings of the development professionals I 
spoke with about their interpretation of the rights framework. Space does not permit 
going into the detail of the methodologies of the projects, the problems associated 
with these and the fine tuning of project design. Similaiiy, my evaluation of the 
success, or othei-wise, of the projects and NGOs in attaining their goals has been 
omitted fi'om my analysis here. What is articulated is the conceptualisation of the 
rights agenda from the point of view of professionals seeking to elevate the status, and 
promote the realisation of, economic, social and cultural rights vis-à-vis, and 
alongside, civil and political rights.
 ^These schemes are DFID’s main way of funding NGOs on a project by project basis. NGOs submit 
project ideas to DFID and, if they are accepted are usually flmded on a 50/50 basis with the NGO 
making the proposal. Some of tlie bigger NGOs, such as CAFOD, Oxfam and Save the Children also 
receive block fhnding and have a heer hand to use this funding as they see fit.
 ^ Resulting in a report entitled ‘An analysis of 3 NGO’s Concerted Approach to Income Generation, 
Training for Work and Participatoiy Political Proposals for Women in Lima’.
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The Emerging Predominance of Rights based Development
‘Rights based development’, has become the focus of optimistic development 
innovation, within both official and NGO policy making as well as through new foims 
of engagement between these actors. OXFAM GB, for instance, has recently framed 
all of its work under 5 rights based aims and is ‘asking that all programmes identify 
the changes in policies and practices that will be needed for these rights to be fulfilled 
as well as existing human rights covenants and legislation which may assist in doing 
so’ (Chris Roche pers. comm.). DFID is also explicitly committed to a ‘rights based 
approach to development’ and is continuing to explore what this means in practice 
(DFID 2000, Hauseimann 1998). Over a five yeai* period following the commitments*’ 
made at the World Summit for Social Development^, an unprecedented convergence 
of the goals of the UN system, national Govermnents and global civil society in the 
eradication of poverty and achieving social integration has unfolded. Greater 
consensus has emerged ai'ound both the definitions of the goals of development and 
the means by wliich these ends can be arrived at, that is, in terms of the standards set 
out in UN treaties and conventions on civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights.
Wilson observes tliat there is a correspondence between Kant’s idea of a 
‘cosmopolitan’ or universal right which underlies his idea of ‘perpetual peace’ and 
CIIR’s reference to ‘the rights and duties of citizens in international civil society’ 
(CIIR’s 1993 Annual review). The fact that a large number of NGOs who are taking 
up the rights agenda have sprung from Cluistian souices is not surprising for Wilson;
 ^International Development Targets:
° 50% reduction in the proportion of people living in exti'eme poverty by 2015 ;
° Universal primaiy education in all countiies by 2015 ;
° Demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating
gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005,
° A reduction by 67% in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 5 and a reduction by 
75% in maternal mortality by 2015;
° Access through the primary health care system to reproductive health services for individuals of 
appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015;
° The implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in all countries by 2005, so
as to ensure that current trends in the loss of enviromnental resorrrces are effectively reversed at 
both global and national levels by 2015.
Targets for international development have been set up witliout genuine commitment many times in the 
past. The IDTs defined by the UN and member states have also been taken up by the World Bank and 
the IMF and as part of OECD’s (Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development) aims in its 
partnerships with developing nations.
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‘It is no mistake that Christian organisations as well as human rights organisations are 
actively participating in the construction of a futuristic notion of an ‘international civil 
society’ based upon human rights, since both share a commitment to universalism and 
global intervention’ (1997: 25). Whilst this is true, the work of these NGOs is quite 
clearly imbued with a mildly relativist and communitarian ethos often quite at odds 
with the individuating agenda of neo-liberalism.
To give an idea of the range of the universal rights framework, the following table 
(which draws on the research I undertook) sets out the central aspects of the UN 
Declarations in terms of the development strategies undertaken by NGOs.
NGO/CSO Policies and Activities
Social Inclusion Capacity building and communication strategies to enable disadvantaged groups and 
individuals to claim their rights
Effective representation of needs and rights of disadvantaged by civil society
Building of self esteem of disadvantaged and marginalised groups
Challenging attitudes and cultural practices that are permissive of the maltreatment or 
exclusion of individuals or groups





Capacity building to strengthen ability of disadvantaged to participate in decision 
making processes
Lobbying government to ensure gender balance in their structures








Increasing capacity of trade union movement to represent marginalised groups and 
informal sector workers (core labour standards, free association, equal remuneration, 
child labour, non-discrimination).
Ensuring that private sector meets labour standards
Lobbying for prioritisation of programmes that most directly promote long term job 
growth/ labour intensive employment
Provision of training in non-traditional/innovative professions





Local monitoring of service delivery (protection of expenditure and prioritisation for 
services which benefit the poor and disadvantaged) according to internationally agreed 
development targets
Involving civil society and community level organisations in negotiating culturally 
appropriate and affordable standards for the public provision of services
Lobbying for policies that allow poor and disadvantaged sectors to gain access to basic 
services
’ Copenha »en 1995
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Lobbying for the provision of information on local and national government policies 
and performance
Information 
and Freedom of 
Expression
Promotion of access of marginalised people to information and communication 
technologies
Training in information technology
Support of cultural diversity
Conflict
Reduction




Security of tbe 
Person
Crisis/Counselling Centres for victims of crime, domestic violence and conflict
Addressing harmful traditional practices, such as FGM.
Challenging cultural subordination of women
Challenging cultural subordination of socio-cultural groups
Advocacy to ensure accessible justice for the disadvantaged
Promotion of knowledge about national Human Rights institutions and processes
Lobbying for national level judicial and institutional reform to ensure access to legal 
justice
NGO*s Perspectives on a Rights Based Approach to Development
All 15 of the NGOs interviewed considered themselves to be implementing an 
evolving rights based approach to development and shared a broadly similar vision of 
what this means, both in theory and practice*. Responses reflected general agreement 
on core values and aspects, such as the ‘universally inclusive’ scope of such an 
approach, the centrality the ‘person’, the importance of freedom and self- 
determination, and the implication that rights always have matching responsibilities or 
duties (although the central difficulty here is that there is often disagreement about 
who carries these responsibilities in different contexts). ‘Empowerment’ was present 
in most definitions, alongside the view that this approach involved addressing the root 
causes of inequality.
The word ‘dignity’ was used by several organisations in their response, designating 
the person as ‘both the object and subject’, or ‘at the heart’, of human development^. 
The emphasis on agency means that this approach goes beyond ‘paternalistic models 
of development’ and is necessarily participatory and demands that ‘the poor and 
marginalised are themselves empowered to be agents of change, given equality of
* Several NGOs considered themselves to be ‘as much human rights organisations as development 
agencies’ (CIIR) whilst the raison d ’être of a significant number of the organisations who contributed 
to the consultation is gaining, protecting or furthering the rights of specific disadvantaged, vulnerable 
or marginalised groups using human rights instruments.
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opportunity to change their environment, allowed to participate in public decision 
making with regard to social, political, economic, cultural and religious realities’ 
(CAFOD). The observation was also made that this approach implies that people aie 
given the oppoitunity ‘to fulfil their responsibilities as well as claim their rights’.
The scope of a rights based approach, covering ‘all aspects of human interaction and 
all levels of institutions’ (from grass-roots to global) was mentioned and one 
interviewee made the bold statement that a rights based approach is
‘Singulai’ly capable of providing an explanatory framework for human well 
being from the personal level to the international level. Through illuminating 
and exposing the obstacles that people face in achieving well being (in 
whatever sense; cultmal, political participation, access to education etc.) a 
rights based approach provides a framework for action at every level whilst 
allowing for variation and the generation of culturally appropriate policies’. 
(Britta Schmidt of ‘Womankind’).
I would disagree with the scope of this statement on the basis of my argument that the 
principle kind of answer offered by rights is in institutional terms and in defending 
well being when it is aggressively tlireatened. As I have ai’gued elsewhere, the idea of 
rights as a framework for well being is often quite at odds with indigenous 
conceptualisations. Rights, in contrast to viitues, are primaiily invoked as a means of 
defence and in maldng demands about political commitments and standards. Wilson is 
in agreement with this point;
‘Groups who now refer to themselves as ‘indigenous peoples’ are aware of 
human rights discourses, if only because they have experienced state violence 
and mai’ginalisation from national political processes’ (1997: 9).
Perhaps because of this defensive stance, the rights paradigm was seen as an 
extremely useful resouice for the work of NGOs, from tlie level of ‘personal 
empowerment’ to international treaties to topics such as labour rights. However, there
 ^ Three organisations pointed out that their espousal of this conception was primarily derived fiom 
Catholic Social Teaching.
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was realism about the emphasis of certain rights (generally civil and political) and the 
sidelining of others by governments and international financial institutions (IFIs). An 
intei-viewee at CORD made tlie following observation:
Tt is also not clear to us what the responsibilities of international organisations 
aie in their role as ‘duty beai*ers’. We obsei-ve that, in the past, donor 
governments have applied human rights instruments rather selectively and 
according to the interests of their foreign policy’.
NGOs^ Misgivings with regard to a Rights Based Approach
Several respondents were sceptical, or realistic, about the limited nature of Northern 
governments’ putative commitment to the whole raft of economic, social and cultural 
rights, noting that DFID’s policies were contmdicted by other UK policies***. It was 
typically ai'gued that a rights based agenda will have very limited results without 
changes in inequitable macro-economic policies. Andrew, from CAFOD, giving a 
narrower understanding of rights made the distinction between the oppression of 
people caused by global and/or structural inequalities and the repression of people’s 
rights by some nation states. National governments may be doing everything within 
their power to ensure people’s access to their rights but aie crippled by a lack of 
resoui'ces and aie unable to meet the very real economic challenges to fulfilment of 
entitlement to food, education, health, water and shelter’. On this view, responsibility 
lies with Northern governments who preside over exploitative global economic 
relations. CIIR, on tliis basis, argued that ‘the UK government should support efforts 
for ILO (International Labom- Organisation) standards to be brought to bear on the 
working conditions of all countries with whom Britain trades -  perhaps through social 
development contracts’.
There was also agreement that a major stumbling block in a rights agenda was the 
major gaps in the ratification of fundamental Conventions. Chris Roche of Oxfam 
aigued that ‘If the UK government is serious about ‘All Human Rights for AH’, 
greater pressure should be put on governments who have failed to sign UN treaties
Similarly, the UN’s spending as a whole on the rights of indigenous peoples only amounts to 1% of 
its budget.
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and declaiations, (especially the US)’. This was echoed by Action Aid; ‘DFID might 
be in a better position to bring pressme to bear on the US government to sign the 
declaiation of Social, Economic and Cultural rights as well as the CRC (Convention 
on the rights of the Child)**. These omissions constitute a major obstacle to progress 
in reducing inequality and poverty’. Another interviewee from Christian Aid was 
concerned about the double standai'ds that lay beneath the rights agenda: ‘It is difficult 
to conceive of promoting democracy in the South until our (UK) pivotal position in 
the IMF, World Bank, UN and WTO yields more democracy in these institutions’. 
Indeed, the rights agenda was seen by another respondent as a ploy for ‘southern 
governments to be held accountable to fulfilment of rights as an excuse for the further 
conditionality of aid’. Space does not peimit going into the many other misgivings 
were expressed*^.
Strategies for Poverty Reduction through a Rights Based Approach
NGOs, recognising the limited nature of northern government’s commitments were 
increasingly taldng up a strategic and overtly political approach (‘development as 
leverage’) to the realisation of the rights that aie routinely sidelined. Responses 
showed agreement that ‘development is essentially a political process’ (War on Want) 
where ‘political will is fundamental to failuie or success’ (EWD). Some consider ‘the 
frameworks within which (they) work’ to be inherently political, focusing on causes 
rather than effects’(CIIR). It was argued that considering the ‘personal to be political’ 
(Womankind) means gearing strategies towaids challenging power structures. The 
expression of this political emphasis is tempered by the fact that in order to keep their 
status as ‘chaiities’, NGOs can not admit to being overtly political organisations. 
Perhaps for this reason it was typically stressed that their political work is never
" The US is one of only a handful of countiies that has failed to sign the CRC.
For mstance, CAFOD pointed out that ‘a rights based agenda, if managed insensitively, can be 
confi’ontational and may magnify existing tensions. It is important to take into account the relations of 
dependency and other tensions that exist between different stakeholders. Seeking to redress power 
imbalances can potentially exacerbate tensions between groups who exist in relationships of stable 
inequality’. CIIR proposed that ‘DFID should support the proposal of taxing (on a global scale) short­
term international transactions by a veiy small percentage - the so-called ‘Tobm Tax’ so as to raise 
funds for social development. ‘Oxfam demanded that ‘DFID, along with the UK government and 
international NGOs, recognises its part in the ’imperfect obligations’ that it has in realising human 
rights world-wide as part of the International Community. This would, for example make it difficult for 
the UK government to be considered to be while it remains the second largest ams dealer in the 
world.’
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oriented towards particular parties. However, Oxfam that it ‘recognises the clout of 
party politics in the partners’ coimtries and supports cross party political coalitions’*^ . 
Strengthening the representation of marginalised and poor people, or supporting 
southern advocacy can have a significant impact on local politics. As most 
respondents ‘give priority to projects with a social transformational dimension’, 
whilst ‘not overtly challenging the political structures’ they would consider 
themselves to have an indirect but deliberate influence on local politics.
Using the legal basis of the human rights framework was indeed, for some, ‘the 
fundamental characteristic’, or distinctive feature, of a rights based approach, 
allowing development agencies to ‘expand their range of responses to poverty and 
marginalisation beyond the project level’ (Christian Aid). Several organisations linked 
a rights based approach to sustainability, stating that this approach involves the aim of 
enshrining rights in legislation and institutional practices (at local, national and 
international level).
There was, however, some variation in which aspects or rights were emphasised. This 
was partly due to organisational specialisation (women, children, water etc.) and 
partly due to some organisations’ view that worldng to enhance people’s access to 
their rights should follow a sequence. Several respondents emphasised their 
prioritisation of ‘minimum conditions’ with reference to the right to livelihood 
security, clean water and food. An interviewee from the NGO Farm Africa, for 
instance, believed that the place to start was with ‘the most frmdamental human rights; 
those associated with basic rights to food, clean water, shelter etc, . . there is no point 
in getting political when people ar e stai-ving’*"*.
‘^ An example is the support to the women’s coalition in Zimbabwe, which intervened in the recent 
electoral processes by supporting all women candidates, regardless of political affiliation or ideology. 
The coalition created a local and national media campaign to raise the visibility of women candidates 
and awareness of the specific types of concerns and problems they face, and provided them with a 
forum to present the interests of women. At a time when the political agenda was being dominated by 
violence and a narrow male dominated agenda, the Coalition wanted to transform women’s status and 
condition in Zimbabwean Society through the promotion, protection and enforcement of women’s 
human rights. To do this, they had to ensme women’s views were represented and central to local and 
national decision making processes, in the event, eleven women, supported by the Coalition, were 
elected, tliree of which were actual activists of the Coalition (Fabienne Wanington).
Organisations added that when involved in humanitarian relief or ‘pm ely assistential’ projects, there 
is still scope for adopting an approach which is participatory, which engenders local ownership, is a 
learning experience and which confronts issues of inequality at a local level. In addition, when 
involved in humanitarian relief, there are internationally agreed standards and principles to conform to.
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Whilst DFID strictly only funds projects that have a ‘poverty focus’ as a primary goal. 
War on Want, to the contrary, stated that there is a ‘difficulty in always combining 
rights work with a poverty focus as those best positioned to work for rights are not 
necessarily the poorest. A great deal could be achieved by building up the capacity of 
trade unions, for example. However, members of trade unions are seldom deemed to 
be appropriate targets for a poverty focused intervention’. In contrast to the view 
expressed above (which places basic needs first in the sequencing of rights), the view 
of a minority of interviewees was that there should be a hierarchy of rights where 
political empoweiment for the authentic exercise of constitutional rights comes first. 
Their view is that
‘Recognition and assurance aie central to the concrétisation of rights and there 
can be no assuiance in any matter unless the people have the power to defend 
their rights and unless they are recognised by the society in question. In other 
words, working for rights places true political empowerment in fiont. Rights 
legitimise the efforts of people . . .  to identify and articulate interests, demand 
appropriate protections, when these aie tlireatened, and redress sufficiently to 
restore an interest when it has been harmed’ (Action Aid).
However, the majority of policy makers in the NGOs aigued that strategic work 
should be grounded in projects so that that advocacy work does not become 
disassociated fiom ‘grass-roots realities’*^ . Several organisations made the point that 
long-teim sustainable change is more likely to be achieved when linking grassroots 
activities with national and international advocacy work**’. Respondents cited various 
policy developments and changes that reflect this thinking*^. Whilst a number of
One respondent (CIIR) explained how ‘recent internal organisational changes, which involved 
amalgamating theh advocacy and ‘skill share’ departments, have enhanced the extent to which the 
advocacy section is informed by pmctice and current experience. Bringing grass-roots experience and 
campaigning together has been challenging but has allowed the formation of integrated programmes 
designed to give greater priority to the perspectives and needs of poor and marginalised people’.
Womankind, for instance in their work to support local organisations set up to fiirther ttie rights of 
women for example, use the Beijing ‘Platform for Action’ as a framework for policies which seek to 
assist women to be eligible for land inlieritance, to lobby governments and raise awareness on issues 
such as domestic violence, ‘haimful traditional practices’ or employ para-legals to use CEDAW (UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women) in local contexts.
A good example here is a project designed by CIT (CODA International Training) and the MCN 
(Nicaraguan Community Movement) to increase the development impact of local community based
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respondents stated that there is ‘a lot of disillusionment with direct service delivery’ 
(Care International), they maintain that many project elements (credit, technical 
inputs) continue to be crucial and should complement a progiammatic approach. 
Indeed, projects often provide a window of opportunity to engender positive social 
change through incoiporating educative and empowering elements.
Bringing these areas together, the general consensus was that NGOs were moving 
towai'ds a more programmatic and strategic approach, away from ‘development as 
delivery’ models. There was a consensus that previous development strategies which 
involved work at a local level with a specific set of beneficiaries had a predictably 
limited impact. NGOs have traditionally focused on the achievement of ‘minimum 
livelihood’ (such as the provision of clean water, food, providing access to credit, 
enhancing income generation in rural areas, building and strengthening commimity 
coping strategies etc.). Whilst NGOs saw this work as being fundamental to their 
focus on poverty, scattered discrete projects were gradually being incorporated into 
str ategic programmes. Newer approaches were based on the recognition that impact is 
maximised and ‘critical mass’ is more likely to be achieved through collaboration, 
linking partners together, and providing strategic links between programmes. Typical 
statements on this topic were that were NGOs were ‘developing underpinning 
strategies to linlc grassroots activities with advocacy at national and international 
level’ (Christian Aid) and ‘gradually shifting from a project approach to a programme 
approach. Programmes are beginning to be defined; they tend to incorporate
efforts (focused on immediate needs such as primary health care, sanitation, electiification, nutrition, as 
well as supporting community centres and addressing people’s representation) through a nation wide 
integrated process of institutional capacity building focused questions of governance, internal 
democracy, the establishment of permanent capacity building in leadership and community activist 
training, promotion of women in leadership, and an audit of the human and material capacity of the 
organisation nationally. A fuither dimension of the project centred around the ‘local agenda’ 
methodology, whereby a community conducts its own analysis of locally determined development 
needs and seeks to build consensus with key stakeholders around theh collective priorities and plans 
for local development. These ‘local agenda’ methodologies hivolve not just pressmising local 
government institutions, but identifying other actors involved in development processes and defining 
then- responsibilities as duty bearers. Through identifying stakeholders, tiaining sessions in local 
government structures and citizen’s rights, the project sought to enable communities to forge 
constructive and creative relationships with agencies of government as well as with service providers 
and sources of funding for development initiatives. The engagement of MCN with local politicians, 
councillors, business people, media, health and teaching professionals, and academics involved a 
change in approach from ‘protest politics’ to ‘proposal politics’ (from analysis of DFID project 
proposals).
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networking and other sti-ategies to give a greater voice to partners and beneficiaries’ 
(CAFOD).
Several reasons were given for this move towards a more strategic approach. It was 
argued that the ‘traditional role of northern NGOs is under question and that there is 
an urgent need for greater relevance’ (CIIR). New generations of staff ‘for whom 
‘political’ action is the key to achieving development objectives have also influenced 
policy-making’ (Care International).
In summary, NGOs agreed that a rights based agenda departs in significant ways fiom 
previously dominant models of development, principally because of:
° the centr ality of the agency and dignity of the person;
° the politicisation of self-determination;
° the indivisibility of rights;
° an emphasis on removing obstacles to rights, through political and institutional
engagement;
° an emphasis on the corresponding governmental and private duties and 
responsibilities that accompany rights.
I would argue that these definitions, which are grounded in an idea of the 
indivisibility of rights, are pushing beyond the limits of the habitual Western usages 
of rights language which give preponderance to civil and political rights in isolation 
from economic, social and cultural rights.
I will now go through the conceptual basis of a strategic rights based approach, as 
understood by the policy malcers of the NGOs I did research with. This will be 
followed by a more discussion of this anti-liberal individualist interpretation of the 
rights approach which draws fiom UN documents. As space does not permit a proper 
discussion of many examples to illustrate each of the points that I would like to make, 
I malce use of footnotes to provide short summaries of apposite projects and policies.
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Participation in Decision Making Processes
All respondents stated that they are committed to promoting participatory processes 
tliroughout programme life cycles, from identification and planning through to direct 
management of components of work and overall monitoring and evaluation**. The 
NGO, Farm Africa, gave the following example;
‘We are moving towards more inclusive participation though, and an example 
is the planning process for a joint forest management project in Tanzania, 
involving a preliminary stalceholder’s workshop. Representatives from 
communities and government officers were brought together to identify the 
constiaints and opportunities of the proposed project. This provided positive 
guidance in the preparation of the proposal document’.
Strengthening the Voices o f the *Poor^  and Marginalised to Promote Policy change
Most interviewees agreed with the statement that ‘there is no direct way to oblige 
national governments to fulfil their responsibilities, with regaid to human rights 
treaties and documents; this is the role of the UN and the donor community’ (Farm 
Africa). Nevertheless, NGOs were active in pressurising governments. The main 
strategies here involve; firstly, recording and reporting people’s rights status, 
secondly, campaigning on specific and general issues to both ‘southern’ (developing 
country) and ‘noi-them’ governments, as well as to International Financial Institutions 
and thirdly, seekhig to support the efforts of civil society ‘to enhance democratic 
processes’.
Various methodologies were cited as examples:
‘Always involving our partner groups in a bottom up (not top down) methodology’ (CORD);
‘In country co-ordinators, trainers and facilitators are almost exclusively local people’ (Oxfam); 
‘Involvement of project stakeholders in initial baseline studies and in deciding upon indicators to 
measure project success’ (Action Aid);
‘Identification of programmes of work in consultation with local partners’ (CIIR);
‘For participatoiy monitoring and evaluation, indicators are identified with partners organisations and 
sometimes with beneficiary groups’ (Wateraid).
‘Assessment procedures involving intensive negotiation with local partners and whom they represent’ 
(Care International).
‘The promotion of ‘a sense of ownership’ of projects, aimed at through the encouragement of ‘cost 
sharing and community contribution towards physical inputs. This may be coimnunity labour, for 
example in the construction of a water point, or the provision of goats only on credit, to women’s 
groups’ (FARM AFRICA).
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As outlined above, a central aim of rights based work is augmenting the influence that 
disempowered and oppressed groups have in public decision making processes. Work 
at programme level is complemented wMi advocacy and campaigning on broad issues 
at national and international levels* .^ Inteiwiewees noted that, in previous 
development strategies, there had been a focus on grass roots work at one level and 
international campaigning on another, leaving a gap in the intermediary levels. A 
crucial area of innovation, then, was establishing fora whereby duty bearers can be 
publicly identified and standards such as benchmarks in service delivery or 
participatory rights, for example, agreed and monitored^**.
Obliging Duty Bearers
NGOs considered it crucial to develop new methodologies and sldlls to further their 
obliging agenda for economic, social and cultural rights, linldng the narrower or more 
immediate objectives pur sued at a local level with changes at a legislative, political or 
wider institutional level. This is usually approached by strengthening the institutions 
that represent these groups so as to foster their ability to malce an impact on local and 
national political fora^*. Increasingly, projects are designed to support civil society 
and commimity level organisations in negotiating culturally appropriate and 
affordable standards for the public provision of services. Networks of civil society 
organisations who have shared goals are also being supported^^. Civil society
Womankind Worldwide has a policy of supporting paitner organisations ‘both financially and 
strategically in producing alternative reports to the CEDAW (UN Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women) committee, when their countries’ governments are reporting 
officially on how they have implemented the Convention’.
As an example, Britta Schmidt explained how ‘Womankind’s Gender Advocacy Programme has 
supported grassroots women in directly influencing domestic violence legislation. A delegation of 
grassroots women visited the South African Parliament to discuss their concerns and provide input into 
the drafting of the domestic violence act. These women’s organisations have subsequently been 
involved in monitoring the legislation and whether it is delivering. Womankind believes that bringing 
about policy change is important, but monitoring its implementation is perhaps even more significant. 
Such reports are perfect lobbying tools for holding governments accountable to then commitments. 
Womankind supported partner organisations in producing alternative reports for the Beijing +5 review, 
at the same time we also participated in the review, using partners experiences and translating them 
into policy proposals that are tlien used to hold government accountable to the commitments they have 
made by signing the Beijing Platform for Action’.
Through financial input, management framing, forums for discussion and debate, to engage people in 
analysis of their situation and through creating inter-agency networks which allow mutual learning, 
‘leadership training’, and civic education, for example.
^ Womankind has recently organised exchange visits between different partner organisations (South 
Africa Rape Crisis and Albanian Family Planning) and the sharing of strategies across different
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organisations are being assisted to develop specific policy proposals, and to ensme 
that these reach a fbmm of discussion with policy makers moving away from ‘protest 
politics’ to ‘proposal politics’. The example from Lima which will be given below 
exemplifies this approach.
As the effects of people’s lack of access to theh* rights are far more visible than the 
undeiiymg stiuctmal and processual causes, NGO’s were becoming more and more 
involved in political and institutional analysis. The challenge was understood as 
‘identifying the institutional aiTangements that perpetuate social exclusion and vicious 
circles of poverty and working for socially inclusive and accountable alternatives’ 
(Fabienne Wairington, Womankind). This involved making connections between 
people’s rights status and the responsibilities of appropriate duty bearers at a local, 
municipal, district or regional leveP^.
As socially excluded groups may not have considered the possibility of holding those 
in public office to account, education in the roles and responsibilities of public 
institutions was understood as often being an essential first stage in standard setting. 
A project manager at Christian Aid explained that ‘tiaining those in public office to 
respond to local perspectives through participatory planning and process consulting is 
another area that needs to be developed in order to make links between CSOs and 
statutory bodies’^ "*.
As noted above, I undertook research on a rights based programme in Lima and 
Callao which sought to mitigate the effects of neo-liberal economic restinctming 
thi'ough the economic and political empowerment of women involved in ‘community
countries has proven to be very successful in developing strategies that enable women to increase their 
access to their rights, in this case particularly the right to a life free of violence.
^ ‘In Ethiopia, the role of the peasant association is an important vehicle for bringing together rural 
people with local government officers. Farm Africa works very closely witli these peasant associations 
and in doing so assists in building those links to govemment. One NGO which is often involved in 
large scale projects which are implemented through government agencies has set up stakeholder 
workshops where representatives of ruial communities are brought together with government decision 
makers in the eaiiy stages of project planning. These workshops were initially resisted by government 
personnel who felt that theii* power and authority would be challenged. In practice, the same 
government officials admitted that the workshops were beneficial and that the consensus reached with 
local communities enhanced the project’s success’.
‘Government staff are seconded to many of our projects in all countries in which we work. This 
allows them to gain direct experience in the approaches used on the projects and to use that experience 
when they return to thefr line ministries’.
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kitchens’. As I consider this project to exemplify many of the perspectives outlined 
above, I will now give a sort summary of its key characteristics.
Women ’5  Economic and Participatory Rights in Lima and Callao
The programme I investigated was designed collaboratively by the UK based NGO 
Womankind Worldwide, Asociacion Aurora Vivar and FECCPAALC (the latter two 
based in Lima). The project’s goal was ‘to empower women from poor urban sectors 
to improve then income generating capacity and employment opportunities and 
promote their economic rights’ tlnough seeking ‘to involve women from grass-roots 
organisations in making policy recommendations with regard to the macro-economic 
environment affecting their economic rights’. At a grass roots level, the project sought 
to provide a response ‘to immediate felt needs’ by assisting women to improve their 
income generation capacity and to manage their community kitchens wliile also 
addiessing the strategic need for women to be more involved in policy development 
at the municipal and state level through education, tiaining and lobbying. 
Additionally, the project sought to tackle issues of gender stereotyping with regard to 
women’s role in work by providing a model for training in non-traditional activities 
for women’.
The programme was thoroughly pragmatic in tlie sense that whilst its fundamental 
goals were to mitigate the dominant neo-liberal agenda, by lobbying for labour rights, 
for instance, women were also being assisted to make a living in the competitive and 
chaotic economic conditions that characterised Peru at this time.
The project design was built around, and sought to add to, the considerable 
achievements of women’s organisations in Lima in their efforts to alleviate poverty, 
access their rights and to demand authentically democratic stiuctures. As a response 
to the difficult economic conditions and increased social exclusion of the 1990s in 
Peru, women in Lima formed a range of commimity based self-help organisations, 
firstly to work together to alleviate the difficulties individual families were having in 
meeting their most basic requirements and from there, to foim local, regional and 
national networks of organisations. Together, these groups have initiated a series of 
political campaigns, mass mobilisations, political proposals and have undertalcen.
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thiough collective social vigilance, to hold the government to commitments made in 
international treaties.
Thorough the linkages between grassroots organisations and NGOs, many women from 
community Idtchens have gone on to paiticipate in, and, after appropriate training, 
manage income generation projects. To varying degrees, these women have also 
developed negotiating and ‘leadership skills’, acquired detailed loiowledge of the 
legal and economic realities which confront them, engaged creatively with 
municipalities and participated as electoral candidates.
Seeking to multiply, consolidate and build upon these achievements, the collaboration 
between Womanldnd, AAV and FECCPAALC resulted in tlie diagnosis of a multi 
level and multi faceted programme. Here, the urgent need to assist women to increase 
their earning capacity was combined with a concerted effort to address the underlying 
reasons why women are disadvantaged economically. The strategic component of the 
project consisted in the generation of positive proposals for policy change in specific 
municipalities and the development of a nation wide ‘Women’s Economic Agenda’ to 
define policy changes wliich will allow the better use and orchestration of government 
resources, private capital and the human and social capital constituted by women and 
their organisations as well as bringing labour rights to bear* on employers. Thiough 
insisting upon positive collaboration with local and central government, the project 
was designed to be a catalyst of better governance as this was considered to be the 
only guarantor of the sustainability of this initiative^^. In short, through strengthening 
the negotiating power of women and then community based organisations, and in 
assisting them to define their collective strategy to gain their economic rights in real 
terms, the project sought to redefine the relationship between government, the private 
sector and tlie urban poor and their organisations.
I will now look very briefly at the social, political and economic context of the 
programme, describe the challenges that were facing women in gaining access to their
As Klaus Toepfler, the diiector of the United Nations Centie for Human Settlements (Habitat) 
asserts, “It is now widely acknowledged that uiban development cannot flourish in an environment of 
poor urban governance. Accountability and transparency in the use of public funds, participatory 
democracy at the local level and enabling policies can have a far greater impact on poverty reduction 
efforts than direct investment in urban development programmes” (Toepfler 2000: 5).
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economic rights and then give a brief account of the way in which a strategy has been 
developed to confront these challenges.
The Impact o f Neo^-Liberal Policies on Poverty and Social Exclusion in Lima
Peru, over the course of the 1990s, underwent a fundamental shift away from state 
intei-ventionism toward a commitment to market oriented solutions^^. In effect, from 
the outset of President Fujimori’s first term, efforts to achieve equity or distribution 
were abandoned in favour of a clear policy emphasis on macroeconomic stability, 
reduction of inflation, reinsertion into the international community and reduction of 
the role of the state in the economy^^.
Fujimori’s ‘success’ in restoring economic stability, was gained at the expense of the 
living conditions of large sectors of tlie population. The stabilisation program 
implemented in August 1990, just 3 weeks after Fujimori was inaugurated, devastated 
living standards^*. The Programa de Emergencia Social (PES) intended to alleviate 
the effects of these policies through food aid administered through ‘FONCODES’, did 
not have either the financial or institutional capital to make a significant impact^^.
hi 2000, the Peruvian government claimed that poverty had decreased since 1991, 
with the greatest advances in Lima. 47.6 % of Lima’s inhabitants population were 
living in poverty in 1991 whilst levels in 1997 fell to 35.5% (Instituto Cuanto). The 
apparent ‘lowering’ of poverty levels since 1991 was deliberately misleading since, 
following the economic shock of 1990, poverty levels increased diamatically.
The centi'al policies which unfolded under Fujimori were the privatisation of state owned enterprises 
and peasant co-operatives, a major overhaul of the tax system, elimination of regulations on foreign 
investment, the liberalisation of trade and a diastic reduction in social spending. The 1980s had seen 
val ions attempts to implement structural adjustment progiammes and alternative heterodox programs 
whose eventual failure led to the collapse of the Peruvian economy in 1988.
However, whilst the role of the State has diminished with regard to protecting worker’s rights, its 
capacity to intervene in the foimation and activity of unions, including strikes and collective bargaining 
has been extended.
Price increases and cuts in social expenditure nearly doubled, the number of Peruvians living in 
conditions of critical poveity, rose from 6 to 11 million overnight, fully half of the country’s 
population. In Mefropolitan Lima, consumption expenditmes, which had already dropped by 46% 
between 1986 and 1990 fell an additional 31% between June 1990 and October 1991, the period when 
Fujimori’s economic package was implemented. (Burgos 1994; 282) Abugattas reports lhat in 1994, 
chronic infant malnutrition had risen to 25.9% in cities and 53.4 % in rural areas. (Abugattas: 1994 in 
Francke 1997)
Social Spending in 1991 per capita was $51. This rose by 229% to $169 in 1997. (Valladolid 1999: 
3) Compare this however with Argentina; $1570 and Chile - $821 at the same time.
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There were also important variations in how any benefits had been distributed among 
geographic areas and economic sectors. From 1992 onwards, the extreme poor 
benefited slightly from increases in social spending whilst a large swathe of the 
population remain chronically poor. It is important to note that the donation of food 
aid significantly and artificially affects the statistics with regard to the extremely 
poor^ ** and does not constitute a guaranteed or sustainable solution, much less an 
indicator of human development (Youngers 2000: 13). According to one Peruvian 
economist, if one subtracts the impact of FONCODES and discretionar y payments by 
the Presidential Ministry, levels of poverty remain die same. He further suggests that, 
in effect;
‘Si uno saca el impacto de los programas sociales a traves de FONCODES y  
del Ministerio de la Presidencia, la linea de pohreza es el mismo . . .  La linea 
de pobreza depende de la voluntad del Présidente Fujimori’ (Gonzalez de 
Olarte, E. Presentation George Washington University. Quoted in Youngers 
2000: 76)
In short, the statistical level of poverty depended on the will of the President. The 
major social developmental difficulties which resulted from, or remained unresolved 
by, government policies were unemployment and sub-employment^*, equity, low 
wages^^, file lack of institutional capacity for administering democratic^^ processes 
and poor education and health infrastructure and quality. Those working in the formal 
sector were seldom able to cover their basic needs which meant that the informal
Constituting an estimated 20% of theii- income. (Youngers 2000: 14)
In 1990 19% Economically Active Population (EAP) were fully employed, compared to 45% in 
1980. This fell to 14% in 1992. Sub-employment rose from 48% to 78% over this same period.(Burgos 
1994: 38). The composition of the unemployed reflect the laige scale redundancies from industry; in 
1997, in Lima 9.6% of the unemployed were over 55 years old (Eduardo Caceres Valdivia CEDAL/ 
APRODEH 1998:35-37). 35.5% of the male and 49.9% of the female Peruvian Urban Economically 
Active Population were sub-employed. 6.9% of males and 8.9% of females were unemployed. 
(Valladolid 1999: 12) In 1990, 60% of wage workers had security in their employment, in 1996, this 
had fallen to 25% (Youngers 2000: 15)
In real terms, between 1980 and 1992, wages fell by 65%. Among civil servants, wages fell by 94% 
over this period. (Burgos: 1994: 38)
A recent report published by WOLA details the disarray of Pemvian democratic structures. 
(Youngers 2000)
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sector was growing rapidly, as well as the number of working children "^*. The lack of 
opportunity in sustainable income generation and formal employment was 
compounded by a lack of investment in human development. In real terms, reductions 
on spending on health and education in Peru had been the most severe among the six 
biggest Latin American countries during the 1990s. The dependence of almost half of 
Peru’s population on food aid^  ^in a context where government led income generation 
and job creation were remote possibilities left large sectors of the Pemvian population 
chronically poor. This was compounded, as will be briefly described below, by the 
difficulties of political representation and participation.
Challenges Facing Working Women in Lima
In urban areas throughout Peru, 52.2% of women aie active in the laboui* market but 
occupy a disadvantaged and marginalised position. Work traditionally cairied out by 
women is undervalued, in both economic terms and with regard to social prestige. 
Where women work alongside men, promotion and caieer development is made 
difficult by discrimination. As described above, the labour market is de-regulated, 
liighly competitive, precarious, fickle, gender discriminatory and characterised by 
short term contracts (Valladolid 1999: 8). Women tend to work in jobs which have 
few entry requirements and, for the most part, receive little remuneration or 
opportunity for increasing earning capacity, no social security, sick pay, maternal 
leave or pension and that demand either very long or extremely short working days. 
This is reflected in recent figures on sub-employment^^. Women over the age of 45 
are much more vulnerable to losing stable employment as they are displaced by men 
or younger women. Women in both the formal and informal sectors also earn 
significantly less than men^ .^ The segregation of employment and remuneration is
The number of children working more than 15 hours per week has grown by 64% over the last 
decade (Valladolid 1999: 41)35 In 2000,42,5 % of the Peruvian population.
1996 1997
Male Female Male Female
Employed 68.5 43.5 71.8 47.9
Sub-employed 37.3 30.3 35.5 49.9
Unemployed 6.4 7.9 6.9 8.9
(Valladolid 2000: 12)
In Meti'opolitan Lima, in 1993, female mdependent workers made on average only 38.2% of male 
independent workers. (Censo Nacional 1993. Valladolid 1999:16)
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horizontal as well as vertical; women tend to be limited to auxiliary and non-technical 
employment. Women tend not to have access to training before, or after commencing, 
employment in managerial or technical specialities and even aimed with appropriate 
qualifications, their prospects may be fuifher jeopardised by discrimination.
The Demise of the Unions and the Emergence o f New Associative Networks
The economic crisis and concomitant changes in laboui" legislation forced popular 
sectors to find new and innovative institutions. The failuie of existing institutions, 
trade unions and the state to respond to the needs of the popular sectors was evident 
(Cameron and Mauceri 1998: 6). The efficacy of trade unions in representing 
worker’s concerns has been in slow decline since the 1980s^*. The legitimacy and 
political strength of the union movement in Peru, after economic recession, massive 
layoffs, the dismantling of laboui* rights, the giovrth in the number of small businesses 
and the explosive increase of the informal sector had been severely weakened. In the 
context of the severe recession of the 1980s, the existing legislation on job secuiity, 
wages and working conditions became increasingly difficult to achieve in practice, 
hence making union demands meaningless in real terms. This lead to a generalised 
loss of faith in union leadership and a recourse to support for liberalising legislation 
by many in the workforce. (Cameron and Mauceri 1998: 3). In addition, repeated 
experiences of the futility of confrontational strategies between 1980 and 1992 in 
achieving any improvement in conditions alienated the union leadership from many 
workers (Bm*gos 1994: 141). Many workers adopted a more pragmatic approach, 
seeking to try to save their jobs rather than increase their wages. This was at odds 
with the more radical perspective of union leadership (Valdivia: pers.comm).
Within the neo-liberal framework described above, the govei*mnent dismantled 
regulatory and interventionist legislation and sought to reduce the possibilities for the 
collective negotiation of working conditions. Liberalising tendencies in the labour 
mai'ket had already begun to unroll under the governments of Belaunde and Garcia,
In Lima, in 1991,47% of salaried workers were represented by a b ade union; in 1996 this had fallen 
to only 12.7% (CEPAL/ APRODEH 1998: 37) In 1970, 80% of salaried employees were part of a 
union. Balbi 1997: 140). The Bill of Collective Rights 1992 gives a great deal of latitude to the private 
sector whilst resfricting the right to form unions by giving the government control over the Register of 
Unions and the authority to dissolve unions. Complaints have been made to the ILO as it is argued that 
this bill conflicts with previously ratified agreements.
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however, under Fujimori, greater leeway was given to employers with regard to hiring 
temporary workers, dismissing staff and dealing with staff discipline at the expense of 
job security^^.
As a direct consequence of the government’s import-substitution development model, 
the composition of the work force altered radically. The decrease in the number of 
wage-workers in productive industry caused a dispersion of foimer union members 
into a multitude of economic activities in the informal sector, hence making collective 
action difficult.
Unions failed to incoiporate the perspectives of the dramatically increasing numbers 
of temporaiy workers'***. Public support for the rationalisation of the public sector, 
which was considered to be inefficient and corrupt, isolated the efforts of the union 
CITE'** to appeal against layoffs and wage reductions. The increased number of 
temporary workers, who were forced to compete on an individual basis for contracts 
abandoned collective negotiation. Unions failed to adapt to incoiporate the concerns 
of temporary workers into their agenda.
Most of the legislation affecting working conditions was passed by decree through the executive 
branch rather than through parliament. For example. Supreme Decree 077 in 1991 gave new rules 
allowing the hiring and firing of temporary workers according to the needs of the market, without 
films’ decisions requiring justification from the Ministry of Labour. This was followed by a further 119 
decrees in the same yeai* which consolidated the discretionary power of employers. This 
encouragement of flexibilisation, whilst increasing efficiency, exacerbated the precariousness of 
employees’ positions. The 1993 Constitution further undermined workers’ possibilities for appeal for 
job security.
In Lima for example, in 1998, it was estimated that 45% of wage workers in the private sector are 
cmrently temporary workers and are not part of unions (Balbi 1998: 137). The growth of numbers of 
small businesses was also significant as workers in fiims with less than 20 employees are not permitted 
to form part of unions. Younger workers were also much less lilcely to be represented by a union. 
Younger generations are much less likely to be represented by a union - “67% of unionised workers are 
35 years of age or older, 27% aie between 25 and 34, while only 6% are younger than 24.” 70% of 
workers in companies with less than 20 employees are under 37 years of age. 75 % of this group are 
not members of unions. (Balbi 1997: 136).
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Community Kitchens as Social Movement: Going Beyond Immediate Needs
It was deal* to the women of the Community kitchens that the unions had failed to 
represent the interests and perspectives of workers as they adapted to the changing 
economic circumstances.
Whilst neo-liberal restructuring divided the interests of the popular sectors and 
resulted in them becoming more heterogeneous, individualised, wealcer 
organisationally, and politically fragmented, over the course of the 1990s in 
pai'ticular, there was a dramatic emergence of new associative networks, new types of 
social organisations and forms of grassroots democracy. The way in which women’s 
groups have organised themselves firstly to address immediate needs and then to 
initiate strategic campaigns for political and societal change is a prime example of 
this, as Degregori explains:
‘Pero ahora los hijos y  las nietos de esos migrantes han desarollado otro tipo 
de movimientos. A pesar de la crisis ya no piden reinvindicaciones sociales o 
de servicios, como tierras, agua, luz, desague o amuento de sueldos, sino 
reclaman ciudadania, respeto al voto, moral . . En estas dos decadas tambien 
aparecio el movimiento de las mujeres, que empezo con los comedores 
populares, y  ahora continua con una agrupacion de clase media como 
'mujerespor la democracia' (Degregori 2000:45).
The majority of the inhabitants of the pueblos jovenes, or shanty town areas of Lima 
are first, second or third generation immigrants from rural areas who continue to 
experience relative marginalisation from the social, cultural and economic life of 
metropolitan Lima"^ .^ Over the last four decades, unmet demands for low cost housing 
led ruial migrants and mban slum dwellers to organise massive land invasions in the 
city’s outskirts where they built precarious dwellings and stinggled to obtain basic
Central Intersectorial de Trabajadores Estatales
30% of Peru’s population live in Lima. Lima’s growth has been spectacular: a city of 500,000 in 
1940, Lima today has 6.4 million inhabitants. (Burt 1998: 289). A decline in opportunities in the 
countiyside both in terms of basic services and life chances and perceived growing opportunities in the 
city aie the main reasons behind urban migration. Political violence was also an important factor in 
rural migrations in the 1980s and early 1990s
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services"^ .^ Govemment policy towards these pueblos jovenes has been laissez faire 
with no real effort to remove land invaders and, likewise, little effort to improve 
living conditions. These areas lack basic infrastructure; water, electricity, sewage, 
public transport, health and education facilities. Limited educational opportunities and 
the lack of opportunity in the formal sector present unfavourable conditions for people 
to compete for salaried employment (Salcedo 1995: 32). The majority work in the 
informal sector. The arms of grass roots organisations in these ar eas has evolved over 
time and has increasingly moved from a discourse of claims for better conditions to 
one demanding full citizenship, political participation and authentic inclusion in 
decision malting.
From the end of the 1970s, in Lima, women had been organising themselves, on a self 
help basis, in community kitchens to address the difficulties families face in meeting 
their most needs and to demand basic services from the government. The role women 
played in the urban migrations and the land occupations of the outlying ar eas of Lima 
in the 1950s constitute the antecedents of this organisational experience. Various 
authors have ar gued that the principles of reciprocity, egalitarianism and communal 
work that ar e characteristic of the kitchens are best understood as having their origin 
in the moral economy of the women’s indigenous background (Schweppe 1993, Lora 
1996). Growing deprivation after the economic shock of 1990, caused the numbers of 
Community Idtchens to multiply' '^ .^ This was accompanied by recognition of the 
importance of forming str ong organisational links and coherent campaigns.
The community kitchens represented by FECCPAALC are known as comedores 
populares autogestionarios'^^. The average number of members in each kitchen is 20.
It has been calculated that if a group of low income families petitioned the state to cede them a 
vacant lot on which they might build, they would have to work their way for six years and eleven 
months through ministi'ies and municipal offices and spend approximately $2,156 (56 times the 
minimum monthly wage at the time) per person, (Mario Vargas Llosa 1995: 288)





(Valladolid 1999) ^Figures represent all Community kitchens; FECCPAALC represents 
approximately 1800.
Other kitchens, such as those under the administiation of the '‘Clubes de Madrés’ receive direct 
subsidies from the government. Vaso de Leche is also government funded.
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FECCPAALC constitutes the apex of an organisational pyramid through which 
approximately 1800 conmiunity kitchens and businesses aie linlced. The community 
Idtchens are organised firstly into 57 zonal centrales, followed by district centrales at 
the level of the 4 cones of Lima and Callao and finally represented by the Federation. 
The Federation was foimed in 1992 and has had 3 Presidents democratically elected 
over tliis time. An important step foiward for the women of the community kitchens 
was achieving of the passing of Law 25307 which allows the members of kitchens to 
form legally recognised organisations and putatively guarantees a government food 
conti'ibution'^ .^ Through the Federation, a co-ordinating body at a national level for 
Community kitchens has been set up.
The first priority of the kitchens is the prepamtion of food of sufficient nutiitional 
qu a l i ty o n  a daily basis for families in each neighbourhood. In addition, kitchens 
often provide for the most vulnerable members of the neighbourhood who are unable 
to pay, often in collaboration with local parish churches. Whilst they receive 
deliveries of food aid from government programmes'^^. However, as the Federation 
has been carefully monitoring the quantities of food it does receive in the community 
kitchens, it has been established that the govemment only provides 17% of what it is 
committed to. (Relinda Sosa, pers.comm). The kitchens aie not otherwise subsidised 
and maintain a strong principle of autonomy from the State. This is of utmost 
importance with regard to the integrity of their political campaigns and negotiations 
with municipalities. It was common knowledge that the govemment used food aid 
selectively as a way to win votes'* .^
The passing of Law 25307 was possible through a concerted effort, initiated by FECCPAALC and 
supported by NGOs and various parliamentarians. The law ostensibly guarantees the basic nutritional 
requirement for all Pemvians. Thiough this law, the government, tlnough establishing the Programa de 
Apoyo a la labor alimentaria de las organizaciones sociales de base, committed itself to providing 
65% of the food that the community kitchens were providing in their neighbourhoods with the other 
35% being paid for by the revenue of the portions sold. An important additional part of this law was 
that the community kitchens were to be recognised legally as grassroots organisations and that local 
governments should support them in their efforts to generate income. However, so far, die regulation of 
this law has never been achieved and the government’s financial commitment is not included in the 
national budget.
Achieving set standards in the nutritional value of each portion is an important aim of each 
community kitchen. The Federation provides education on how this can be best achieved. However, as 
the kitchens receive food aid directly rather than economic subsidies, the nutritional value of portions is 
often less than it should be. The quality of food deliveries is monitored by FECCPAALC,
The distribution of food from the government is administered through the Programa Nacional de 
Apoyo Alimentario (PRONAA).
a^l PRONAA se le ha asignado el rol de atender las demandas alimentarias de la poblacion mas 
pobre. Pero este ultimo . .  .es realizado de modo sesgado: el apoyo se canaliza hacia organizaciones
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Since their inception, there has been a progressive incorporation of educational and 
capacity building elements into the work of the Idtchens, with materials focused on 
the financial, administrative, health and nutritional practicalities of running a kitchen 
and increasingly on leadership, negotiation, citizenship and rights. These materials 
have been foimalised into a number of courses for community Idtchen members 
which are lun in co-operation with other agencies through the Escuela de Dirigentas 
‘Amanda Suarez Barrueta\
The federation’s unofficial motto ‘Protesta con Propuesta’ (‘Protest with Proposal’ 
[sometimes explained as ‘protest by proposal’]) captures the dual approach of 
maintaining a critical distance from the State whilst actively seeking practical and 
strategic solutions to the causes and effects of urban poverty. Beyond addressing 
immediate needs, the federation has initiated a number of strategies to enhance 
women’s access to their economic rights and their participation in decision making, 
such as mass mobilisations, specific political proposals, social vigilance, lobbying and 
collaboration with wider networks such as Consorcio Mujer^^ The members of the 
Federation have a clear* agenda of contributing to démocratisation and social equity 
through positive engagement witli municipalities and campaigning. Through the 
organisational experience gained through the Federation, a significant number of 
women have gone on to participate in local, municipal and Parliamentary elections, in 
immediate response to the recently promulgated ^Ley de Cuotas’ (1998) which 
guar antees that 25% of participants in electoral lists must be women^\
Developing a Strategy to Enhance Women’s  Access to their Economic and Social 
Rights
The government food aid programme, whilst being of value in terms of immediate 
nutritional needs was neither sustainable nor* creative in stimulating income
favorables al regimen. Es decir, a la mama de los ‘politicos tradicionales ’ qtw tanta gusta criticar el 
Présidente Alberto Fujimori’ ÇQmgos 1994; 41).
This is made up of CENDOC MUJER, CESIP, FLORA TRISTAN, MANUELA RAMOS and 
associated institutions -  AMAUTA -  Cuzco, CEPCO — Tarapoto and IDEAS Piura.
Unfortunately, the experiences of some women participating in elections has been that they have 
been invited onto pai*ty’s lists without any serious intent on the part of the parties to have them elected. 
Women’s organisations are campaigning to have the quota lifted to 50%.
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generation^^. Taking the initiative, many of the community Idtchens have developed 
commercial interests. Of those that have succeeded in maintaining a slim profit 
margin, the majority operate at a micro-level whilst a number, through developing 
technical capacities and increasing the quality of products, have competed 
successfully to win contracts with State bodies such as FONCODES (clothing) or 
PRONAA (bread production for schools). These commercial interests are grounded in 
a commitment to the movement for social justice and a proportion of any profits made 
from the ventures that emerged from the kitchens are re-invested for further 
development.
The potential benefits, in terms of income generation, of training in specific technical 
professions for individual women, are being discovered through FECCPAALC’s 
collaboration with AAV and Womankind Worldwide. This collaboration, in addition 
to the expansion of technical training for work, builds upon the well established 
practice among cornmimity kitchens of encouraging personal and organisational 
empowerment with a view to enhancing women’s access to their rights. Experience 
has shown that efforts are unlikely to succeed imless they are based upon an 
integrated strategy which involves forming supportive community based networks 
and engaging creatively with local govemment^^.
The shared vision of FECCPAALC, Asociacion Aurora Vivar^^ and Womankind 
emphasised the integrated development of women but gave particular importance on 
the centrality of economic concerns in women’s lives. The accumulated experience of 
these organisations in the promotion of women’s economic rights attested to the 
entr enched natur e of the problems faced by women and that a multi-faceted, multi­
level and multi-disciplinary approach was necessary. This programme drew not only
Neither in the community kitchens themselves, or for local producers.
The coherence of the practice, strategy and vision of these women’s organisations in enhancing 
access to economic rights and political participation is not matched by government practice. Pern’s 
ratification of relevant UN treaties has not been reflected by authentic changes in policy or practice 
with regard to women’s economic and participatoiy rights. A number of interviewees explained that the 
Peravian govemment has a ‘double discourse’ whereby commitments made at Beijing, for example, are 
followed up by specific but isolated target programmes (such as guaranteeing that women will be 
assisted at childbirth), whilst failing to undertake more comprehensive investments in social 
development and authentic participation. Relinda Sosa, pers.comm, Betsey Valdivia, pers. comm.)
AAV have their institutional roots in the union movement and worked primarily with and on behalf 
of wage working women. However, AAV adapted the focus of their work to accompany and assist the
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on knowledge gained but also on resources of human and community based social 
capital, which have been forged through previous collaborations.
In sum, then this rights based stiategy was designed to empower women in terms of 
self esteem, knowledge of their rights and how to access them, how to build 
organisational strength and, on this basis make political gains that would benefit them 
and their communities. Training was accompanied by mounting a challenge to 
prevailing restrictive or discriminatory societal attitudes thiough supporting the 
creation and diffusion of positive experiences. The progiamme also sought to impart 
these inclusive and enabling attitudes to decision makers in local government. For this 
reason, a pedagogic approach extending beyond the range of immediate beneficiaiies 
was fundamental to the project design. Thiough demonstrating the potential benefits 
of the government investing in education and training, access to financial services, 
social services, and developing conducive economic and fiscal policies, the project 
sought to establish more lasting oppoitunities for women.
In order to foment a wider and more lasting impact of this promotion of women’s 
economic rights and oppoitunities, those involved worked collaboratively to develop 
a strategic ‘women’s economic agenda’ that would be made up of policy and 
legislative recommendations and demands. This agenda diew upon the experiences of 
women engaged in economic activities as well as decision malcers and was to be 
agreed through a thorough process of consultation. When 1 finished my reseaich the 
following topics had been identified for the ‘Women’s Economic Agenda’ thiough 
the ongoing collaborations:
‘Peimanent consultancy and capacity building that will allow gradual 
commercialisation of micro-enterprises. That labour rights are respected. That 
it is ensured that resources reach the most excluded parts of society. Definition 
of policies and programmes for those running small companies with attention 
to their needs, size and experience. That access to training, marketing 
infoimation, benefits of formalising business and financial packages is 
provided. That these policies and proposals are included in the agendas of
huge numbers of women who lost regular employment by initiating ti aining for work in alternative and 
non traditional professions.
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local govemment, public bodies, NGOs, financial institutions and national and 
international networks’.
The diffusion and dissemination of these perspectives with other actors in civil society 
was to be established through mutually supportive community networks. Working 
groups gathering actors from NGOs, community groups, govemment, businesses and 
workers to share perspectives and together develop detailed, integrated and coherent 
strategies were being set up.
A rights based agenda as conceived by the representatives I interviewed then, has 
breadth in seeking to enhance the access of all taiget and identity based gioups to 
their rights, and depth in seeking to promote these rights at a local level and through 
changes to legislation and institutional arrangements at national and intemational 
levels. In the ensuing final section, I will now discuss the principal featui'es of the 
rights agenda that is being taken up by NGOs in terms of the content of UN treaties 
and Declarations.
*TIie Right to Development^
The effort to address growing extreme poverty, social marginalisation and excessive 
differentiation in the distribution of resources (nationally and globally) has gradually 
become more central to tlie UN agenda. ‘The Right to Development’, adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1986, was declared to be
‘An inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in wliich all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be realised’.
The Declaration is intended as a synthesis of previous treaties and declarations^^. The 
declaration identifies ’the person as the central subject of development and therefore
The Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) had been preceded by several years of 
consultation and argumentation from both governmental and NGO sources. The Declaration is intended
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an active participant and beneficiary of the right to development’ (Symonides 1999: 
5).
as a synthesis of UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW and CRC, but as discussed above, has a number 
of important new emphases. The Core Conceptions of the Declaration are as follows: 
a The right of peoples to self determination, meaning the right to determine freely their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development;
D Their right to full and complete sovereignty over all their wealth and natural resources;
a Elimination of massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of peoples and individuals;
° All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent, and equal attention
should be paid to the promotion of all rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultuial. 
Promotion of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other 
human rights and fundamental freedoms;
° International peace and security are essential elements for the realisation of the right to
development;
° The human person is the central subject of development process and development policy should
therefore make the human person the main participant and beneficiary of development;
° Equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of nations and of individuals who
make up nations and, hence, resources released through disarmament should be devoted to the 
economic and social development and well being of all peoples and, in particular, those of the 
developing countries;
Perhaps most radically, efforts at the international level to promote and protect human rights and 
fimdamental freedoms should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international economic 
order, (see also Baxi 1999: 99). The Declaration has been given a central place on the agendas of 
further United Nations world Conferences; World Conference on Education for All (1990), World 
Summit for Children (1990), UN Conference on Envfronment and Development (1992), Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), Intemational Conference on Population and 
Development (1994), Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), Vienna Conference Declaration for 
Social Development (1995).
Consideration of the profound implications for social policy of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development (1986) has been placed on the agendas of subsequent treaties. The Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio (1992) included a cross-sectoral reflection on the situation of 
vulnerable groups and the urgent necessity of satisfying basic needs. ‘Agenda 21’ explicitly linked 
economic and social development with environmental protection as mutually reinforcing and 
interdependent. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) emphasised that democracy, 
development and respect for human rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The Vienna 
Conference further declared that states and should co-operate so as to eliminate obstacles to 
development through adopting equitable and sustainable policies at a national level and through 
establishing an intemational economic environment that is more conducive to the economic stability 
and growth of the poorer nations. Discussion took place in this forum on the universal nature of human 
rights and various nations proposed a more relativist model of rights. The Vienna Declaration however 
confhmed the universality of rights and reaffirmed that states are duty bound, regardless of religious, 
political, economic and cultmal factors, to protect and promote all human rights. The World Summit 
for Social Development in Copenhagen (1995), in its programme of action, called upon governments 
and other agencies to tackle all obstacles to people’s access to all human rights, ‘including those 
relating to education, food, shelter, employment, health and information, particularly in order to assist 
people living in poverty’. The Right to Development was also affirmed by the Platform for Action of 
the World Conference on Women. The right to participate in public decision making, a core theme of 
the Right to Development was fiuther affirmed in 1997, at the Universal Declaration on Democracy 
(Cafro), where participatory democracy was identified as a basic right of citizenship. The General 
Assembly called upon all member states to move away from theoretical and or political debate about 
the implications of the Declaration to undertake practical measmes to bring about its implementation. 
The adoption of the Declaration on the Right to Development began a process whereby governments, 
UN agencies and NGOs have sought to find concrete expression of the Declaration in policies and 
programmes. Through this process, greater clarity is being gained in defining and approaching the 
major obstacles to people’s access to their social and economic rights.
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Echoing the concerns of the NGOs outlined above, the chai'acteristics of the 
Declaration on Right to Development that I will focus on aie:
° an unequivocal emphasis on the centrality o f the person to development;
° for the first time in UN history, confirmation of the indivisibility o f human rights',
° a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the nature o f obstacles to 
rights and
° a radical expansion of the concept of ‘duty bearers \
Person Centred Development
Identifying the human person as the centre of developmental endeavour, as both end 
and means, implicitly transcends state and community sovereignty and has important 
implications in oui* understanding of both rights and responsibilities. In the 
Declaiation on the Right to Development, ‘for the first time in recent history we move 
fiom conceptions of rights as resouices for individuals against state power to the 
conception of human rights as species rights as well’ (Symonides 1999: 100). The 
definition of duty bearers is thus extended, in principle at least, beyond state parties to 
all human beings and organisations. The Declaration solicits the participation of 
individuals, private interests, and NGOs in equitable and sustainable development, 
moving away from a govermnental and admhiistrative approach.
The Person in Context
The Copenhagen Declaration recognises ‘the family’ as the basic unit of society and 
acloiowledges the importance of different kinds of human association in social 
development and states that ‘as such (the family) should be strengthened, with 
attention to the rights, capabilities and responsibilities of its members’. 
Anthiopologists will be reassured to see that the document recognises tliat ‘in 
different cultural, political and social systems, various forms of family exist’ (Section 
B sub-paragraph [h]). A person centred approach therefore begins policy making at 
the level of the particular* values, rights, needs and perspectives of individuals, 
families, and communities situated in then* specific contexts, hi this declaration, 
governments are not defined as the only, or best, judges of what constitutes well being 
and the common good. What is called for* is the involvement of civil society
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organisations representing the poor, disadvantaged and marginalised sectors of society 
in public decision making and an authentic devolution of power and authority in 
public institutions.
However, the insistence upon the rights of the individual ai e important here as it has 
to be recognised that the ‘family’ or ‘tradition’ whilst often being foundational for 
fulfilment and well being, through care, nmturing and cai*e, can also be a context of 
abuse and the restriction of flourishing. For this reason, the rights of the individual are 
presented as superseding the rights of a group, family, or tiadition over an individual. 
The danger here is that if this is over-emphasised the idea the health and well being of 
the individual and the health and continuation of community go hand in hand may be 
obliviated.
Poverty and the Indivisibility of Human Rights
The Vienna Declaration states that ‘extieme poverty and social exclusion constitute a 
violation of human dignity’ (Paragraph 2). From the perspective of human rights, 
poverty is perceived as a comprehensive denial of opportunities to achieve well being, 
liberty and basic d i g n i t y ‘extreme poverty is multidimensional, not only limited to 
income, but also affecting livelihood, health, education and housing as well as social, 
cultuial and political participation.’^^  In addition, poverty is often accompanied by 
discrimination and exacerbates the difficulties experienced by the more vulnerable 
members of society. In short, the experiences of the extremely poor constitute a set of 
proofs for the necessity of understanding human rights as indivisible'.
‘The violation of the right to a reasonable standaid of living entails the 
violation of all the other human rights, since their observance is quite simply 
made materially and stiucturally impossible’ (Pettiti and Meyers-Bisch 1999: 
159)
The idea, however, that dignity is impossible for those living in conditions of ‘poveity’ is obviously 
highly questionable.
ATD Fomth World 1999: Redefining Human Rights Based Development: The Wresinski Approach 
to Partnership with the Poorest: 3
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Whilst Economic, Social and Cultuial (ESC) rights are often approached by States in 
terms of large scale measuies, the effects of being denied these rights impact upon 
each individual conscience and dignity as acutely as being denied Civil and Political 
(CP) rights. Hemmed in by the conditions of extreme poverty, individuals are 
thwarted in achieving goals and responsibilities such as caring for one’s family, 
having one’s values respected, fulfilling one’s potential through education and 
cultural participation and having an influence on political decisions that will affect 
one’s life.
Development policies which identify sectors of the population in terms of welfare, or 
basic needs requirements therefore do not fulfil the profile of a person centred 
approach, primarily because this amounts to a discrimination between, or hierarchy 
of, human rights categories. In the experience of the poor, to be the recipient of food 
aid, or to basic housing stock whilst denied the right to participate in decision making, 
or to adequate education, is to be considered as a second class citizen.
The Failings of Political, Social and Cultural Contexts vis-à-vis Human Rights
Recognising the indivisibility of human rights and understanding poverty in terms of 
mutually reinforcing deprivations, insecurities and vulnerabilities, rather than in terms 
of quantitative tliresholds, means sliifting the analysis of causes to focus on ways in 
which the dynamics of particular* political and social systems systematically deny the 
rights of particular groups.
Public institutions may be impeded in efforts to address poverty comprehensively 
because ‘the failure to recognise the idea of indivisibility is reflected in administrative 
divisions’ (Pettiti and Meyers-Bisch 1999: 160). Whilst the circles of deprivation and 
insecmity are experienced together by those in poverty, different elements (such as 
health or discrimination) are separated out and dealt with in a piecemeal and 
inconsistent fashion by different bureaucratic divisions. This is compounded by a lack 
of cross over between different areas of Icnowledge and between different disciplines.
These insights requhe that indicators of developmental progress do not merely 
measme the minimum requirements for survival, but rather take a far more
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comprehensive and qualitative perspective that assesses whether the conditions of 
human dignity aie being met. This approach demands that both rights and 
participatory responsibilities are included in policy making.
Cultural Rights and Empowerment
Without cultural rights, especially those to maintain and express one’s identity (either 
cultural or individual), access to other rights is problematised. Through not being 
recognised as potential initiators and participants in decision making, marginalised 
peoples ai e rendered bereft of rights and become recipients of services conceptualised 
around basic needs. Womankind Worldwide, for example, in a project focused on 
indigenous women’s rights in Peru, state that women have reportedly benefited 
greatly fiom undertaking a study which traced the impact of ‘Arab gender values’ on 
medieval Spanish culture which, in turn, has influenced the relations between 
indigenous men and women over the last five centuries. This history was contrasted 
with the cosmologies and mythologies of indigenous people which revealed the 
existence of far more egalitaiian relations between men and women. Recapturing this 
history was salutary for these women in re-evaluating and challenging the gender 
relations that exist today (fiom my research in Cuzco 2001).
Removing Obstacles to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Aiticle 6 (3) of the Declaiation on the Right to Development exhorts States to 
eliminate all obstacles to the observation of both Civil and Political and Economic, 
Social and Cultuial rights^ .^ The implications of this ailicle are fai* reaching: if the 
State itself constitutes an obstacle to people’s access to their rights, it follows that it 
should be reformed, if not transformed. Governments that do not respond, within their 
means, to tlie perspectives of their citizens, or do not respect their participatory rights, 
can according to the declaration, be considered obstmctive to people’s rights. Article 
8 of the same declaiation asserts that governments must be responsive to the 
requirements and preferences of the governed.
This article was based on the reasoning that States have so far failed to meet the obligations of the 
Intemational Covenants.
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Paiticipatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) have developed to obtain a better 
understanding of the obstacles that poor and mai ginalised people face in realising well 
being (see Maxwell 1999). It has become increasingly cleai* that ‘poor’ people, in 
addition to the difficulties they face accessing services and meeting basic needs, ai*e 
concerned with governance issues, the lack of accessibility to and, transparency and 
accountability of, public institutions as well as tlieir sense of powerlessness in public 
decision making. The creation of spaces for dialogue between civil society, 
government and private interests, equitable sharing of infoimation and the 
establishment of üanspaiency and accountability in public and private institutions are 
essential components of this vision of multidimensional processes of determination in 
development programming.
A more contentious implication of Article 6 is that it does not limit itself to 
institutional obstacles. Equally, it presents a challenge to those elements within 
society or culture more generally, which violate or obstruct human rights. A profound 
implication of this article is that it invites, and legitimises, a close scmtiny of the 
social, cultural, political and religious forces and values which undeipin and animate 
particular national and cultmal contexts, according to human rights criteria. The 
removal of obstacles to the UN’s progiessive view of development, then, involves not 
just midertaking refoims to social and economic policy but involves challenging 
particular* world views, social hierarchies and prejudices if they stand in the way of 
people’s access to their rights.
This interventionist perspective is based upon the observation that the distribution of 
political power in public and private institutions reflects the vei*y power differentials 
that exist in wider society^ .^ Norms, in any given setting, are immanent in social 
relations, or as Wilson puts it, ‘internal to their very expression . . .  a particular form 
of power and governance interior to the social body and ar e embedded in matr ices of 
value distinctions (1997: 14). Civil Society, as noted above, is as susceptible to these
Patronage and cUentelism may prevent disadvantaged groups from gaining access to decision 
making, judiciaries may not be independent and are influenced by social and political forces, party 
systems lack strength and coherence and presidential style, cenfralised decision maldng prevents 
locally elected bodies fi'om investing resources at a local level.
328
power dynamics as State structures and may be actively dominated by State powers.^^ 
CSOs often find themselves in the difficult position of balancing their goals of 
protesting against social inequalities caused by State decision maldng, and the goal of 
influencing State strategies through working with govemment bodies. Whilst 
autonomy and the maintenance of a critical distance fiom the State is essential for the 
integrity of CSOs, their goals may well be to integrate their activities with State 
bodies, or to encourage State agencies to undertake responsibility for delivering 
services they have been carrying until that point.
Participation
Popular* participation in public decision maldng is regarded by NGOs as the most 
direct and effective strategy to oblige gover-nments to fulfil their obligations. The 
dynamics of collaboration with gover*nment can assume different forms and vary in 
extent. Leaving aside non-collaborative or intransitive participation, where people are 
caught up in, and do not contest circmnstances that are not of their own maldng, 
participation can be reactive (monitoring and responding to government policy 
making and delivery of services) or proactive (popular initiation^\ ai*ticulation and 
implementation of development programmes).
Exclusionaiy styles of development, in which economic growth has been 
accompanied by huge increases in the numbers of people living in poverty, is in 
opposition to a rights based and integrative model for development as depicted above. 
‘New’ social movements have responded to the perceived inadequacies of current 
economic and political models. In the wake of economic restructuiing and the 
dramatic increase in poverty levels throughout the 90s in Latin America for example, 
new modes of popular organisation and social activism have emerged. The so called
‘Underlying the ideologies of national unity there is a hegemonic imperative which di ives the state 
and the self-proclaimed dominant social groups to seek to contiol and shape civil society . . Most 
regimes severely restrict access (to the political system) by preventing the autonomous and pluralistic 
organisation of subordinated social groups. Instead, rulers either attempt to integrate the various social 
forces into single movements, or set up intermediary and indirect means of control. Their objective is 
to enlist the dominated social groups within the existing space of domination, and to teach them to be 
subject to the State’ (Bayart 1986: 113, in Gledhill 1994: 103-4)
An example of the latter is the creativity of civil society groups working towards collaboration with 
the Peruvian govemment at municipal level, their approach encapsulated by the slogan ‘Protest by 
Proposal’. (REFERENCES FROM PERU)
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‘New Social Movements’ have pushed for an ‘expansion of the démocratisation 
agenda, towards issues of social welfaie and a variety of concerns that had 
traditionally remained marginal, such as identity, the environment, and ageing, among 
others’ (Escobar and Alvaiez 1992:5). The last decade in particular has seen a 
proliferation of civil society organisations including women’s movements, labour 
support organisations (in both the formal and informal economy), peasant 
associations, neighbouihood movements, indigenous rights organisations, civil rights 
mobilisations, Christian base community organisations, organisations organised 
ar ound issues such as external debt, among many others (Escobar and Alvarez 1992)
Responding to the complexity of social inequality, these movements often articulate 
specific claims on the basis of identity (cultural, gender, age, ethnicity, and locality) 
as well as socio-economic position. In addition to their focus on identity, these 
movements are distinguished from their predecessors by many analysts by 
characteristics such as decentralised organisational structures, the use of 
unconventional tactics, their use of human rights legislation and international links. 
The formation of civil society organisations and wider social movements are based on 
the promotion of cultural values or the normative model of society that they hold dear, 
the defence of particular groups of people from exploitation and oppression and/or 
competition for resources and/or decision making power (Escobar and Alvarez 
1992).
Rights to freedom of speech, of association, and of legitimate governance are essential 
here but may not be sufficient as the articulation of the needs and perspectives of 
powerless and/or marginalised groups may never reach public forums, not because of 
illegal suppression but through more subtle forms of discrimmation (see Bayart 1986). 
Authentically participative decision making is often thwarted when transparency is 
denied and where dominant elites at different levels enforce their will often whilst 
playing lip service to democratic and/or devolved/decentralised decision making. 
DFID Document Human Rights for Poor People (Feb. 2000), paragraph 3.15 
observes: ‘The evidence suggests that decentralisation may increase the participation
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of marginalised peoples, but only if it talces place within the context of a political 
framework which promotes the equal rights of all people
Poverty, social exclusion, and marginalisation persist in nations where democratic 
processes operate relatively equitably. It is clear that democratic participation alone is 
insufficient for the most disadvantaged to gain access to their rights. To complement 
participation, obligation and political pressure is also a requirement of a rights based 
approach. This entails poor and marginalised people’s involvement in public decision 
maldng and being enabled to hold public and private agencies accountable for policies 
that affect or involve them.
Popular Representation, Justiciability and Obligation,
The discussion above shows the significance of the indivisibility of all rights in any 
attempt to address extreme poverty. For example, a pre-requisite for the right to 
paiticipate in public decision making is freedom of speech and expression. The 
importance of having access to all human rights can be seen in the example of the 
manipulation of food aid by Pemvian authorities to gain votes -  here the right to food 
is played off against the right to vote fr eely (fr om my research in Lima),
Whilst the integrated perspective described above has made a rights based approach 
fat* more relevant to the work of development agencies, there are still no ‘positive 
rights’ for those with low entitlement status. Indeed it is argued that the relevant 
aificles of the UDHR and UN Covenants remain seriously inadequate as a fr amework 
for addressing poverty eradication. Among the various Charters, only that dr awn up 
by Organisation of African Unity explicitly exhorts solidai'ity (Chapter II, on duties). 
The issue of the effective implementation of the component rights of the Right to
As I obsei-ved in Chapter 2, in Bolivia, the Popular Participation Law, promulgated in 1994 gave 
constitutional recognition to the traditional decision making structures of indigenous peoples and 
putatively guaranteed the involvement of these groups in decision making at mrmicipal level with 
regard to the allocation of govemment resomces. However, recent research (Kidd and MacLullich 
2000) has shown that significant barriers continue to prevent indigenous communities enhancing then 
control over local govemment resources. These obstacles relate to the lack of recognition given to 
indigenous organisations at municipal level, their lack of negotiating (financial) power, the necessity of 
gaining access to decision making through political parties which, controlled by local elites, often co­
opt indigenous candidates and promise co-operation with indigenous people at election time but do not 
follow up. Indigenous people often feel forced to vote for the parties who are controlled by local elites 
because these same groups are their* employers.
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Development is a complex with regard to both the justiciability of these rights and the
definition of duty bearers. j
The fact that a lar ge number of recognised human rights have yet to reach a sufficient 
stage of concrete, contextualised elaboration to be justiciable in legal terms^  ^requires 
that other forms of obligation are used, such as standard setting, charters and 
demanding transparency and accountability. Reaching agreed targets with regard to 
economic rights is primarily dependent on resource availability, possibilities for 
income generation, establishing entitlement rights and the efficacy and equity of 
redistributive policies. Hence, an essential component of a rights based agenda is one 
which sets out to empower poor and disadvantaged people to participate in the 
decision maldng processes which affect their lives and to be able to hold public and 
private service providers and employers accountable for then policies and 
performance. One of the most serious difficulties faced by extremely poor people is 
achieving proper representation; as Pettiti and Meyer Bisch state:
‘They are socially nothing and that, when all is said and done, might well be
the socio-political definition of poverty’ (1999: 252).
The Communitarian Agenda in Rights; Swimming against the Current
In summary, the rights agenda, in the context of modern liberal institutional 
arrangements, offers useful, but limited, possibilities for the protection of the well 
being for dispossessed, marginalised and impoverished individuals and groups. In the 
contemporary global political and economic setting, rights constitute a ubiquitous set 
of claims that can be used to elicit basic guarantees and protection from governments.
Rights can be used to pin down what has to be put in place or removed in order to 
create the conditions within which people can function and thrive. The chief difficulty 
is that the commimitarian effort to harness rights instmments will always be thwarted 
by the instrumental, individualistic and market mentality that bedevils modem 
liberalism and which sets the shape of political commitments.
All Nation States are obliged to uphold, protect and engender respect for civil and political rights as 
well as to ensure the minimum livelihood of all citizens. Economic, cultural and social rights are to be 
realised progressively.
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Essentially, rights can be regarded as a framework within which finer considerations 
of human flouiishing can be worked out. The rhetoric of rights language places an 
emphasis on personal autonomy and freedom of choice; ‘there is a big difference 
between pushing people into functioning in ways you consider to be valuable and 
leaving the choice up to them’ (Nussbaum 2000: 101). In my discussion, I have 
sought to emphasise the efforts that have been made within the rights agenda to 
underline the importance of creating the material, social and political circumstances 
which make freedom of choice real and actual, rather than the identification of rights 
with possessive individualism. Lukes asks some incisive questions about the 
assumptions that underlie individualistic ideas of autonomy:
‘Are lives not rendered less autonomous by unintended actions, by social 
relationships and by impersonal and anonymous processes that may radically 
restrict people’s alternatives of thought and action . . . and also the lack of 
resources? Why should we conceive of their ‘essential interests’ as what 
narrowly conceived rights protect and narrowly conceived opportunities 
promote? Why should they not include basic needs, or the conditions of 
normal functioning and their access to wider opportunities and a fuller life, 
and why should these not have a more urgent claim on society’s resources to 
the extent to which they remain unmet?’ (1997: 69).
I have quoted tliis passage in full because it sets out very lucidly the urgency that 
underlies the anti-liberal individualist interpretation of a rights agenda. For some 
theorists, the rights agenda will always reflect the power differentials that pervade 
society, thereby rendering the social, economic and cultur al rights sites of hegemonic 
struggle where ‘Western ruling classes’ will tend to emerge the victors. The 
recognition of Western society as being not a balanced plur al arrangement of different 
conceptions of the good but rather involving ‘structures of power which seek to 
impose comprehensive doctrines on members of society’ (Gledhill 1994: 89) demands 
attention to the ways in which rights discour se is contested and shaped by dominant 
individuatmg agendas.
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The fact that the idiom of rights simplifies reality is simultaneously problematic and 
useful as Wilson explains; ‘rights accounts impose meaning and coherence upon 
chaotic and indeteiminate events in order to create discrete units of information which 
are capable of being distributed and consumed globally’ (1997: 21). The defence of 
‘collective’ rights appeals to traditional anthropological sensibilities. Achieving 
conditions that allow the well being of individuals, insofar as this depends to a 
significant extent on the individual’s social context, may mean looking at the 
positionalities of social groups as units. The assertion of collective rights m a given 
society (such as women’s economic rights, or indigenous land rights) are clearly 
fundamental to the well being of mdividuals within these categories. Also, given that 
there are different conceptions of the ‘good life’, the inculcation of the pre-eminence 
of individual rights and personal choice may be out of synch with models of well 




‘What matters at this stage is the construction o f local forms o f community 
within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can he sustained 
through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And i f  the tradition o f 
the virtues was able to survive the horrors o f the last dark ages, we are not 
entirely without grounds for hope. This time however, the barbarians are not 
waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for some 
time. And it is our lack o f consciousness o f this that constitutes part o f our 
predicament. We are waiting not for Godot, but for another, doubtless very 
different, St. Benedict’ (Alasdair MacIntyre 1997: 263).
Social Anthropologists, as individuals who have their own thoughts about the good, 
about human values, moral aspiration, well being, the choices that people are able to 
make, and who have working definitions of such ideas as care, justice, neglect and 
responsibility, when involved in development, can not help but find that their personal 
ethical self understanding, as well as their views of the evaluative concepts that 
characterise different asymmetrically positioned cultmal realities, become radically 
interrogated, if not seisrnically shaken. In this context, it would seem vital to 
deliberate ‘about which theories we really want to hold onto, which intuitions are 
really the most deeply rooted in om* moral sensibility’ (Nussbaum 2000: 300). The 
practices and policies of development are simultaneously the product of a sum of 
people’s moral intuitions, choices and ethical theories as well as being hugely 
consequential - from global economic structmes to the social life of the most ‘remote’ 
communities.
Anthropologists are more awar e than most that the question of the morality of 
development is complicated by the fact that the ‘tar gets’ of development interventions 
consider the impacts and opportunities from evaluative standpoints that are 
qualitatively different from the modern presuppositions that miderlie development. A 
further, indeed, probably the most cracial, complication is that in MacIntyre’s words, 
‘the language -  and therefore also to some large degree the practice - of morality
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today is in a state of gr ave disorder. That disorder arises from the prevailing cultural 
power of an idiom in which ill-assorted conceptual fragments from various parts of 
our past are deployed together in private and public debates which are notable chiefly 
for the unsettleable character of the controversies thus carried on and the apparent 
arbitr ariness of each of the contending parties’ (1997: 257). In this fragmentation, as I 
have argued, certain agendas, which are often implicit, have more persuasive force 
than others. In this respect, I have pursued the contention that the instrumentalism and 
individualism of modernity that finds its most thoroughgoing expression in neo-liberal 
economic development paradigms is a dynamic that it would be salutary for 
anthr opologists to resist in their pur suit of an ethical approach to development. Given 
that I have sought to emphasise the Aristotelian connection between well being and 
belonging to a moral community, the following argument by Hornborg captur es one 
of my principle concerns:
Tn realising his own projects of self-definition, the modem individual was 
required to redefine his relationship to places and to people. These could no 
longer constitute his points of reference as particular s, only as categories . . . 
modernity implied a movement from concrete to abstract reference points for 
identity construction . . .  Specific places and people had to be detachable from, 
rather than constitutive of, the conception of the person’ (1994: 237).
The passage from the ‘pre-modern’ to modernity, then, can be understood in terms of 
a movement (or forced extrication) away from the individual’s involvement in a 
specific forms of sociality to enter, instead, into ‘a series of mobile, changing, 
revocable associations, often designed for highly specific ends. We end up relating to 
each other through a series of partial roles’ (Taylor 2000: 502). On tliis view, the non­
modem socially embedded person, entering into Westem modes of political discour se 
has to make sense of a cultural shift to the Westem stress on competitive self-reliance, 
the pursuit of subjective happiness, coercion and emotive argumentation that 
underlies the cover of rights based ethics. This can be felt existentially as a move fr om 
‘Cosmos’ to ‘Chaos’.
The very discomfort that social anthropologists feel in relation to modernity is 
therefore, a reflection of a wider phenomena. As I indicated in tlie introductory
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chapter, anthropologists often occupy standpoints of moral resistance to the 
modernising project of development. I believe that is principally because of the 
anthropological insistence that the deliberations of development can never be 
undertaken in ‘analytic neuti'al’ and it is the duplicitous use of ‘universals’ in 
modernity that masks the imposition of a Westem mode of being upon other cultural 
realities. Many anthropologists, in fact, conclude, like Gledliill, that the Western 
imaginary has always been based on the arrogant assumption that ‘all humankind 
could benefit in the long term from allowing the West to exercise domination’ (1994; 
227). Anthropologists are often well placed to surwey and feel the dubious nature of 
what has been delivered by the West and to consider the starkness of the failure of the 
West to meet its promises.
A key question that has regularly surfaced in my discussion has been that of how to 
best conceptualise the characteristic and particular moralities and bodies of 
loiowledge of the modem West, that is, those wliich distinguish the West fr om non­
modem cultural settings. Taylor is also concerned with this question in his discussion 
on ‘cultural and acultural theories of modernity’. On the ‘cultural^’ theory of 
modernity, the coming into being of modernity is understood ‘in terms of the rise of a 
new culture’ (in Houston 1998: 234), given vision and power through the west’s 
social imaginary of ‘the good’. As Houston argues, on this view, ‘the notion of 
progress is problematised’ (1998: 234, my emphasis). Alternatively, acultural theories 
of the tr ansformations that lie behind the rise of modernity point to ‘cultme-neutral 
operations’, often associated with the Enlightenment, such as ‘the growth of reason . .
. issuing in a set of changes that any and every culture can go through as its members 
begin, or are forced to see, that previously held beliefs are ennneous or even self 
deluding’ (Houston 1998: 234). On this view, which envisages the formation of a 
cultural state in wliich previously held beliefs and values are discarded or made 
obsolete through the introduction and extrapolation of ‘superior’ reasoning, ‘the 
notion of cultural equality is problematised’ (Houston 1998: 234).
 ^ In Taylor’s writings, ‘any particular culture is taken to encompass an ensemble of practices and ideas 
regarding personhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, goods and bad, virtues and vices etc.' 
(Taylor 1995: 24) and is unified to the extent that it is viewed as a single constellation among others, as 
a member of the plurality of human cultures.’ (Houston 1998:234)
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The teleology of an acultural theory of modernity that places the technological 
advances of the west at, or near, the causal centre visualises the inexorable 
incorporation of non-Westem societies into the West and its ways. Taylor is opposed 
to the modern vogue of ethical thinldng, which tends to tiy to derive all our 
obligations from some single principle (such as utilitarianism or Westem technology). 
On this basis, we can see the ethnocentric implications of acultur al theories. In their 
emphasis on one line of enquiry (rationality, the rise of the market economy), 
acultural theories do not have the scope to conceptualise the real differences in the 
moral economies of different peoples in different places and times. As Houston states, 
‘in ignoring the cultural transformation (i.e. the change in implicit self understanding 
etc.) that informs modernity, acultural theory takes for granted that all cultures have to 
experience the same social changes as the west’ (1998: 238). A cultural theory of 
modernity, instead, opens up consideration of the relative moralities and visions of the 
good that stmctur e social and economic change.
As I have argued, the ‘visions of the good’ that characterise the modem West are 
thoroughly fragmented. Due to the interminable nature of moral reasoning in the 
West, dominant economic, instrumental and individuating agendas continue unabated, 
relatively unchecked by the force of shared values that emphasise the pre-eminence of 
social relationships rather than material things. Recent critiques of development, 
reflecting these, and other, concems, have been subsumed by a larger critique of 
modernity. Homborg, for instance, argues that the dominant dynamic of the West’s 
relationship to ‘the Rest’ has been a ‘strategy of conceptual encompassment which 
defined modernity as simultaneously a cognitive and a socio-political phenomenon’ 
which has implications in domains that are superficially distinct, such as ‘identity 
construction, loiowledge constmction, economic exploitation and ecological 
destruction’ (1994: 232). Perhaps most cmcially, for the ethics of applied 
anthropology, Hornborg’s contention is that the asymmetric agentive
conceptualisation and reordering of ‘the Rest’ (i.e. the non-modern) involves the often 
destructive ‘disembedding’ of individuals from particular* life-worlds and forms of 
community wherein well being is achieved.
So, the moral predicament of the applied anthropologist in development is such that 
he or she, if interested in formulating an ethical approach, needs to consider the moral
338
conflicts that inhere in modernity and which are evident in the West’s idioms of 
relating to the ‘other’. As I will discuss below, the areas that appear* to be present the 
greatest challenge, within Westei*n moral and political discourse, for the formulation 
of an ethics for applied anthr opology, are the Western dichotomies between the public 
and the private, between society and the individual, the over bearing rationalist mode, 
the individuating agenda of liberalism, the market mentality and the paternalism and 
peremptory and coercive language that characterises Western approaches towards the 
‘other’. One of my main arguments has been that it is from a communitarian 
perspective, often embodied in highly particular and nuanced forms in indigenous 
life-worlds, or in the aspirations and social practices of new associative networks or 
social movements, that we can best understand the mistalces which lie at the heart of 
modernity.
On the basis of these observations, it is clear that moral reaction to, and reflection on, 
the development phenomena, as a modernising project, is complex, manifold and 
wide ranging. In this thesis I have explored, in broad terms, the moral predicament, 
and more directly, the ethical dilemmas of social anthropologists vis-à-vis the 
phenomena of development. My agenda in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 was to set out the 
terrain for this discussion. Beginning with an account of the deliberations surrounding 
the British government’s consideration of their support of the indigenous peoples of 
lowland Bolivia through the eyes of an incipient, and admittedly narve, 
anthropologist/consultant, I sought to umavel the ethical tensions of development 
practice which generate its inherent conflicts. On this basis, I sought to assemble a 
fairly abstract portrait of the anthropologist/consultant, with the particular* moral 
choices he or she is confronted with. I approached this second aspect in two main 
ways.
Firstly, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I looked at the theoretical resources that social 
anthropologists have devised, guided by different kinds of moral discer*nment and 
wider theoretical movements, in relation to grasping and evaluating planned social 
and economic change. My chief concern was to trace the anthropological endeavour 
to properly, that is, relevantly and critically, describe social change; apprehending the 
workings and impacts of economic, political power in development. Following this I 
proposed that anthropology’s privileged focus or the ‘anthropological concrete’ (at
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least in relation to development) should be apprehending the ways in which socially 
embedded individuals achieve well being together in ways that may be partially 
incommensur able from the dominant categories that organise development.
Secondly, in Chapters, 8, 9, 10 and 11, I considered the ethical frameworks that 
stmcture development practice from the point of view of the fragmentary modern 
moral outlook. My contention throughout was that applied anthropologists cannot 
avoid apprehending the ethics of involvement in development other than as being 
inextricably related to one’s own individual personal ethics. Similarly, extrapolating 
from individual moral experience, the anthropologist can not avoid tackling the 
question of the moral force that is exerted by the discipline of social anthr opology in 
terms of its pronouncements and relationship to governance and political values. A 
core contention I made was that it is vital to recognise that social anthropologists are 
implicated in the conflicts that inhere to the modem liberal identity and that social 
anthropology as a discipline is positioned in an uneasy relationship with the modem 
moral westem outlook.
I will briefly outline my main conclusions fr om each of these sections.
The Moral and Ethical Dilemmas o f Applied Anthropologists in Development
Anthropologists in development find themselves posited as a locus of reflection 
between asymmetrically positioned life worlds, simultaneously representing local 
people and the ‘development community’, articulating needs, values and resolutions. 
Extrapolating from my experience as a anthropologist/consultant in Bolivia, I argued 
that the dynamic of radical asymmetry between the development enterprise and the 
life-worlds of those considered to be targets of development underpinned practically 
all of the moral difficulties that aiose. This asymmetry was manifested in various 
ways such as the uni-directional analytical and intrusive auditor’s gaze of 
development researchers as well as issues sunounding financial asymmetry and 
power of decision making disparities. I noted that the opaque and peremptoiy 
language of economic development routinely results in inappropriate development 
interventions.
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The anthi'opologist/consultant can not but engage with the regularities of the 
development discoui'se, wi estling with modes of representation and terms of reference 
that aie defined a priori. Because of this, an unavoidable difficulty is devising a 
language that is adequate to the task of reflecting the aspirations and perspectives of 
those the anthropologist seeks to represent whilst remaining within the scope of 
development discourse. Being aware that, beyond the limited range of concepts that 
aie negotiated in the development discomse, there exist richer and more nuanced 
understandings of well being, the anthropologist is faced with the difficult task of 
reducing ethnographically gleaned insights into development language without 
haemoixhaging the integrity of meanings of those on whose behalf he or she purports 
to be wilting. What is especially challenging in teims of applied anthropology as a 
kind of writing, then, is that the insights of the ethnographer have to be balanced with 
a demonstration of the skills and forthrightness that allow observations to be 
syntliesised into conclusive statements that can be acted upon. Because of this, 
discernment is required with regard to the presuppositions and dichotomous 
evaluations of modernisation that continue to colour the very terms that developers 
use. This was explored further in Chapter 5 which looked at correspondences between 
development and the colonial gaze.
‘Slow Steps Towards a Relevant Anthropology: Theoretical Resources for Applied 
Anthropology*
As noted above, my concern here was to tiace the growing relevance and explanatory 
coherence of social anthiopological approaches to development. In particulai* I sought 
to identify the ways in which anthropologists developed approaches which combined 
explanations of the dynamics of Western driven planned social and economic change 
whilst also resisting models that attributed a naixow version of personhood to 
individuals (as in versions of modernisation and dependency theory). My view is that 
the discipline of social anthropology, in its enduring opposition to obtuse universalism 
continues to undergo a moral passage involving a perpetual reshaping of theory, 
shedding aspects of pre-emptive sociological scientism so as to be faithful to the 
evaluative meanings that inhere in specific contexts. Nevertheless, as noted in the 
previous section, particularly in applied anthropology, anthiopologists can never hilly
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let go of the fi ameworks that inform policy and planning as he or she must wiite and 
spealc in this idiom so as to be intelligible within the development discourse.
I pm-sued these arguments by considering the historical unfolding of the 
anthropological conceptual and evaluative apprehension of planned social and 
economic change. On this basis, I also considered the natme of the critiques and 
contributions that social anthropology has generated. I noted the conespondences that 
exist between development and the colonial gaze and traced the principle ideas that 
became prominent as development was inaugmated as a morally ‘justified’ global 
project. The idiom of development involves a claim that the ‘first world’ has now 
relinquished the exploitative dynamics of colonialism in relation to the ‘third world’, 
and now extends fiaternal help in an ethos of global co-operation in the effort to 
eradicate poverty (see also Larrain 1989 6-7). However, this idiom of assistance belies 
the power asymmetries that are infused through development encounters at every 
level. Hobart (1993: 2) suggests that ‘because the prevailing rhetoric is of alti-uistic 
concern for the less fortunate, it is useful to remember that development is big 
business’. Because of this, a troubling issue for anthropologists is that tire language of, 
and knowledge interests which inform, development, whilst cast in terms of support 
and assistance, have arguably inherited the same underlying dynamics that fuelled the 
colonial enterprise. These questions relate to the initial perspective, the means 
underlalcen and the end that is aimed towards. Hobart (1993) signals the ‘agentive’ 
aspect of development representations of the other, that is, the linldng of particularly 
defined states of being, such as ‘poor’, ‘backward’ or ‘small farmer’, to ameliorating 
activities, whether it be management, law, investment, land reform or whatever. The 
nature of the relationship between the ‘developers’ and the ‘developed’ can therefore 
be gauged by the idiom of expression used. As Escobar argues; ‘Labels and 
institutional practices are issues of power; they ar e invented by institutions as part of 
an apparently rational process that is fundamentally political in nature’ (1991: 667). I 
argued that a cr-ucial aspect of applied anthropology precisely involves the 
simultaneous subverting of the dichotomous evaluations that development’s language 
of relating inherited from colonialism and the support of those aspects of development 
discourse which emphasise personal agency, local lorowledge and shared values and 
the empowerment of disempowered and downtrodden social groups.
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In my discussions on power and knowledge in development, the importance of 
apprehending local knowledges and the contribution of post-modernism to 
development critiques, a key argument that I made was that whilst it is crucial for 
social anthropology to show the ways in which Western development discourse and 
practice often involve a Tack of fit’ with local realities and aspirations, the task of 
applied anthropology has to do more than deconstruct and stress the diversity of 
perspectives.
An important paradox of the colonial era was that functionalism, whilst being a 
relativistic paradigm that emphasised the importance of societal coherence, being 
bereft of a critical perspective on the dynamics of political and economic power 
served as a peculiarly appropriate and compliant theory vis-à-vis colorrialism. I asked 
the question whether a similar dynamic can be discerned with regard to the 
relationship between post-modern approaches and the realities of neo-liberalism. It 
seems to me that whilst post-modernist approaches, which stress ‘polyphony’ and the 
contingency and false authority of grand narratives, offer a great deal to the critique of 
development, this emphasis on the dijferend can divert attention away from the shared 
values (globally and locally) that are necessary for both coherent political critiques 
and the achievement of well being in particular- social settings.
More precisely, my point is that post-modernism’s recognition of power differentials 
in representation is not equivalent to political action and self-conscious partiality, that 
is, deliberately and constr-uctively taking sides in a given debate. Gledhill makes the 
accusation that the apparent politicisation of the discipline through post-modernist 
approaches has not resulted in many clear- statements about social injustice. He asserts 
that in the curxent climate, ‘it is not merely difficult to achieve a consensus on 
principles, but not even clear that the practice of the profession at large is changing in 
any profound way as a result of talking about problems’ (1994: 210). On this basis, I 
have agreed with Nussbaum, who, as a proponent of cross-cultural values, asserts that 
wliilst ‘sensitive thinkers’ have become ‘sceptical about all forms of universalism . .  . 
universal values may be necessary for an adequate critique of colonialism itself 
(2000: 31), although, as will be discussed in the subsequent section, great care needs 
to be taken with the whole idea of universals.
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My contention thi'oughout this section was that it is essential for social 
anthropologists to continue to undertake a critical and reflexive approach to 
ubiquitous Western social, cultural economic encroachment and encompassment. 
Herzfeld also makes a case for looking at the suffermg that results from the 
imposition of Western society;
‘For it is here that “society” - anthropology’s favoured object -  has failed its 
members, by almost any standard one could invoke. And it is here that the 
categorical brand of reflexive thinking may offer glimpses, if not of solutions, 
at least of understanding the sour ce of that suffering’ (2001: 239).
Nevertheless, as Gardner and Lewis argue, ‘to criticise the inability of ‘development’ 
to deliver is relatively e^y; understanding and supporting the alternatives are more 
difficult’ (1996: 155). With this in mind, it is important for an ethically relevant 
applied anthropology to engage with the values and aspirations that are embodied in 
political struggle and the emergence of new kinds of social movements, for instance. 
In short, one of the key assertions that I sought to make was that social anthropology’s 
expertise in deciphering and translating indigenous and local perspectives, as well as 
the discipline’s mcorporation of the critical perspectives of post-modernist discourse 
need to be combined with a relevant engagement with the social forces that 
chaiacterise economic development. Anthropology’s insistent defence of the value of 
indigenous and local perspectives combined with post-modern critiques of Western 
dominant discourses is essential to ‘disrupt the existing establishment of narratives 
and frameworks of social thought’ (Marcus 1999: 11). The applied anthropological 
task, however, by necessity, goes beyond dismantling and deconstruction to 
constructively engage with development planning by grounding and systematising 
‘critical initiatives into more sociological empirical terms’ {loc. cit).
Anthropological Engagement with the Ethics of Development Theory and 
Practice
In addition to this analysis of the theoretical resources relevant to applied 
anthropology, a second related aspect of my investigation was to unearth the moral 
and ethical resources in the West that aie brought into play when considering the
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ethics of development. Again, my intention here, whilst maintaining a critical 
perspective, was to identify those aspects of the Western moral tmdition that provide a 
basis upon which anthropologists, in their pursuit of an ethical approach to their 
applied work, can meaningfully engage with. Within the Western tradition, despite the 
preponderance of liberal individualist and capitalist forces, there are ethical resources 
that social anthropologists, as well as indigenous and disempowered peoples, can 
diaw upon and contest in the construction and defence of different traditions of well 
being and which can fonn a basis for ‘pro-poor’ political advocacy.
In Chapter 8, I set out some of the characteristics of the contemporary development 
context, which I chaiacterised under the heading ‘globalised polarised disassembly’. 
On the basis of an overview of the stark realities of global poverty, I introduced some 
featuies of the dominant neo-liberal agenda in economic development and, as an 
aspect of the more open politicisation of development discomse, I noted that NGOs 
aie taking up increasingly eclectic strategies in their efforts to mitigate the social and 
economic inequality, individuation, insecurity and fragmentation which they consider 
to be concomitant with neo-liberal policies. As a prelude to Chapter 11, I observed 
that the human rights framework has become central to development deliberation.
My main interest, though, in Chapter 8 was to examine the reasoning behind the 
Western (lack of) response to global poverty, in the face of unprecedented global 
wealth and technical capabilities. I discussed tlie reasons why the utilitarian 
philosopher Singer’s challenge - that if we can prevent poverty without sacrificing 
something of compaiable moral importance, then we should be morally bound to do 
so - has little evocative force in the West. I then explored the moral equivocations 
(that can, in many cases, I aigue, be considered to be moral abdications) that underlie 
tlie intransigence and duplicity of the West’s discourse on ‘third world poverty’. 
Noting the dissonance that exists between our moral intuitions with regard to the 
suffering caused by poverty and the rationalisations that underlie Western 
recalcitiance to go beyond self-congratulatory charity, I argued that Western ethical 
models aie often counter intuitive. Ethical frameworks can be considered hegemonic 
if we understand them as being profoundly shaped by the instiumental concerns that 
are pre-eminent in Western thought. Here I introduced the aigument that the West’s 
skewed emphasis on ‘libeity’ as something opposed to certain basic responsibilities or
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aspects of human mutuality and acknowledged dependence at a social, as well as 
transnational level is profoundly problematic in the consideration of development 
ethics. Given that ethical models provide a basis upon which to interpret and act, my 
argument here was that a central aspect of the ethics of applied anthropology is to 
interrogate and contest the moral and political philosophical explanatory models that 
underlie Western development policy and practice.
Presenting an introduction to this endeavoui* was the task of Chapter 9. Here I 
examined the emerging field of ‘development ethics’ which is laigely articulated in 
ternis of the maxims that are fimdamental to Western moral and political traditions. 
My intention in this chapter, building on observations made in my discussion on the 
theoretical resources for applied anthropology, was that development ethics cannot be 
properly conceived without an active engagement with, and espousal of, certain 
universal moral commitments and a simultaneous focus on the embedded, contingent 
and contextual nature of the social construction of well being. I also developed my 
claim that the Western emphasis on personal liberty and the pursuit of subjective 
happiness is duplicitous in the sense that these liberties of choice and self-fulfilment 
ar e rendered inaccessible in the absence of the very social and material preconditions 
that neo-liberal policies actively remove for large sectors of the population of 
developing countries.
Building upon an account of the compromises and possibilities of modem liberalism 
which constitutes the primary conceptual context for Western development ethics, I 
presented a number of critiques of ‘commodity based’, ‘utilitarian’ and ‘Kantian’ 
approaches to development policy and practice. Within the modem liberal fr amework, 
I aclmowledged that the Kantian imperatives of ‘non-coercion’, ‘basic needs’ and 
‘ non-paternalism’ contain useful resoirrces for development ethics and that certain 
aspects of utilitarian social engineering can result in socially beneficial practices. 
However, I also sought to explicate the failings of these models from an 
anthropological perspective. In general terms, I observed that Western development 
discourse, which often involves an erroneous pretension to being based on universally 
valid principles, is routinely at odds with non-modem perspectives and sources of 
value. This is the basis of the moral dissonance that is ubiquitous in development 
practice. My principle critique of these ethical frameworks, then, centred firstly on
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their different normative and conceptual insensitivities and blindnesses to particular 
social contexts and secondly, their various abstractions and fetisliisations of certain 
ti-uncated understandings of the means to well being (such as commodities, rights, 
rationality, or liberty), rather than looking at the myriad ways in which well being is 
actually acliieved or thwarted in different contexts.
The Socially Embedded Individual; The ‘Applied Anthropological Concrete*
My view has been that the Western radical distancing of the idea of ‘society’ away 
from the abstmcted and disengaged ‘Individual’ diverts emphasis from considering 
the ways in which the social and the individual aie constitutive of each other in 
culturally specific ways. It also clouds consideration of the ways in which sociality is 
deeply valued and the ineradicable sense of belonging and purpose that underpins 
people’s active participation in their cultuml settings. On this basis, it seems important 
that applied anthiopologists, in the face of Western development discourse, stress that 
the creation of cultures or shared moral spaces is intrinsic to being human, that is, a 
universal social strategy that can nevertheless only be apprehended in measured 
relativistic terms.
I acknowledged that critiques of exclusionary and severely hierarchical versions of 
collectivism are often valid in the sense that certain forms of sociality constrain the 
well being of individuals and groups within a community. Neveifheless, one of the 
key interests that I pursued over Chapters 9 and 10 was that this should not dissuade 
applied anthropologists from maintaining their enduring and profound respect for the 
ways in which people apprehend and experience their own societies as relatively 
coherent, although dynamic, wholes. Indeed I have argued that there is a 
contemporary urgency to resist the Western tendency to perfunctorily dismantle 
specific cultural realities so as to privilege the disengaged individual as the sole focus 
of ethical interest. As human flourishing is utterly inextricable from the myriad ways 
in which sociality is constructed, the achievement of well being can not be understood 
in terms abstracted from the apprehension of the socially embodied knowledges of 
individuals embedded particular cultural inter-subjectivities.
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Let me recapitulate. My arguments in Chapter 10 centred on the contention that the 
Western moral tradition’s tendency to perfunctorily privilege the individual over the 
community results in narrow understandings of the ways in which well being is 
achieved. A glaring difficulty with Western liberal individualism is the char acteristic 
resistance to accepting that a necessary counterpart to personal liberty and the pursuit 
of subjective happiness is what MacIntyre calls the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence (1999: 120). I also argued that the emphasis on coercion, that is intrinsic 
to rights based ethics, rather than highlighting the virtues that make social life 
possible and more than merely tolerable, such as trust or generosity, is often out of 
step with people’s moral aspirations and understandings of a good life. Standai’d 
Western ethical systems are often too nanow to allow an appreciation of embedded 
viitues, the richness of personal relationships and the nuances of sociality for 
achieving well being.
A crucial moral imperative for social anthropology, then, is to continue explaining 
how indigenous world views, rather then being moribund survivals, are primary and 
constitutive of life-worlds fiom whose vantage point Western perspectives and 
practices are often devastatingly disruptive and profoundly /mmoral. An ethic for 
applied anthropology has to adequately grasp and explain the qualitative rational, 
intuitive and affective moral distinctions that are essential to the construction of the 
social and individual well being of particulai’ groups and moral traditions. Building on 
these critiques, I argued that the virtue ethics tradition offers a great deal in the 
anthropological endeavoui' to apprehend cultuially specific ways of achieving well 
being.
In short, virtue ethics begins with a consideration of the natuie of a ‘good human life’ 
or vision of society and extrapolates from this to look at what ‘it is good to be’ that is, 
an interest in which kinds of human conduct, for example one’s attitude towaids 
others, facilitates or disrupts the mutual effort of people to achieve their shared vision 
of the good. This is quite different in emphasis, and has different implications from, a 
primary concern with the consequences of actions (utilitaiianism) or the perfunctory 
fulfilment of one’s duty (Kant). Aristotle, from whom viitue ethics aie largely derived 
in the Western moral tiadition, understood tlie human telos in terms of a particular 
definition of human natuie. MacIntyre’s idea of the shared telos, that individuals
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achieve through the practice of virtues, emphasises the importance of cultuially 
specific visions of the good life. Virtues differ firom society to society as they are 
inextiicable fi*om, and only fully intelligible within, the shared visions of particulai* 
kinds of society. I argued that this perspective in the first place, by virtue of the 
emphasis on particular visions of the good that inhere in shared moral spaces, does 
not pre-empt what the moral aspirations of a given society are, nor what they ought to 
be, by Western standards. Secondly, the virtue ethics perspective, in any setting, 
requires an apprehension of what a shai ed vision of the good means, which, can only 
be salutary, at least as an antidote to the inscrutable sovereignty of the disengaged 
Western individual.
The above seems to be a thoroughly relativistic argument. However, with regard to 
the idea of moral absolutes, I have drawn again from Taylor in his insistence that 
whilst there are cultural differences in conceptualising moral values and different 
stories invented to explain, and affirm, certain instincts (such as the reluctance to 
inflict death on one’s own), certain moral intuitions are in fact, universal^. We feel an 
innate sense of responsibility to help malnourished children, for instance, we intuit a 
sense of responsibility to them. Taylor wants to establish that, beneath the various 
ontological arguments that exist about morality, which often veer away from what 
really matters to us, are deep moral instincts that are in touch with our human nature 
and spiritual predicament.
‘We should treat and deepest moral instincts, our ineradicable sense that 
human life is to be respected, as oui* mode of access to the world in which 
ontological claims aie discernible and can be rationally argued about and 
sifted’ (2000: 8).
On this realist view, our most profound moral sensibilities precede rationalistic proofs 
and arguments. This idea for Taylor is central to his aigument (and to this thesis) that 
the ethical and political models that have been created around us and which we are 
born into in the West, because they have been profoundly shaped, one might say 
contorted, by exclusive insti*umental concerns, aie often counter-intuitive to our moral
 ^This idea has was also asserted by Hume; ‘No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in 
itself and in its consequences, than the propensity we have to sympathise with otiiers’ (1978: 316),
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sense. If one accepts this argument, (and I believe that intuitively, many people do) it 
becomes clear that the Western dislocation of its moral frameworks from deeper 
human intuitions should be a matter of self-effacement, especially in relation to an 
enterprise so hugely consequential as development.
The anthropological consensus that I have been aiming for, then, is that there are 
moral absolutes but these can not be considered in isolation from the recognition that 
social knowledge can only be the work of an embodied agent interacting with others, 
that is by apprehending the active embeddedness of the self in shared social and moral 
spaces. On this basis, given that social realities, whilst being the only settings in 
which well being can be achieved, equally, can also impede and prevent well being. 
For this reason, I have argued that the privileged focus, or object of allegiance for 
applied anthropology has to be considered in terms of the socially embedded, but not 
entirely determined, individual.
Whilst great care has to be talcen in making moral judgements about different cultural 
settings on the basis of the extent to which individuals within that context are deemed 
to be able to live in such a way that it is possible for their dignity to remain intact, I 
believe that this foundational allegiance to the individual person is essential for a 
valid approach to applied anthropology. What malces this problematic is tlie Western 
tendency to denigrate entire societies on the basis of particular civil and political 
‘human rights abuses’, whilst diverting attention from the West’s devastating neglect 
of economic and social and cultuial rights in their dealings with ‘third world 
countries’
On the basis of my critique of these Western ethical paradigms, I identified the 
‘capabilities approach’ as offering the greatest scope for an intermeshing of 
anthropological concerns with development ethics. This approach brings together 
aspects of the philosophical frameworks that I have discussed. There is an 
aclaiowledgement of the Kantian insistence on autonomy and basic needs as well as 
the utilitarian concern with welfare but these are considered in concert with a neo- 
Aristotelian interest in human flourishing, belonging in a moral community and 
culturally relativist perspectives. Stemming from the liberal egalitaiian tradition, the 
capabilities approach combines an allegiance to the fiouiishing of individuals with a
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recognition of the cultui’ally specific social goals that create the conditions for people 
to fimction in a ti'uly human manner.
In short, this approach involves looking at the achievement of certain universally 
defined human functions which aie considered to be indispensable in the creation of 
‘a good human life’, in ternis of what individuals are able to actually do, or become 
according to their own volition in paiticulai* contexts. The ‘central human functional 
capabilities’ include such things as ‘being free to imagine’; ‘not having one’s 
emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic 
events of abuse or neglect’; ‘to be able to use one’s senses’; ‘being able to form a 
conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s 
life’ (Nussbaum 2000: 77-80). From an anthropological perspective, the strength of 
the capabilities approach is that it provides scope for the explication of the 
achievement of well being in terms that do not necessarily involve the domineering 
and often negative Western interrogation of whether paificular societies have the 
prerequisites that are often fetishised in the West (such as commodities, technology or 
bureaucracy). An important insight within this approach is that capabilities (such as 
fulfilling one’s emotional life, or bodily health) can be brought within reach by very 
different kinds of commodities (for example, land for indigenous people so that they 
can continue their traditional livelihoods rather than food aid or increasing 
employment oppoilunities).
It has been my argument that this framework offers interesting possibilities for the 
engagement of anthropological perspectives which seek to bring together an 
appreciation of cultural specifics with wider political issues of social justice and 
poverty alleviation. An important aspect of the capabilities approach is the attempt to 
establish clear ‘universal standards’ that refer principally to ‘constitutional 
guarantees’. In this sense, human rights are considered as occupying an often 
necessary although subsidiary role, that is, as a potential means to the creation or 
protection of well being. In principle, then, this approach seeks to avoid the obtuse 
versions of universalism that I described above.
Obviously, in addition to a defence of otherness, there is a clear imperative for applied 
anthropology to engage with the political discourses that unfold in development
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practice. The well being of indigenous people as well as other disempowered groups 
depends to a very gr eat extent upon the politics of the nation state. For this reason, a 
necessary aspect the agenda of applied anthropology, involves addressing the local 
transmutations of Western human rights discourses. In terms of the contested 
pragmatics of development practice, applied anthropologists need to consider the 
meanings and uses of universals (such as rights) as they actually unfold in practice 
and how these discourses are interpreted and modified locally (see Wilson 1997). 
Universal frameworks, such as transnational rights discourses, are acted upon in 
practice through the institutions of development and need to be understood as social 
facts that are variously interpreted and shaped by the defensive and opportunistic 
responses of local people.
Whilst rights based ethics do not constitute an adequate framework for the 
apprehension of the complex ways in which sociality is achieved in different settings, 
rights can be usefully invoked as a means of the defence of both individuals, 
particular* social groups and, indeed whole societies. The rights fr amework constitutes 
an ubiquitous set of claims that can be used to elicit basic guar antees. In the thesis, I 
emphasised two broad aspects of the rights agenda in relation to applied 
anthropology.
Ffrstly, in relation to the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, I argued that anthropologists 
can usefully support the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Protecting indigenous 
rights is based upon harnessing the legal resources available to indigenous people to 
protect themselves from being reduced to the experience of proletarian exploitation 
(sweat shops, working on large scale farms with no labour rights). When indigenous 
peoples gain legal control over their* traditional terxitories and their political structur es 
are recognised legally, the value of indigenous life-worlds as a distinct and precious 
shared way of being is affir*med and protected. For this reason, an important and 
traditional contribution anthropologists can malce in development is the self aware 
defence of communities from overbearing individualising processes. Gledhill, in 
defence of communitarian autonomy, contends that;
‘The burden of state action on native communities has been to work for
individuation against collectivism and holism, which anthropologists have
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generally seen as a process which undermines cultural coherence. ‘Natives’ 
become welfare-dependents, alcoholic, persons in need of treatment or food- 
stamps. They also become people whose identities are shaped by the state 
agencies on which they come to depend’ (1997: 99).
Whilst this catastrophic view of the dissolution of cultures and the consequent moral 
dispossession of individuals is not always the case, the point is a very serious one. 
The effort to maintain communitarian ties is especially difficult in the context of neo­
liberal social change where labour markets are de-regulated, highly competitive and 
characterised by short term contracts. Anthiopologists should be alert to the fact that 
the minimalist neo-liberal state involves subordination through individualisation, and 
normalisation.
Secondly, on the basis of research with the ways in which UK based NGOs interpret 
and utilise the rights agenda, I emphasised the ‘ anti-liberal-individualist’ aspect of the 
rights framework which constitutes a set of ar guments and tools which can be used to 
mitigate the impacts of exclusionary neo-liberal models. I illustrated this argument 
with reference to a particular* project on Women’s Economic Rights’ in Pern, a 
country that throughout the 1990s experienced the devastating social effects of neo­
liberal economic ‘shocktherapy’.
It is a plausible argument that appealing to rights is insufficient to challenge the 
hegemonic order because the rights discourse is ultimately shaped by this same order. 
My view here is that this defeatist view does not take into consideration the very real 
gains that indigenous communities and social movements have made in their pursuit 
of the realisation of the rights that give pre-eminence to the value of social 
relationships and the protection of disempowered groups. I believe that the very 
purpose of applied anthropology would be rendered futile without a belief that the 
dominant discourse can be subverted, challenged and, in the case of indigenous 
societies that seek to remain their territorial and cultural integrity, opted out of.
In summary, in my review of the moral possibilities and impossibilities of the applied 
anthropologist in development, I have argued that a contemporary imperative for the 
discipline is to adopt a broadly communitarian contraposition to what I consider to be
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the dominant liberal individualist and instrumental agenda in development thinking 
and practice. I have argued that wliilst the concepts and values that emanate from 
social anthropology are multi-faceted and many stranded, I believe that the 
anthiopological standpoint is both distinctive and potentially counter hegemonic. I 
looked specifically at the anthropological disruption of the moral and ethical 
fiameworks that underlie development policy and practice. A core argument has been 
that Western moral reasoning, as a result of deep disagreements about the sources of 
value in human life and society, tends to rely upon proceduial, instrumental and 
coercive ethical frameworks and ways of relating to the ‘other’. On this basis, one of 
my assertions is that communitarian arguments, whilst also being needed as a healthy 
antidote to the excesses of liberal individualism, also constitute a reflection of the 
aspirations of people(s), many of whom are beleaguered by the alienation, atomism 
and instrumentalism of modern society, to realise their visions of the good life. I 
sought to stress that the anthropological imderstanding of morality, along with 
considerations of social justice and the universally conceived basic requirements of 
human dignity, should also involve an intense interest in, and defence of, the 
particular virtues and visions of the good that are lived out in particular social settings 
and which underlie the possibility of human flourishing. The communitarian 
perspective also underpins a political commitment to supporting those besieged 
indigenous cormnunities that struggle to defend their integrity. In the face of the 
fragmentary and individuating neo-liberal development policies, the communitarian 
response also involves emphasising economic, social and cultural rights (that are 
routinely sidelined) to protect indigenous societies and, also, to support the 
construction of new associative networks that represent the aspirations, and embody 
the values, of marginalised and disempowered social groups.
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